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Abstract

ABSTRACT
Recognizing Freedom: Manumission in the Roman Republic
by
Tristan K. Husby

Advisor: Liv Mariah Yarrow
Roman manumission was at the center of three different groups: the Roman state, Roman slaveowners, and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves. I draw upon G.F.W. Hegel, Orlando
Patterson, Judith Butler, and Pierre Bourdieu to describe Roman manumission as a ritualized
practice that transforms a slave’s life from unlivable to livable. The term “unlivable” comes from
the philosopher Judith Butler, who developed it in conversation with Hegel’s master/slave
dialectic and the term “social death,” which sociologist Orlando Patterson used to describe
slavery. Hegel and Patterson’s thoughts on the movement and experience of freedom are useful
for theorizing Roman slavery precisely because they constructed their universalized ideas out of
the particulars of Roman history, including slavery and manumission. This framework of
ritualized practice brings to the fore the Roman state’s stake in manumission. On the one hand,
the state taxed and regulated manumission, processes that depended on the “state’s sight”, a term
that I take from anthropologist James Scott but augment with Michel Foucault’s thoughts on the
intersection of sight and power. The connection between the state’s sight and the surveillance of
manumission appears both in the movements and words that made up the action of manumission
and in the stories concerning the origins of manumission that survive in Livy, Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, and Plutarch. Manumission also contributed to what it meant to be a slave-owner.
Roman slave-owners negotiated the expectations of other slave-owners as part of their
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competition with other slave-owners, including their own family members. Philip V and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus point to how Greeks commented on Roman manumission. Such
Greek thought influenced Roman conception and evaluation of manumission, which in turn
formed the social terrain upon which Roman slave-owners—both historical, such as Cicero, and
fictional, such as the characters in the works of Plautus and Terence—surveilled and competed
with each other. In order for manumission to have the power to free slaves, freeborn Romans,
ones who did not own slaves, had to recognize the freedom that manumission granted. They
recognized the freedom of manumission, but did so while distinguishing themselves from former
slaves. This distinction from former slaves was connected to slavery providing them with a
“psychological wage”, a term that I take from W.E.B. Du Bois. In their plays, Plautus and
Terence reproduce the distinction between former slaves and freeborn Romans through the level
of language and also the level of performance, most especially the masks that the actors wore
during the performance. Livy likewise reproduces this distinction in his description of the
manumission of volones and the freeing of captive freeborn Roman soldiers. In Rome, the state,
slave-owners, and those who were freeborn but who did own slaves benefited from making
slaves’ lives unlivable and, therefore, had an interest in guarding the boundaries of manumission.
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Introduction
LESB. quid hic est locutus tecum? PHIL. Quid censes? homost:
volt fieri liber, verum quod det non habet.
LESBONICUS: What was it that he spoke with you?
PHILTO: What do you think? He’s human: he wants to be free, but he has nothing which he
can give.
Plautus, Trinummus, 563-4, translation my own.

For Plautus’ Philto, it is obvious that the search for freedom motivates all slaves. Philto
clarifies that the slave in question, one Stasimus, has nothing to give his owner. That is, Philto
implies that if Stasimus had something to give to his owner Lesbonicus, then Stasimus would be
free. Because Romans slaves could pay their owners for manumission, Philto suggests that the
freedom that Stasimus wants is the freedom of manumission. Furthermore, Philto naturalizes this
urge for manumission: Stasimus does not want it because he is a particularly special slave, but
merely because he is human, “homost.” To be human is to want to be free, and to be a Roman
slave is to want to be manumitted, to become a citizen of the Roman Republic.
Manumission during the Republican Period deserves study distinct from the study of
manumission during the Imperial Period for the simple reason that, under the Republic, the
Romans hailed the citizenry as their sovereign power. While it is possible to overemphasize the
difference between lives of Republican Romans and the lives of Imperial Romans, I hold that the
political differences between the Republic and the Empire are great enough to justify an
investigation into the practice and conception of manumission during the Republican period
alone because an integral aspect of Roman manumission was that manumitted slaves were also
granted citizenship. Unlike during the Imperial Period, during the Republic, this citizenship
meant that manumitted slaves became part of the sovereign power of Rome. Furthermore, this
question of citizenship is not a topic ancillary to the ancient texts, but is rather a concern that
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Roman writers themselves addressed: Plautus has the pimp Dordalus describe manumission as an
opportunity to make the “great citizenry greater.”1 When paired with Philto’s comments, it is
possible to see Plautus as exploring how manumission united slaves, slave-owners, and the state.
Manumission therefore stands at the boundary between slavery and freedom, but also at
the boundary of who is, and who is not, a Roman. Manumission was part of the question of what
it meant to be human, to be free and to be Roman. Because the scope of these questions is large,
even to ask “what was Roman manumission and how did it work?” is to set down a path that
meanders through a variety of types of evidence and methods of analysis. First, the evidence and
its modern interpreters: While freedmen and freedwomen of the Empire left behind a plethora of
tombs describing their families, friends, feuds and occupations, there is no comparable
epigraphic record during the Republic. Instead, there are descriptions of manumission in the
literature of this time, such as the works of Plautus, Terence, and Cicero. Furthermore, later
writers, specifically those who lived during the Empire, such as Livy, Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and the jurist Gaius, also describe the practice of manumission in the
Republic. The diversity of this evidence matches the diversity of analyses of manumission.
Fields of study similar to fields known by the ancients, like literature, history, and law, offer
lenses through which to study manumission. However, modern fields of study, unknown to the
ancients, such as economics and sociology, also offer methods for analyzing the role that
manumission played in Rome. Rather than restrict myself to a singular disciplinary lens, I instead
draw upon a range of disciplines, from philosophy to anthropology, to describe how
manumission functioned in the Roman Republic.
I ask why and how three different groups participated in and benefited from
manumission: the Roman state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves.
1

“civitatem maximam maiorem” Persa, 475. For more on this passage, see Chapter 3 Section 4a.
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While I am committed to finding, highlighting, and analyzing the voices and experiences of
Roman slaves, I believe that it is necessary first to articulate the interests that these three groups
had in slavery and manumission, prior to exploring how slaves themselves approached and
strategized for manumission and other forms of freedom. Philto’s comments may indeed reflect
the belief and desires of Roman slaves. But what does it mean that it is the slave-owning Philto
who asserts that slaves desire freedom because they are human?
The dramatis personae of Plautus’ surviving plays include a preponderance of slaves; his
plays also contain many comments on slave life, including manumission. Amy Richlin argues
that Plautus as a playwright was genuinely interested in slaves.2 Slaves were both members of
Roman acting troops and the Roman audience, and therefore, Plautus’ interest in slaves is a
logical extension of his interest in his surroundings. In contrast, Kathleen McCarthy and Roberta
Stewart argue that Plautus appropriates slaves and slaves’ lives for the purposes of his storytelling, and moreover, he does so in a way that makes slaves’ desire for freedom anodyne rather
than subversive.3 In contrast to McCarthy and Stewart, Peter Spranger analyzes the slaves in
Plautus and Terence together. In his more holistic approach, he notes that both playwrights
carefully distinguish between characters who are slaves and freeborn characters who are
enslaved.4 In other words, while Philto asserts that Stasimus wants freedom, the freedom of
Stasimus’ potential manumission is distinct from the freedom that accompanies the release of an
enslaved citizen.
Other Roman writers, such as Cicero and Livy, demonstrate a similar concern in
identifying how slaves are distinct from freeborn citizens. William Fitzgerald traces this concern
across a number of different examples of Roman literature, in particular pairing the comedians
2

Richlin (2014).
McCarthy (2000). Stewart (2012).
4
Spranger (1984: 27-28). McCarthy analyzes the slaves of Terence separate from her work on Plautus (2004).
3
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with Imperial writers, such as Horace and Petronius.5 Because there is more surviving Imperial
literature than Republican literature, it is easier to create portraits of slaves and manumission
from surveys that include this time period. On the other hand, Sandra Joshel’s close reading of
Seneca Epistle 47 provides a model for how to extrapolate the nuances of slavery and slaveownership from a single text, an approach necessary for the temporarily scattered texts of the
Republican period. In this letter, Seneca advises his addressee Lucilius on the proper practices of
slave-ownership. Joshel argues that through this advice, Seneca uses slaves as mirrors of their
owners: they reflect the virtues and vices of their owners.6 Does Philto assert that Stasimus wants
to be free because Philto himself wants to be free?
But while Seneca’s letter is closely rooted to his Neronian times, replete with descriptions
of decadent banqueters and depilated slaves, authors of other pieces of Imperial literature are
dedicated to reconstructing the Republican past, including Republican manumission. Roman
jurists, for example, were keenly interested in Republican manumission and even provide
evidence for how Romans treated and manumitted slaves in the past. Alan Watson uses the
evidence that the jurists provide about the Twelve Tables to reconstruct the social world of the
early Republic, including the lives of slaves.7 Similarly, Salvatore Tondo uses the evidence of
jurists and other writers to examine Roman manumission anthropologically. 8 In contrast, W.W.
Buckland examines the Roman laws of slavery as law; that is, he attempts to piece together the
legal thinking that motivated the practice within Roman courts.9 While the laws of Roman
slavery do not constitute how the Romans themselves practiced slavery, the law is an important

5

Fitzgerald (2000).
Joshel (2011). For other approaches to literature and Roman slavery, see Alston et al. (2011) and Serghidou
(2007).
7
Watson (1975).
8
Tondo (1967).
9
Buckland (1970).
6
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aspect of slavery and manumission, since manumission was a legal process. For example, the
Roman jurists reveal that the money that Stasimus would have used to buy his manumission
from Lesbonicus was called a peculium. The study of Roman law as law can also reveal how
peculium articulated the connections of slave, slave-owner, and a slave’s property.10 But to ask
how Plautus’ depiction of Stasimus’ peculium, and tentative manumission, relates to the reality
of Roman slavery is to ask not a legal question, but a historical one.
The attempt to place Stasimus’ search for manumission in historical context runs into two
problems. First is the problem of the quantity and quality of evidence pertaining not only to
manumission, but slavery generally during the Roman Republic. Second is the problem of
understanding Roman slavery on its own terms because historians and Classicists have always
examined Roman and slavery and manumission with at least half an eye on issues of their day.
For example, in 1848, Henri-Alexandre Wallon composed his history of ancient slavery with the
express purpose of advancing abolitionism, a cause in which he was an active participant.11 In
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the contemporary concerns of historians persisted in
informing their works, even if the political urgency of scholarship on ancient slavery was not as
clear. These concerns spark the indignation of Niall McKeown, who calls for greater vigilance in
the rejection of contemporary concerns and sympathies that might influence the study of ancient
slavery.12 Despite McKeown’s objections, it remains the case that to write about Roman slavery
is to act within the present, as well as to be in conversation with other scholarship on Roman
slavery. Joseph depicts ancient slavery as symbiotic, which K.R. Bradley rejects in his histories

10

Buckland (1970: 187-206).
Wallon (1848, second edition 1879).
12
McKeown (2007a). His type of concerns about historiography goes as far back as Nietzsche’s “Vom Nutzen und
Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben” (1873) and also include more recent figures such as White (1973). But
Nietzsche and White come to very different conclusions than McKeown about the proper way forward.
11
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of Roman slavery, as he emphasizes slave-owners’ cruelty.13 M.I. Finley uses Marxist ideas to
articulate what was at stake in the relationship of slavery, as well as try to make the most of the
scanty amount of surviving evidence, which is the first problem of studying Republican
slavery.14 Likewise, Keith Hopkins uses a variety of sociological theories to construct a complex
argument about the relationship of Roman imperialism, farming, and slavery, while Walter
Scheidel uses models from demography to answer how many slaves there were in Italy at fall of
the Republic.15 In contrast, William Harris and Jean-Christian Dumont pay no particular
allegiance to models, but instead gather as many references to slaves amid the literature, in order
to create synchronic accounts of Roman slavery.16 A common refrain in these histories is that
manumission is both an end of slavery, in that it releases slaves from bondage, and a function of
slavery, as it motivates slaves to be loyal to their owners. Stasimus’ desire for manumission is a
desire that perpetuates his bondage.
This desire also has the potential to transform Stasimus into a freedman. Just as in
histories of Roman slavery manumission is an end, so too in histories of Roman freedpeople
manumission is a beginning. Both Georges Fabre and Henrik Mouritsen shift through the
literature of the Republican and the Imperial Periods in order to describe manumission as the
starting point of a freedman’s life.17 Similarly, Susan Treggiari and A.M. Duff use manumission
as the starting point of the lives of freedmen, but they focus their attentions on the Republic and
the Empire respectively.18 However, there is no reason to only examine manumission as a
starting point. One can, instead, analyze manmission as a focal point. Matthew Perry approaches
13

Vogt (1975). Bradley (1987), (1989), (1994).
Finley (1968) and (1980).
15
Hopkins (1978). Scheidel (1997).
16
Harris (1980). For an explicit debate of the worth of these two different methods of inquiry, cf. Harris (1999) and
Scheidel (2005); cf. Hin (2013). Dumont (1987).
17
Fabre (1981). Mouritsen (2011a).
18
Treggiari (1969). Duff (1928).
14
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manumission an aspect of a freedwomen’s relationship with her owner from before, during, and
after her manumission.19 Ingomar Weiler further disrupts manumission’s status as a beginning,
or end, as he places manumission alongside other conclusions of slavery (Beendigung des
Sklavenstatus), such as slave flight and asylum.20 In other words, Philto believes that Stasimus
wants manumission because he wants freedom. But what if Stasimus’ desire for freedom did not
correspond to a desire for manumission?
The questions of whether slaves want freedom and if so what kind of freedom are
concerns that cut across not just the study of ancient slavery, but the study of slavery generally.
The answer to the question “did Roman slaves want freedom?” matters, as the answer shapes the
representation of many aspects of slave life besides manumission, such as revolt. Because of
their different answers to this question, K.R. Bradley and Theresa Urbainczyk provide practically
contrasting assessments of the slave wars in Sicily and mainland Italy.21 Sociologist Orlando
Patterson is keenly concerned with the question of the slave’s desire for freedom, both in his
account of slavery generally and manumission specifically. Indeed, Patterson makes
manumission central to his universalizing account of slavery, presenting manumission as the
inverse of enslavement. Patterson’s book Slavery and Social Death: a Comparative Study was
controversial and thought inspiring when he published it in 1982, and today, it continues to shape
the discourse of the study of slavery within Classics and many other disciplines beyond that of
sociology.22 A further testimony to its importance is the book’s influence outside of slave

19

Perry (2014).
Weiler (2003).
21
Bradley (1989), Urbainczyk (2008). Yavetz (1988) provide yet other perspectives. Capozza surveys the slave
revolts in Rome prior to the Sicilian slave wars (1966).
22
Davis, the premier historian of American slavery, accurately predicted the influence and challenges of the book
(1983).
20
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studies, as well as the types of questions that it prompts within the field of slave studies.23 For
instance, Joseph Miller’s argument that it is best to approach slavery as a strategy, rather than as
an institution, is an idea that he forms in opposition to Patterson’s thought.24 In other words,
while the debate over what slavery is and how it functions continues, this debate occurs in
Patterson’s shadow. Slavery and manumission are part of a contemporary, and contested,
discourse. It is therefore worthwhile to ask what Stasimus’ manumission was and also to ask how
manumission mattered to an audience that included slaves, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans
who did not own slaves.
In Chapter 1, I begin by exploring which theories can articulate what Roman
manumission was, and I end by proffering a description of manumission as a ritualized practice
that transforms a slave’s life from unlivable to livable. Patterson defines slavery as social death
and manumission as social rebirth, two terms that provides sociological clarification, while
jettisoning the unproductive, legalistic definition of slavery as a form of human property.
Patterson grounds his definition of slavery and manumission in part through the work of
philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, most especially Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman from The
Phenomenology of Spirit. Significantly, both Hegel and Patterson were readers of ancient Rome,
including Roman slavery. Indeed, these thinkers are useful for articulating the movement and
experience of Roman freedom and slavery to a large degree because they constructed their
universalized ideas out of the particulars of Roman slavery. I supplement my reading of Hegel
and Patterson with the philosophy of Judith Butler. I turn to Butler’s term “unlivable” to augment
Patterson’s description of slavery as social death, as Butler’s philosophy points both to new uses

23

For an example within Classics, see Zelnick-Abramowitz (2005: 25-7). For an example from anthropology, see
Graeber’s work on debt (2011: 170-1). For Patterson’s influence on Butler, see Chapter 1 Section 5b.
24
2012: 1-36. Andreau and Ducat give a recent defense of slavery as an institution in both the Greek and Roman
worlds (2006).
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for Patterson’s term, as well as new connections between Patterson’s understanding of the social
and Hegel’s understanding of the self and the body. Butler’s emphasis on the body connects to
the term “practice,” which I take from sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and from the term
“ritualized,” which I take from religion scholar Catherine Bell. Specifically, these groundings of
manumission in the movements of the body provide a framework for analyzing the three types of
manumission described in Roman law.
Cicero makes clear that there were three types of manumission in the Roman Republic
that the Roman state considered equally capable of freeing slaves.25 These three types of
manumission were manumissio vindicta, manumissio censu, and manumissio testamento, or
manumission by the staff, manumission by the census, and manumission by testament,
respectively. Evidence from Roman comedies, legal writings, and letters provide the details that
are the basis of my reconstructions of the movements and words that made up these different
types of manumission. In Chapter 2, I pair these reconstructions of the practice of manumission
with analysis of the aetiologies that the writers Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch
provide on the origins of manumission. Specifically, I analyze the movements of manumission
and the stories concerning the origins of manumission to describe how through manumission the
state had a direct relationship with slaves, a relationship that was not mediated by slave-owners.
All of these lines of questioning stem from the question, “What was at stake in manumission for
the Roman state?”.
My guiding question for Chapter 3 is “How did manumission contribute to what it meant
to be a slave-owner?”. For my answers, I return to Butler and her thoughts on subjection, which
is to say, the process of becoming a subject. Roman slave-owners had to negotiate a variety of
pressures and expectations when performing manumission, most especially the expectations of
25

Topica, 10. See Chapter 2 Section 7 for more.
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other slave-owners. Even though these expectations did not have the force of law, they did carry
disciplining force, as a number of examples from the comedies of Plautus and Terence, as well as
the letters of Cicero, demonstrate. Furthermore, how Roman slave-owners looked at
manumission was complicated by their valorization of Greek culture, including how the Greeks
thought about and valued manumission. I therefore, examine what the Greeks Philip V and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus said about Roman manumission and connect that to the discussions
on the propriety of manumission in Plautus and Cicero. This pairing of Cicero and the comedians
yields another important theme: that of manumission as a source of fraternal rivalry. Both Cicero
and the comedians at the time completely downplay the importance of the Roman state in order
to elevate the importance of non-state surveillance.
Slave-owners were of course not the only ones who surveilled manumission for the
simple reason that not all Romans were slave-owners. Freeborn Romans who did not own slaves
also participated in the surveillance, maintenance, and continuation of manumission. But while
slave-owners had to internalize knowledge of manumission in order to succeed as slave-owners,
non-slave-owning Romans examined manumission for the purpose of distinguishing themselves
from former slaves. Because Plautus and Terence staged their comedies before the public, a
public that included Romans who did not own slaves, I again examine the comedies, this time to
ask how these performances participated in the divisions between former slaves and freeborn
people. In doing so, I compare the language that the playwrights use to describe the freeing of
freeborn people with the language that they use to describe the freeing of slaves. But I also
analyze the plays as performances, in particular arguing that the racialized appearance of these
slave masks connected to freeborn Romans’ need to distinguish themselves visually from former
slaves. For while Roman authors are consistent in describing slaves’ bodies as visually
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ambiguous, nonetheless, the theater-goer Julius Pollux read slave masks as distinct from the
masks of freeborn characters. This need for a visual distinction was linked to how the Romans
ascribed to slaves negative characteristics, including cowardice. Livy’s history of the volones, a
unit of slaves whom the Romans recruited to fight Hannibal, emphasizes how these slaves were
cowards and generally unfit to be soldiers. Livy writes of the volones in this way, even though he
himself records how Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus—ancestor of the famous plebeian tribune—
freed them for winning the battle of Beneventum. I examine Livy’s disparaging description of
these soldiers as an example of a psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans, as Livy’s
assumption that these slaves were cowards is connected to his valorization of the courage of
freeborn Romans. Freeborn Romans benefited from making slaves’ lives unlivable and therefore
had an interest in guarding the boundaries of manumission.
The slave’s transformation into a civis demanded the recognition and participation of the
Roman state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans. All three of these groups benefited from
slaves’ status as slaves, but they also benefited from slaves’ pursuit for freedom. The state
benefited because manumission increased the rolls of the citizenry and brought in more revenue.
Slave-owners benefited because manumitted slaves continued to owe a debt of gratitude to their
former owners. By insisting that former slaves were distinct and inferior from themselves,
freeborn Romans benefited psychically from manumission. Because while freedmen and
freedwomen formed a group superior to slaves, nonetheless they were inferior to freeborn
Romans. Against this backdrop, Roman slaves struggled to gain their freedom through
manumission.
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Chapter 1: Theorizing manumission
1. Introduction
Maiores vero triginta annorum servi semper manumitti solent, adeo ut vel in transitu
manumittantur, veluti cum praetor aut pro consule in balneum vel in theatrum eat.
The practice is that slaves over thirty are readily manumitted; it is such an everyday matter that
manumissions are performed even en route from one place to another, for instance, when the
praetor or proconsul is on the way to the baths or the theatre.
Gaius, Institutiones, 1.20, trans. Gordon and Robinson.

Sometime during the second century CE, the jurist Gaius wrote his Institutiones, a text in
which he introduces to future lawyers the practice of law, including the laws surrounding
manumission. In this passage on the Lex Aelia Sentia, he demonstrates that the Romans faithfully
obeyed the precepts of the law that prohibited the manumission of slaves under the age of thirty
without special warrant. In providing details culled from his own observation of daily life, the
jurist shows that manumission was not simply a matter of law, but was instead an important
strand in Rome’s social fabric. Indeed, in this passage Gaius literally takes manumission out of
the law courts and places it in the streets of Rome with words that can evoke in our historical
imagination the image of a briskly walking slave-owner maintaining a firm grip on the arm of his
slave, while simultaneously besetting a harried praetor, who is much more eager to get to the
baths than he is to oversee the manumission of yet another slave under the July sun. Nonetheless,
by the end, the praetor has enacted something like a bit of magic: standing before him is now a
Roman civis, where before there had been a slave.
One place to begin to understand the magic of Roman manumission is Orlando
Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death, the most influential book of sociology on slavery. In this
work, Patterson provides a universalizing theory of the process of enslavement, slavery, and
manumission. But Patterson’s theory has an unusual relationship to Roman manumission.
Because Patterson is a close reader of Roman history, most especially Roman slavery, his
12
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universalizing ideas on slavery are constructed out of his reading of Roman slavery. That is, he
constructed his universalizing theory not out of abstract arguments alone, but historical evidence,
including Roman historical evidence. Indeed, Patterson clearly states the great value he places on
both Greek and Roman history, writing in his preface that
All who engage in comparative studies live in apprehension of the specialist, and no group is
more to be feared than the students of Ancient Greece and Rome – not because they are more
hostile to generalists than other specialists, but because their subject has more traps and pitfalls
for the unwary comparativist than any other.26

This praise is sincere, as in Slavery and Social Death Patterson engages with Roman writers
ranging from Pliny to Publilius Syrus and scholars of antiquity ranging from Franz Bömer to
M.I. Finley.27 Patterson’s theory of slavery and manumission not only has Roman roots, but is a
universal theory constructed out of Roman particulars. In a real sense, Patterson’s sociology is
Roman history.
At the same time, Patterson’s sociology is one that searches for “the universal features of
the internal structure of slavery.”28 Patterson’s emphasis on the universal is connected to his use
of the philosopher G.F.W. Hegel. Hegel’s philosophy pushes all investigations towards the
absolute and the universal.29 Patterson’s own investigation into the “universal features” of
slavery is in part his answer to this call. Hegel describes the universal in his own, idiomatic
language giving rise to his reputation as an obscure thinker. Indeed, Hegel’s style is a
justification to ignore him.30 But to ignore Hegel is to set aside not only an influential
philosopher, but also an insightful reader of Roman history and Greek literature. Hegel’s

26

1982: xii. Patterson is consistent in this praise. See his more recent treatment of Greek slavery (2008).
Pliny: 1982: 339. Publilius Syrus: 1982: 77. Bömer: 1982: 66-7. Finley: 1982: 70.
28
1982: x.
29
Cf. “Hegel wants us to see that any here, now, or this is really a universal.” Kain (2005: 34).
30
“For English-language commentators Hegel is a great (and in analytical circles unmentionable) ‘other’, a
‘difficult’ philosopher not in the analytical or empirical tradition…Metaphorically, those in the English-speaking
world are always advised and warned when ‘Continental’ philosophy looms ahead, as if in a fog on the far side of
the Channel.” Carver (2000: 37).
27
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knowledge of Roman slavery informed his composition of The Phenomenology of Spirit,
including his famous description of the struggle between the bondsman and the lord. True,
Hegel’s book pursues many goals distinct from reconstructing and representing the Roman past,
since, for Hegel, history is the movement of the World-Spirit through self-consciousness towards
absolute knowledge.31 But it is because Hegel was a reader of Roman slavery that his struggle of
the bondsman has so many affinities to Roman slavery. These affinities explain why Classicists,
such as William Fitzgerald and Roberta Stewart, continue to cite Hegel as an influence in how
they study Roman slavery.32 Despite his book’s many other commitments, and despite his book’s
strangeand allusive style, Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit is grounded in Roman slavery
and Roman manumission.
Because of this grounding, the debate over how to interpret The Phenomenology of Spirit,
most especially the struggle of the bondsman, is also a debate about Roman manumission. While
Patterson reads the struggle of the bondsman as including a defnitive break between the
bondsman’s enslaved past and free future, philosopher Judith Butler instead reads the struggle of
the bondsman as “the resolution of freedom into self-enslavement.”33 Butler therefore
complicates Patterson’s use of Hegel and Patterson’s resulting description of slavery as social
death. For Patterson describes slavery as social death, and manumission as social rebirth, through
recourse to Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman. More specifically, Patterson references Hegel’s
struggle of the bondsman to shore up the psychological aspects of his sociological description of
slavery. However, Butler complicates Patterson in three ways. First, Butler is a reader and user

31

“Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object in various ways, according to the precise
stage it has reached in the development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness.” §234. For absolute knowledge,
see §789. Throughout, I use A.V. Miller’s translation of The Phenomenology of Spirit. I also reference the texts via
the paragraph number.
32
Fitzgerald 2000: 28-9. Stewart: 2012: 8-9, 113, 116.
33
1997: 31.
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of Patterson’s work. Indeed, she uses Patterson’s term “social death” in conversation with her
own term, the unlivable life. Second, Butler provides a reading of Hegel’s struggle of the
bondsman that conflicts with Patterson’s, as her reading emphasizes that although Hegel make
uses of experiences and events from slavery, he is nonetheless theorizing about subjects more
generally. Third, Butler’s reading of Hegel emphasizes the continuity of the bondsman’s
inferiority to the lord, a reading that challenges Patterson, as Patterson reads Hegel as describing
a rupture: the bondsman is initially enslaved and socially dead, but then he is manumitted, free,
and socially reborn. Butler’s reading of Hegel provides a way to describe slaves as living
unlivable lives, thereby making manumission the transition to a livable life. This framework
emphasizes the alleviative, rather than the assimilative, aspects of manumission.
First, what is the Phenomenology of Spirit? Section 2 of this chapter explores the
Phenomenology as work in which Hegel is not only making a number of arguments about the
development of consciousness, but also universal history—in this case, universal history as the
story of all human affairs. In order to proceed on both fronts simultaneously, Hegel employs a
purposely difficult and obscure style, in which he forces the reader to take his words on his own
terms, rather than on terms that have easy reference to preceding and contemporaneous literature.
Thus, even though Hegel’s work includes prolonged critiques and conversations with a variety of
ideas, events, and authors, specific ideas and people are only faintly visible through his prose.
Indeed, Hegel scholar Philip Kain is fond of saying that the Phenomenology is allusive in a
manner similar to a novel.34 Despite the passage’s seeming timelessness, the struggle of the
bondsman functions as a description of consciousness that has definite, if oblique, connections to
events in Hegel’s lifetime, such as the advent of capitalism and the Haitian Revolution.

34

See Section 3b.
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That readers of Hegel, such as Susan Buck-Morss and Andrew Cole, connect Hegel’s text
to these historical events is a testament to the philosopher’s broad interests, including an active
interest in antiquity generally and Roman history specifically. In Section 3, I position Hegel as a
reader of ancient Rome. Indeed, Hegel wrote a number of his early works directly on Classical
topics. I use this Roman lens to analyze the conflict between the bondsman and lord and the
stages that follow this struggle. Because of connections to antiquity in the passages that
immediately follow the struggle of the bondsman and antitiquity, readers are justified in applying
a Roman context to his description of the previous conflict. For example, Hegel names the stages
that follow the struggle of the bondsman and lord after two ancient schools of philosophy,
Stoicism and Skepticism. Hegel’s description of the bondsman and lord is, in part, the product of
his reading of Roman history and Roman slavery. As a result, there is a productive correlation
between his description of the bondsman and Roman slaves.
Section 4 concerns how Patterson uses Hegel’s conflict between the bondsman and lord
for the psychological aspect of his own theory of slavery as social death. Patterson elaborates
how slavery deprives slaves of honor, thereby excluding them from the very society that their
labor supports. For Patterson, manumission is the slave’s admittance into society. That is,
manumission is social birth, or rebirth. Patterson uses this idea to theorize how manumission was
connected to how freedmen and freedwomen received the social necessities of recognition and
honor. How this allocation of freedom is functioned is important to Patterson, as he argues that
freedmen and freedwomen experienced a type of freedom distinct from the freedom of the
freeborn.
Patterson’s description of slavery and manumission is useful and powerful, but Butler
provides ideas and vocabulary that can improve it. In addition to being a reader of Hegel and
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Patterson, Butler is also a close reader of Michel Foucault, whose conception of power she
places in conversation with Hegel, without attempting to resolve the contradictions between the
approaches of the two thinkers. Like Patterson, Foucault posits power as shaping all
relationships, but because Foucault differs in his description of power, Butler’s thought yields a
different picture of the nature of manumission. Section 5 explores how Roman slaves were
integrated into Roman society, but integrated in such a way to their permanent disadvantage.
When applied to Roman slavery, Butler’s vocabulary describes Roman slavery as a practice that
made slaves’ lives unlivable. That is, while slaves were still very much part of society,
nonetheless they could not thrive. Slaves could only thrive by becoming free, by becoming
former slaves.
While Butler’s work articulates the ethical stakes within the experience of slavery and
slave-ownership, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provides the tool to describe how manumission fit
into Roman society by being iterative, improvised, localized, and strategic. Bourdieu defines
practice as encompassing strategic and situational aspects, which are two aspects essential to
Roman manumission, as slaves and slave-owners manipulated the contexts of manumission. The
Romans also incorporated formulae and instruments into the practice of manumission, indicating
how they wished to distinguish manumission from other practices. Catherine Bell’s term
“ritualized” describes how the Roman slave-owners and slaves worked to make manumission
unique. Importantly, slaves engaged in this ritualized practice while in negotiation not only with
their slave-owners, but also with the Roman state, other slave-owners, and non-slave-owning
Romans. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 in turn investigate the pressures at play within manumission
through slaves’ relationships with these different groups.
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2. The struggle of the bondsman and lord
My reading of Hegel’s description of the struggle of the bondsman and lord is based on
my understanding of the Phenomenology as a whole. This section of the Phenomenology not
only advances the book’s central arguments, but also interacts with the texts and events that
informed Hegel’s thought. There are two challenges to interpreting this complex book: first, its
enigmatic style; second, its use of allusions. Analyzing the events and people that informed
Hegel’s writing of the Pheneomenology provides some solutions to both these challenges. While
my concerns about obscurity and allusion may appear tangential in this summary of the struggle
of the bondsman, they are necessary platforms for my larger argument about Hegel, Roman
slavery, and freedom.

a. What is the Phenomenology?
The Phenomenology was a book that Hegel considered overdue. Hegel needed a book to
advance his academic career, which by 1807 was one marked by more failures than successes.35
The thirty-seven-year-old Hegel composed this long book in a remarkably short amount of time,
and under great duress, during 1806 and 1807.36 1806 was a hard year for Hegel, as it was then
that his mistress Christiana Burkhardt was pregnant with their son Ludwig.37 1806 was also the
year of Napoleon’s invasion, and destruction, of the Holy Roman Empire, which was the
government under which Hegel had lived his entire life. Rather than sending the last pages of the
Phenomenology through the post, Hegel carried it to the publisher himself, not wanting to risk
losing the manuscript in the mail.38 Despite these adverse conditions, Hegel finished the book to
his satisfaction, and years later, he continued to refer to it as integral part of his systematic
35

Pinkard (2000: 221-230).
Cf. Pöggler (1973: 193).
37
For the importance of Ludwig, see Kaufmann (1965: 91-5). Hegel never married Burkhardt, but instead married
Marie Helena Susanna von Tucher in 1811 (Pinkard 2000: 296-300).
38
Pinkard (2000: 230).
36
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philosophy.39 However, the continuity of Hegel’s philosophical system over the years is,
unsurprisingly, a matter of debate. While I occasionally reference Hegel’s other works, my
interest in Hegel is the Hegel of the Phenomenology.40
Hegel wrote the Phenomenology in an allusive and opaque style. Indeed, Hegel’s style is
so notable that Buck-Morss, Kaufmann, and Pinkard have offered a range of causes to explain it.
Buck-Morss notes that Hegel did not have any assurance of either academic freedom or freedom
of speech, and thus his obscurity should be read as a form of self-protection.41 Kaufmann offers a
more psychological explanation: he argues that Hegel’s “poetic impulse” overpowered his need
for clear and logical presentation of his arguments.42 In contrast, Pinkard places Hegel’s verbal
obscurity in the context of his circle of friends, who included the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling
and the great poet J.C.F. Hölderlin. Pinkard makes the case that just as Hölderlin sought to break
with traditional poetic subjects and perspectives, in part, through his self-conscious change in
vocabulary, so too did Hegel seek to use a style of writing that forces readers to abandon the
words upon which they relied, thereby forcing them to think for themselves.43 What is true is that
Hegel’s obscurity contributes to the myriad of different, and at times conflicting, interpretations
of his book.
Despite containing critiques of many different philosophers and philosophies, the
Phenomenology names only thirteen historical and fictional people within its hundreds of pages.
This small number points to the challenges readers face in establishing with whom, and in what
manner, Hegel criticized and absorbed his predecessors. Most of these individuals are ancient

39

Cf. Encyclopedia §25. Cf. Kaufmann (1965: 240).
Furthermore, attempts to synthesize the Phenomenology with later writings needs to be done carefully. Editors’
somewhat creative revisions to Hegel’s posthumous publications are numerous (cf. Kaufmann 1965: 218-224).
41
Buck-Morss (2009: 17-20; cf. also 59 n. 111).
42
Kaufmann (1965: 121).
43
Pinkard (2000: 82).
40
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Greeks, and their names are a good indication of how, for Hegel, antiquity was quite close to the
nineteenth centuruy: Anaxagoras, Antigone, Aristotle, Descartes, Diogenes, Hamlet, Homer,
Kant, Lichtenberg, Origen, Plato, Solon, and Sophocles.44 More sympathetic readers of Hegel
defend the indirect manner in which he engages with other writers, even though these readers
themselves argue about what is the best way to incorporate these allusions into an interpretation
of the text. Kain writes that because these allusions are similar to those in a novel, readers should
approach them as opportunities for expanding the text: “[The allusions] are not specific, precise,
and limited. They are general, open, even symbolic—as if they were trying to refer to as much as
possible.”45 However, the allusions are also quite capable of tripping up readers. Kaufmann notes
that an early American scholar of Hegel, Josiah Royce, assumed that a quotation of Goethe’s
Faust meant that the succeeding four pages were Hegel’s thoughts on Faust.46 Kaufmann,
persuasively, argues that Hegel’s reference to Goethe’s poem is not a strong enough foundation
for Royce’s assumption that the pages following this quote are best understood as Hegel’s
analysis of Faust.47 However, careful establishment of a connection between the Phenomenology
and another text can lead to a fruitful analysis of Hegel’s thought. For example, Kain first notes
the unmarked correspondences between the beginning of the Phenomenology and numerous
sections of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to show how Hegel is criticizing Kant in these
sections of the book. Likewise, Karin de Boer makes the persuasive case that in the
Phenomenology’s section on womanhood—which follows the discussion of Antigone—Hegel is
thinking about Greek domestic life through Aristophanes’ plays.48 This point prompts a re-

44

Kaufmann assembled this list (1965: 125).
2005: 21.
46
Hegel quotes Faust, Part I, in §360. Royce (1919: 190 ff.)
47
1965: 121-5.
48
2010.
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evaluation of how Hegel approaches Antigone’s relationship to her family, demonstrating the
worth of taking Hegel’s allusions seriously.
The above discussion, on Hegel’s style and allusiveness, points to the problem of
summarizing even individual clauses in the Phenomenology. How then to summarize the book as
whole? The fairest description I have found is from Kaufmann, who is, likely, able to summarize
the book gracefully because he himself he does not wish to elevate, or denigrate, Hegel’s
project.49
The basic idea of the Phenomenology of Spirit is that a philosopher should not confine himself
to views that have been held but penetrate behind these to the human reality they reflect. It is
not enough to consider propositions, or even content of consciousness; it is worth while to ask
in every instance what kind of spirit would entertain such propositions, hold such views, and
have such a consciousness. Every outlook, in other words, is to be studied not merely as an
academic possibility but as an existential reality. 50

Hegel’s project is to describe the development of consciousness. In this project, he shifts among
descriptions of individuals, civilizations, and all of history. At the same time, it is possible to use
these accounts in an atomized way, such as to merely look at psychology of an individual’s
consciousness. As a result, the struggle between the bondsman and the lord can be read as the
conflict between two separate individuals, but other possible readings include it as a description
of a conflict within a civilization or of a conflict central to human history.51

b. What is the struggle of the bondsman and lord?
The section of the Phenomenology that I call the struggle of the bondsman and lord is
better known as the master/slave dialectic.52 I prefer the more cumbersome appellation, “struggle

49

Kaufmann is more well known for his translations and interpretations of Nietzsche (e.g. 1974), whom many
consider a kind of anti-Hegel. Given Kaufmann’s interest in existentialism, he unsurprisingly makes Hegel relevant
to existentialists.
50
1965: 115.
51
In Kojève’s reading, the conflict between the lord and bondsman begins with human history (1969: 52). Stern
reviews some of the different ways of reading through the problem of interpreting the struggle of the bondsman
(2002: 25-7).
52
Arthur argues that it was mid-twentieth century French thinkers who first analyzed this passage as an example of
Hegel’s dialectic (1983: 67-8).
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of the bondsman and lord.” This term more accurately reflects Hegel’s own words and is
therefore a reminder of the gap between the philosophy of Hegel’s own text and the philosophy
that is merely associated with Hegel. For Hegel titles this section of his text Herrschaft und
Knechtschaft, “lordship and bondage,” and repeatedly uses the German words Herr and Knecht
for the eponymous characters.53 A pleasant corollary of this method is that it leaves aside the
question of how the dialectic functions in Hegel’s philosophy; for while Hegel does use the word
dialectic elsewhere in his work, it is not an important word in the Phenomenology.54 However,
despite my preference for using Hegel’s own terminology, I nonetheless seek elucidation of the
text from those who do describe this passage as the master/slave dialectic, such as Jean
Hyppolite. His summary is especially useful:
…[the struggle of the bondsman] consist[s] essentially in showing that the truth of the master
reveals that he is the slave, and the slave is revealed to be the master of the master.55

Importantly, for Hegel this process is not abstract, but physically perilous. Although Hegel titles
this section with abstract ideas, he calls the account of the encounter of the lord and bondsman a
“life-and-death struggle.”56
The conflict between the bondsman and lord results when two parties try and secure a
stable and consistent recognition of their own self-consciousness from each other. Prior to being
bondsman and lord, the two had been equals.57 As their consciousnesses developed in parallel,
they both reached the stage in which they sought recognition from others. Despite this mutual
need, they attack each other. This attack is both a way to find recognition in the other and, by

53

Title of the section: §166. Herr: §190. Knecht: §190. Throughout this dissertation, I use Miller’s translation
(1977).
54
While Hegel does mention the dialectic in the Phenomenology, it is only in minor contexts (cf. Kaufmann 1965:
153-162).
55
Hyppolite (1974: 172).
56
“…den Kampf auf Leben und Tod bewähren.” §187.
57
§182.
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risking death, a way to “supersede this otherness of itself.”58 Despite this commitment to fight to
the death, in the struggle neither dies. In place of death, the loser, the bondsman, is bonded to the
winner, the lord. The lord then commands the bondsman to do his work, allowing the lord to
enjoy the fruits of this labor without exertion.59 But despite having leisure time that the
bondsman does not, the lord’s consciousness is developmentally stymied.
In contrast, the bondsman’s consciousness advances through his work, as the experience
of this work provides an independence that the lord cannot find in the results of the work.60
Bondage also forces the bondsman to confront the fear of death.61 The combination of work and
the threat of death fosters a self-discipline and knowledge that make it clear that “The truth of
the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman… a
consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly
independent consciousness.”62 That is, the bondsman has reconciled to a kind of independence
that was impossible prior to his struggle with the lord. However, Hegel concludes this section by
noting that “having a ‘mind of one’s own’ is self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in
servitude,” emphasizing that this independence is not complete.63 That this consciousness
continues to change is evident through how Hegel arranges the text: The struggle of the lord and
bondsman makes up most of section 4a of the Phenomenology, which Hegel titles “Independence

58

“Es muß dies sein Anderssein aufheben...” (§180). On the risk of death, §187.
“but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect
of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it.” (§190).
60
“…in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists essentially
and actually in his own right.” (§196).
61
“for it [servitude] has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite
unmanned, has trembled in every fiber of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its
foundations… Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and
gets rid of it by working on it.” (§194).
62
“Die Wahrheit des selbständigen Bewußtseins ist demnach das knechtische Bewußtsein... sie wird als in sich
zurückgedrängtes Bewußtsein in sich gehen, und zur wahren Selbstständigkeit sich umkehren.” (§193).
63
“...der eigne Sinn ist Eigensinn, eine Freiheit, welche noch innerhalb der Knechtschaft stehenbleibt.” (§196).
59
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and dependence of self-consciousness: lordship and bondage”.64 The following section is titled
“Freedom of self-consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness”.65 I
emphasize the titles of these two sections to make clear that Hegel does not see the struggle of
the bondsman as an isolated event, but rather one intimately involved in the development of
human reality.
While the struggle of the bondsman is today one of its most famous passages of the
Phenomenology, in the nineteenth century, readers, such as Karl Marx, were not drawn to it.
Even though the passage has many affinities to Marx’s philosophy, Marx himself does not
directly comment on it.66 Rather it was Alexandre Kojève, a twentieth century scholar of Hegel
and Marx, who argued for the importance of this passage. For Kojève, the struggle between the
lord and bondsman is not about a particular instance in human history; rather, it describes a
struggle that motivates all of human history. “Consequently,” he writes, “History stops at the
moment when the difference, the opposition, between Master and Slave disappears.”67 In
contrast, readers ranging from Herbert Marcuse to G.A. Kelly see the struggle of the bondsman
as Hegel’s articulation of the conflict between propertied and property-less classes, in other
words, as Hegel’s version of class struggle.68
Andrew Cole objects to such readers of the struggle of the bondsman, arguing these
readers are determined to make Hegel a proto-Marx, thereby ignoring the context of Hegel’s own
words. Cole argues for reading this passage as Hegel’s thoughts on feudalism, not capitalism,
noting that this term best describes the German economy in Hegel’s time. Cole’s combination of
64

“Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewußsteins; Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.” (§178).
“Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins; Stoizismus, Skeptizismus und das unglückliche Bewußstein.” (§197).
66
Cf. Wood (1993) and Levine (2012). Burns and Fraser review the various ways Marxists have interpreted Marx’s
relationship to Hegel (2000). Carver argues that Engels emphasized Marx’s relation to Hegel as a strategy to
establish Marx’s authority as a philosopher (2000). In contrast, Cole argues that in some passages of the Grundrisse
and German Ideology Marx is alluding to Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman (2004: 595-6).
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1969: 43.
68
Arthur catalogues a number of readers who present the struggle of the bondsman in this light (1983: 69 n.10).
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philology and history makes a persuasive point: whatever other texts or historical events with
which this passage does intersect, Hegel was certainly commenting on his own times, on its own
terms.69 However, rather than use Cole’s argument to seal Hegel’s text shut, I use Cole’s
argument as the foundation upon which to build more connections between the Phenomenology
and the world.70 Furthermore, Cole’s position is easier to understand when it is clear that he is
also arguing against Steven Smith, who asserts that this section was Hegel’s critique of
Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery.71 For while Aristotle writes that slaves and slave-owners are
ontologically distinct people, Hegel’s philosophy provides a narrative in which the two people
change positions and power over time.72 One of Cole’s points is that this Hegelian struggle does
not simply occur in Ancient Greece, but also in Hegel’s Germany.73
To limit Hegel’s thought to nineteenth century Germany is to ignore Hegel’s own
commitment to universalism, a commitment that Buck-Morss has him answer in her analysis of
Hegel’s debt to the Haitian Revolution. Buck-Morss’ recruitment of Hegel to the Haitian
revolution touched off a controversy over her own treatment of contemporary research on Haiti
and Hegel, most especially her treatment of the Hegel scholar Pierre-Franklin Tavarès.74
Nonetheless, I build upon Buck-Morss’ work because she holds Hegel to the high standards that
he sets for himself.75 Buck-Morss’ book points to the productive ways that Hegel’s struggle of
the bondsman can be read alongside historical events, even when Hegel does not explicitly name
them. Drawing upon Hegel’s own notes and reading habits—in particular his love of
contemporary journalism—Buck-Morss contextualizes Hegel’s universal struggle of the
69

2004.
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bondsman amid the backdrop of the Haitian revolution, most especially the revolution’s abolition
of slavery.76 By framing radical anti-slavery as a universal human project, Buck-Morss makes
the Hegel of the Phenomenology into an unknowing, but eager, evangelist of the Haitian
revolution, a philosopher who translates the slaves’ uprising into the pursuit of universal and
absolute freedom. In order to read Hegel in this way, it is necessary to note how he condemned
the work and lives of Black people and Africans, making the supposed “unhistoricity” of African
societies and civilizations fundamental to his history of the world.77 By pitting Hegel’s professed
universalizing claims about the development of freedom into conversation with the struggle for
freedom in the Haitian revolution, Buck-Morss points a way to use Hegel for what she calls the
double liberation of universal history: “Universal history engages in a double liberation, of the
historical phenomenon and of our own imagination: by liberating the past we liberate
ourselves.”78
It is because readers like Buck-Morss continue to find such powerful potential in Hegel’s
Phenomenology that I turn to it for my analysis of Roman manumission. To turn to Hegel is not
to simply apply Hegel’s thought to Roman manumission, as if using a microscope to look at a
Petri dish. Instead, I argue that Hegel’s thought itself was formed in dialogue with Roman
manumission. Furthermore, this Roman context for the struggle of the bondsman strengthens
Butler’s cautioning about the liberatory potential of this passage: Butler argues that to read the
struggle of the bondsman merely as the triumph of the oppressed over oppressors is to ignore
how Hegel implies that the lord returns with the unhappy consciousness. In other words, Butler
emphasizes the conservative aspect of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman, since in her reading it
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reproduces inequality, rather than overthrowing it, similar to how Roman manumission
maintained Roman slavery.79

3. Hegel, slavery, and Roman manumission
Hegel was a reader of Roman texts and reader of contemporary scholarship on Rome. He
drew upon this knowledge in his integration of Rome into his philosophy, including his
description of Stoicism and Skepticism. In that section of the Phenomenology, Hegel deploys a
clear allusion to Stoicism, and several vague sentences that have long been read as him analyzing
Stoicism’s relationship to Rome. In this section, after clarifying my claim of Hegel as a reader of
Rome, I revisit the arguments for understanding Hegel’s evocation of Rome in his discussion of
Stoicism and then argue that is possible to use this Roman setting as a way to think through his
previous discussion of the struggle of the bondsman and lord. As my above discussion of the
struggle of the bondsman makes clear, it is unproductive to insist that this passage is ‘about’ a
singular event or group of people. Rather, the most productive interpretations of the
Phenomenology are those with many points of entry into Hegel’s text. I argue that Hegel’s
struggle of the bondsman maps well onto the discussion of Roman manumission not because
Hegel articulated an abstract theory of slavery that one can then apply to Roman slavery, but
because his text is already involved with Roman slavery. Therefore, to study Hegel’s struggle of
the bondsman is to learn about Hegel and his thoughts on Roman slavery and manumission.

a. Hegel as a reader of ancient Rome
Hegel was a reader of ancient Rome in two ways: first, Hegel read the works of Greek
and Roman writers who lived under the Roman Empire. Second, Hegel read contempory
scholarship on Roman history, including historiographical works such as Gibbon’s Decline and
Fall of the Roman Empire as well as more philosophical approaches to history, like Herder’s
79
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This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity.80 In approaching Hegel as a
reader of Rome, I build on the work of Valerio Rocco Lozano, who has written a systematic
analysis of the use of ancient Rome in Hegel’s early writings.81 But while he charts in Hegel’s
essays and articles the development of ideas that are central to the Phenomenology, Lozano does
not analyze the Phenomenology itself.82 As a result, my arguments for reading ancient Rome
alongside the struggle of the bondsman compliment, but do not replicate, Lozano’s work, most
especially because I position Hegel as a reader of Rome in order to reposition Roman slavery as
a conflict in conversation with the struggle of the bondsman.
Hegel was a reader of Rome because reading and writing in Latin was an essential part of
his education and, simply, because knowledge of Rome was essential to nineteenth century
European education. When Hegel first went to school at age five, he already knew the first
declension of Latin because of his mother’s tutoring.83 Reading Latin and Greek texts was a
central aspect of Hegel’s education, including his years studying theology at Tübingen
University. There, Hegel’s study of Christianity was in part historical and therefore built and
further developed his knowledge of Roman literature and history.84 When Hegel renounced his
commitment to theology and instead dedicated himself to philosophy, he nonetheless used the
historical and philological skills that he learned in his theological training in his philosophical
work, including his writings that preceded the Phenomenology.
While the Phenomenology was Hegel’s first book, during his earlier years Hegel
composed essays and articles that are important to examine as Hegel’s preliminary approaches to
aesthetics, theology, and politics prior the Phenomenology. Some of these early writings are on
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explicitly classical themes, such as Hegel’s exploration of the origin of comedy and tragedy. 85
More significantly, Lozano also argues that ancient Rome is a uniting thread for the aesthetic,
theological, and political ideas that Hegel pursues in his early work. For in addition to studying
Roman poetry directly, Hegel also engages with it indirectly: his comments on Molière’s
L’Avare are in part a reception of Roman literature because Molière based his play on Plautus’
comedy Aulularia. Lozano points out that this connection between the French and Roman plays
is key for Hegel’s thoughts on both Romanitas and Festigkeit (“fixity”), a term important to his
aesthetic thought.86 Similarly, Hegel’s political thought was always in conversation with Rome,
as he used Roman history as a juxtaposition to current, political developments. Hegel’s use of
Rome in this regard is so consistent that Lozano argues that there was a change in which Rome
Hegel prefers: when he initially approved of the direction of the French Revolution, he evoked
Republican Rome. When Hegel soured on the revolutionaries’ project, he evoked Imperial
Rome.87 Lozano argues that this negative view of Imperial Rome carried over into Hegel’s
Phenomenology, specifically that Imperial Rome was a place defined by its lack of freedom, both
internal and external, despite having many different possibilities for enacting freedom. 88 Hegel
inserts the origins of Christianity into the friction generated by Imperial Rome’s Republican past,
which for Hegel is Rome’s free past. In doing so, Lozano argues that Hegel frames Christianity
as the “…realization and actualization of the potential logic implicit in the Roman world.”89
Ancient historians will likely find this framing of Christianity familiar, and for good reason: one
of Hegel’s students was the influential Johann Gustav Droysen, biographer of Alexander the
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Great and coiner of the term “Hellenism.”90 This aspect of Hegel’s theology is important for
reading Roman slavery in the Phenomenology because Hegel’s Christianity is a thread that
definitively binds his thoughts on the development of freedom to the Roman world. But Lozano
points out that we can go further. Indeed, he calls upon us to reread the Phenomenology while
examining how Hegel charts the development of freedom by alluding to the Roman world,
including the struggle of the bondsman.91

b. Ancient Rome and the struggle of the bondsman and lord
Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman connects with Roman slavery in two ways. First, there
are similarities between bondsmen (Knechten) and slaves (Sklaven), and, therefore, it is possible
to read Hegel’s description of the relationship between the bondsman and lord as a charting of a
similar relationship between a Roman slave and slave-owner.92 This method essentially takes
Hegel’s philosophy as an abstract theory that can be applied to the practice of slavery. However,
this method ignores how in his typically obscure manner, Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman is in
direct conversation with Roman slavery, as is clear from the Roman context in the section that
follows the struggle of the bondsman in the Phenomenology, namely Hegel’s discussion of
Stoicism, Skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness. Kain and Pollhammer have noted that this
section contains an allusion to the freedman philosopher Epictetus, as well as descriptions that,
while vague, are easily read as describing the Roman Empire. This allusion to Epictetus
establishes the Roman context for Hegel’s description of Stoicism. I use this context, in
particular Epictetus, to reread the struggle of the bondsman in a Roman setting. In doing so, I
suggest that we need to take Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman seriously as a philosophy of
90
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Roman slavery, not because Hegel was articulating a general theory of slavery, but because
Hegel himself was drawing upon the history of Roman slavery and manumission when he wrote
this passage.93 That is, Hegel’s description of the end of the bondsman’s bondage has many
similarities to manumission, most especially because it a transition to a type of freedom that,
while quite real, nonetheless does not reorder existing social relationships. Instead, following
Butler’s reading of the struggle of the bondsman, manumission marks a moment of the slave’s
internalization of the Roman slave-owner. For Butler argues that the unhappy consciousness, a
type of consciousness which succeeds the bondsman, contains a psychic, rather than corporeal,
version of the lord.94
Hegel’s section on Stoicism contains an allusion to two important Stoic thinkers,
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Hegel writes,
This consciousness accordingly has a negative attitude towards the lord and bondsman
relationship. As lord, it does not have its truth in the bondsman, nor as bondsman is its truth in
the lord’s will and in his service; on the contrary, whether on the throne or in chains, in the
utter dependence of its individual existence, its aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless
indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence….95

That the “throne” represents Marcus Aurelius and that the “chains” represent Epictetus is, at this
point, an old interpretation.96 The more recent, and intriguing, question is how this allusion can
function as a hermeneutical key for Hegel’s description of Stoicism, by putting his conception of
Rome into dialogue with his description of the development of Stoicism.
Kain argues that the allusion to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius corresponds to Hegel’s
description of Rome. For in Hegel’s discussion of Stoicism, Hegel is quite specific about what
93
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political and cultural conditions that make this new way of thinking possible, even though he
does not name which government oversaw the transformation of Stoicism from a mere school of
philosophy into something truly universal:
As a universal form of the World-Spirit, Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of
universal fear and bondage, but also a time of universal culture which had raised itself to the
level of thought.97

In this description, Hegel is not so much interested in explaining Stoicism’s origins in fourth
century BCE Athens as he is, instead, interested in explaining how, under the Romans, Stoicism
became a form of thought so significant that, in his words, it was “a universal form of the WorldSpirit.” Kain clarifies that, for Hegel, Stoicism’s role as a universal form in Imperial Rome is
connected both to the emotional detachment that the Stoics used to define Stoic psychology and
also to Hegel’s own conception of Imperial Rome as a government that lacked personal
investment in its citizens, and is therefore similar to a slave-owner.98
The citizen of imperial Rome had lost all opportunity to participate in a public assembly where
citizens themselves could be in control of important civic matters. The citizen had become a
small cog in a big, complex, and impersonal machine…. In an important sense, all are slaves in
Rome. All must serve the abstract concerns of a huge and far-flung empire. And they serve
much as a slave does—they must be ruthlessly disciplined to serve effectively and they must
sacrifice all personal concerns.99

In other words, Kain argues that Hegel wants the reader to approach Rome from the perspective
of Epictetus, the slave in chains, rather than from perspective of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor
on the throne. The Stoic consciousness results from the work and freedom of the struggle of the
bondsman.
But while Hegel alludes to Epictetus through the imagery of chains, Epictetus did not
spend his entire life in chains. Importantly, the two texts through which Hegel knew Epictetus,
the Encheiridion and the Discourses, were written after Epictetus was manumitted and had
97
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founded a successful philosophical school.100 Hegel uses chains to allude to a man who had not
remained a slave, but who had become a manumitted freedman. Epictetus is, furthermore, an apt
key for unlocking the struggle of the bondsman because Epictetus’ manumission was connected
to his success as a philosopher. That is, the ancient sources on Epictetus’ biography suggest that
his owner Epaphroditos had been in part motivated to free him because of his talents in
philosophy.101 In other words, Epictetus’ intellectual development and freedom are intertwined,
similar to how the development of the bondsman’s development of consciousness is intertwined
with the freedom that he gains through his struggle with the lord.
Because Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman has three important similarities to Roman
slavery and manumission, the struggle of the bondsman is in conversation with Roman slavery,
most especially the enslavement and manumission of Epictetus. First, the bondsman was
originally free prior to his struggle with the lord. Likewise, many Roman slaves were born free.
Second, the bondsman performs physical labor for the lord, while simultaneously facing lethal
threats for failing to perform this labor correctly. So, too, did Roman slaves physically labor for
Roman slave-owners. Third, despite the important affinities of the struggle of the bondsman to
the Haitian revolution and Marxist conceptions of the struggle of the proletariat, Hegel does not
write that the bondsman triumphs over the lord through violence or any sort of radical social
change. Rather, Hegel concludes the section of the bondsman by simply commenting on the new
type of freedom that the bondsman experiences through his laboring. That is, like Epictetus’ own
advancement, the freedom of the bondsman does not upset the physical or social world. The
world accommodates the bondsman’s new freedom, similar to how the politics of Roman world
easily accommodated Epictetus’ new freedom as a freedman. Instead, it was Epictetus’ Stoic
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philosophy that was a challenge to the Roman world, as his philosophy challenged the Romans
to conceive and practice an entirely different type of freedom, similar to how it is the
bondsman’s development in consciousness, rather than his power, that challenges the lord. That
Epictetus challenged the Roman world is a rather radical proposition, and it may seem strange
that Hegel entertained this idea. But one of the most revered figures in Aurelius’ Meditations is
Epictetus.102 For a philosopher such as Hegel who revered powerful, political leaders, Aurelius’
attention to Epictetus might be an indication of Hegel’s goals for his own work.103
In this charting of the struggle of the bondsman onto the biography of Epictetus, the
lord’s consciousness exits while the bondsman’s advances, transforming into the Stoic
consciousness. This absence of the lord poses problems for using Hegel to analyze slavery, as
slave-owners do not simply disappear when slaves become free. One way to read the struggle of
the bondsman is that Hegel suggests that while the bondsman’s consciousness advances, the
lord’s consciousness is stalled, having reached an impasse. Indeed, that is how Patterson reads
Hegel as commenting on slave-owners, much to Patterson’s dissatisfaction. For while Patterson
finds in Hegel a number of important ideas and descriptions on how slavery and manumission
played a key role in the development of freedom, the sociologist frames his theory of slavery as
breaking with Hegel’s philosophy a number of key ways.

4. Patterson, Hegel, and Roman slavery
Rejecting the common definition of a slave as a human who is treated as property, in his
book Slavery and Social Death: a Comparative Study, Patterson instead defines a slave as a
human without honor.104 Notably, even Joseph Miller, who explicitly positions his theory of
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slavery in opposition to Patterson’s, refuses to return to a definition of slavery as property.105 For
Patterson, people without honor are socially dead because honor is essential to social life.106
Following this logic, Patterson then defines manumission as social birth or rebirth because it is
the process through which a slave either enters or re-enters society, as after manumission the
slave is able to become an honorable person.
In both his description of slavery as social death, and his description of manumission as
social birth, Patterson turns to Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman for psychological and
sociological insight: first, to describe the experience of slavery; second, to theorize how slavery
shapes and constrains the essential, and life-affirming, processes of recognition within society;
third, to describe the consequences and limitations of slavery within slave-holding societies; and
fourth, to distinguish two types of freedom: the freedom of the freeborn versus the freedom of
the freedperson. That is, Patterson asserts that the freedom of former slaves is qualitatively
distinct from the freedom of slave-owners. Significantly, Patterson relies on a number of
examples from Roman slavery to make his argument about freedom, power, and social death.
While, like Hegel, Patterson is more concerned about Imperial Rome, nonetheless, I frame his
work as a piece of Classical scholarship that needs to be taken as such, rather than a universal
theory of slavery developed in isolation from the particulars of Roman history. Patterson’s
thought therefore provides an important direction for approaching the power of Roman
manumission.

a. Patterson, Hegel, and social death
Patterson’s theory of slavery and social death is an argument original to Patterson, but he
is open about his many debts to Hegel, both for his thoughts about slavery and also his thoughts
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about the relationship of slavery to freedom. For Patterson, slavery and freedom are intimately
connected because it is slavery that makes freedom possible. As a result, Patterson puts freedmen
and freedwomen at the center of his history and philosophy of freedom. Such centering of
freedpeople means that Patterson makes manumission fundamental to the development of
freedom, even if manumission originated as a tactic of slave-owners to further their control over
slaves.
Patterson describes slavery as social death, as that phrase motions towards how slaveowners refuse to recognize slaves either as members of their own community or as members of
an outside community. While Patterson frames this exclusion in terms of the loss of honor, he
also notes that it has important intersections with Hegel’s description of recognition in the
struggle of the bondsman.107 For Patterson, enslavement is the process of removing a person
from the social sphere, a removal that occludes a person from the recognition that is an essential
aspect of the accumulation and maintenance of honor. Patterson’s definition of honor is based on
that of anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers, who argues that honor “…is a sentiment, a
manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation of this conduct by others, that is to
say, reputation. It is both internal to the individual and external to him—a matter of his feelings,
his behavior, and the respect he receives.”108 By describing the slave as a person without honor,
Patterson argues that communities make people slaves by refusing to acknowledge their
honorable sentiments and the manifestations of those sentiments. For Patterson, slaves lack
recognition of their honor.109 Significantly, recognition is precisely what both the bondsman and
lord sought from each other at the beginning of their struggle.
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Patterson also turns to Hegel to discuss labor and the threat of death in enslavement, and
in doing, Patterson makes clear how he reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman: as a potential
universal theory of slavery. That is, he reads the Phenomenology as trying to articulate ideas like
his own. Patterson uses Hegel to argue that fear, most especially the fear of death, is fundamental
to the experience of slavery. Hegel asserts that the bondsman’s fear is integral to his experience
of a truth that is distinct from the truth of the lord:
For this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd
moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of
death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every
fiber of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. 110

Patterson interprets this passage to argue that the slave’s experience of the fear of death makes
his desire for freedom all the more acute: “The slave, by his social death, and by living ‘in mortal
terror of the sovereign master’ becomes acutely conscious of both life and freedom.”111
However, Patterson disagrees with Hegel about how the slave, despite being in mortal terror,
achieves freedom. In Patterson’s reading, Hegel asserts that labor is the activity that frees the
bondsman, while Patterson insists that labor has nothing to do with the slave’s pursuit of
freedom.
Patterson clarifies that in his own theory of slavery as social death conflicts with Hegel’s
struggle of the bondsman in two important ways. First, Patterson notes that, for Hegel, the act of
laboring is the answer to the riddle of why it is the bondsman’s, rather than the lord’s,
consciousness that advances. The sociologist agrees that this theory has explanatory power for
the experience of workers, but he also asserts that it is wrong to apply it to slaves. Patterson notes
that while many slaves were workers, “There is nothing in the nature of slavery which requires
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the slave to be a worker.”112 For in Patterson’s survey of precapitalist societies, many slaveowners owned slaves entirely for reasons of status and honor. Significantly, Patterson is defining
labor very narrowly here. Feminist economists, such as Barker and Feiner, have since stressed
the importance of approaching caring and nurturing work as forms of labor.113 Patterson also
insists that the owners held the slaves solely for reasons of status and honor because these slaves
were economic burdens.114 As a result, Patterson does not posit labor as the process that pushes
slaves towards freedom.115 Instead, it is their lack of freedom that makes freedom meaningful.
The second way that Patterson reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman as diverging from
his own thought of slavery is in the description of the owner. Hegel is quite clear that in the
struggle of the bondsman, the consciousness of the bondsman advances in a way that the lord’s
does not. Hegel’s silence on how the lord’s consciousness progresses, while he details precisely
how the bondsman’s consciousness advances, prompts many readers, Patterson included, to
conclude that the lord as having reached some sort of impasse.116 For Patterson, the idea that
slave-owners are developmentally stalled does not adequately describe either the continuity of
slave-ownership or the thriving lives that slave-owners had within slave-owning societies,
including ancient Rome.117 Indeed, Patterson advances Pliny the Elder as one of the most selfaware slave-owners of all human history because of his honesty about how thoroughly Romans
relied on slaves for physical, intellectual, and caring labor.118 For Pliny writes,
alienis pedibus ambulamus, alienis oculis agnoscimus, aliena memoria salutamus,
aliena et vivimus opera, perieruntque rerum naturae pretia et vitae argumenta. nihil aliud pro
nostro habemus quam delicias.
112
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We use other people’s feet when we go out, we use other people’s eyes to recognize things, we
use another person’s memory to greet people, we use someone else’s help to stay alive – the
only thing we keep for ourselves are our pleasures. 119
Pliny, Naturalis Historia, 29.8 = 29.19, trans. Weidemann.

While slave-owners were parasites who required slaves for their own lives, in Patterson’s
reading, Pliny’s comment demonstrates that this parasitism does not necessarily inhibit their
personal growth or even their ability to reflect.120 Rather, this parasitism simply requires slaveowners to confront their own dependencies in order to be honest with themselves. However, in
arguing that this quote represents Pliny’s thoughts on slaves, Patterson ignores the quote’s larger
context, which makes clear that Pliny is specifically castigating those Romans who do not learn
medicine, thereby making themselves reliant on Greek doctors. Patterson’s source for this quote
is Thomas Wiedemann, who includes it in his sourcebook on Greek and Roman slavery.
Wiedemann’s justification for this inclusion is that Pliny is attacking Greek doctors who are
themselves slaves.121 Unfortunately, Patterson does not admit to the medical context in which
Pliny lays out his invective. As a result, Patterson does not present this quote as opprobrium of
the medically ignorant, but rather as a self-aware confession of the parasitic nature of Roman
slave-ownership.122 Patterson places this quote at the end of Slavery and Social Death, where he
argues that slavery is a type of parasitism.123 The self-aware aspect of the confession is important
for Patterson’s distinguishing himself from Hegel, as Patterson uses this self-awareness as
evidence that slave-owners are not permanently stymied. For Patterson, contra to Hegel, slave-

119

Quoted in Patterson with an incorrect citation to the location of the passage in Pliny (1982: 339).
“…Pliny the Elder, who in one of his few inspired moments made himself unique among the slaveholders of all
time by laying bare the parasitic nature of the relation between slaveholders and slaves…” (1982: 339).
121
Patterson on Wiedemann as a source (1982: 339 n.11). Wiedemann (1986: 68).
122
Pliny just prior to this quote: “medicoque tantum hominem occidisse inpunitas summa est…merito, dum nemini
nostrum libet scire, quid saluti saue opus sit.” 29.8 = 29.18-19. Cf. How Clark reads this quote in the context of
Patterson (2013: 137).
123
1982: 336-342.
120

39

Chapter 1: Theorizing manumission

owners are capable of advancing developmentally to a point in which they can accurately reflect
on their situation.
Patterson allows that slave-owners are capable of honest reflection, but he does not
expect them to be consistently honest about their motives, as his analysis of Roman law makes
clear. Patterson makes a powerful argument about the fundamental importance of Roman law to
our modern conception of slavery as a form of ownership, in which the owner has absolute
dominion over the slave. That is, just as how Hegel constructs his universal idea of the struggle
of the bondsman out of the particulars of Roman history, so too does Patterson construct his
universal theory of slavery out of the particulars of Roman law. Patterson begins with the
assertion that relying on property as the primary definition of slavery is insufficient because
within legal thought any persons can become property, but this property status does not entail the
absolute dominion that is associated with slavery. Patterson notes that there is no inherent
necessity that a society would need to define property as the object of one’s complete dominion.
Indeed, as Patterson points out, the Greeks themselves never did: among the Athenians, notions
of property were always connected to notions of proper use.124 Patterson speculates that the
differences between Greek and Roman slavery, such as the as the Romans’ dependence on slaves
for agricultural production, combined with the Romans’ inclusiveness created a need for an
absolute distinction between slaves and other peoples unmatched in the Greek world. Patterson
then frames the results of the Romans’ solution to this problem:
…the Romans invented the legal fiction of dominium or absolute ownership, a fiction that
highlights their practical genius. It is not as jurists that we should applaud the Romans, but as
applied sociologists. Let us see how dominion worked. First, by emphasizing the categories of
persona (owner) and res (thing) and by rigidly distinguishing between corporeal and
incorporeal things, the Romans created a new legal paradigm in which there could be no room
for ambiguity in deciding what was and what was not the object of property…. If it is difficult
124
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to explain why the Romans would want to invent the idea of a relation between a person and a
thing (an almost metaphysical notion, quite at variance with the Roman way of thinking in
other areas), it becomes impossible to comprehend why they should want inner psychic power
over it unless we understand that, for most purposes, the “thing” on their minds was a slave.125

To further clarify: Patterson is arguing that it was Roman slavery that shaped the Romans’ legal
ideas of property ownership, not the reverse. Patterson advances the radical centrality of slavery
to Roman property while also asserting that Romans were quite aware that they needed this legal
authority for their slaves and their slaves alone.126 In other words, Patterson does not see Roman
slave-owners as acting misguidedly because of some impasse; rather, they understand their needs
as slave-owners and act to meet these needs, while refusing to acknowledge the extent to which
their role as slave-owners shaped their motives.
But while Patterson does not see slave-owners as facing an existential impasse, he does
believe that slave-owners and former slaves had a fundamentally different experience of
freedom. Patterson quotes Hegel in order to justify his own argument that freedom is birthed in
the experience of slavery itself:
The slave, by his social death, and by living in “in mortal terror of his sovereign master”
becomes acutely conscious of both life and freedom. The idea of freedom is born, not in the
consciousness of the master, but in the reality of the slave’s condition. Freedom can mean
nothing positive to the master; only control is meaningful. 127

Patterson uses Hegel in order to define freedom as the bondman’s experience, rather than the
lord’s. For while Patterson rejects the notion that the slave-owner is developmentally stymied by
the practice of slave-owning, he nonetheless asserts that the slave-owner does not experience a
desire for freedom. Instead, the slave-owner experiences control and a sense of honor. The slave,
in contrast, first experiences freedom through its absence. The slave’s acute experience of the
loss of freedom clarifies his or her desire for it, as well as clarifies the importance of freedom for
125
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all other people.128 For this reason, Patterson argues that the experience of slavery precedes the
experience of freedom:
Before slavery people simply could not have conceived of the thing we call freedom. Men and
women in premodern, nonslaveholding societies did not, could not value the removal of
restraint as an ideal…. Slaves were the first persons to find themselves in a situation where it
was vital to refer to what they wanted in this way. And slaveholders, quick to recognize this
new value, were the first class of parasitic oppressors to exploit it. 129

Patterson is emphatic that this conclusion of the importance of slavery to freedom results from a
Hegelian methodology, and so he describes his method as dialectical.130 Unsurprisingly,
Patterson’s thoughts on manumission are, similarly, informed by Hegel. However, Patterson also
turns to the work of anthropologist Marcel Mauss to explain what he calls “the meaning of
manumission.”131

b. Patterson, Hegel, and manumission
In examining the practice of manumission in slave-owning societies throughout world
history, Patterson makes use of different societies’ thought to examine what he calls “the
conception of manumission” as well as the motions and words that constitute the ritual of
manumission. Both investigations are necessary to articulate what he labels “the meaning of
manumission,” which he frames through the theories of gift exchange from Mauss, but also
Mauss’ anthropological successors Raymond Firth and Marshall Sahlins. Nonetheless,
Patterson’s description of manumission has a decidedly Hegelian twist because, unlike other gift
exchanges, manumission includes the development of a new kind of freedom.
Patterson’s first investigation into manumission, the “conceptual problem,” begins with
Roman law. In Roman law, Patterson finds the clearest answer to the question of why
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manumission cannot be a transaction of buying and selling, what lawyers name conveyance.
Patterson notes that Roman slave-owners allowed their slaves to own property and money,
ownership which they called peculium.132 Slaves used this peculium to purchase their freedom
from their owners. Nonetheless, the slave was not the true owner of the peculium because the
owner was entitled to all money raised by the slave, whether by the slave’s labor, credit, or good
fortune.133 Manumission, therefore, cannot be a conveyance, as slaves do not truly own the
money with which they pay for their freedom.134 Furthermore, there is an additional problem in
framing the slave-owner as the seller of the slave’s freedom: in conveyance, there is a buyer, a
seller and a thing conveyed between the two.135 To describe manumission as conveyance is to
insist that in this relationship, the seller and the thing are the same. Patterson rejects as
incoherent this explanation of manumission as conveyance. He then turns to the motions and
instruments that made up the practice manumission in order to investigate manumission as a
ritual of redemption.136
In examining the rituals that make up manumission, Patterson again turns to Roman law,
this time to contrast the Romans’ practice of postliminum with the manumission practices of the
Mbanza Manteke of central Africa. Postliminum was a legal recourse available to captured
Romans to ensure they could regain their citizenship and property.137 Patterson takes
postliminum as an example of how Romans refused to conceive of enslavement as a permanent
status, but rather as status that was the result of vicissitude.138 Patterson juxtaposes this Roman
conception with how the Mbanza Manteke insisted on the permanence of enslavement. The
132
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Mbanza Manteke also accept the return of people whom others had captured and enslaved. But,
unlike the Romans, the Mbanza Manteke received these captives as slaves into their own
societies, as emphasized by the chalk that they marked on their bodies during the moment of the
exchange.139 In other words, while the Roman captives come home free, the Mbanza Manteke
captives come home as slaves. Patterson then reads the motions and materials that made up the
return of the chalked captives as an example of a gift exchange: the slave is a gift from the
outside community to the Mbanza Manteke.
In contrast, while manumission is similar to this exchange of hostages among the Mbanza
Manteke, Patterson notes how manumission differs fundamentally in that it involves the creation
of a freedperson. That is, for Patterson, gift exchange cannot explain how prior to manumission
beginning there is a slave, while after manumission has ended there is a freedperson.
Nonetheless, Patterson is drawn to the model of gift exchange because he wants to highlight how
slaves frequently gave their owners a sum of money for their freedom.140 Indeed, this aspect of
manumission is important to the study of Roman manumission because payment for
manumission was so standard in Rome that the jurists developed sophisticated legal explanations
of how this exchange functioned.141 But because Patterson notes that the owner already owned
this money, he asserts that the gift exchange that is most similar to manumission is the gift
exchange between humans and the gods. For just as the gods are already entitled to all that
humans give them, so too are slave-owners already entitled to all that slaves give them.142 For
this reason, Patterson describes manumission as an asymmetrical gift exchange, a phrase that
connects to his description of manumission as social rebirth.
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Manumission is an asymmetrical gift exchange for Patterson because enslavement was an
asymmetrical exchange. Patterson describes enslavement itself as a form of debt, the debt that
the slave owes to the slave-owner. Patterson argues that the justification of slavery is that the
owner has either directly or indirectly given the slave physical life. Notably, this is an idea that
the Romans themselves articulated, as the jurists used this explanation to articulate why slavery
is justified, even though under natural law no one is born a slave.143 The owner gives the slave
physical life in exchange for the slave’s obedience; that is, the obedience is a proxy for the
slave’s entire life, which is owed to the slave-owner. This exchange strips the slave of honor,
making the slave socially dead. For Patterson, the functioning of this process becomes only more
evident when juxtaposed with the gift of manumission.
Enslavement was separation (or symbolic execution), slavery was a liminal state of social
death, and manumission was symbolic rebirth…. The master gives the slave physical life either
directly (if he was the original enslaver) or indirectly (if he purchased or inherited him), in
return for which the slave is under obligation to reciprocate with total obedience and service.
In the act of repaying his debt, the slave loses social life. This loss, however, is not part of the
repayment to the master; it is rather one of the terms of the transaction – the exchange of
physical life for total obedience. With manumission the master makes another gift to the slave,
this time the gift of social life, which is ideologically interpreted as a repayment for faithful
service.144

In this passage, Patterson notes that it is the owner who gives the slave two gifts that are beyond
the slave’s ability to repay in full. The first gift is the gift of physical life. The owner, whether
directly or indirectly, chooses to spare the slave, rather than kill the slave. The slave, therefore,
owes the owner his or her very life.145 The second gift is the gift of manumission. While the
slave may pay for manumission, Patterson here notes that manumission remains a gift because
just as a slave’s physical life is irreplaceable, so too is a slave’s social life. Specifically, the
slave’s physical and social lives are irreplaceable because they are necessary for the slave to
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accumulate, discharge, and manage past and future debts. Therefore, manumission is not simply
an act of exchange, but an act of creation and birth: the slave is created as freedperson and
birthed into social life. Patterson binds this creative aspect of manumission to his ideas on the
development of freedom, ideas that are intimately intertwined with his reading of Hegel.
Patterson further describes manumission as the slave’s “negation of the negation,” a
Hegelian term that emphasizes the novelty and distinction of the former slave’s freedom. That is,
as I discussed in Section 4a above, Patterson is emphatic that freedpeople and slave-owners have
qualitatively distinct experiences of freedom because it is the slave who first experiences
freedom by experiencing the lack of freedom in slavery:
As enslavement is life-taking, it follows logically and symbolically that the release from
slavery is life-giving and life-creating. The master gives, and in giving he creates. It must
always be the case that the master give up something, so that the slave may gain something
else. The master would seem to gain nothing. Hence he incurs a loss. What results from this
deliberate loss is a double negation: the negation of the negation of social life, resulting in a
new creation—the new man, the freed man.146

The term “negation of the negation” explains the qualitatively distinct experience of the former
slave’s freedom, for just as slavery is the negation of the slave’s freedom, so then the
freedperson’s freedom is the negation of slavery, which is to say the negation of the negation of
freedom. Notably, Hegel himself does not use this term to describe the struggle of the bondsman.
Patterson instead uses this term from Hegel’s Science of Logic to supplement his reading of
Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman; to emphasize that while manumission creates freedom, it is a
new type of freedom.147
Patterson turns again to Roman slavery to ground his idea of manumission as the creation
of a new type of freedom, that is to say, a form of social birth. Specifically, he notes that the
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Roman legal scholar W.W. Buckland describes Roman manumission as the creation of a civis.148
The Romans were unusual in human history in this liberality of citizenship; most human
societies did not equate manumission with entry into the citizenry. Nonetheless, Patterson finds
in this unusual aspect of Roman manumission an indication of how manumission functions in a
universal sense. That is, Patterson takes this unusual particularlity of Roman history as reflecting
a key aspect of manumission universally, which is that manumission is a form of rebirth.149
Because not all societies allowed former slaves to become citizens, manumission, instead, is the
social rebirth of a slave. This rebirth distinguishes the freedom of the freedperson from the
freedom of the slave-owner: for the freedom of the former slave is a freedom marked by the
experience of lack of freedom or, more specifically, social death.
But does social death distinguish slaves from other people, or does the term highlight the
pains and struggles that are part of slavery, pains and struggles that are not unique to slavery?
Other sociologists have used Patterson’s term to describe the conditions of people other than
slaves. For example, Joshua Price uses this term to analyze the lives of prisoners in the US, while
Lisa Marie Cacho uses it to explore the intersection of racism and the American criminal system
more broadly.150 Furthermore, as I demonstrate in the next section, Butler goes a step further and
uses Patterson’s terminology as part of her discussion of subjects, subjection, and subject
formation. Butler also deploys another term, unlivable life, which she develops in conversation
with Patterson’s thought on social death. I argue that Butler’s work on the unlivable life is an apt
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description of the lives of Roman slaves and is one that elucidates the importance of Roman
manumission.

5. Butler, Hegel, the unlivable life, and Roman slavery
Like Patterson, Butler is a close reader of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman. Unlike
Patterson, Butler joins the struggle of the bondsman to Hegel’s description of the unhappy
consciousness. Butler does so because while she sees the passage from bondsman to unhappy
consciousness as having important contributions to the discussion of freedom and power, she is
concerned that those who read the struggle of the bondsman in isolation from the rest of the
Phenomenology risk missing how the unhappy consciousness is a continuation of the lord’s
dominance over the bondsman. Butler provides a persuasive reading of the struggle of the
bondsman in which after the struggle, the bondsman does not face the opprobrium of an external,
physical lord, but does face the scorn of an internalized, psychic lord.
Butler puts her reading of Hegel in conversation with Foucault’s description of power, in
part to posit possible solutions to Foucault’s disregard for psychic interiority. Furthermore,
Foucault’s thoughts on power are very useful for describing the dynamics of a complex practice
such as manumission, especially when combined with the vocabulary of Bourdieu. Foucault
himself advocates a pragmatic, rather than systematic, approach to the adoption of various
thinkers, thereby making his own work suitable for combining with Hegel. By combining
Foucault’s thoughts on power with ideas from Hegel and Patterson, Butler provides an ethical
way of thinking about Roman manumission that is sensitive to the numerous social forces at play
in manumission, including slaves’ own participation. For while the state, slave-owners and
freeborn Romans all participated and had stakes in a slave’s manumission, so too did slaves
themselves. The difference was that the slaves’ stake in manumission was their freedom and
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their participation was their very lives. Just as Patterson’s description of slavery as social death
has powerful ethical dimensions, I similarly use Butler’s phrase “unlivable life” in part because it
flags the injustice and moral harm of slavery that continues after a slave’s manumission.

a. Butler, Hegel, and power
Butler rereads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman in part to emphasize the importance of
bodies, a move that is directly connected to Foucault’s insistence on the corporeal nature of
power. Foucault looked at how power functioned in institutions such as psychiatric asylums and
prisons, rather than explicitly political institutions such as governments, making his thought
useful for articulating how power functioned in practices that are not often thought of as
political, such as manumission.151 Foucault’s thoughts on power are integral to my own
discussion of the power of manumission, as well as my reading of Butler’s description of power.
Butler reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman as a way to highlight the trajectories, and turns, of
power that flow through the body and the psyche. In doing so, like my Romanizing reading in
Section 3b above, Butler reads the struggle of the bondsman as a part of a longer narrative that
includes Hegel’s description of Stoicism and the unhappy consciousness.
Foucault articulates four aspects of power that connect to the functioning of Roman
manumission. First, Foucault asserts that power operates upon the field of the body; power is
always localized. In other words, to appeal to a grand description such as ‘Rome has power over
Greece’ is insufficient for describing how power operated when the Romans manumitted Greek
slaves. Rather, an analysis of Roman manumission must take into consideration how the very
bodies of slaves and slave-owners were positioned and moved. Second, there is an intimate
relationship between knowledge and power. As a result, in the study of humans, the aims of
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knowledge can never be disentangled from the aims of power.152 For Foucault, just as knowledge
is a tool of power, so too is power a tool of knowledge.153 This aspect of power undergirds how I
approach the legacy of slaves, as the study of ancient slavery interacts with the current practices
of slavery in this contemporary, post-abolitionist world, as well as interacting with forms of
oppression that are direct descendants of Atlantic slavery. Third, Foucault argues that all human
power exists only in relationship; indeed, Foucault goes so far to state that such power is
essential to constituting us as humans.154 Fourth, because of this relational aspect of power,
power is never completely hierarchical or unilateral. Rather, because power does not reside with
a single person, any instance of domination is simultaneously a “conduit from below.”155 These
last two aspects of power are essential to understanding how manumission was a practice that
demanded the participation of slaves in order to generate the power to free them.
But I cannot use Foucault’s thoughts on power uncritically, or even in a manner
completely faithful to Foucault’s arguments, as he insists that some of these aspects of power are
specific to modernity, and he explicitly contrasts this functioning of power to how power
functioned in the past.156 At the beginning of Discipline and Punish, he reads the difference
between “public execution and the time table” as a difference between two distinct time periods.
He posits that in monarchical France, and presumably in earlier time periods as well, power was
spectacularly enacted on the body, unlike in the nineteenth century and later, in which power was
constitutive of subjectivity. Because Foucault himself advocated a thoroughly pragmatic
approach to thinkers, going so far as to say the best way to pay tribute to an author’s thought is to
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“use it, deform it, to make it groan and protest,” using Foucault’s thoughts on power for a study
of antiquity seems fitting.157 In doing so, I am in good company, as Butler also makes Foucault
groan.
Butler’s description of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman is both pre-political and
political, thereby complimenting the corporeal discussion of power that she takes from Foucault.
Butler’s reading of Hegel is pre-political in the sense that she uses the conflict between the lord
and bondsman in order to explain why an unequal distribution of power and socially
differentiated consciousnesses precede the genesis of political relationships.158 The pre-political
nature of Butler’s reading comes through in her description of Hegel’s Phenomenology as a
“…reflection upon the very possibility of beginning, and a gesture towards a conception of
infinity which is without beginning or end….”159 At the same time, her reading of the struggle of
the bondsman is political, as she uses it to demonstrate how Hegel, like Foucault, shows that
“[The] limits to liberation are to be understood not merely as self-imposed but, more
fundamentally, as the precondition of the subject’s very formation.”160 For Butler, both Hegel
and Foucault are highlighting how the conflict between the body and the psyche is a dynamic
bound up with the production of subjects, who have the coherence to manipulate power on their
own.
This reading of the struggle of the bondsman, therefore, dovetails with her reading of
Foucault’s description of power as intimately involved the formation of subjects. Specifically,
Butler turns to Foucault to discuss the third and fourth aspects of power that I highlighted above,
how power is relational and constitutive.
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We are used to thinking of power as what presses on the subject from the outside, as what
subordinates, sets underneath, and relegates to a lower order. But if, following Foucault, we
understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing the very condition of its
existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also, in
a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbor and preserve in the
beings that we are.161

One of Butler’s goals in The Psychic Life of Power is to demonstrate how Hegel’s
Phenomenology anticipates Foucault’s description of power as providing the venue for “the
inhabitation of the body.”162 Butler is aware of how Hegel and Foucault’s thoughts conflict with
each other in fundamental ways, but she nonetheless deploys the two thinkers together.163 This
pairing allows her to write the body back into Hegel’s text as well as posit the unhappy
consciousness as a bondsman who has internalized the directives of the lord.
The Phenomenology includes the following sequence in section B, Self-Consciousness:
the struggle of the bondsman, Stoicism, Skepticism, and the unhappy consciousness.164 While it
is dangerous to assume that the entire Phenomenology is best read as a narrative progression, that
hermeneutical technique is valuable for combining the two sequential subsections Independence
and dependence of self-consciousness: Mastery and bondage and Freedom of self-consciousness:
Stoicism, Skepticism and the unhappy consciousness.165 Furthermore, in his description of the
development of Stoicism, Hegel alludes to his earlier passages on the lord and bondsman,
demonstrating the progressive connection between the struggle of the bondsman and Stoicism,
implying that the consciousness of the bondsman is the consciousness that transforms into the
consciousness that is Stoicism. For Hegel writes, “Stoicism is the freedom which always comes
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directly out of bondage and returns to the pure universality of thought.”166 That is, Stoicism is a
consciousness that values thinking about abstractions, rather than engaging in the particularities
that constitute the world.167 The history of bondage undergirds Hegel’s description of Stoicism;
the history of bondage frames his thinking about abstraction as a strategy for avoiding the pains
that accompanies living in the world, and all of its particularities.
This commitment to abstraction ultimately leads to the change from Stoicism to
Skepticism, as the consciousness’ desire to remain at the level of abstraction draws it to practice
contrarianism: the destruction of all claims about the real.168 Such contrarianism initially allows
the consciousness to remain in abstraction, but at the cost of disowning Stoicism. For the
constant contrarianism evokes a change in desire. While Stoicism valued abstraction as a form of
freedom, Skepticism finds pleasure in contradicting all claims about reality.169 This pleasure is
not sustainable, as altercations with other consciousnesses forces Skepticism to examine the
contradictions within its own arguments.170 This self-reflection marks the change to the unhappy
consciousness, as the unhappy consciousness is a “single consciousness, [but] must ever have
present in the one consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of each in turn in the
very moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the other.”171
Butler notes that while Hegel does not reflect on bodies as “sites of experience,”
nonetheless bodies play an important role in the Phenomenology, as the lord and bondsman are
positioned in opposition to each through their bodies.172 This concern about Hegelian bodies
connects to her interest in Foucault’s invitation to consider the “soul as the prison of the
166
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body.”173 Hegel describes the unhappy consciousness as a single consciousness that has another
consciousness present in it, a division resulting from the altercation of Skepticism. For Butler,
this division allows the unhappy consciousness to “take itself as its own object of scorn.”174 In an
attempt to avoid this scorn, the unhappy consciousness devotes its own body to the service of
unchangeable thought.175 While this scorn is connected to other distinctions of the unhappy
consciousness from Skepticism and Stoicism, the important result is that the unhappy
consciousness is in a psychic conflict. This conflict similar to the struggle between the bondsman
and the lord, but it is contained within a single body.
Every effort to reduce itself to inaction or to nothing, to subordinate or mortify its own body,
culminates inadvertently in the production of self-consciousness as a pleasure-seeking and
self-aggrandizing agent. Every effort to overcome the body, pleasure, and agency proves to be
nothing other than the assertion of precisely those features of the subject. 176

As in her pre-political and political reading of the struggle of the bondsman, Butler articulates
this containment as part of power’s production of the subject.
Butler’s reading dovetails with my Romanized reading, as both use Hegel’s description
of the unhappy consciousness to elaborate the context and meaning of the earlier struggle of the
bondsman. First, Butler does draw attention to the many Christian themes in Hegel’s unhappy
consciousness, such as devotion, self-sacrifice, and the figure of the priest.177 In doing so, this
most unhistorical of writers makes the unhappy consciousness historically specific, as she
implicitly casts the unhappy consciousness as interacting with Rome by calling out these
Christian themes as well as evoking the ancient schools of Stoicism and Skepticism.178 Second,
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in Butler’s interpretation of the development of the bondsman, his freedom is hard-won, but still
limited, as he internalizes the subordination and mortification that he had endured under the lord,
and repeats such subordination on himself, as the unhappy consciousness devotes its body to the
service of unchangeable thought. Butler’s emphasis on internalization for the unhappy
consciousness adds an important psychological nuance to my reading Roman manumission
through the struggle of the bondsman. That is, Butler’s argument about the internalization in the
unhappy consciousness corresponds to how Roman slaves needed to internalize Roman values,
and practices, to first become worthy of manumission and then survive as freedmen and
freedwomen. To reread the example of Epictetus through the unhappy consciousness, his
philosophy of Stoicism becomes not simply a response to his enslavement, but also a way for
him to work through the masterly demands that were once external, but are now internal. In such
a reading, while manumission remains the casting off of metal chains, it is simultaneously the
beginning of a struggle with psychic chains.
To review: while Patterson reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman in order to articulate
how slavery and manumission create a new kind of freedom, Butler’s emphasis on the unhappy
consciousness makes the bondsman’s struggle with the lord a story of continuity, rather than
rupture. This continuity is important to Butler, in part because she wants to use the struggle of
the bondsman to describe the formation of subjects throughout human history, in contrast to
Patterson, who turns to the struggle of the bondsman to argue why it is was slaves who first
experienced freedom. Of course, the proper Hegelian response to this dilemma is to attempt to
synthesize these two approaches, to assert that manumission was fundamental to the
development of freedom and to assert that the freedom of manumitted slaves included psychic
struggles.
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b. Butler, the unlivable life, and Roman slavery
Livability and its opposite, unlivability, lie at the intersection of three different poles in
Butler’s thought: grief, gender, and intelligibility, a term closely related to recognition. There is
in Butler’s description of livability and unlivability a vocabulary suitable for illuminating what
was at stake in Roman manumission for slaves, slave-owners, the state, and freeborn Romans.
Rather than use Butler’s vocabulary to judge the moral worth of Roman manumission, I instead
turn to it to outline how manumission was part of slaves’ strategies for living amid the interests
of disparate groups who had different interests in manumission. Roman slavery made life
unlivable for slaves, and manumission was the transition to a livable life.
Butler’s connection of grief to livability is perhaps best apparent in her analysis of
Sophocles’ Antigone. In her reading, Antigone is “…not to have a life to live, to be condemned
to death prior to any possibility of life.”179 Butler connects Antigone’s foreclosed life to her
ungrievable grief for Polynices, but also writes that Antigone is not alone in having ungrievable
grief, that it is common to the condemned:
Antigone refuses to obey any law that refuses public recognition of her loss, and in this way
prefigures the situation that those with publicly ungrievable losses—from AIDS, for
instance—know too well. To what sort of living death have they been condemned? 180

The implication is that in order to live a livable life, one must be able to mourn and to grieve, and
the prohibitions against grief are trespasses against one’s full flourishing. Bonnie Honig objects
to Butler’s connection of grief to livability, suggesting that Butler is creating new criteria for a
moralizing humanism, specifically, a humanism defined primarily through the need to grieve.181
I instead read Butler as an ethical tactician; that is, she does not hold out a definitive telos for
ethical action. Instead, she evaluates the kinds of ethics that are possible in a given terrain. Her
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tools livability and unlivability are suitable for the ethical terrain of Roman manumission, just as
they are suitable for charting the terrain of gender.
In the preface to the 1999 edition of Gender Trouble, Butler not only reflects on the style
of her writing, but also breaks from her own impersonal style to comment on the role of gender
in her own childhood and adolescence.182 She reviews how the assumption that gender was either
natural, or a cultural constant, was the justification for a violent policing within her family. This
violence is the background for her description of her experience of foreclosed life, “I also came
to understand something of the violence of the foreclosed life, the one that does get named as
‘living,’ the one whose incarceration implies a suspension of life, or a sustained death
sentence.”183 Butler then alludes to this part of her life when she clarifies that her current
research includes asking how gender determines what is livable:
What continues to concern me most is the following kinds of questions: what will and will not
constitute an intelligible life, and how do presumptions about normative gender and sexuality
determine in advance what will qualify as the “human” and the “livable”? 184

Butler is of course most famous for her examination of gender and performativity, and so any
analysis of her questioning how gender determines livability needs to be read in this light.185 By
examining gender through the lens of performance, Butler rejects the easy notion that gender is
something added to a preexisting human; instead she insists that we approach gender as
contingent upon, and participating in, others’ recognition in a way that includes the very
production of our bodies.
The importance of recognition in Butler’s thought is apparent in the above quote on
intelligibility. For Butler, intelligibility is an attribute necessary for humans to participate in
recognition, a recognition that is, in turn, necessary for a livable life. The quote above also
182
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indicates that intelligibility is closely connected to issues of gender. However, in her work on
other topics, such as war, Butler describes recognition as necessary for aspects of life distinct
from gender:
But here I am wondering whether there is not also a differential way of regarding populations,
such that some are considered from the start very much alive and others more questionably
alive, perhaps even socially dead (the term that Orlando Patterson developed to describe the
status of the slave), or as living figures of the threat to life…war seeks to deny the ongoing and
irrefutable ways in which we are all subject to one another, vulnerable to destruction by the
other, and in need of protection through multilateral and global agreements based on the
recognition of a shared precariousness.186

Notably, Butler uses recognition in this passage after beginning with a review of Patterson’s
description of social death and asking how this term might illuminate the conception and
treatment of populations other than slaves, specifically populations who are considered threats to
life, rather than recognized as fellow precarious humans.
Butler explicitly, and implicitly, refers to Patterson’s term “social death” throughout her
work, refusing to deploy the term uncritically, but attracted to how it succinctly evokes a
subject’s dependence on inclusion, as well as the harsh penalties of exclusion. For Butler, the
term is simply too inviting to be used only as a description of slavery. In Antigone’s Claim, after
she summarizes how Patterson uses social death to describe slavery, Butler then pivots and opens
up the term to people other than slaves.
… [Patterson] offers us the important concept of “social death” to describe this aspect of
slavery in which slaves are treated as dying within life.
“Social death” is the term Patterson gives to the status of being a living being radically
deprived of all rights that are supposed to be accorded to any and all living human beings.
What remains uninterrogated in his view, and that I believe resurfaces in his contemporary
views on family politics, is precisely his objection to slave men being deprived by slavery of
an ostensibly “natural” patriarchal position within the family. 187

Butler is aware that by opening up this term to non-slaves, she re-asks the question of what it is
that slaves miss through their enslavement. Nonetheless, she does not seek to establish a
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definitive list of human activities, relationships, or experiences that slavery denies slaves,
although her work on the connection of grievability to livability suggests that at the very least
slavery denies slaves the healing power of grief and also the dignity of being grieved. Given
Butler’s cautions against assigning transcendent value to certain relationships, it is unprofitable
to assume that Butler seeks to correct Patterson’s views about slaves and fathers by offering a
different list of what social death denies.188
But significantly for the study of Roman slavery, Butler charts new territory for
examining how social death is constructed and maintained, a process that I see as connected to
her interpretation of Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman, which is to say, connected to her
thoughts on the formation of subjects. In The Psychic Life of Power, there is an allusion to
Patterson’s social death in Butler’s phrase the “socially dead,” which refers to those whose
deaths are not so much ignored, as they are celebrated as a form of triumph.
Can we read the workings of social power precisely in the delimination of the field of such
objects, objects marked for death? And is this part of the irreality, the melancholic aggression
and the desire to vanquish, that characterizes the public response to the death of many of those
considered “socially dead,” who die from AIDS? Gay people, prostitutes, drug users, among
others? If they are dying or already dead, let us vanquish them again. And can the sense of
triumph be won precisely through the practice of social differentiation which one achieves and
maintains “social existence” only by the production and maintenance of those socially dead?189

Notably, in describing the triumph that these deaths evoke, Butler focalizes from the perspective
of the triumphant. She does so, I argue, not because she wishes to align herself with this feeling,
but rather to highlight how this triumph is forged through the complicity of all the subjects
producing social existence. In other words, Butler asks if social death is the result of our own
social existence, if another must become the socially dead as we struggle to become subjects. For
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remember that Butler reads Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman in such a way that it reflects
universal patterns in subject formation, suggesting this kind of internalization is not unique to
slaves, bondsmen, or other people, but is rather indicative of life itself. Butler does not answer
her question about the relationship of the socially dead to the desire to vanquish, but her
searching points to how Patterson’s term enables questions of a radically different nature than the
ones he originally asked about slavery. Butler’s broadening of the scope of social death to ask
questions of complicity is, in part, the basis of my exploration of how the Roman state, slaveowners generally, and freeborn Romans shaped the practice of manumission.
Describing Roman slavery as unlivable emphasizes that slaves were indeed alive, that
they were family members, workers, writers, and the many other roles and identities that
complicate any attempts to think about Roman slaves as a single class of people. That is to say,
their social death did not entail social isolation, a point that Patterson himself emphasizes.190 As
people integrated into Roman society, Roman slaves had social lives, but these were lives that
other Romans worked together in various way to make unlivable. The term unlivable life also
brings to the forefront how enslavement is a precarious condition. While the dead are complete
in their deadness, the living, by the mere virtue of being alive, are incomplete: their lives
continue forward into the unknown future. This future included the possibility of physical death,
as well as manumission, but also flight from slavery and armed resistance to slave-owners. In
this incompleteness and precariousness, those living unlivable lives face the possibility of further
wounding, including both physical wounding as well as social degradation. The inventiveness of
human cruelty means that an unlivable life can always be rendered even more unlivable, just as
the life of a slave can always be rendered more painful or degrading. However, the
precariousness of the unlivable life also keeps open the possibility of ecstasy, including the
190
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ecstasy of freedom obtained through manumission, flight, and revolution. The conception of
slavery as an unlivable life implies that manumission is the transition to a livable life, while
simultaneously allowing the past of slavery to linger and haunt. Furthermore, because it is the
transition to a livable life, rather than recognition with a society, manumission becomes
compatible with flight and revolution, rather than a norm against which slave’s flight and revolt
must be measured.

6. Roman manumission as ritualized practice
Manumission was a ritualized practice that transitioned slaves from an unlivable life to a
livable life. My use of the term practice comes from Bourdieu, who develops this word in
conjunction with his theory of habitus. My Bourdieu is, primarily, the one found in the work of
religion scholar Catherine Bell, whose work on ritual prompts me to analyze Roman
manumission as ritualized practice. In her analysis of theories ritual, Bell takes to task Émile
Durkheim and Clifford Geertz for ignoring how the ritual that is the object of their theorization is
an object that their very own theorization calls into existence.191 That is, the conception of ritual
as a coherent and stable identity is more the result of the demands of one’s own schemas than it
is a coherence and stability that is inherent in the events and actions that make up rituals. In place
of theory, Bell proffers a framework for approaching ritual as a type practice, that is, an activity
distinct from other practices only to extent that its practitioners themselves need to distinguish it
from other actions.192 Because the Romans’ descriptions of manumission included both
magistrates reluctantly performing governmental duty for a singular slave in the street and a
general magnanimously granting freedom to thousands of a slaves after battle, it is important for
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any definition of manumission to be flexible enough to accommodate the diverse contexts in
which Romans freed slaves.193
Bourdieu describes practice as situational and strategic. By situational, Bourdieu means it
is not possible to consider it abstractly without some loss, as practice is corporeal, with gestures
and words that are entirely dependent on the original context.194 Abstraction is of course
necessary when considering the influences and causes upon some practice, but because a practice
is so particularized, to divorce it from its context is to reject possible avenues of investigation
that are unique to that particular context. By strategic, Bourdieu means that participants can use
their logic and sense in manipulative and expeditious ways.195 Bourdieu is also quite insistent
that practice operates by a different logic than “logical logic.”196 Bourdieu notes that by viewing
practice as strategic, it becomes clear how practice is not merely the repetition of a past action,
but an invention that is sensitive to demands of the moment, even if this novelty bypasses the
immediate awareness of the practitioner. Hence, he describes practice as “the intentionless
invention of regulated improvisation.”197 This kind of tension between the anonymous
expectation of others and the demands of the moment is present in Gaius’ description of the
harried magistrate.198
Bourdieu’s description of habitus articulates how manumission functioned as part of the
culture of slave-ownership among the Romans. Indeed, it is through Bourdieu’s habitus that it is
possible to treat manumission as an object of historical inquiry, as habitus is the site of the
accumulation, and circulation, of a society’s past practices, as well as that which informs the
193
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improvisation of current practice. More specifically in terms of slavery, I use habitus to explain
how Roman slave-owners had similar, coherent, but changing, methods for treating and acting
around slaves. Significantly, the habitus is not congruent with social structures, but is rather a
location and component of, and for, such social structures. Bourdieu would point how the
Romans taught each other the mechanics of slave-ownership through bodily motions. Indeed,
since Bourdieu suggests that whole cosmologies are communicated in injunctions such as “stand
up straight!”, it is easy to imagine the whip similarly communicating the cosmology of slaveownership.199
Bourdieu posits the idea of habitus as a way to surpass the problems of describing
practice as the obedience to particular rules.200 Bourdieu’s formulation has the benefit of both
describing the intentionless reformation of various practices in response to new problems, as well
as emphasizing the importance of timing and the sense of style in practice. That is, for Bourdieu,
the habitus is a “generative principle of regulated improvisations” that adjusts to the pressures of
the moment in order to produce “practices that cannot be directly deduced from the objective
conditions.”201 In other words, for Bourdieu one never merely follows a tradition, but instead one
practices it at that particular moment, a practice that can in turn become the basis of another
practice in the future. In an important contrast to structuralist models, Bourdieu writes that the
habitus is a “product of history,” as the dispositions that constitute it “survive in the present and
[it] tend[s] to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practice structured
according to its principles.”202 Since Bourdieu’s habitus is within time and is, indeed, part of the
fabric of a society, it is possible to chart a history of the changes within the habitus overtime.
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Second, the term practice suggests continuity, rather than separation, from the majority of
human activity. This similarity is important when approaching manumission as ritual because
one of the false steps in theorizing ritual is to demarcate it as so separate from other activity that
it becomes necessary for theorists to distinguish ritual from ceremony, from magic, and so
forth.203 Indeed, Bell entirely discards the question of “is this a ritual?” to instead consider
ritualization as a choice that participants may use in order to distinguish a certain practice from
others. For Bell, the word ritualization also emphasizes how no activity is essentially a ritual, but
is instead only a ritual because the participants demarcate it so in relation to other activities. As
an example, Bell offers up the example of the Christian mass. The mass is defined in opposition
to meals through formalization (i.e., presence of qualified participants and special food) and
periodization (i.e., how it occurs, at a minimum, every Sunday). Nonetheless, formalization and
periodization are not essential aspects of mass, as some Christians practice masses that are
markedly informal and irregular, that is, they practice masses that are in opposition to the
formalized and regularized masses.204 Similarly, formalization was not an essential in the
Romans’ conception of manumission: on the one hand, in manumissio vindicta, the Romans
required the slave-owner, a magistrate and a fictive litigant to recite specific formulae and hold a
festuca staff at particular moments in order to consider the slave properly manumitted.205 On the
other hand, when Roman actors freed slaves on the stage, the slave-owner simply declared the
slave free.206
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7. Conclusion
I chart what influence of the Roman state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans had on the
shape of manumission. I do so because in order to write properly how slaves participated in and
experienced manumission, it is first necessary to confront the problem of recognition that Butler
describes: “The problem is not merely how to include more people within existing norms, but to
consider how existing norms allocate recognition differentially.”207 In other words, the history of
Roman manumission must accommodate the slaves’ experience as humans while simultaneously
recording how they were part of a society that systematically created conditions that made their
lives unlivable. To assert simply that one will consider ancient slaves as human is to run the risk
of ignoring how our only methods of knowing about Roman slaves is through sources that are
invested in their denigration. It is because the state, slave-owners, and non-slave-owning Romans
profited from making slaves’ lives unlivable that their stakes in manumission were so high.
My interest in these social stakes in manumission may raise questions about my interest
in Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman. For while Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman is indeed quite
useful for describing the psychological and experiential concerns relationship between slaves and
the slave-owners, what can this relationship explain about the relationship between the slave and
the state or the slave and a freeborn Roman who does not own slaves? Hegel does not describe
the struggle of the bondsman as occurring within any particular social context, and as a result,
the struggle of the bondsman is not good at illuminating the interests of groups of people, other
than those who can be read as either the bondsman or the lord. But while Hegel does not
articulate a social context for the struggle, Patterson does. While Hegel does not raise questions
of others’ complicity with the struggle of the bondsman, Butler does. Patterson and Butler both
apply a telescopic lens to Hegel that brings into focus various shortcomings within the struggle
207
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of the bondsman, vis-à-vis his ideas on the worth and value of the enslaved. But they also bring
to Hegel a wide-angle lens that highlights the connections that bind the struggle of the bondsman
to a wider and more fully socialized context.
Despite Patterson’s and Butler’s augmentations and rearticulations of Hegel, I
nonetheless also turn to other thinkers in order to analyze the social functions of the words and
movements that made of manumission. For this reason, in this chapter, I turn to Bell, Bourdieu,
and Foucault, as their vocabulary of power, practice, and ritualization provide useful tools for
articulating the function of Roman manumission. While I return to these thinkers in Chapters 2,
3, and 4, in those chapters I also bring in other thinkers in order to bring into focus unique
aspects of the relationship between manumission and the group in question. Therefore, Chapter 2
incorporates ideas of anthropologist James Scott, whose work on how states organize knowledge
articulates part of what was at stake in the Roman state’s interest in manumission. Likewise,
Chapter 3 introduces the term secondarity. Although the philosopher Rémi Brague originated the
term as part of a larger project to describe the relationship of Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem in
European history, Classicist Emma Dench demonstrates that it’s possible to detach the term from
Brague’s theological goals and instead use it to articulate how the Romans positioned themselves
vis-à-vis their Mediterranean neighbors. I use secondarity to describe how the Romans
incorporated Greek ideas on Roman manumission. Finally, Chapter 4 includes the terms
psychological wage and racialization. Racialization is a term that I take from the sociologists
Omi and Winant, while psychological wage comes from sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois. I use the
term racialization to describe one tactic that freeborn Romans, who were not slave-owners, used
to distinguish themselves from slaves and former slaves. Such freeborn Romans were motivated
to make and enforce such distinctions in order to collect a psychological wage, that is, a sense of
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superiority over both slaves and former slaves. That freeborn Romans who did not own slaves
became aligned with slave-owners rather than slaves returns the question to Butler because
Butler describes social death as part of the process of subjection, that is, the process of becoming
a subject. This interest in complicity, in turn, prompts a return to both Patterson and Hegel’s
struggle of the bondsman. This understanding prompts a return to Patterson, in order to explore,
more fully, the relationship between slaves and non-slave-owning free people. Such an
exploration of Patterson in turn prompts a return to Hegel in which the reader is equipped to
make Hegel’s thought follow through on his commitment to describing the movement towards
absolute freedom.
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Chapter 2: Seeing like a state: The state and Roman manumission
1. Introduction
How did the Roman state see manumission? This question forces an examination of what
kind of relationship there was between the Roman state and Roman slave-owners qua slaveowners. This question also brings to the forefront how the Roman state had a relationship with
slaves, one that was not mediated through the slave-owners. For example, that the state could,
and did, expect such loyalty from slaves to the extent that slaves betrayed their masters for the
sake of the Roman state. In articulating how the Roman state saw manumission, I argue that the
state had interests in, and values of, manumission that were distinct from the interests of either
the slaves or the slave-owners. Manumission was an issue of patronage between the slave-owner
and the slave; in other words, manumission was a point on the pole between the slave and the
slave-owner. This chapter lays the groundwork for a similar pole between slaves and state.
Since manumission is a legal process, involving the transition of the slave from one legal
category to the other, it may appear obvious that manumission is a process intimately involved
with the state.208 However, I argue that the ways that the state shaped the practice of
manumission went beyond the creating and enforcing the laws by which the Romans manumitted
their slaves. First, the state was interested in cultivating a certain kind of slave-owner, one who
manumits his or her slaves in way consistent with policies around Roman citizenship. Second,
the state wanted only certain kinds of slaves to be manumitted, slaves who were loyal to Rome
and could support the common good. Third, the state saw manumission as a source of revenue.
Over the long term, newly freed slaves benefited the Roman economy, politics, and culture. In
the short term, the taxes on manumission provided the state with revenue.
208
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While in this chapter I examine a wide range of evidence, including some from the
beginnings of Latin literature but also legal writings from the third century CE, I do so in order
to extrapolate how Republican Romans thought about manumission and how such thoughts were
connected to the Roman state. The evidence for this thought includes writers such as Plautus,
who lived during the Repulic, and Plutarch, who lived during the Empire. When reading a source
such as Plutarch, I stress his status as a writer who is reconstructing the Republican past.
Nonetheless, his work, and the work of other writers, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and
Livy, are also valuable for the details from the past that they preserve. These details provide
important evidence for how Republican Romans thought about and practiced manumission.
Despite this emphasis on thought, nonetheless the exact proces of manumission is important, and
so the movements and words that made up manumission are part of my larger argument about
the relationship between manumission and the Roman state.209
To articulate how the state shaped how slave-owners approached manumission, in
Section 2 of this chapter, I turn to Foucault’s thoughts on power, especially the relationship of
sight and power. Foucault’s work points to how the state’s sight is diffuse and multifaceted. I use
his work in tandem with that of anthropologist James Scott to explain how the state’s gaze is
present, not only in government officials, but also at times, in Roman citizens. For Scott connects
how states order their knowledge to how states centralize power, a process that, for him, is
closely connected to how the state looks at people, land, and resources. I argue that the Roman
state relied on these espials to regulate and tax manumission, as well as discipline slave-owners.
The Roman state’s tools for shaping manumission included both regulation and taxation.
On the one hand, the state used these tools to further its interest in manumission as a source of
financial gain. On the other hand, I argue that these laws were attempts to make slave-owners
209
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look at their manumissions from the perspective of the state. In Section 3, I argue that Livy’s
testimony suggests that, already in the early second century, the Roman state surveilled slaves as
slaves and that, therefore, it is logical that the state had an interest in manumission. However, as
the next section makes clear, manumission does not relate to state power merely because it
connects to Roman tax revenue. Rather, manumission was of interest to the state because of the
power of manumission to force Romans to recognize the freedom of a former slave.210 This
chapter investigates manumission as a moment in which slaves become visible to the state as free
and explains how the state’s gaze was a key part of recognizing former slaves as Romans.
I find evidence for the state’s gaze on manumission both in the physical act of
manumission and in how ancient writers thought about manumission. Roman writers asserted
that there were three types of manumission, manumissio vindicta (literally “manumission by
wand”), manumissio censu (manumission through the census), and manumissio testamento
(manumission through a will).211 I extrapolate how the state saw manumission from scholarly
reconstructions of these three different ritualized practices. For example, the combination of
ritual instruments, movements, and words in manumissio vindicta were means by which the
Romans created a type of power by which the state could see and recognize a slave as a citizen.
The state’s perspective on manumission also survives in ancient descriptions of manumission
itself and in discussions on the origins of manumission and Romulus’ asylum.
In Section 4, I argue that the Romans connect and struggle with how manumission and
the state relate to each other in the myth of Romulus’ asylum. Both the asylum and manumission
challenge the conception of the boundaries between Roman and non-Roman, as well as the
boundary between slave and free. The boundary between citizen and non-citizen was a matter of
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importance for the state, as such boundaries are essential to determining which people the state
calls upon for military service and for taxes. Furthermore, the description of these boundaries in
this chapter lays part of the groundwork for my exploration of the manumission the volones in
Chapter 4. The approach that I use for Romulus’ asylum is similar to the one that I use for
examining the stories concerning the origins of manumission in Sections 5 and 6.
Rather than explaining manumission as a reward for loyal service to a slave-owner,
which is how the Romans frequently discussed manumission, these origin stories instead frame
manumission as a prerogative of the state. One origin story, that of Vindicius, frames
manuimssio vindicta as originally a reward for the slave daring to value loyalty to the Roman
state over loyalty to his owners. The other origin story, that of king Servius, depicts Servius
enfranchising slaves through some form of manumissio censu, despite the protests of slaveowners, likewise demonstrating that the state’s interests were not identical to that of individual
slave-owners. These two origin stories indicate that the Roman state had two different ways of
viewing manumission: the state saw manumission as a tool to garner the loyalty of slaves and as
a tool to increase the citizenry. Both these tools strengthened the state’s power. These
aetiological stories also point to the state’s interest in the control of slaver-owners as slaveowners.
This chapter concludes with an examination of manumissio testamento. Unlike
manumissio vindica and manumissio censu, there is no surviving aetiological account of how the
Romans began this practice. Nonetheless, the Romans did take this particular form of
manumission seriously, since Augustus targeted this practice for legal reforms at the end of the
first century. This account of Augustus and manumission anticipates the Conclusion, in which I
analyze how first century Romans used manumission to centralize their power. Augustus’
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reforms occur within a larger context of state involvement with Roman wills, demonstrating that
Roman slave-owners practiced this form of manumission while negotiating their visibility and
vulnerability to the state’s gaze.

2. Theorizing the state’s gaze
I theorize the phrase “the state’s gaze” as an activity that is connected to sight, power,
and knowledge. While I primarily turn to Foucault in order explain how these three operate, I use
a modified form of Foucault’s thought. At first glance, Foucault’s commitment to connecting
issues of power to the advent of modernity makes it impossible to apply his theories to antiquity,
especially because his description of power and discipline is part of his other projects on the
development of contemporary knowledge.212 I argue that it is possible to jettison Foucault’s
thoughts on modernity while nonetheless keeping his descriptions of power and sight. To fortify
this position, I turn to the work of James Scott. Although Scott mainly writes independently of
Foucault, nonetheless, his work touches on similar concerns about power and knowledge. But
while Foucault examines the organization of knowledge in order to make arguments about its
development and periodization, Scott instead focuses on the organization of knowledge as part of
state centralization. Foucault and Scott bolster my own theory of how the Roman state’s gaze
worked with manumission.
I argue that this description of the state’s gaze is suitable for a combination of evidence
that includes the following: first, the physical actions associated with manumission; and second,
how ancient writers conceived of manumission as relating to issues of the citizen body. On the
one hand, the gaze is a physical act and is, therefore, relevant for evidence that relates to the
ritualized practice of manumission. On the other hand, unlike other physical activities, the gaze
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is easily abstracted, and so questions about conceptualization are closely related to issues of the
gaze, including how and why characters in stories use a particular gaze. This section concludes
with my elaboration of how I use ancient historiography as evidence for Roman thought, since in
this chapter I pay close attention to stories which are, almost certainly, not historical, despite the
insistence of ancient writers.

a. Foucault
In Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, he uses the history of the prison in order to explain
how the advent of modernity changed the distribution of power and how power operates. The
cleavage between the pre-modern and modern in his thought is fully evident in the opening of the
book, in which he juxtaposes the torturous execution of Damiens the regicide in 1757 CE and
Léon Faucher’s rules for the juvenile delinquents in his prison from 1837.213 According to
Foucault, the difference between these punishments is indicative of the disciplinary function of
power in modern states, in which subjects face punishment not only from transgressions, but also
for failure to meet standards and norms. This concern with normalization connects to issues of
sight, since it is only through frequent observation and examination of subjects’ progress towards
that norm that authorities can judge the subjects. This observation and examination in turn
depends on specific kind of knowledge, one that is abstracted so that it might be applied to any
individual regardless of his or her context. Foucault sees these issues most readily accessible in
Bentham’s description of the panopticon, a piece of prison architecture that allows for permanent
surveillance of prisoners, without the prisoners ever being aware of whether or not they are being
watched.214 In other words, dissymmetry and disequilibrium are essential to Foucault’s
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panopticon.215 The panopticon, and the power that it operates upon the prisoners, is indicative of
the aims and functioning of what Foucault calls the “disciplinary society.” For Foucault, this
disciplinary society is specific to modernity, as it depends upon, among other things, the rise of
the bourgeoisie.216 While Foucault never explicitly describes how power functioned in antiquity
according to his ideas, he clearly demarks this period as operating with a different type of power,
as he juxtaposes how visibility and power functions in modern societies to how it functioned in
antiquity generally and among the ancient Greeks specifically.217 I therefore risk misapplying
Foucault’s thoughts on power in attempting to use it to describe how manumission functioned in
antiquity.
However, I argue that it is possible to apply Foucault’s description of discipline and
power to Rome because while ancient Rome lacked modern technology, in many ways Foucault
concerns about modernity overlap with descriptions of centralization of Roman state power.218
True, Foucault created his ideas in order to analyze European states and peoples from the
eighteenth century and onwards. For example, in his description of power in disciplinary
societies, Foucault is quite insistent that anonymity is key to making discipline asymmetrical.
Note some of his more gnomic utterances: “Visibility is a trap,” and “invisibility is a guarantee
of order.”219 While anonymity and discipline do not easily combine in antiquity, nonetheless,
there is good reason to examine Foucault for the intersection of power and sight in antiquity. For
example, the stories of Gyges’ invisible ring and Deioces’ tower in many ways anticipate
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“We are much less Greek than we believe. We are neither in the bleachers, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic
machine, invested by its effects of power…” Foucault (1995: 217), translation modified. Foucault also claims that
“Antiquity had been a civilization of spectacle” (1995: 216).
218
I also take comfort from Butler’s discomfort with theories of modernity: “I do not traffic in theories of modernity
because the concept of modernity strikes me as too general.” (2016: 108).
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Foucault’s concerns about the intersection of power and visibility.220 The other reason is that
Foucault’s discussion of power and sight articulates the Roman state’s stakes and functioning in
the surveillance of citizens.

b. Scott
In order to stress manumission’s connection to sight, state power, and knowledge, I take
the title of this chapter from Scott’s book, Seeing like a State. In that book, Scott argues that
states can only make their utilitarian calculations about people and resources if those states have
access to knowledge of a certain aesthetic, namely one that is ordered and abstract. In other
words, for Scott, the state’s sight is a gaze that summarizes for the purpose of focusing on
projects of extraction or discipline. For Scott notes that without such ordering and abstraction,
knowledge is impossible to bring to a political center in a coherent manner. While in Seeing like
a State, Scott makes a strong connection between these projects and the aims of modern states, in
a later book, the Art of Not Being Governed, he nonetheless makes similar claims about the
projects of pre-modern states in Southeast Asia.221 Although Scott remains attuned to how issues
of technology, among other things, significantly change the nature of states in the modern period,
in his later work, he is willing to analyze pre-modern states as disciplining their populaces in
ways similar to modern states. For in the Art of Not Being Governed, Scott analyzes a range of
materials and knowledges as sites of contesting the centralizing tendency of pre-modern states,
including root vegetables and distances of measurement.222
Foucault and Scott’s work is fruitful for the study of the intersection of the Roman state
and manumission because both thinkers approach the state as a relationship rather than as an
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Gyges’ invisible ring: Plato, Republic, 359d1. Deioces’ tower, from which he governs his country through spies,
Herodotus, 1.96ff. For the pairing of these two stories, see Graeber (2001: 101-2).
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Scott names the collection of ideas and practices he investigates “high modernism” (1998: 87-102).
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Scott argues rice is an excellent crop for states, while root vegetables an excellent crop for nomads (2009: 64-97).
Scott collects local methods of measuring distances, including measuring how a long a walk is by the time it takes to
smoke a cigarette (2009: 48, cf. 1998: 25).
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institution that is clearly demarcated from the rest of society. As a relationship, the state is a
conduit of power that is indistinguishable from knowledge, since the collective actions that
constitute politics depend on the subjects knowing how to interact with each other in a particular
manner. In this broad sense, both every occurrence and every discussion of manumission is
obviously political and is closely related to how power operated at ancient Rome. Manumission
was also in the sight of the state, since in order to act the state had to know who was and who
was not a citizen.

c. The state’s gaze and manumission
The state’s gaze is a useful heuristic for analyzing who looked at manumission and also
why a slave-owner could not manumit a slave without the state. Manumission entailed the
Romans collectively altering how they recognized the slave, and such alteration required the
movement towards a new consensus of how this slave ought to be seen and treated. The Romans
created this consensus, in part, through laws and, in part, through the relationship between the
slave and the slave-owner. But the slave-owner could not manumit slaves alone; the presence of
representatives of the state were necessary in order to evaluate both the slave and the slaveowner. I argue that these representatives had the state’s gaze not only because they were acting
on behalf of the state, but because—as Foucault and Scott reveal—their sight served the purpose
of disciplining, abstracting, and summarizing. These purposes were the purposes of the state, but
they were connected to the purposes of the slave-owner and slave; all three worked together to
convince others to recognize this slave as a freedperson.
Those who looked at manumission from the perspective of the state included the
governmental officials who looked at slaves when they performed the legal action of
manumission. Such officials included the censors who registered slaves as citizens and the
magistrates who participated in the legal ceremony of manumisssio vindicta that freed slaves.
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However, the state’s gaze was diffuse and not limited to these officials, but included witnesses to
these procedures: both those witnesses who were required by law and those who were not. For
these witnesses performed a similar, albeit distinct, role from the government officials in that
they were looking at the slave, examining the slave and judging the slave’s worth as a potential
Roman citizen. Because the Roman state did not trust that slave-owners viewed the
manumissions that they conducted, from the perspective of the state, the presence of other
witnesses was necessary to attempt to ensure that each particular manumission was performed in
a way that conformed to the expectations of the Roman state.223
In other words, a key component of the presence of the witnesses was their ability to
discipline the process through their gaze. Their gaze had this power because they could report
infractions to officials, but also for the subtler reason that the mere process of rendering such a
procedure public makes it vulnerable. Indeed, Cicero’s treatment of his freedman Chrysippus
makes clear that when witnesses were absent, slave-owners could, and did, manipulate the
process in their favor.224 This disciplining gaze was also connected to abstraction and
summation, since through these witnesses, the state’s gaze did not acknowledge the (potentially)
personal aspect of the relationship between slave and slave-owner. Instead, the state sees and
judges whether a particular manumission follows generalized guidelines. In its concern only for
legal procedure, the state’s gaze desires a mere summary of the conditions of manumission, most
especially if such a summary follows the laws surrounding manumission. These issues of
summary and abstraction were also connected to recording and remembering manumission, since
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The slave-owner and even the slave could hold the state’s gaze as well, since these two quite could certainly have
internalized the priorities and values of the state in regards to their manumission at hand. But since this chapter is
focused on the state’s role in manumission, I leave aside this question for Chapters 3 and 4.
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See Section 5e below.
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it was through the state’s gaze on manumission that the Romans were able to verify if
manumission had actually occurred.

d. Finding the state’s gaze in ancient historiography
This chapter aims to deploy Foucault and Scott’s ideas about the intersection of power
and sight as a way to connect the ritualized movements around manumission to how the Romans
used a variety of stories to explain why manumission was important. In other words, I
supplement this very physical description of power—how power operates through the act of
looking—with evidence based on how ancient Greeks and Romans wrote about ideas and stories
that relate to manumission in thematic concerns. Since most of these ideas and stories are
contained in works of ancient historiography, it is necessary to state what metholdogy I use for
studying these works of historiography. I closely examine the histories of Livy and Dionysius, as
well as different biographies from Plutarch, in order to find evidence of how the Greeks and
Romans thought about manumission and topics similar to manumission, such as the
enfranchisement of runaway slaves at Romulus’ asylum. That is, rather than attempting to
reconstruct particular instances of manumission, I use these historiographies to reconstruct how
the Romans’ thinking on manumission was closely bound up with thoughts about the state and
the state’s role in manumission.225
The stories that these historians tell about manumission are evidence of how the ancients
thought about the state’s gaze. While the historians do not describe the physical act of
manumission, they do tell originary narratives, such as Romulus’ asylum, they had to explain the
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In doing so, I take as a starting point Woodman’s arguments for reading ancient historiography as literature
(1988: 197-215). For Woodman’s influence on this point, see, for example, Darbo-Peschanski (2007: 41), Kraus and
Woodman (1996), Haynes (2003), Henderson (1998), Nicolai (2007: 19-21), Saïd (2007: 76). For an invective,
disguised as an argument, against Woodman’s treatment of ancient historiography as literature, see Lendon (2009).
However, Lendon’s histrionics are mere childplay compared to historian E.P. Thompson’s unconstrained contempt
for Louis Althusser (1978), an anger that comes from a similar place as Lendon’s.
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state’s stake in manumission.226 Since ancient historians collected ideas and details from a
variety of sources, many of which are now inaccessible, I attribute these ways of thinking to an
ancient Roman public rather than the individual author, after taking into account how the author
affects the representation of this way of thinking.227 True, sometimes the author addresses his
readers directly and makes clear his stance or interpretation on a particular issue, but other times,
his thoughts are best apparent through a comparison of his version of a story with that of another
author’s. For example, by comparing how Livy tells the story of Romulus’ asylum to Dionysius’
version, it is possible to see contrasting opinions on the boundary between who was Roman and
who was not. I then use these opinions as evidence for my larger argument about the role of the
state’s gaze in the recognition of the slave as a Roman citizen. But prior to using this approach
for the historians’ descriptions of the origins of manumission, I first examine Livy for his
descriptions of the various ways that the state used laws to restrict how and why slave-owners
manumitted slaves, and also how the state profited from manumission.

3. Taxing and regulating manumission
Livy recounts how the state attempted to control slave-owners’ motives for freeing their
slaves and how the state profited from a tax on manumission, descriptions that are important
prologues to Augustus’ reforms of manumissio testamento that I examine in Section 7. In short,
Livy describes the state as disciplining the slave-owners, so that they only used manumission for
purposes that were agreeable to the state’s aims, especially in regards to the boundaries of the
citizen body. Reconstructing how successful the state was at these endeavors is impossible to
determine only using Livy’s descriptions. Given the limited reach of the Roman state as a pre226

While classifying these originary narratives as myths may do more to confuse the issue than clarify it, I
nonetheless find scholarship on the relationship of ancient historiography and myth useful for understanding both
why Livy and Dionysius included these stories and what role the stories have in their works (cf. Marincola 1997:
117-127 and Saïd 2007).
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Cf. Gehrke (2001).
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modern state, it is unlikely that it achieved complete compliance. Nonetheless, these regulations
point to how the Roman Republic aimed at creating disciplined slave-owners, specifically ones
who looked at manumission not only from the perspective of their own interests, but also from
the perspective of the state. Since the Romans taxed manumission, in many ways, freedom for
slaves doubly benefited the Roman state, since manumission increased the citizen body and also
provided short-term gain in the form of taxes.

a. The state and the motives of manumission
Livy describes an episode in which the Roman state created new legal procedures in
order to prevent slave-owners for using manumission for ulterior or purely personal reasons. In
effect, Livy depicts the Roman state attempting to discipline slave-owners so that they looked at
manumission from the perspective of the state, in addition to the perspective of slave-owners.
The reforms of 177 concern not only the boundary between the Roman citizenry and slaves but
also how all slave-owners were expected to participate in policing that boundary. These reforms
also participate in the story of Rome’s new authority over the other peoples of Italy. With
Hannibal’s death in the 180s, Bispham is right to suggest that at this time the Italians’ line of
thought was “if Hannibal had been unable to remove the Roman yoke, who else could?”228 Livy
records how a moral panic caused the Roman state to commit disciplining slave-owners directly,
rather than through the various states that represented the other Italians.229 Such disciplining
suggests that the state was attuned to the potentiality hidden in individuals but was dissatisfied
with how the other states were mediating the relationship between their own citizens and
Rome.230
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According to Livy, the Romans reformed manumission in 177 in response to a diplomatic
crisis with the Latins. In that year, Latin ambassadors addressed the Senate and complained that
too many of their fellow countrymen were illicitly becoming Romans.231 For while the Romans
had for many years made it easy for Latins to become Roman citizens, these ambassadors
complained that recently men were not fulfilling these minimal requirements, but were instead
committing fraud. One type of fraud pertained to manumission, since in order for a Latin man to
become a Roman citizen when he came to Rome, he had to leave his son at home. However,
Livy explains that the Latins used manumission to get around this requirement:
nam et ne stirpem domi relinquerent, liberos suos quibusquibus Romanis in eam condicionem,
ut manumitterentur, mancipio dabant, libertinique cives essent; et quibus stirpes deesset, quam
relinquerent, ut cives Romani fiebant.
To avoid the necessity of leaving a son at home, men would hand their sons over as slaves to
anyone with Roman citizenship, on the condition that the sons would be manumitted; as
freedmen they would become citizens.232
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 41.8.10, trans. J.D. Chaplin.

On the one hand, by focusing on how it is the Latins who commit fraud, Livy downplays how
these strategies only succeeded with the complicity of Roman slave-owners. On the other hand,
Livy’s description highlights how manumission necessarily made the boundary between Roman
and non-Roman porous: since anyone can become a slave, therefore anyone can become a
Roman. Manumission therefore complicates and even threatens the binary of Roman and nonRoman.
In order to combat this appropriation of Roman citizenship, the senate passed a decree
that attempted to ensure that all slave-owners thought of the security of the Roman citizenry
when they manumitted slaves. Livy records that the Senate reformed manumission in the
following way:
231

Briscoe’s commentary on this crisis focuses on the Latins seeking citizenship, rather than the sale of Latin sons
(2012: 61-66).
232
For Latins as genial prisoners of war in Rome, cf. Livy 2.22.
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ad legem et edictum consulis senatus consultum adiectum est, ut dictator, consul, interrex,
censor, praetor, qui nunc esset quive postea futurus esset, apud eorum quem qui manu
mitteretur, in libertatem vindicaretur, ut ius iurandum daret, qui eum manu mitteret, civitatis
mutandae causa manu non mittere; in quo id non iuraret, eum manu mittendum non
censuerunt.
The Senate added its own decree to the consular law and edict: if anyone should ask a senior
magistrate, present or future, to perform a manumission or a vindication of free status, the
dictator, consul, interrex, censor or praetor now or in the future should require the petitioner to
take an oath that the purpose of the manumission was not to alter civic status; in any case there
was no such oath, the Senate forbade the manumission.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 41.9.10-11, trans. J.D. Chaplin.233

In other words, slave-owners had to be ready to swear that they were not manumitting slaves
either for ulterior motives or for the sole purpose of turning their slave into a Roman citizen.
Notably, Livy’s description of the law does not describe what kind of motives were permissible,
thereby providing space for a multiplicity of reasons that slave-owners might free their slaves.
Based on other evidence of the discourse that slave-owners used to justify manumission, likely
this law implied that the slave-owners ought to manumit only those slaves who had proven their
loyalty to them. However, the ambiguity in this law also leaves open another reason to free
slaves: their loyalty to the Roman state, as exemplified through the story of Vindicius.234

b. Taxing manumission
Livy makes two obscure references to a tax on manumission. A combination of literary
and epigraphical sources from the Imperial Period only somewhat illuminates how this tax
functioned, complicating attempts to reconstruct what kind of tax the Romans actually had
through a synthesis of the evidence. Although Livy’s account lacks enough coherence to provide
firm evidence that the Romans had instituted a tax on manumission for as long as he asserts, his
description of the Manlian law indicates that a key component of how the Roman state viewed
manumission was as a source of revenue. And as a source of revenue, the state viewed
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manumission in opposition to the interests of individual slave-owners and slaves, since the state
collected this tax from them.
While Livy’s account of the year 357/6 primarily focuses on the actions of the consul
Gaius Marcius, the historian ends the year with the following description of how the consul
Gaius Manlius passed a law outside Rome proper. Rather than being concerned with how this
law functioned, Livy is instead concerned about the context in which the consul passed this law.
nisi quod legem novo exemplo ad Sutrium in castris tributim de vicesima eorum, qui manu
mitterentur, tulit. patres, quia ea lege haud parvum vectigal inopi aerario additum esset,
auctores fuerunt; ceterum tribuni plebis non tam lege quam exemplo moti, ne quis postea
populum sevocaret, capite sanxerunt; nihil enim non per milites iuratos in consulis verba
quamvis perniciosum populo, si id liceret, ferri posse.
Nothing worth mentioning was achieved by the other consul apart from his setting a precedent
in having a law proposed in his camp at Sutrium, through a tribal assembly, which levied a five
percent tax on manumitted slaves. Since no insignificant revenue accrued to the depleted
treasury from this law, the senators ratified it. The plebeian tribunes, however, less concerned
about the law than they were about the precedent, made it a capital offense for anyone in future
to hold an assembly of the people outside Rome. For, they claimed, when soldiers were sworn
to obey a consul, there was nothing that could not be brought into law by them, no matter how
detrimental to the people it might be.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 7.16.7-8, trans. J.C. Yardley.235

Livy imagines that already in the fourth century Romans were manumitting their slaves so
frequently that the Senate understood that a tax on manumission would provide a large source of
revenue. Just how Livy imagined that manumission was so profitable is unclear, since he does
not describe what value that tax is measuring. Given the historian’s own description of how the
census tallied the worth of slaves, it is reasonable to assume that Livy thought that the vicesima
referred to the price of the slave. Whether the Roman state in the fourth century had already
created a bureaucracy sophisticated enough to collect taxes based on the worth of a slave is hard
to measure. Livy undermines the trustworthiness of this account of the origin of the vicesima tax
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Confusingly, the Romans referred to this tax either as the vicesima or the as the vicensima. Furthermore, since the
name literally means “twentieth,” they sometimes used this expression to refer to other taxes which taxed at the
same rate, cf. Livy 43.2.12.
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by later asserting that it was paid only in gold, a detail that suggests that he is reporting his own
reconstruction of the past, one based on plausibilities rather than an authoritative source.
In his description of how the Romans used the funds raised from this manumission tax
during the second Carthaginian War, Livy gives precise amounts of how much this tax brought
to the Roman coffers in measurements of gold.
cetera expedientibus quae ad bellum opus erant, consulibus aurum vicensimarium, quod in
sanctiore aerario ad ultimos casus servabatur, promi placuit. prompta ad quattuor milia
pondo auri. inde quingena pondo data consulibus et M. Marcello et P. Sulpicio proconsulibus
et L. Veturio praetori, qui Galliam provinciam erat sortitus, additumque Fabio consuli centum
pondo auri praecipuum, quod in arcem Tarentinam portaretur; cetero auro usi sunt ad
vestimenta praesenti pecunia locanda exercitui, qui in Hispania bellum secunda sua fama
ducisque gerebat.
As the consuls were making all the other necessary preparations for the war, the decision was
taken to withdraw the gold raised by the five-per-cent tax [vicensimarium], which was being
kept in reserve in the inner treasury to meet emergencies. Approximately 4,000 pounds of gold
were withdrawn, and from this sum the consuls, the proconsuls Marcus Marcellus and Publius
Sulpicius, and the praetor Lucius Veturius (who had drawn Gaul as his province) were each
given 500 pounds.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 27.10.11-13, trans. J.C. Yardley.

Henrik Mouritsen and Dominic Rathbone argue that, in this passage, it is possible that Livy is
conflating the vicesima with an archaic practice in which former slaves deposited dedicated gold
in the aerarium Saturni.236 This thesis is plausible because, in the Greek world, former slaves
made dedications in Greek temples. However, these dedications were of uniform amounts, rather
than being a variable dependent upon the slave’s price.237 In contrast, A.R. Meadows argues that
the source of this gold was ultimately Ptolemy IV because a gift of bullion from the king would
both explain the presence of gold coins dating to this time period, as well as justify certain
passages in Livy and Polybius on Rome/Egypt relations.238 Either explanation, that of Mouritsen
or that of Meadows, suggests that, in his attempt to synthesize his sources, Livy has conflated his
236
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2005: 83-6 and 121-22). Meyer (2010) has argued that this list concerns metics rather than freedmen and
freedwomen. Zelnick-Abramovitz (2013: 95-105) defends the interpretation that this list concerns slaves.
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knowledge of the manumission tax of his own time with descriptions of dedicatory practices
from archaic Rome.
To understand whether Livy is projecting expectations of the collection of manumission
tax based on his experience of the first century, it is necessary to review what the collection of
this tax was like in the Imperial Period. Writers during the first century BCE, and later, depict
those who collect the vicesima as diligent and insistent.239 Furthermore, a bilingual inscription
from second century CE Athens describes a certain Philtos as a public slave whose official
position was that of a collector of the vicesimae libertatis. Apparently even in Athens keeping
track of the manumission of Roman slaves was a full-time job, or at least a job that a public slave
considered worth commemorating.240 To reconstruct how Republican Rome was equally capable
of looking at manumission for a consistent source of revenue, I turn to Livy’s description of
slaves and the census.
Livy describes Cato assessing the worth of slaves as part of his duties as a censor, a duty
that I argue is indicative of the care with which the second century Republic examined slaves,
and therefore manumission. According to Livy, one of the reasons why Cato’s censorship was so
notorious was that he systematically overvalued all luxury items, including those slaves who
were young and who had fetched a high price.241 This combination of youth and expense
suggests that Livy imagines Cato as overvaluing slaves whom Romans prized for their beauty.
This testimony also establishes that Livy thought that, in the early second century, the state saw
and recorded the value of all slaves. On the other hand, this testimony also reveals the extent to
which disciplinary power, in second century Rome, was not anonymous and standardized, but
239

Cicero discusses the revenue of this tax alongside others (Ad Atticum 2.16.1, see Conclusion Section 2). Petronius
describes those who collect the vicesima as happy to argue about the correct worth of a slave (58.2, 65.10 and 71).
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SIA VI 8 = CIL III 555 7287. See Zelnick-Abramovitz (2013: 57) for discussion.
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dependent upon particular personalities. For Livy records Cato contributed to his public image
by how he challenged, and successfully changed, the value of the property that he assessed.
in censibus quoque accipiendis tristis et aspera in omnes ordines censura fuit. ornamenta et
vestem muliebrem et vehicula, quae pluris quam quindecim milium aeris essent, deciens pluris
in censum referre iuratores iussi; item mancipia minora annis viginti, quae post proximum
lustrum decem milibus aeris aut pluris eo venissent, uti ea quoque deciens tanto pluris, quam
quanti essent, aestimarentur, et his rebus omnibus terni in milia aeris adtribuerentur.
Tax officials were instructed to assess at ten times their market value decorative articles,
women’s dresses, and carriages worth more than 15,000 asses. Slaves under twenty years of
age who had fetched 10,000 asses or more since the last lustrum he likewise ordered to be
assessed at ten times their market value. All these items were to be taxed at a rate of three
asses per thousand.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 39.44.1-3. trans. J.C. Yardley.

Livy’s description of the exceptional way that Cato assessed the worth of these slaves suggests
that the historian assumed that it was normal for the censor and the slave-owner to agree on the
price of the slave. Livy also makes clear that slaves’ value was an important part of calculating
how much a Roman owed the state in taxes.242 Since the state monitored slaves while they were
slaves, it is reasonable to assume that it turned its gaze upon them when they were manumitted
so that it could collect tax.
Livy’s dramatic rendering of how the proceeds from the vicesima funded key defenses
during the second Carthaginian war suggests that the Romans conceived of taxing manumission
as consistently profitable.243 Unfortunately, the garbled nature of Livy’s account of the vicesima
prevents us from knowing how the Romans did store and spend this revenue. However, the
historian’s description makes clear that the state’s gaze upon manumission did more than simply
police the boundary between Roman and non-Roman: this gaze was also profitable, extracting
value from the transition from slave to free.
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For the census and tributum, see Northwood (2008). For this particular passage and issues of tributum, see
Fraccaro (1956: 479-80) and Briscoe (2008: 363-4).
243
See also Ad Atticum, 2.16.1 = Shackleton Bailey 36.1. I discuss that passage in Conslusion Section 2.
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4. Romulus’ asylum and manumission
Even though Romans describe Romulus as a divinely born monarch, his particular
founding of Rome valorizes the city as an inclusive and egalitarian civic body, two values that
are essential to, as well as complicate the practice of, Roman manumission. More specifically, I
argue that Livy’s and Plutarch’s descriptions of slaves as men who joined Romulus’ new polity
indicate that earlier Romans thought that Romulus’ asylum demonstrated the strengths of Rome’s
open citizenry. Furthermore, Dionysius’ description of slaves as pointedly excluded from the
asylum is indicative of an opposing school of thought on the value of former slaves as Roman
citizens. This emphasis on the difference between the accounts of Romulus’ asylum is similar to
T.P. Wiseman’s emphasis on the difference in the first century accounts of the secession of the
plebs. Wiseman also suggests that that these differences in the accounts were connected to the
demands of the moment.244 The story of Romulus’ asylum provided a way for all Romans, both
those who were and who were not slave-owners, to think through the benefits to the Roman state
of making manumitted slaves citizens.245

a. Overview of the Romulus’ asylum story and its sources
While a variety of Greek and Roman writers reference Romulus and his asylum, the most
detailed accounts survive in the works of Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch. These writers emphasize
that they are not inventing this story; indeed, Plutarch explicitly credits his version of the story to
both Fabius Pictor and Peparethos. Plutarch’s references suggest earlier Romans judged the story
of the asylum as an important part of their history, a judgment that surely influenced why later
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Wiseman (2009: 63-68).
Cf. Wiseman, “Romulus’ refuge was a symbol of equality: all comers were welcome, whatever their background.
Of course that idea was ideologically contentious, and pejorative descripotions of the ‘infamous asylum’ and the
rabble it attraced are not hard to find.” (2009: 77).
245
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writers such as Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch retold the story with important similarities.246 All
three writers agree that at some point in the founding of Rome, Romulus set aside a particular
space within Rome to be a haven for outsiders who wished to join the Romans. Livy and
Dionysius further elaborate that this space was the inter duos lucos on the Capitoline.247 But the
three writers disagree on a number of other details about this story, including the chronology of
the asylum in relation to foundational events such Remus’ death.248 Significantly, the historians
also disagree over whether or not Romulus granted haven to slaves as part of his asylum. I argue
that the writers’ disagreement over slaves in the asylum is connected to how they thought
through contemporary concerns about manumission.249

b. The asylum and the worth of manumission
Dionysius’ disdain for slaves is so apparent in his description of Romulus’ asylum that it
makes sense to start with his account to see how ancient authors could use this story to think
through the issues of manumission. The details about the asylum that Dionysius provides in his
story are especially significant for his project, since he himself writes that Greeks and barbarians
manipulate stories about Rome’s origins to denigrate Romans. Indeed, he specifically mentions
in his preface that one of the ways that Greeks and barbarians slander Romans is by depicting
Rome ascending to power entirely through blind fate, since the city was originally a collection of
nomads, a heterogeneous mix in which not even all men were free. For Dionysius, the idea that
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In Romulus (3.1). For Fabius Pictor, cf. BNJ 809 F4a and FRH 1 F 4b. For Peparethos, cf. BNJ 820 F 1.
Ab Urbe Condita 1.8.5. Unfortunately, Livy provides an unclear description of where exactly these groves were.
For the debate over the emendation of this line, see Wellesly (1974). Heyworth (2011) provides a map with a
probable location of the inter duos lucos. Purcell (1993: 146 n.87) provides an alternate location of the asylum. See
also Dench (2005: 18-20). Dionysius’ account is much less precise, cf. 2.15.4.
248
Plutarch writes that Remus participated in establishing the asylum (Life of Romulus, 9.3), while Livy and
Dionysius write that Romulus created the asylum after Remus’ death. Wiseman (2009: 81-98) analyzes how only
Dionysius records that Romulus distributed land among his followers as evidence that Dionysius took his account
from Varro.
249
See again Wiseman (2009: 77). Wiseman argues that Strabo’s (5.3.2), Juvenal’s (8.273-5), Justi’s (38.7.1), and
Minucius Felix’s accounts of the asylum all conform to
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Romulus’ asylum included slaves is so obviously political that he argues that Greek historians
only repeated such slander to please barbarian kings.250 Dionysius’ history of the asylum appears
all the more histrionic when juxtaposed to Livy’s account, as that Roman writer willingly
included slaves as among Rome’s founders.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses his preface to justify his authority as an historian of
ancient Rome. One of the tools that he uses to create his own authority is to undermine the
authority of other historians. Specifically, Dionysius claims that many of the other accounts of
early Rome are motivated by an animus towards the Romans. One of the ways that other
historians reveal their vindicitiveness is through their description of the early Roman community
as consisting of vagabounds and slaves.
ἔτι γὰρ ἀγνοεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὀλίγου δεῖν πᾶσιν ἡ παλαιὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πόλεως
ἱστορία, καὶ δόξαι τινὲς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἀκουσμάτων τὴν ἀρχὴν
λαβοῦσαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξηπατήκασιν, ὡς ἀνεστίους μέν τινας καὶ πλάνητας καὶ βαρβάρους
καὶ οὐδὲ τούτους ἐλευθέρους οἰκιστὰς εὐχομένης, οὐ δι’ εὐσέβειαν δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν
ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ἁπάντων ἡγεμονίαν σὺν χρόνῳ παρελθούσης, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτοματισμόν
τινα καὶ τύχην ἄδικον εἰκῆ δωρουμένην τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν σμάτων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαι
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξηπατήκασιν
For to this day almost all the Greeks are ignorant of the early history of Rome and the great
majority of them have been imposed upon by sundry false opinions grounded upon stories
which chance has brought to their ears and led to believe that, having come upon various
vagabonds without house or home and barbarians, and even those not free men, as her
founders, she in the course of time arrived at world domination, and this not through reverence
for the gods and justice and every other virtue, but through some chance and the injustice of
Fortune, which inconsiderately showers her greatest favours upon the most undeserving.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antitiquities, Preface 4.2, trans. E. Cary.

Dionysius then goes on to explain that other historians are motivated to slander the early Romans
because they want to argue that the Romans’ dominance of the Mediterranean is merely the
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Preface 4.2-3. Dionysius’ account appears even more conspiratorial when juxtaposed with the other surviving
Greek accounts of the origins of Rome. Wiseman’s review of the evidence points out that the Greeks only began to
write about Romulus in the fourth century, but that this account differs significantly from the accounts of first
century authors. Overall, Greek writers appear to have been more interested in the story of Aeneas (cf. Wiseman
1995: 42-63). On the other hand, Dionysius may have had some knowledge of now lost Greek histories that did
make such derogatory claims about the founding of Rome.
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result of chance. In contrast, Dionysius sees the Romans’ dominance as connected to the
Romans’ virtues and practices.
In his retelling of the founding of Rome, Dionysius not only preserves the class
distinctions among the men who were the citizens who joined Romulus, but he only mentions
slaves when he catalogues the founders’ property:
ἦν δὲ ἐν τούτοις πολὺ μὲν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐν πόλει κινουμένῃ τὸ δημοτικὸν γένος, ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ
τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου γνώριμον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Τρωικοῦ τὸ εὐγενέστατον δὴ νομιζόμενον, ἐξ οὗ
καὶ γενεαί τινες ἔτι περιῆσαν εἰς ἐμέ, πεντήκοντα μάλιστ᾽ οἶκοι. ἐχορηγεῖτο δὲ τοῖς νεανίσκοις
καὶ χρήματα καὶ ὅπλα καὶ σῖτος καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ ὑποζύγια ἀχθοφόρα καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πόλεως
ἦν κατασκευῇ πρόσφορον.
Among these, as is likely to happen when a city sends out a colony, there were great numbers
of the common people, but there were also a sufficient number of the prominent men of the
best class, and of the Trojan element all those who were esteemed the noblest in birth, some of
whose posterity remained even to my day, consisting of about fifty families. The youths were
supplied with money, arms and corn, with slaves and beasts of burden and everything else that
was of use in the building of a city.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 1.85.3, trans. E. Cary.

Such distinction between slaves and Romulus’ followers suggests that Dionysius did not
conceive of the slaves present at the founding of Rome as possible ancestors to the present
Romans.251 Indeed, Dionysius is even more emphatic that none of Romulus’ followers were
slaves in his description of the asylum. This place, according to Dionysius, accorded amnesty to
any fugitives in Italy, but on the condition that they were free men.
ἔπειτα καταμαθὼν πολλὰς τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πόλεων πονηρῶς ἐπιτροπευομένας ὑπὸ
τυραννίδων τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν, τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἐκπίπτοντας τῶν πόλεων συχνοὺς ὄντας, εἰ
μόνον εἶεν ἐλεύθεροι .
Secondly, finding that many of the cities in Italy were very badly governed, both by tyrannies
and by oligarchies, he undertook to welcome and attract to himself the fugitives from these
cities, who were very numerous, paying no regard either to their calamities or to their fortunes,
provided only they were free men.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 2.15.3,trans. E. Cary.
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Cf. Juvenal, Saturae 8.269 ff. See Dench (2005: 18-20) and Bremmer and Horsfall (1987: 38ff). My own
argument about the importance of this founding follows Gabba’s (1991: 148-158) argument that Dionysius is
particularly interested in framing the events of the Roman monarchy as having explanatory power for the present.
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This erasure of slaves at the founding of Rome connects to Dionysius’ concerns about slaves in
present day Rome. Dionysius complains that now Romans are too lenient in their grants of
manumission and suggests that the Romans ought to only manumit slaves who are truly moral.252
Dionysius appears to have written his account of Romulus’ retinue in order to align with his own
judgment that only a small number of slaves have the ability to transform themselves into
capable and moral members of society. In other words, Dionysius uses Romulus’ asylum in order
to think through his own thoughts on contemporary manumission and Roman expansion.
Livy disagrees with Dionysius over the details about slaves in the story of the asylum.
Livy explicitly judges the asylum as a source of Rome’s strength. Indeed, Livy insists that
Romulus accepted any, and all, comers as citizens into his new polity and that this blanket
acceptance was beneficial to new state’s power. Furthermore, unlike Dionysius’ description of
Rome beginning with a carefully maintained hierarchy, Livy describes the initial Roman
citizenry as an undifferentiated mass, with no distinction between former slaves and citizens.253
But rather than being a weakness, this lack of distinction is a strength. Livy even writes that it
was only after the motley crew of slaves and freemen arrived that Rome became a strong city:
Eo ex finitimis populis turba omnis sine discrimine, liber an servus esset, avida novarum
rerum perfugit, idque primum ad coeptam magnitudinem roboris fuit. Cum iam virium haud
paeniteret consilium deinde viribus parat.
A motley mob from the neighboring peoples flocked to the spot, with no distinction made as to
whether they were free or slave, and all eager for a new start in life. These men were the
beginning of the real strength of the city. 254
252

Roman Antiquties, 4.24. For connection to the lex Aelia Sentia, see Mouritsen (2011a: 32-33). For more on this
passage, see Chapter 3 Section 3b.
253
As a narrator, Livy refers to the asylum myth to stress Rome’s humble origins (2.1.4). In a speech, Camillus
refers to the asylum to emphasize Rome’s connection to that particular place (5.53.9). Later, Livy discusses the
Greek origins of the word asylum, 35.51.2. Ovid paints a similar picture of Romulus’ asylum, Fasti 3.430-2. Cf.
Dench (2005: 18-20).
254
Livy’s insistence that the strength of the city began with the inclusions of these men has echoes with a reliquia of
Cato’s Origines (Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 18.21.1). This echo is significant for manumission because it is tentatively
further evidence that already in the second century Romans were using the asylum to think through the benefits of
manumission. Unfortunately, in the cover-text, Gellius does not provide enough context to establish definitely that
Cato is referring to the asylum, despite insistence from Schröder (1971: 175). Cf. the commentary in FRH 5 F 117.
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Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.8, trans. P.T. Luce.

For Livy, slaves, just as their free counterparts, had the ability to transform themselves into
Romans, specifically Romans who had the ability to help Rome grow. In this way, Livy’s
description of how slaves were among Romulus’ followers connects with Livy’s description of
Vindicius’ manumission: if a slave was loyal enough to the Roman state, he gained his
freedom.255

c. The asylum, manumission, and the Roman state
For Livy, Romulus’ new city provided citizenship to slaves, thereby making Romulus a
kind of manumittor, but he is a manumittor without the state’s gaze. For while Romulus’ asylum
was not an act of manumission in a literal sense, nonetheless the story does emphasize that he
was willing to trust and elevate men that other leaders had disregarded. Significantly, Romulus’
amnesty does not integrate slaves into the communities of their slave-owners, but rather allows
them to participate in the creation of a new polity, along with other men generally deemed
untrustworthy by prevailing cultural norms. Since Rome as a state does not yet exist, Livy does
not write as if the state’s gaze was either organizing or disciplining, these men. The lack of the
state’s organizing and disciplining gaze contributes to the lack of distinction between the
followers of Romulus who used to be slaves and those who used to be citizens of the surrounding
communities because without state representatives, or even men who temporarily take up the
state’s perspective, there was little distinction among Romulus’ followers. As such, the story of
Romulus’ asylum differs from manumission, as manumission, for slave-owners and for the state,
is very much about the accepting of their own slaves into their own communities. Nonetheless,
the description of how any man was able to join Romulus in his project, regardless of his
background, has implications for how the Romans granted citizenship to their slaves because
255

For Vindicius, see Section 5 below.
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Romulus’ use of slaves could function as an exemplum, especially since Livy himself explains
that the lack of boundaries was a source of strength for the future Roman state. Both Dench and
Wiseman read the story of Romulus’ asylum as an example of an indiscriminating and
welcoming refuge. Dench and Wiseman also argue that for the Romans to valorize the asylum
was to participate in a political discussion about which people were welcome at Rome.256
In contrast, Dionysius takes up the state’s gaze when surveying Rome’s beginning. The
Greek historian’s careful catalogue of what property the Romans brought with them is the result
of an ordering gaze. This gaze surveyed the Romans’ equipment, but then organized the details
into a list that explains the purpose of the expedition. In a way, the gaze that Dionysius casts
upon Rome’s founders is quite similar to the census, since he not only takes note of the rank of
these men, but also what property they owned.257 When Dionysius looks upon Rome’s founding,
he utilizes assumptions of his own experience of Rome, where the distinction between slave and
free was essential. For Dionysius, after the founders arrive from the neighboring towns, they
look upon their slaves with the same disciplining gaze. Dionysius naturalizes the state’s gaze,
imagining it as preceding the existence of the Roman state itself.

5. Vindicius and manumissio vindicta
While the story of Romulus’ asylum affirms the ability of slaves to integrate into the
Roman state at the same level as free born citizens, the story of Vindicius raises the question of a
slave’s loyalty in order to emphasize the divide between slave-owners and the Roman state. In
the two elaborate versions of this story that survive, Livy and Plutarch praise Vindicius for
choosing his loyalty to the newly formed Roman Republic over his loyalty to his master. In
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Dench (2005: 3) writes, “…the myth of the asylum is strikingly uniterested in the legal procedures of
manumission or enfranchisement, and within a Roman context [it is] an unusually impersonal, collective and
potentially even popularist descent-myth…”. Cf. Wiseman (2009: 77).
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For the state’s gaze and the census, see Section 6d. below.
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Dionysius’ version of the story, Vindicius does the right thing and collects his reward from the
state, all while failing to act in a noble manner. Regardless of the different ways the writers
describe Vindicius, the story makes clear that even though slave-owners own their slaves,
nonetheless, the slaves should be loyal to the Roman state at the expense of their owners. The
story of Vindicius highlights how the Roman state was not a tool of slave-owners, but rather a
force that has its own concerns and interests. Furthermore, like the story of Romulus’ asylum, the
story of Vindicius is a narrative by which Romans thought through the values and questions of
manumission, rather than being simply an aetiological explanation of the names of one of the
Roman methods of manumission. However, aetiology is an important aspect of the Vindicius
story as well. More specifically, the prominent role that the state plays in the ritual of the
manumissio vindicta has a parallel to the state’s prominence in the Vindicius’ story. The Romans
assigned prominence within manumissio vindicta in part through the use of the festuca staff, a
ritual instrument that was so closely associate with the act of manumission that referring to the
festuca was shorthand for manumission.

a. Overview of the Vindicius story and sources
While Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch differ in the level of detail that
they provide for this story, and furthermore disagree with each other about the importance of this
story, all three writers agree on the following in their accounts: While serving as one of the first
consuls of the new Republic, Lucius Iunius Brutus was unaware that two of his sons, Titus and
Tiberius, had joined a conspiracy to restore Tarquin Superbus to the throne. However, the slave
Vindicius overhears Titus and Tiberius plotting with other members of the Vitelli and Aquilii.
Specifically, Vindicius hears how the conspirators had written a letter to the exiled Tarquin.
Vindicius then alerts the Roman authorities to the presence of this letter, which incontrovertibly
demonstrates that these men, including Brutus’ sons, are guilty. Brutus refuses to let his love for
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his family transform into mercy for traitors and proves his loyalty to the new government by
overseeing the execution of his own sons. Because of his loyal service to the Roman state,
Vindicius gets the reward of freedom and Roman citizenship.
The three writers are divided on how important this grant of freedom was. Both Livy and
Plutarch assert that Vindicius’ manumission was the first example in Roman history in which a
slave gained Roman citizenship with his freedom. As a result, these two writers further explain
that Vindicius’ name was the origin of the vindicta in the phrase manumissio vindicta.
Furthermore, Livy and Plutarch explain that it is because Vindicius gained his citizenship in his
manumission that even now the Romans grant citizenship along with freedom in manumissio
vindicta.258 In contrast, while Dionysius mentions the grant of freedom, he says nothing about
how Vindicius’ name connects to manumissio vindicta.259 Dionysius omits this aspect of the
story because according to him, at the time of Vindicius’ freedom, manumission was already
connected to enfranchisement. In Book 4 of his history, Dionysius explains that King Servius
Tullius had decreed that manumission was now connected to enfranchisement.260
On the one hand, since Vindicius’s story revolves around an eavesdropping slave who
then reflects on what to do with his secret information, this story can easily be another piece of
evidence for T.P. Wiseman’s argument for the close connection between Roman myth and the
stage.261 Eavesdroppers are common in Roman comedy, and they are prone to reflexive
monologues during, and after, learning secrets, and so it seems quite possible that at some point
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Livy 2.5.10 and Plutarch Life of Publicola, 7.5.
Roman Antiquities, 5.13.1.
260
4.22.3-4. For more on this story, see Section 6b below.
261
See Wiseman (1994: 10-18), (1995: 133-138) and (2008: 180-182). Keaveney (2003 and 2006) attacks the
general idea that many Roman myths were performed on the stage. Kragelund (2002) supports Wiseman. Lendon
reads this very idea as evidence of Wiseman’s moral failings (2009: 47 n.20).
259
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Vindicius was a character on the Roman stage.262 On the other hand, the stories among the three
different authors are different enough that it seems unlikely that they had adopted it from a single
source. However, such a question also needs to take into consideration the three writers’ roles as
authors.

b. Vindicius’ loyalty to the state and his loyalty to his owners
As authors, the three writers had some control over their narratives, and they exercised
this control in writing about the importance of Publicola. Plutarch and Dionysius’s rendition of
Vindicus’ story glorifies Publicola.263 For the stories of the two Greek writers, Publicola is
essential, since he is the one who initially believes Vindicius’ accusation against the Vitelli and
Aquilii. Publicola then incites a mob of Romans to storm the house of the conspirators to find the
concealed epistle. In contrast, Livy makes no mention of Publicola; he instead describes
Vindicius alerting anonymous authorities after the conspirators had handed off the incriminating
letter to foreign envoys. While Plutarch and Dionysius specify that it was the Aquillii who
owned him, Livy does not, leaving open the possibility that in Livy’s version Vindicius was
Brutus’ own slave.264 But because Livy makes no mention of Brutus owning Vindicius when he
rewards the slave at the end of the story, it seems unlikely that Livy understood the story in that
way. The writers also exercised their own, individual control over the narrative in their depiction
of Vindicius himself. The three writers disagree with each other on the question of what kind of
man earns his freedom by betraying his master.265
For Livy, Vindicius displays no hesitation about turning over his rebellious masters to the
state, since the historian writes that the slave had suspicions even prior to hearing the young men
262

For an example of eavesdropping in Roman comedy, see Mostellaria, 157-312. For more on that passage, see
Chapter 4 Section 3b.
263
Contra Kleijwegt, who over emphasizes the similarities of accounts (2009: 320).
264
Plutarch, Life of Publicola, 7.1. Dionysius: 5.10.4.
265
Livy includes the stories of other slaves who turn informant: 22.33.2, 26.27.4, 27.3-5, 32.26. Cf. Fabre (1981:
49).
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discussing revolt. Vindicius anticipates their betrayal. He then quickly and intelligently acts,
waiting to secure a letter so that his evidence will not simply be hearsay.
nam cum pridie, quam legati ad Tarquinios proficiscerentur, cenatum forte apud Vitellios
esset, coniuratique ibi remotis arbitris multa inter se de novo, ut fit, consilio egissent,
sermonem eorum ex servis unus excepit, qui iam antea id senserat agi, sed eam occasionem, ut
litterae legatis darentur, quae deprehensae rem coarguere possent, expectabat. Postquam
datas sensit, rem ad consules detulit.
The impending plot naturally required detailed discussion, in the course of which one of the
slaves overheard them. This fellow had guessed even before what was afoot but was waiting
for the moment when the envoys would be given the letter, which when seized would be proof
of what was going on. When he saw that it had indeed been handed over, he reported the
matter to the consuls.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2.4.5-6, trans. T.J. Luce.

By having Vindicius procure a letter, Livy also sidesteps Roman expectations that in order for a
slave’s testimony to be considered trustworthy, the slave must first be tortured.266 Indeed, for
Livy, Vindicius’ dedication to the Republic makes him practically a citizen and, therefore,
unworthy of torture. This depiction of Vindicius as a proto-citizen also allows Livy to entirely
sidestep the question of what Vindicius might owe his owners, even though they are traitors, as
well as sidestep any claims that these owners might try to exert over him in court.
For Plutarch, Vindicius believes in and uses the Roman hierarchy for the greater good.
Plutarch imagines that Publicola was particularly willing to listen to and trust his subordinates.
When Vindicius tells Publicola about the conspiracy, Publicola believes the slave, but in order to
persuade the other Romans, Publicola has to procure the letter. Significantly, Vindicius knew
that Publicola was a trusting man. For after Vindicius overhears the plot, he is initially at a lost
for what to do, but then he decides to turn to Publicola because of his reputation for kindness and
willingness to listen to subordinates.267 This detail makes Vindicius appear appropriately
deferential to the Roman hierarchy. Furthermore, in Plutarch’s version there is an extended trial
266

For an overview of the legal sources on the torture of Roman slaves for evidence, see Gardner (2010: 430-2). See
also Buckland (1970: 86-88).
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Life of Publicola, 4.3-4.
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sequence, and so the biographer includes the detail that the accused Vitelli and Aquillii
attempted to assert their ownership over Vindicius.268
Dionysius uses Vindicius’ petition of Publicola in order to depict a slave who is more
concerned with his own life and safety than he is with the good of the Republic. According to
Dionysius, Vindicius wanted to go to the consuls, but he doubted that Brutus would be able to
put aside his feelings for his sons. Instead, he goes to Publicola. But rather than trusting in this
man’s honesty, Vindicius asks the Roman leader swear an oath that what he will reveal will
bring him no harm:
…οὔσης ὡς ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπὶ χρείαν τινά, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑπάτους ὤκνησεν
ἐλθεῖν δεδιώς, μὴ συγκρύψαι τὸ πρᾶγμα βουλόμενοι διὰ τὴν εὔνοιαν τῶν συγγενῶν τὸν
μηνύσαντα τὴν συνωμοσίαν ἀφανίσωσιν, ἀφικόμενος δ᾽ ὡς Πόπλιον Οὐαλέριον, ὃς ἐν τοῖς
πρώτοις τέτταρσιν ἦν τῶν τὴν τυραννίδα καταλυσάντων, δεξιώσει καὶ δι᾽ ὅρκων τὸ πιστὸν
παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ λαβὼν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ μηνυτὴς ὧν τ᾽ ἤκουσε καὶ ὧν εἶδε γίνεται.
…he hesitated to go to the consuls, lest, in their desire the keep the matter quiet out of
goodwill for their kinsmen, they might do away with the one who gave information of the
conspiracy, but went to Publius Valerius [Publicola], one of the four who had taken the lead in
overthrowing the tyranny; and when this man had given him assurance of his safety by
offering his hand and swearing oaths, he informed him of all that he had both heard and seen.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 5.7.4-5, trans. E. Cary.

Dionysius depicts Vindicius as a reluctant and nervous witness. Such a man is unlikely to make
good use of the money and civic rights that come with his reward. This dispiriting depiction of a
slave is consistent with Dionysius’ antipathy towards slaves generally.269
By eliding that Vindicius indeed betrays his owners, all three writers attempt to avoid a key
question about the relationship between slave-owners and the state: do they owe their loyalty to
their owners because they themselves are outsiders, and it is their owners who are connected to
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Life of Publicola, 7.1-2.
For Dionysius, slaves and Romulus’ asylum, see Section 4 above. For his diatribe against Roman manumission,
see Chapter 3 Section 3b.
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the Roman state?270 Or do slaves owe their loyalty directly to the Roman state because they are
part of Roman society? Patterson’s theory would demand the first explanation, as for him social
death is in part predicated on how the social rejection of the slaves makes them into appendages
of their owners.271 But the story of Vindicius suggests that the Romans saw slaves as having
unmediated relationship with the Roman state, one in which the state looked upon their work,
and evaluated their loyalty to itself, rather than their loyalty to their owners. Enslavement did not
hide slaves behind their owners; the state still surveiled them, a condition that signals the
importance of turning to Foucault. Foucault’s thoughts on the disperse centers of power elaborate
why slaves could, and did, have relationships with the Roman state that had the potential of
being in conflict with their slave-owners, even if most of the time the state and slave-owners
embarked on similar projects of disciplining slaves. However, since Livy and Plutarch imply that
slaves owe the Roman state loyalty, they cast them as members of Roman society. Slaves are
under the disciplining gaze of state, even though the state has no obligation to represent them
like it does the slave-owners. The story of Vindicius points to the state as the subject worthy of
loyalty. The story also presents the state, not the owner, as that which has the power to transform
the slave’s life from unlivable to livable.272

c. Vindicius, citizenship, and manumission
By exalting loyalty to the state over loyalty to a slave-owner, the story of Vindicius does
not address why it is that Roman citizens, through their own initiative, had the authority to
change slaves into citizens. However, both Livy and Plutarch take the time to note explicitly that
Vindicius’ manumission was the origin of manumissio vindicta. Why would both writers assert
270

Kleijwegt notes the absence of this question in Livy’s account (2009: 324). While I agree with Kleijwegt that
Livy’s Vindicius story is a defense of freedmen’s standing in Rome, I disagree with his pairing of this story to
Augustus’ antipathy towards freedmen.
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For Patterson and his theory of slavery as social death, see Chapter 1.
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For Butler and the unlivable life, see Chapter 1 Section 5b. For other examples of the Roman state rewarding the
loyalty of slaves, see Livy, 22.33.2 and 32.26.14. Cf. the anonymous slave of Zeuxippus, 33.28.11-15.
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this claim when they knew that in this aspect manumissio vindicta greatly differed from
Vindicius’ manumission? For significantly, while the Roman state freed Vindicius without the
consent of his masters, in manumissio vindicta, the slave-owner must be present and willing in
order to free the slave. In other words, the motivations and details of Vindicius’ manumission
appear to have nothing in common with manumission vindicta, other than the grant of
citizenship. This discrepancy is particularly significant because both Plutarch and Livy have a
unitarian conception of Roman history. Kurt Raaflaub and Timothy Cornell define a unitarian
conception of history as one in which the time spanning from the archaic past to yesterday is
singular. Time organized in this way is subject to the influence of a single, originary event.273
Both Plutarch and Livy approached even small details within contemporary practices as having
an intimate connection to antiquity. I argue that Livy and Plutarch understood manumissio
vindicta as demanding three aspects that needed explanations that the story of Vindicius’
freedom provides. First, the story of Vindicius explains why it is that slaves are permitted to be
citizens at all. Second, Plutarch and Livy found an explanation necessary because no other
peoples in the Mediterranean consistently enfranchised their slaves upon manumission. Third, I
further hypothesize that the two writers understood the story of Vindicius as the origin not only
of the name of this type of manumission, but also the ritualized movements and instruments used
in that practice. While neither writer reveals what sources they used for this narrative, it is
possible that the aetiological core of the story is quite old. Indeed, the story perhaps dates to a
time when the Romans needed to explain to themselves why their manumission practice differed
from those of the surrounding peoples.
After explaining that the young aristocrats failed in their counter-revolution, Livy provides
the following description of Vindicius’ manumission:
273
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praemium indici pecunia ex aerario, libertas et civitas data. ille primum dicitur vindicta
liberatus. quidam vindictae quoque nomen tractum ab illo putant; Vindicio ipsi nomen fuisse.
post illum observatum, ut, qui ita liberati essent, in civitatem accepti viderentur.
The slave was rewarded with a grant of money from the treasury, with freedom and with
citizenship. He is said to have been the first slave to have been freed vindicta. Some think the
word vindicta derived from his name, which they say was Vindicius. Thereafter those who
were freed in this manner were regarded as having been received into Roman citizenship.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2.5.9-10, trans. T.J. Luce.

By relating how his sources describe Vindicius as the first freedman, Livy gives the details of
this manumission explanatory importance for understanding how manumission currently works
in Rome. He then elaborates on the precise results of Vindicius’ manumission, as the historian
explains that all slaves who are freed according to the process of manumissio vindicta become
citizens. The implication of this description is that Livy knows that there are other types of
manumission after which a slave is freed, but does not become a citizen, and that the true
significance of Vindicius’ manumission was that he became a citizen. Therefore, it is not
surprising that Livy’s language has a legalistic tone to it: Daube notes that the phrase “qui ita
liberati essent, in civitatem accepti viderentur” shares many similarities with jurists’ descriptions
of manumission.274 It is therefore entirely possible that Livy used both legal texts and earlier
aetiological narratives when he composed his own version of Vindicius’ manumission.
Plutarch similarly takes Vindicius’ manumission as the model for current Roman practices,
albeit he adds certain legal details about Vindicius’ status as a citizen. Unsurprisingly, since he is
writing a biography of Publicola, Plutarch credits Vindicius’ manumission specifically to
Publicola.275 But a consequence of this attribution is that Publicola appears as Vindicius’
substitute slave-owner, thereby making Vindicius’ manumission more like manumissio vindicta.
In Plutarch’s account, there is less emphasis on the state’s power to manumit a slave. Since
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Publicola has a status similar to Vindicius’ owner, Plutarch’s description of Vindicius earning his
freedom through loyalty appears more similar to the language of loyalty that slave-owners often
used to justify the manumission of their slaves:
ἀξίαν ἀπολαβὼν τῆς προθυμίας χάριν ἧς οἰόμενός τι δεῖν ἀπολαῦσαι τὸν Οὐινδίκιον
ἐψηφίσατο πρῶτον ἀπελεύθερον ἐκεῖνον ἐν Ῥώμῃ γενέσθαι πολίτην καὶ φέρειν ψῆφον ᾗ
βούλοιτο φρατρίᾳ προσνεμηθέντα. τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἀπελευθέροις ὀψὲ καὶ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον
ἐξουσίαν ψήφου δημαγωγῶν ἔδωκεν Ἄππιος ἡ δὲ παντελὴς ἀπελευθέρωσις ἄχρι νῦν οὐινδίκτα
λέγεται δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον, ὥς φασι, τὸν Οὐινδίκιον.
He [Publicola] thought that Vindicius ought to share, and therefore had a decree passed which
made him, first of all freedmen, a citizen of Rome, and entitled him to vote with any curia in
which he chose to be enrolled. Other freedmen received the right of suffrage in much later
times from Appius, who thus courted popularity. And from this Vindicius, as they say, a
perfect manumission is to this day called "vindicta."
Plutarch, Life of Publica, 7.4-5, trans. B. Perrin.

Plutarch also takes the unusual step of describing Vindicius’ manumission as complete,
“παντελής,” and that therefore all manumissions like Vindicius’ are similarly complete. Plutarch
does not explain what it means for a manumission to be complete; but given the importance of
Vindicius gaining citizenship in the story, presumably that is what Plutarch is highlighting.
Further, the description of Vindicius’ manumission as complete implies that there are imperfect
types of manumission, likely those that do not grant citizenship to the freed slave. As a Greek,
especially a Delphic priest, Plutarch was well acquainted with that type of manumission, but here
he appears to express a preference for the Roman method.276
Notably, Plutarch writes about manumissio vindicta at a time when it was the only form
of manumission that granted citizenship immediately. Testimony from Ulpian points to how in
the later Empire, the Romans no longer used manumissio censu.277 While manumissio testamento
granted citizenship, it was not immediate: the slave-owner announced his or her intentions to free
a slave in his or her will, but this freeing did not occur until after the slave-owner died.
Furthermore, once the owner was dead, the freed slaves were still vulnerable to legal challenge
276
277
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by inheritors, including challenges that could rescind their manumission.278 Evidence from the
Imperial Period points to how at that time there was another form of manumission called
manumissio inter amicos.279 This form of manumission did not grant citizenship status upon
completion, since the Dositheum Fragment explicitly states that slaves manumitted in this way
are not citizens, that they are “non esse liberos”.280 A slaved freed through manumissio inter
amicos could gain citizenship later, but the process of manumissio inter amicos itself did not
grant citizenship.281 For a writer like Plutarch in the Imperial Period, manumissio vindicta was
distinct in immediately granting citizenship.
In addition to being a biographer, Plutarch was an antiquarian fascinated by the ritualistic
details that made up Roman life and religion, as evidenced by his work The Roman Questions.
Plutarch’s and Livy’s aetiological accounts of manumissio vindicta connect with the origin of the
ritualized instruments and movements that the Romans imagined as being synonymous with that
type of manumission. Comparable examples are the etymologies of the word manumissio by
later Latin writers, in which they connect the phrase manu mittere to the practice of slapping a
slave upon manumission.282 These authors were undeterred by the lack of actual antiquarian
evidence that archaic Romans had slapped slaves when they freed them. They instead implicitly
appealed to the idea that movements preceded names. So when Plutarch describes the
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Owners could and at times did place requirements in their wills that slaves had to fulfill to obtain manumission,
requirements that slaves did not always fulfill, cf. Buckland (1970: 492-4).
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Fragmenta Dositheina, 4 and 5.
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Fabre explicitly states that these slaves are not citizens: “l’eslave libére informellement n’accède pas à la libertas
pleine, c’est-à-dire la citoyenneté” (1980: 56). Cf. Buckland (1970: 444-5) and Mouritsen (2011a: 85-86).
281
cf. Pliny Epistulae, 7.16.4 and see Mouritsen (2011a: 189 n. 313) for comment. Notably, in his taxonomy of
manumission, Cicero excludes inter amicos, suggesting that under the Republic, it was not valid; see Section 7
below.
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Sextus Pompeius Festus 158.10-22 and Isidorus 9.4.48. Harper (2011: 468-474) surveys the Latin sources and
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development of manumission in the Imperial Period, see the Conclusion below.
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movements involved in the process of manumission, I argue that he is seeing the movement of
the staff as intimately bound up with the entire process of manumission.283

d. Manumissio vindicta and the festuca
There is a strong and persistent connection between the manumissio vindicta and the
festuca staff. The story of Vinidicius is, in part, an aetiology that explains the complex
relationship of the slave-owner, slave, and state within the process of manumissio vindicta. For
just as how it was the Roman state rather than Vindicius’ owners who freed him, so too in
manumissio vindicta, it is a citizen participant other than the slave-owner who initially
recognizes the slave as a free person and who has to convince both the slave-owner and the state
that the slave in question should go free. In other words, both the ritualized practice of
manumisio vindicta and the story of Vindicius grant the role of liberator to people other than the
slave-owner, specifically people closely associated with the state. The ritualized movements of
manumissio vindicta function to make memorable, and honor, a slave-owner’s request that a
slave should now be treated a citizen. At the same time, the movements and instruments of the
manumissio vindicta operate such that they remind the participants that the power of
manumission does not lie within the slave-owner, but rather within the Roman state.
Plautus reveals that Republican Romans used the festuca, a type of ceremonial staff, to
manumit slaves. However, only the writers of the Imperial Period provide descriptions of how
the Romans performed manumissio vindicta. Because of the intervening centuries, it is
dangerous to assume that these writers had the same process in mind. Indeed, Gaius in particular
is aware that Roman practices had the potential to change over time. Unsurprisingly, this jurist
provides slightly different descriptions of how the movement of the festuca was part of
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manumissio vindicta. I argue that Bourdieu’s conception of the habitus explains both the
tendency of such ritualize practice to change overtime while still retaining its power.
Plautus’ writing proves that festuca was such an integral part of manumission in the late
third and early second century that the festuca could represent the entirety of the manumission
through synecdoche. In the Miles Gloriosus, the slave Palaestro is describing to the soldier
Pyrgopolinices a woman who has the potential to be his lover. Since Pyrgopolinices has never
met the woman, he questions Palaestro about her. Indeed, his first question is the status of the
woman, whether or not she is free and what kind of free woman she is:
PYRG. Quid ea? ingenuan an festuca facta e serva libera’st?
PAL. Vah, egone ut ad te ab libertina esse auderem internuntius,
qui ingenuis satis responsare nequeas quae cupiunt tui?
PYRGOPOLINICES: What woman is she? Freeborn? Or by the staff was she made free from
being a slave?
PALAESTRO: Oh, could I, as a messenger, dare to tell you that she is a freedwoman,
Since you are scarcely able to answer all the freeborn women who want you?
Plautus, Miles Gloriosus, 961-3, translation my own.

Since Pyrgopolinices readily agrees to Palaestro’s description of women, it is clear that, for
Pyrgopolinices, there is a strict hierarchy of free women: those who were originally slaves are
lower than those who were born free. His description of manumission as “festuca facta e serva
libera’st?” reflects this hierarchy, emphasizing how this woman is free only by virtue of a crude
instrument. Plautus’ emphasis on a phallic object like the festuca in Palaestro’s frank discussion
of sex raises the possibility that the actors incorporated sexualized gestures into their
performance.284 This line is also another example of Plautus’ use of his elastic Greek setting for
humor, as the line prompts his audience to laugh at why the supposed Greek, Pyrgopolinices,
makes use of a specifically Roman custom when thinking about manumission.
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Pluatus makes a similar joke in the Curculio when the slave Planesium demands her
freedom in the following way:
Em istoc verbo vindictam para:
si amas, eme, ne rogites, facito ut pretio pervincas tuo.
bene vale.
Go, and with that word, prepare the staff. If you love me, buy me, don’t negotiate, make it so
that you prevail with your price. Farewell!
Plautus, Curculio, 212-213, translation my own.

The problem with this line by itself is that it is not clear if Plautus refers to the vindicta as a
physical object to the process of manumissio vindicta.285 I argue that Plautus is referring to the
physical staff used in manumissio vindicta for two reasons. First, Plautus uses the staff as a
synecdoche of manumission in the Miles Gloriosus. Second, as a physical object in this setting,
the vindicta becomes a double entendre, and given the sexualized nature of Roman comedy, why
would Plautus pass up a double entendre?286 For the speaker, Planesium, is a slave of pimp
Cappadox. Furthermore, in these lines, she is addressing her paramour, the adulescens
Phaedromus. As a double entendre, her words are not only a command for Phaedromus to
prepare for her manumission, but also for him to prepare his own private “staff” for her loving
attention. However, while Plautus’ testimony reveals that when he wrote in the third and second
centuries, the festuca was synonymous with manumission, he does not indicate how the Romans
used it or what it was.
Similarly, the Greek antiquarian Plutarch demonstrates that in the Imperial Period the
Romans considered this instrument vital for manumission, but he also does not clarify what it
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was. Both Plutarch’s Greek rendering of festuca and the Roman antiquarian Varro’s philological
discussion of it fail to articulate what kind of instrument it was. Plutarch renders festuca as
κάρφος, a word with a wide range of meanings that includes sticks of cinnamon and the twigs
that birds use to build nests.287 However, in his use of κάρφος, Plutarch does explain how the
Romans used this instrument in manumission:
Ῥωμαῖοι δέ, οὕς ἄν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρῶνται, κάρφος αὐτῶν λεπτὸν ἐπιβάλλουσι τοῖς
σώμασιν.
And on the other hand, the Romans, whenever they announce certain people as free, they take
up their staff and lay it upon the slaves.
Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta, 550b, translation my own.

Although Plutarch does not mention manumissio vindicta by name in this passage, since he
emphasizes here the immediate process of a slave becoming free, it is almost certain that he is
thinking of the same process that, in the Publicola, he described as “complete manumission.” Of
course, in Plutarch’s description, κάρφος could still mean a piece of straw, as it is entirely
possible to touch someone with a piece of straw.288 Varro explains that festuca was a type of
stalk.
Rastelli ut irpices serrae leves; itaque homo in pratis per fenisecia eo festucas corradit, quo ab
rasu rastelli dicti. Rastri, quibus dentatis penitus eradunt terram atque eruunt, a quo rutu
ruastri dicti.
Rastelli ‘hay-rakes’, like harrows, are saw-toothed instruments, but light in weight; therefore a
man in the meadows at haying time corradit ‘scrapes together’ with this the stalks [festucas],
from which rasus ‘scraping’ they are called rastelli.
Varro, Lingua Latina, 5.31, 134, trans. R.G. Kent.289

This agrarian association is fruitful for R.G. Nisbet, who is interested in creating the proper
symbolic meaning for the festuca in the context of manumission.290 Plutarch’s Greek account of
the festuca provides the important detail that a slave must be touched by the festuca to be
287

Cinnamon: Herodotus, 3.111. Bird’s nest: Aristophanes, Aves, 643. Cf. LSJ κάρφος.
A position that Grimm (1854: 127) was willing to entertain, much to Nisbet’s surprise (1914: 1-2).
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considered free, while Varro’s Latin account points to how the term was used outside the setting
of manumission. The jurist Gaius provides more details about how the festuca was in
manumission itself.
Although jurist Gaius does not describe the process of manumissio vindicta, he does
describe two processes, the adsertio libertatis and the vindicatio’, that appear to be connected to
the process of manumissio vindicta. Adsertio libertatis was a process in which one Roman
claimed a particular person was a slave while the slave in question asserted that he or she was in
fact a free person. Most of the details of this procedure come from late antiquity, but there are
two pieces of evidence that suggest that some form of this procedure dated from an early period
in the Republic. The more tentative evidence is that of Livy and Dionysius. Both historians
describe Appius Claudius, one of the decemviri of the fifth century, as misusing adsertio
liberatatis in order to enslave a plebeian woman, a hubristic act that culminates in his own
downfall.291 The more authoritative evidence is from Polybius’ account of the fourth century
treaty between Rome and Carthage. In order to prevent the Romans and the Carthaginians from
enslaving each others’ citizens, the treaty included provisions which sought to ensure that people
who claimed to be unjustly enslaved had legal avenues to correct this injustice.292 Given these
two testimonies to the antiquity of the procedure, it is possible that the Romans used elements
from the procedure of adsertio libertatis when they created the legal process of manumission,
most especially the role of the adsertor. Since slaves, along with women and men who were not
Roman citizens, could not represent themselves in the Roman court, the adsertor was the person
who advocated on behalf of the person who claimed to be enslaved wrongfully. Since this role
appears quite similar to the role that the man who vouches for the freedom of the slave in cases
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of manumissio vindicta, W.W. Buckland uses the same term to describe the role within
manumissio vindicta.293
According to Gaius, in his time, the festuca was an integral part of the legal process named
vindicatio. A vindicatio is a dispute about who owns a specific piece of property, in which two
men agree to abide by the decision of a magistrate.294 Because authors like Plautus make plain
that the festuca was used in manumissio vindicta and because of the similarity between the
names manumissio vindicta and vindicatio, Buckland, Mouritsen, and Tondo have used Gaius’
description of vindicatio for evidence about the practice of manumissio vindicta.295 An additional
reason to assume that the process of vindicatio was similar to manumissio vindicta is that Gaius
uses a slave as his example of a disputed property. To clarify, Gaius is not describing a
procedure that is only for disputes over slaves. Rather, Gaius is describing a procedure that the
Romans used for any dispute over any type of moveable property; he is simply using a slave as
an example.296 For remember, Gaius’ text is a book that introduces the practice of law.297
Qui vindicabat, festucam tenebat; deinde ipsam rem adprehendebat, velut hominem, et ita
dicebat: HUNC EGO HOMINEM EX IURE QUIRITIUM MEUM ESSE AIO SECUNDUM
SUAM CAUSAM; SICUT DIXI, ECCE TIBI, VINDICTAM INPOSUI, et simul homini festucam
inponebat. Adversarius eadem similiter dicebat et faciebat. Cum uterque vindicasset, praetor
dicebat: MITTITE AMBO HOMINEM.
If the property at issue is indeed moveable and carried or lead into court, in this way. The
claimant would hold a rod [festuca]; then he would take hold of the actual property, for
instance a slave, and say “I declare that this slave is mine by quiritary right in accordance with
my case. As I have spoken, see, I have placed the rod [vindicta]”, and at the same time he laid
the rod on the slave. When each of them had made this claim the praetor would say: “Both of
you, let go the slave.”
Gaius, Institutiones, 4.16, trans. Gordon and Robinson, modified.

Afterwards, the two men state their reasons for why the property justly belongs to them. Then the
293
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magistrate makes his decision. In this passage, Gaius himself only describes the instrument as a
festuca, but in the formula that he ascribes to this legal process, he notes that the instrument is
called a vindicta. In both Gaius’ words and in the words of the formula, the word used to
describe the motion of the instrument towards the slave is impono, a movement that appears to
correspond to the motion that Plutarch describes as ἐπιβάλλουσι.298 As a result of this similarity,
along with others, it is logical to use the Gaius’ description of vindicatio as the basis for a
reconstruction of manumissio vindicta.
Having reviewed the vindicatio, I turn to the reconstructed manumissio vindicta.
Manumissio vindicta appears to have included five aspects: 1) the slave is the property, the slaveowner is the defendant, and a witness is asked to be the adsertor. 2) The defendant and the
adsertor perform the movements with the festuca that Gaius describes. 3) The adsertor then
states his reasons for why the slave should be considered free, according to some sort of formula.
4) The defendant waives his right to defend his right to the property. 5) Since the defendant
offers no defense, the magistrate is obligated to grant freedom to the slave. It is important to note
that steps 3) through 5) are reconstructed in large part through the assumption that the Romans
initially created the legal process of vindicatio, and only later adopted it as a legal tool for
manumissions.299 Prior to examining fully the role that festuca plays in manumissio vindicta, it is
first necessary to both look at Gaius’ own description of the instrument as well as other writers’
descriptions of the movements within this ritual.
In addition to describing how the festuca functions within the process of vindicatio, Gaius
also provides a history of the festuca which suggests, but does not prove, that this instrument was
something more magisterial than a piece of straw:
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Cf. ἐπιβάλλουσι in De Sera Numinis, 550b. See above Section 5c above.
Buckland (1970: 451), Mouritsen (2011a: 11-12), Tondo (1967: 2-8 and passim.).
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festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco, signo quodam iusti dominii, quando iusto dominio
ea maxime sua esse credebant, quae ex hostibus cepissent; unde in centumviralibus iudiciis
hasta proponitur.
Nevertheless, they used a festuca in place of a spear, which once was the sign of proper
ownership, when they trusted in those things most certainly to be his according to proper
ownership, specifically those things they took from the enemy. For the spear was used in the
courts of the centumviri.
Gaius, Institutiones, 4.16, trans. Gordon and Robinson.

Gaius’ explanation that the festuca is a replacement for a spear suggests that the festuca was a
staff or rod.300 On the one hand, this interpretation of Gaius’ writing makes sense, as it sensible
that a Roman, when presented with a staff in a law court, would connect that staff to a spear;
such a substitution is an example of the ritual sense that Bell describes, that is, a type of aesthetic
sense of what is appropriate in a ritual setting.301 Of course, the substitution also makes sense in
either a Freudian or Lacanian framework, that is, a framework in which phallic-like objects are
associated with authority.302 Such a framework would also explain the sexual connections in
Plautus’ use of the festuca. While Gaius’ description is in part an assertion of his juristic
authority through his antiquarian knowledge, his explanation of how the festuca used to be a
spear also points to how the Romans themselves were somewhat aware of the mutable nature of
their practices. In other words, Gaius suggests that the Romans were not completely unaware of
the improvisational nature of their practices; that is, at times, they thought about their practices
similar to Bourdieu’s habitus.303
In Gaius’ description of vindicatio, the festuca distinguishes the adsertor from the
defendant.304 For note how Gaius writes that the adsertor who holds the festuca and then touches
the slave with this staff: “Qui vindicabat, festucam tenebat…et simul homini festucam
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inponebat.” In contrast, the defendant merely touches the slave with his hand. Indeed, the
defendant touches the slave after the vindicator while not touching the festuca. The two men then
lift their hands from the slave at the same time. As a result, in the description of manumissio
vindicta based on Gaius’ account, the festuca visually distinguishes the roles of the two men: the
man holding the festuca is the one asserting that the slave should be free, while the one who does
not hold the festuca is the slave-owner. Such a visual distinction established for the collected
witnesses, that is, those who looked upon the action with the state’s gaze, who in this ritual
practice had the authority to grant the slave freedom: the man holding the festuca.
On the other hand, testimony from two other jurists from the second and third centuries
suggest that in at least some manumissions, the slave-owner or the presiding official used the
festuca at some point during the process. Ulpian describes the instrument used in manumission
not as a festuca, but as a vindicta. That this word stands for the instrument rather than for the
abstract process of manumission is clear from Ulpian’s use of the verb impono:
Potest et servus sine dolo malo in libertate morari, ut puta testamento accepit libertatem, quod
nullius momenti esse ignorat, vel vindicta ei imposita est ab eo, quem dominum esse putavit,
cum non esset, vel educatus est quasi liber, cum servus esset.
It is even possible for a slave to remain in freedom without bad faith, as in the case of one who
accepted freedom during a contested will, since during the moment he knows nothing of it. Or
the vindicta has been placed upon him by a man whom he thinks to be his master, when he is
not. Or he was raised as if a freeman when he was a slave.
Digest. 40.12.12.2 = Ulpianus 55 ad ed, translation my own.

According to Ulpian, the slave-owner at some point during manumissio vindicta holds the
festuca and places it upon the slave.305 In contrast, the jurist Paulus suggests that the magistrate
holds the festuca during some part of the ceremony when he asserts that an imperator does not
need a festuca in order to manumit a slave:
Imperator cum servum manumittit, non vindictam imponit, sed cum voluit, fit liber is qui
manumittitur ex lege augusti.
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When an imperator manumits a slave, he does not place the festuca, but when he wishes, the
man who is manumitted under the law of Augustus becomes free.
Digest, 40.1.14.1 = Paulus 16 ad plaut, translation my own.306

With these additional testimonies about the process of manumissio vindicta, there is the
possibility that these authors are either describing different steps of the same process or they are
giving accounts of different ways of preforming manumissio vindicta. Possibly the Romans used
the festuca either in different ways over time or in different ways at the same time.307 But clearly
the Romans required at least one of the participants to touch the slave with a festuca in order for
the manumissio vindicta to be done properly.
I argue that Bourdieu’s habitus in part explains the varied accounts in the sources.308 For
the habitus, the collective repository of movement and words, does not demand that movements
and words be repeated precisely in order to create a powerful practice. Despite Roman insistence
on repetition and perfection in ritual, as evidenced by their repeating rituals until they are
properly done, they were nonetheless free to change their rituals, especially if, in the moment,
some new movement or word appeared to the practitioners to compliment their own experiences
of that moment. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s emphasis on the importance of iteration to habitus has
important connections to Butler’s discussion of the importance of reproduction to subjection.309
The obvious objection to this position is that the Romans themselves do not write as if they had
this freedom. But a corollary to Bourdieu’s emphasis on innovation within practice is that a key
part of practice is the forgetting of practices’ own past, since it is only by forgetting that practices
have a history that it is possible to imagine that they are natural and intuitive.310
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The festuca was a ritual instrument that served as a focal point for the state’s gaze. By
using this instrument, the performers of the manumissio vindicta marked their motions and words
during this time as distinct and of a more lasting register than the motions and words of their
daily lives. As Gaius explains, the festuca associated the proceedings of the manumission to the
Roman courts, since Romans such as Gaius viewed the instrument as a connection to the court of
the centumviri. The use of the festuca also asserts that the slave-owner cannot complete the
manumission on his own, that he must ensure that the manumission is completed according to
the norms established by the Roman state.
That ancient writers provide different accounts of who held the festuca does not diminish
its importance to the state’s gaze; instead, these differing accounts suggest that it was the
presence of the festuca rather than a particular set of people that empower the manumissio
vindicta to free the slave. The festuca coordinated the recognition of the slave as a freedperson.
The state’s gaze is also present in manumissio vindicta in order to discipline the participants.
Both the magistrate and the adsertor are witnesses who ensure that the slave-owner is not doing
anything untoward. Nonetheless, within manumissio vindicta, the two men perform very
different actions. On the one hand, the magistrate primarily observes, being almost as passive as
the slave in question.311 On the other hand, the adsertor makes movements and speaks words that
parallel the slave-owner: they both touch the slave, they both say formulaic words about the
status of the slave. Significantly though, it is an adsertor, not the slave-owner, who claims the
slave is free. In effect, the adsertor, a representative of the state, claims to recognize the slave as
both a free person and a citizen prior to the completion of the manumissio vindicta. The
magistrate, also a representative of the state, judges this claim to be valid. Just as how in the
story of Vindicius, it was the state who recognized Vindicius as free rather than his masters, so,
311
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too, during the manumissio vindicta, it was the representatives of the state who first recognized
the slave as free, rather than the slave-owner. In both the story of Vindicius and the ritual of
manumissio vindicta, it is the state’s gaze that initially recognizes the slave as free, not the
owner.

e. Manumissio vindicta gone wrong: Cicero and the state’s gaze
The importance of the state’s recognition of the slave’s new status is perhaps most
evident in Cicero’s treatment of his freedman Chrysippus. Cicero’s vindictive attempt to revoke
Chrysippus’ freedom not only points to the separate interests of the slave-owners and the Roman
state, but also how necessary witnesses to manumission were to ensure that the process
proceeded as the law intended. Since Cicero had not properly observed the legal procedures
when he manumitted Chrysippus, he instead presided over an undisciplined manumission. After
the fact, Cicero took advantage of this disorganization to advance his interests as a private slaveowner, albeit by resorting to subterfuge.
In a letter that he wrote to Atticus in November 50 BCE, Cicero complains that two of his
freedmen had run away from his son, including a certain Chrysippus whom Cicero derides as
only somewhat literate.312 Chrysippus’ flight so wounds Cicero that he wishes to harm this man,
even though he does not know where he is: Cicero wants to rescind his freedom. The minor
problem that Roman slave-owners did not legally have the power to take back freedom appears
not to have stopped the great lawyer for long, since Cicero simply looked for a precedent for
authorizing re-enslavement because of procedural errors during the act of manumission itself.313
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Through this description, Cicero’s ill-will is apparent. In earlier works, Cicero writes that Chrysippus worked
with Tyrannion to improve the library of Cicero’s son (Epistulae ad Q. Fratrem 3.4.5 and 3.5/6.6, see Treggiari
(1969: 257-8). Cf. Cicero’s freedmen Tyrannion and Dionysius who at times acted as librarians (Yarrow 2006: 401).
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Cicero believed that he had found a possible candidate for such a precedent and asked Atticus if
he agrees:
Itaque usurpavi illud Drusi, ut ferunt, praetoris in eo qui eadem liber non iuraret, me istos
liberos non addixisse, praesertim cum adesset nemo a quo recte vindicarentur. Id tu, ut
vidbitur, ita accipies; ego tibi adsentiar.
So I have followed the precedent of Drusus the Praetor, so they say, in the case of the slave
who would not retake the oath after manumission, and have denied giving them their
freedom—all the more easily since there was nobody there by whom they were competently
represented [vindicarentur]. You will react to this as you think proper and I shall assent to your
judgment.
Cicero, Ad Atticum 7.2.8 = Shackleton Bailey 125.8, trans. Shackleton Bailey, modified.314

While a later letter reveals that Atticus did support Cicero’s plan, since nothing else is known
about Drusus’ case, how faithful or expedient Cicero’s reading of that case is is open to
question.315 But it is possible to risk a reconstruction of Cicero’s interest in Drusus based on the
reasonable assumption that Cicero had manumitted these men while he himself was a
magistrate.316 As a magistrate with imperium, Cicero had the authority to oversee cases of
manumissio vindicta. As mentioned above, manumissio vindicta required both the participation
of a magistrate and the slave-owner.317 So when Cicero writes to Atticus that these men had been
freed without proper representation, it is possible that he is claiming that the actual event of their
manumission had consisted of himself functioning as both adsertor libertatis and magistrate.318
In short, Cicero asks Atticus if it is a good idea to pronounce Chrysippus a runaway slave, rather
314
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than a disloyal freedman, by admitting that Cicero himself had not followed all the procedures
involved in a proper manumission.
By conducting Chrysippus’ manumission alone, Cicero attempted to avoid the state’s
gaze from settling on his own actions, even though as a magistrate he himself was entrusted to
look upon manumissions as the state’s representative. Without the gaze of witnesses to discipline
Cicero, and to recall the when and where of the manumission itself, Chrysippus’ freedom was
vulnerable to Cicero’s post hoc machinations. Cicero’s gaze upon this long past, and completed,
manumission is not entirely that of the state, as he has neither fully abstracted Chrysippus’
manumission nor even made it anonymous, or properly bureaucratic. Cicero’s rant to Atticus
makes clear that he wants to punish Chrysippus not because of abstract reasons, but because of
deeply personal ones, an urge to punish quite separate from the state’s motivations.319
That Chrysippus’ absence personally wounded Cicero goes against Foucault’s description of the
impersonal aspect of the disciplining gaze.320 Rather, Cicero’s anger points to the need for
Butler’s description of how the trajectories of power are connected to our psychic interiorities.321
Furthermore, Butler’s comment on the connection between the sense of triumph and social death
possibly illuminate the origins of Cicero’s rancor.322 Cicero refuses to recognize Chrysippus as a
freedman and, instead, views the man as his own slave, even though the state—through Cicero’s
own words as a magistrate—has recognized Chrysippus as a freedman.
Cicero’s perfidy towards Chryippus distracts from the impotency of his plan. In his letter
to Atticus, Cicero gives no indication that he has any idea where Chrysippus is or what he is
319
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doing, and so it would matter little if Cicero successfully rebranded Chrysippus as a runaway
slave.323 What this incident does make clear is that the freedman escaped the gaze of his former
owner, who then attempts to take up the state’s gaze in order to punish him. That Cicero has to
toggle between the gaze of the slave-owner, who evaluates Chrysippus worth in terms of his past
loyalty as a slave and future prospects as a client freedman, and the gaze of the state, which is
concerned only with whether the manumission was performed correctly, further demonstrates the
conflicting values and fields of vision behind, and within, the gazes of Roman slave-owners and
the Roman state. Manumissio vindicta, rather than being a simple process of a slave-owner
making public his or her decision to free a slave, was instead a practice intimately involved with
the state in order to generalize the new recognition of the slave as free.

f. The Roman state and manumissio vindicta
To review: in the aetiological stories about the origins of manumissio vindicta, it is the
state, rather than the slave-owner, who has the authority and receives the credit for freeing the
slave. Likewise, the movements and instruments associated with manumissio vindicta—as
reconstructed by its supposed similarities to vindicatio—suggest that in the ritual itself, the slaveowner did not have a prominent role; instead, the representatives of the state, both the adsertor
and the magistrate, are more significant. The prominence of these roles, possibly, also explains
why Cicero took up the role of the magistrate rather than adsertor when he freed his own
freedmen. I argue that the state’s prominence in both the stories and the ritual is indicative of the
state’s stake in manumission. That is, these stories and rituals contain clues for reconstructing the
state’s view of manumission.
The hypothesis of the legal dodge in the development of the laws around Roman
manumission further strengthens my argument that the Roman state had interests in manumission
323
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that were separate from the interests of individual slave-owners and slave-owners collectively.
The idea of the legal dodge also combines nicely with Bourdieu’s description of habitus, as the
idea of the dodge is that because intention and application of law are separable, people can use a
law in ways contrary to its orginal intention. The phrase legal dodge refers to the repeated use of
a law for purposes contrary to its original intention or even stated purpose.324 Like Bourdieu’s
habitus, the legal dodge suggests that contrary-to-intended usage can persist through iteration.
Charles Appleton, W.W. Buckland, M. De Visscher, and Alan Watson argue that the Romans
initially used legal procedures such as adsertio libertatis to claim that their slaves were already
citizens and that the official laws permitting and regulating manumission came later.325 That is,
they argue that Roman slave-owners initially had to use a legal dodge in order to free their
slaves, since the Roman state did not originally have a fully schematized and rationalized method
for transforming slaves into citizens. M. Wlassak and Henri Lévy-Bruhl argue against the legal
dodge hypothesis. They instead posit that slave-owners never needed to deceive the state because
they always had the ability to transform slaves into citizens; albeit slave-owners required the
presence of governmental officials in order to do so.326
The theory of Roman manumission beginning as a legal dodge is a good articulation of
the divide between the Roman state and Roman slave-owners. In the example of the legal dodge,
slave-owners appear to want to free their slaves, but the state prevents them. The conflict
between the state and slave-owners is, in part, the clash between manumission in an abstract and
summarized form—the form that is topic of legal discourse, a type of knowledge that Scott
324
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points out is amenable for state’s records—and manumission as turning a point in the
relationship between a slave and a slave-owner, that is, a personalized type of knowledge that is
impossible to summarize. As Cicero’s experience shows, the state’s gaze is not concerned with
the emotional bonds that could exist between slave and slave-owners, even if slave-owners such
as Cicero attempted to use the state’s gaze to pursue emotional closure. In short, Cicero
attempted to deceive the state’s gaze after the fact, to manipulate the role of the state’s gaze as
the recorder of manumission. Cicero attempted to use the state’s disciplinary power to punish
Chrysippus even though he was no longer a slave.
The relationship among Chrysippus, Cicero, and state means it is dangerous to assume
that the legal history of Roman manumission was a narrative of slave-owners wanting to free
their slaves in opposition to the state’s law. Significantly, my reading of the Vindicius story and
the prominence of the state in the manumissio vindicta suggests that the Romans were quite
capable of thinking that it was the state, rather than the slave-owners, that wanted slaves to be
freedpeople. Dionysius’ account of King Servius’ establishment of manumission also takes this
perspective, as the king himself frees and enfranchises the slaves. He then defends this action
against the angry slave-owners.

6. Ma(r)king new citizens: Servius, the census, and manumissio censu
While Livy and Plutarch’s account of the origins of manumission stress how Vindicius
had to choose, actively, to be loyal to the Roman state, Dionysius instead writes that Servius
Tullius mixed manumission with enfranchisement through fiat, as he simply enrolled a number
of slaves in the census. Like Romulus, Servius is also a foundational figure. While the Romans
credited Romulus with the creation of the physical city, they credited Servius with the creation of
fundamental religious and legal practices. In the case of Dionysius, that includes crediting
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Servius with the creation of manumission. Dionysius’ omission of slave agency from this origin
story is not surprising, as within his history Dionysius overall disdains the moral potential of
slaves. But even though Dionysius erases slave agency by attributing all the action to Servius,
the historian nonetheless continues the theme central to Livy’s and Plutarch’s account of
Vindicius: it is the slave’s loyalty to the state, rather than to the slave-owner, that is necessary for
manumission. But while there are important thematic similarities between the two accounts,
Vindicius’ story is quite different from that of Servius’: Servius sees, and thinks, like a state. For
him, manumission is not about individual slaves, but about slaves generally and how this policy
spefically can strengthen Roman power and simultaneously align geographical borders with civic
identities.
While Dionysius depicts Servius as considering manumission abstractly, he himself is not
abstract. Because of the connection of this action to the character of Servius, it is necessary to
consider how the king’s background plays a role in how the ancients thought through why
Servius was interested in, and reformed issues like, manumission.327 While Vindicius’
manumission is singular and specific to his own past deeds, in contrast, Dionysius writes Servius
as approaching manumission at the level of policy, despite the process’s close connection to his
own life.328 Both Livy and Dionysius recount stories in which Servius was born to a woman who
had been enslaved. While Dionysius shows no interest in determining what Servius’ status had
been when he was born, Livy, on the other hand, explicitly doubts in the probability that Servius
had been a slave. Livy’s doubts points to how there were different versions of Servius’
childhood. Furthermore, these different versions of Servius’ childhood suggest that just as the
Greeks and Romans used Romulus’ asylum in order to think through how Roman political
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inclusion relates to questions of manumission, so too did they use Servius to think through
questions about Roman social mobility. While the Romans did not imagine Servius as a literal
founder of Rome like Romulus, he was still a founding figure, in regards to Roman religious
traditions and political structures. As a result, it is important to examine Servius’ own life in
order to understand why and how the ancient writers attributed to him the invention of
manumission through census.

a. Manumission and Servius the slave
The Romans liked thinking with Servius. In the version of Claudius’ speech to the Senate
preserved on the Lyons tablet, the Emperor recounts how Servius was a foreigner, but
nonetheless achieved Roman kingship in order to persuade the senate to accept provincials into
the Senate.329 In other words, Claudius uses Servius as an exemplum of a successful foreigner in
Rome; Claudius used the figure of Servius to think through the connections of the past to the
present, as well as what is possible and what ought to be done. It would be logical to assume that
the Romans similarly used Servius’ status as a slave to think through contemporary questions.
On the one hand, they did credit Servius with creating a number of festivals and religious
practices that were either specifically or closely associated with slaves.330 On the other hand, the
Romans specifically did not turn to Servius’ life in order to explain other aspects of slavery.
Ancient writers consistently avoided describing Servius as ever having been manumitted. There
are a number of possible explanations for this omission, including simply that the Romans could
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(1987: 209).
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not reconcile a just, and successful, reign with a man who was initially a slave.331 Indeed, such
discomfort with the idea that a slave ruled Rome appears to have been a factor in Livy’s retelling
of Servius’ birth and childhood. Livy asserts that other writers describe Servius as slave, thereby
providing evidence that at least some Romans thought of Servius as a slave, or at least thought it
was possible that he was a slave. Relatedly, Dionysius ambivalently retells stories of Servius’
childhood. Since Dionysius also describes Servius as the originator of Roman manumission, his
retelling of Servius’ birth is an important place to look for clues for how the historian understood
this servile background as influencing the king’s decisions about the Roman citizenry.
Livy and Dionysius tell roughly the same story of Servius’ birth: when the Romans
sacked the city of Conriculum, they seized a pregnant woman who had been the wife of the
leader of Conriculum, a man who died defending his city.332 Because this captive had certain
outstanding qualities, she was given to the Roman Queen Tanaquil.333 But while Livy insists that
Tanaquil promptly freed this woman, Dionysius writes that the woman gave birth while still a
slave. The question of this woman’s status is connected to the way these two writers’ different
conceptions of slavery and Roman success, demonstrating that the ancients used Servius’
background in order to think through issues that pertained to manumission.
Livy tells his readers that it is implausible that Servius was born a slave and was a slave
in his youth. Prior to describing the fall of Corniculum, Livy notes that there are some who
believe that Servius himself had been a slave, but that he instead follows another account:
Hic quacumque de causa tantus illi honos habitus credere prohibet serva natum eum
parvumque ipsum servisse. Eorum magis sententiae sum….
…it is difficult to believe that he was the son of a slave and as a youth was himself a slave. I
am more inclined to follow those who give this account.
331

Cf. Mouritsen on the stain of slavery in Roman life (2011a: 10-35).
For an extensive comparison of the two different versions of the birth, see Fromentin (2002: 56-60). See also
Fromentin (2003).
333
For more on the women captives of Romans, see Allen (2006: 180-6).
332
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Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.39.5, trans. T.J. Luce.

In other words, Livy describes Servius as the son of a freedwoman, rather than the son of a slave
woman. Nonetheless, Livy does not use either the word, or even the concept of, manumission to
explain how Servius’ mother was freed. Instead, he writes that queen Tanaquil freed her on
account of her nobilitas, a process that allows the historian to depict the woman more as a
dignified prisoner of war rather than a woman whom the Romans could have relegated to a life
of drudgery and misery.334 Livy then notes how his version of the story explains why there are
those who believe that Servius had been slave, as there are people who ignore how Servius’
mother had already been freed when she gave birth to him:
…fortunam matris, quod, capta patria in hostium manus venerit, ut serva natus crederetur
fecisse.
Whatever the reason for it, the honour accored to Servius was so great that it is difficult to
believe he was the son of a slave and as a youth was his himself a slave.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 1.39.6, trans. T.J. Luce.

Livy is interested in the question of Servius’ status as a baby and as a youth, but does not fully
commit himself to any particular version of this story. What Livy’s provocations do suggest is
that the historian was interested in preserving Roman hierarchies. While Livy does not name any
writers who assert that Servius was born a slave, his narrative contains men who do. The sons of
the former king Ancus and the sons of the former king Tarquin Superbus refer to Servius as a
slaveand furthermore assert that this background made him unfit to be king.335 Although Livy
does not condemn these attacks because they degrade Servius, by both attributing such thinking
to ignoble people and by asserting that such attacks are not true, Livy discredits as ignoble these
slanderous attacks on an innovative king. By providing his readers with the more plausible of

334
335

1.39.5.
Sons of Ancus: 1.40.2-4. Tarquin Superbus: 1.47.10.
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Servius’ origins, Livy aligns himself, and his readers, against those who slander Servius as a
slave.
In a way, Livy’s description of Servius matches the values of his version of Romulus’
asylum: Rome does well when the citizenry is more concerned about merit and loyalty to the
state than about background.336 But Livy’s rendition of Servius’ birth also contradicts the values
of the asylum story, since in the case of Servius, Livy cannot conceptualize that one of Rome’s
great leaders was born a slave. For Livy writes that Servius intended to “give freedom to his
homeland,” a plan that Tarquin’s assassination interrupted.337
In contrast, Dionysius asserts that Servius was born when his mother was a slave, a
background that Dionysius appears to reference implicitly when he describes how Servius at
times champions the poor and excluded.338 According to the Greek historian, the woman, whom
he reports was named Ocrisia, named her child Servius specifically because she was a slave
when she gave birth to him.339 Dionysius then explains to his Greek readers that the Latin
adjective servius has the same meaning as the Greek δουλίος.340 In essence, Dionysius uses folk
etymology as evidence for the reconstruction of Servius’ birth. But even though the historian
provides numerous pieces of evidence that suggest that Servius had a servile background,
Dionysius shows no interest in the question of Servius’ exact social standing at the time of his
birth, despite the historian’s own antipathy towards slaves. What Dionysius does make clear is
that he prefers the story of Servius’ birth to Ocrisia and human father over accounts of possible
336

Cf. Fromentin (2002: 54).
“liberandae patriae consilia agitanti intervenisset.” 1.48.9. Accius likewise had attributed noble intentions to
Servius (see Cicero, Pro Sestio, 123). For analysis of the positive tradition around Servius, see Ridley (1975) and
Richard (1987).
338
Although Dionysius, like Livy, writes that Servius designed the voting system to favor the wealthy (Roman
Antiquities, 4.21.1, cf. Ab Urbe Condita, 1.43.10), his other accomplishments, such as the reordering of the Roman
body and the construction of the Severan walls, depict him as considering all of Rome’s people.
339
4.1.2. In other traditions she is Ocresia. On the spelling, and her role in Etruscan legends, see Ridley (1975),
Thomsen (1980).
340
Roman Antiquities, 4.1.3. In contrast, Plutarch describes Orcesia as an αἰχμαλώτος (Roman Questions, 100).
337
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divine origins. Likely, Dionysius’ disdain for the supernatural story prompted the historian not to
investigate the natural story too closely.341 While Livy draws attention to Servius’ precise status
in order to dismiss the possibility that he had been manumitted, Dionysius simply avoids the
question altogether.
Although Dionysius and Livy use very similar details in their reconstruction of Servius’
life, the two historians attach very different values to the question of whether or not he was born
a slave. On the one hand, Livy is at pains to assure his readers that there is only an indirect
connection between Servius and slavery. That is, even though Livy explains that this king’s
name means “slave-like,” nonetheless, he had never been a slave; as a consequence, Servius was
never manumitted. On the other hand, Dionysius uses the etymology of Servius’ name without
any sort of concern that connecting Servius to slavery might be slanderous. Indeed, Dionysius’
positive review of Servius’ reign suggests that he does not have any intention to slander this
man. Furthermore, while Dionysius does include the detail about Servius’ servile origin, the
historian does not make any connection between this past and the king’s reforms on
manumission. Instead, Dionysius portrays the king as ordering these reforms only for the good of
Rome.342

b. Dionysius on Servius and manumission
Dionysius’ discussion of Servius’ decision to enfranchise manumitted slaves consists of
three sections. The first section is a description of Servius’ decision to make former slaves
citizens as an extension of how previous kings had enrolled foreigners as Romans. In the second
section, Servius gives a speech, in oratio obliqua, in order to defend this promotion of former
slaves from complaining patricians. Servius’ speech begins with philosophical and historical

341
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In 4.2.1 and 4.2.4, Dionysius makes it clear that he does not stand by the story of Servius’ divine birth.
For Servius generally, see Thomson (1980). For Dionysius’ use of Servius, see Gabba (1991: 157).
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arguments about humanity, but concludes by arguing that combining manumission
enfranchisement will increase Rome’s military power. The third section consists of Dionysius’
evaluation of Servius’ reform, after which he contrasts it to how the Romans practice
manumission in his own day.343 In that third section, Dionysius conceives of Servius’ practice of
manumission as a kind of exemplum that ought to guide current Roman practices.
Because Dionysius does link the census to the enactment of the originary act of
manumission, it might appear that the historian is explaining the origin of manumissio censu.
However, the Dionysius himself does not make the connection between the census and Servius’
manumission of the slaves. Instead, Dionysius is interested in Servius’ action for its ability to
provide relevant moral guidance on how to free slaves who become citizens. In other words,
even though this account resonates with how Imperial jurists write that during the Republican
period it was possible for slave-owners to register and free their slaves with censor, Dionysius
himself does not assert that Servius originated manumissio censu.344
Rather than using Servius’ invention of the census as an aetiology of manumissio censu,
Dionysius instead connects manumission to the census in order to think through two different
questions. The first question is why the Romans were so successful in their conquests. Since this
question is closely connected to Dionysius’ status as a Greek writer, I return to it in Chapter 3.345
The second question concerns the relationship of slaves, foreigners, citizens, and the Roman
state, a question which for Dionysius is closely related to Servius’ role as a bringer of order, the
bearer of the state’s gaze. The Romans, as well as Greek writers, described Servius not simply as
a reformer, but as a reformer who created the initial categories of the Roman army and society as
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First section: 4.22.3-4; second section: 4.23; third section: 4.24.
Ulpian 1.8 and Gaius 1.17. Ulpian writes as if this practice was extinct in his own time. Gaius is less precise. Cf.
Buckland (1970: 440).
345
Chapter 3 Section 3b.
344
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well as the boundaries that allowed for these categories to have meaning.346 For Dionysius,
Servius’ use of the census to enfranchise former slaves is a continuation of this role.
According to Dionysius, Servius does not simply make all former slaves citizens. Instead,
he offers them the choice to either become citizens or return to their homelands:
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ξένους ὑποδεχόμενοι καὶ μεταδιδόντες τῆς ἰσοπολιτείας φύσιν τ᾽ ἢ τύχην
αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἀπαξιοῦντες, εἰς πολυανθρωπίαν προήγαγον τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δὲ Τύλλιος καὶ τοῖς
ἐλευθερουμένοις τῶν θεραπόντων, ἐὰν μὴ θέλωσιν εἰς τὰς ἑαυτῶν πόλεις ἀπιέναι, μετέχειν τῆς
ἰσοπολιτείας ἐπέτρεψε.
For they [the previous kings], by receiving foreigners and bestowing upon them equal rights of
citizenship without rejecting any, whatever their birth or condition, had indeed rendered the
city populous; but Tullius permitted even manumitted slaves to enjoy these same rights, unless
they chose to return to their own countries.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.22.3-4, trans. E. Cary.

By asking the slaves to either be with Rome or against it, Servius solidifies the border between
being Roman and non-Roman. In essence, Dionysius depicts the king as using enfranchisement
to resolve the conflicting identities of former slaves: those who choose to stay after Dionysius’
decree were former slaves ready to make sacrifices for Rome, while those who choose to return
home no longer had any claims to be any sort of Roman. Dionysius also downplays this
transformation of the slaves by describing it as a continuation of the earlier practice of permitting
foreigners who live in Rome to become Roman citizens. In this way, the combination of
enfranchisement with manumission is not so much about the liberty of slaves, but rather is about
realigning Rome’s physical borders with the boundaries of the citizen body.347 Thinking about a
realignment of borders was more than an academic interest for Dionysius; as a resident alien in
Rome, he was aware the tension between the physical boundaries of a space and the boundaries
of a collective identity.348
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Livy on Servius’ divisions of the military and society: 1.42-3. Dionysius on Servius’ restructuring of Rome: 4.1522.
347
Cf. Ando’s work on the intersection of territory and Roman citizenship (2015: 7-28).
348
I further discuss Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ status as a resident alien in Chapter 3 Section 3b.
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c. Comparing Vindicius and Servius in Dionysius
The desire of Dionysius’ Servius to adjust the boundaries of Roman territory and the
Roman citizenry so that they perfectly align has values diametrically opposed to the values in the
story of Vindicius. Since Dionysius is the only writer to assert that Servius originated Roman
manumission, I compare the two stories in Dionysius with an aim to further draw out the writer’s
thoughts on manumission. The Vindicius’ story values flexible and porous boundaries, as it
suggests that Rome can easily accept as Roman those who prove their worth to the state
regardless of their background. In contrast, the Servius story values impassable boundaries:
Servius manumits the slaves in order to align Rome’s physical border with the borders of its
citizenry. Another way that the two stories differ is in regards to the slaves’ agency. Vindicius’
manumission and enfranchisement were rewards for his own activities, so while he himself did
not have the authority to grant himself these gifts, nonetheless, it was clear that he himself played
an important role in securing his own citizenship. In contrast, Dionysius attributes the policy of
combining manumission with enfranchisement entirely to Servius, the leader of the state: the
slaves have no agency.
But while the two accounts differ in regards to slave’s agency, they nonetheless present
the state and slave-owners as having antagonistic interests when it comes to manumission.
Specifically, both stories depict the slave-owners as having an interest to continue the
enslavement while the state has an interest in freeing the slaves. In the Vindicius story, the
conspirators have an interest in continuing their enslavement of Vindicius in order to prevent his
testimony. Likewise, in Dionysius’ depiction of Servius’ manumission practices, the slaveowners initially reject his policy of combining enfranchisement with manumission.349 As a result

349

“ἀχθομένων δὲ τῶν πατρικίων ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι καὶ δυσανασχετούντων…” The πράγμα in question is Servius’
decision to treat former slaves as plebeians (4.23.1).
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of this hostility, Servius gives a speech defending his decision. Notably, only one of the
rationales take up the perspective of a slave-owner; the rest instead consider manumission from
the viewpoint of the Roman state. Because this speech is indicative of Dionysius’ own
perspective on Roman manumission, I examine the rataionales in detail in Chapter 3 Section 3b.
The significant result of this speech is that Dionysius downplays the potentially personal nature
of this grand gesture. That is, Dionysius could have easily have explained this mass manumission
as Servius’ attempt to consolidate power against the patricians, which is how Appian explains
Sulla’s enfranchisement of more than 10,000 slaves.350 Instead, the historian describes the king
as concerned only with the good of the state, rather than his own fortunes.
In other words, even though Dionysius is concerned with Servius’ servile background, he
nonetheless writes Servius as seeing manumission from the perspective of the state. That is, this
Servius is not concerned with specific examples of manumission, but he is concerned with
conceiving it as an iterative and widespread practice that demands regulation through
bureaucratic enforcement, specifically the bureaucratic enforcement of the census. Servius’
imperial vision, unconcerned with the feelings of the patricians, is similar to the diffused gaze of
the actual practice of the census. For while the Roman state entrusted the censors to count the
population, theirs were not the only eyes at work in the census. The census was a public affair,
which drew the eyes of the Roman public. The public’s gaze upon the Roman men, who were
declaring the nature of their family and property, was a gaze that was itself an impetus for these
men to provide the proper count.

350

Appian Bellum Civile, 1.100. CIL I2 2.722 mentions a libertus of Sulla, cf. Keaveney (1982: 141). For more on
this passage, see the Conclusion Section 2.
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d. The state and manumissio censu
While Dionysius’ account of Servius’ manumission through the census does not contain
an explicit aetiology of manumissio censu, nonetheless, there are important connections
concerning state power between that account and the practice of manumissio censu. This
congruence of the values and interests of gazes within Dionysius’ account of Servius and the
ritualized practice of manumissio censu does not mean that Dionysius’ story is any more
authoritative than the aetiology of manumission within the story of Vindicius. Rather, the
similarities between the story of manumissio censu and the practice of manumissio censu suggest
that the story articulates concerns that the Romans were thinking through while practicing
manumissio censu.
What exactly the census entailed, most especially which people the census counted, is a
matter of scholarly controversy.351 However, ancient writers do assert that in addition to counting
people, the census also counted property, including land and that which in Roman law is called
moveable property.352 The purpose of counting and evaluating the worth of this property was so
that the Roman state could both assign the household to the proper order as well as extract the
proper amount of tributum.353 Livy’s retelling of how Cato purposefully overvalued the worth of
a number of slaves suggests that the censors had a wide range of discretion in monetizing the
property that they surveyed.354 In other words, it seems possible that the censors, possibly in
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A simple account of the debate is that, on the one side, there are “low counters,” such as Brunt (1971), who
defends Beloch’s position that the reason the count in the Augustus census was so high is that it included women
and children. On the other side, there are “high counters” such as Lo Cascio (1994) and Kron (2005), who argue
instead that Augustus’ high count included regions previously excluded. Hin offers up a new defense of the socalled “middle count” position (2013: 286 ff.).
352
Gellius mentions farm equipment (6.11.9). Livy mentions clothing, jewelry, transport, and slaves (39.442-3).
Cicero also mentions slaves (Leges 3.7, Flaccus 80). Cf. Northwood (2008: 260).
353
Cf. Northwood (2008).
354
Livy 39.44.1-3. I discus this passage in greater detail in Section 3b above, cf. Northwood (2008: 260-1).
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normal circumstances in dialogue with the slave-owners, assigned a price to slaves when taking
the census.
Like the census itself, the precise steps of manumissio censu require reconstruction. As
with all reconstructions, care is needed, especially since unlike either manumissio vindicta or
manumissio testamento, it appears that during the Imperial period the Romans no longer used
manumissio censu.355 The process did continue until the late Republic because when Cicero
writes of the three different types of manumission, he includes manumissio censu.356 A
reconstruction of the process is as follow: first, the slave tells the censor that he is a citizen.357
Second, the owner agrees. Third, the censor writes down the slave as a citizen among the others
on the rolls.358 In other words, in manumissio censu it is the gaze of the Roman state, not the
slave-owner, that both plays the prominent role and has the power to free the slave.
By gaze of the Roman state, I do not simply mean the gaze of the censor, but rather a
decentralized gaze that included the espials of other Romans. The act of taking the census was a
public affair: for the Romans complained about the incongruity between the wealth that other
Romans declared and the wealth needed to support other Romans’ spending habits.359 As a
result, the power of the census to compel citizens to report their family, and their property,
truthfully depended on how the census was public knowledge. That is, to be counted in the
census was to be visible, for both the censor and the body politic to see the former slave.360
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While Gaius writes as though it was still in practice, the testimony from other jurists puts this in doubt, cf.
Buckland (1970: 440).
356
De Oratore 1.183.
357
The masculine gender is purposeful, since I believe that the censors only counted male citizens in the census, cf.
Kron (2005).
358
For the relative unimportance of the presence of the slave-owner in this process, see Buckland (1970: 439-441).
359
Publius Scipio Aemilianus complained that Tiberius Claudius Asellus spent more on one prostitute than his entire
declared value of his Sabine farm (Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 6.11.9 = ORF 128; cf. Northwood 2008: 260).
360
I leave aside the question of the relationship between visibility and the written record of the census.
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The example of manumissio censu, therefore, reveals that it was the gaze of the state and
the anonymous public that had the power to free the slave through recognition rather than the
slave-owner. Just as the incongruity of the prominence of the state and the supposed power of the
slave-owner in the case manumissio vindicta is connected to the hypothesis that manumissio
vindicta began as a legal dodge, so too has Alan Watson argued that manumissio censu was not
originally intended as a process to free slaves.361 Watson argues that when the Romans did not
have access to laws that allowed them to manumit their slaves, they purposefully misused
already extant laws in order to achieve their desired ends.362 In the case of the census, such a
dodge would have meant declaring that the slave in question was already a citizen even though
he was not. As in my discussion of manumissio vindicta, whether such a development actually
occurred is outside the scope of my argument.363
Instead, my argument is that the process of manumissio censu encouraged Roman
citizens to take the perspective of the Roman state, rather than the perspective of an individual
slave-owner. More precisely, manumissio censu calls upon the censor specifically, and
whichever Romans happen to be present at this particular manumission, to look upon a specific
example of manumission abstractly for the good of the Roman commons. Furmore, the Romans
used the state’s gaze in a similar fashion in the first century BCE: because the reformed cura
annonae distributed grain to all citizens for free, the state had a higher stake in identifying which
people were freedmen whose manumission had been completed properly.364 Significantly, such
concerns are the same ones expressed through Servius’ gaze, as Dionysius’ account of Servius
emphasizes that he did not free and enfranchise these slaves because of their individual
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Watson (1975: 90).
Watson (1975: 90).
363
See Section 5f above.
364
For more on the cura annonae, see the Conclusion Section 2.
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attributes. Rather, Servius enfranchised them for the good of Rome, a priority that during the
Imperial Period the Romans attempted to cultivate in slave-owners through the regulation of
manumissio testamento.365

7. Manumissio testamento and the Roman state
Of the three methods of manumission, manumissio testamento would initially appear to
be a process in which the state had no role, since a will is supposedly a guarantee that the
deceased’s property will be handled according to his or her wishes. However, the origins of
Roman wills demonstrate that rather than being a practice within a non-governmental sphere, this
process was closely interwoven with the Roman state. As a result, it is necessary to consider the
working of the state’s gaze with manumissio testamento, as the state was a participant. Such a
perspective helps makes sense of Augustus’ Lex Fufia Maninia, a law which sought to regulate
the precise number of slaves that Romans could manumit in their wills. Although this law falls
outside the Republican scope of this project, it provides context for Livy’s descriptions of
Republican regulations of manumission, which I examined in Section 3. Augustus’ regulations
also contextualize my analysis of how powerful Romans used manumission in the first century
BCE in the Conclusion of my dissertation.
Jurists’ descriptions of the original types of Roman wills make clear that it was necessary
for a representative of the state to be present, presumably in order to verify that the property was
distributed in the proper way and, also, to record that this process had occurred at all. According
to Gaius, originally there were only two types of wills, in comitiis calatis and in procinctu.366
The first, in comitiis calatis, was highly formal: the paterfamlias went before the curia on one of
only two days of the year in order to plead his case in front of the Pontifex Maximus. The second
365
366

For more on such refomrs, see the Conclusion Section 2.
Gaius 2.101, cf. Jolocwicz (1952: 125-6).
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was designed to allow for emergencies when citizens were in the army. The procedure in
procinctu allowed a soldier to use three or four of his colleagues as witnesses to his will. In both
of Gaius’ descriptions of the two earliest forms of Roman wills, there was some sort of
representative of the state: in the case of in comitiis calatis, the Pontifex Maximus along with the
curia are the representatives, while in the case of in procinctu, the soldiers are the emergency
substitutes. The second type of will further demonstrates the disperse nature of the state’s gaze,
since in extremis soldiers were trusted to function as witnesses.
Likely the writers of the Twelves Tables only knew these two types of wills, a connection
significant for manumission, because Ulpian asserts that the Twelve Tables had legislation
around this process. Unfortunately, Ulpian neither cites the precise language of the law, nor even
provides much context for why it was necessary for the Twelve Tables to guarantee that Romans
could manumit slaves through a will:
Ut testamento manumissi liberi sint, lex Duodecim Tabularum facit, quae confirmat.
The law of the Twelve Tables asserts and confirms that those who were manumitted by
testament are freedmen.
Ulpian, Ad Sabinum, 1.9, translation my own.

Possibly, Ulpian’s testimony about the Twelve Tables is an interpretation of some aspect of
inheritance. Ulpian’s testimony is not good evidence that Romans in the fifth century saw a need
to legislate about manumission.367 The Twelve Tables outlived the community of Romans who
were its readers and writers, and its enigmatic imperatives passed into the hands of Romans who
had different expectations for slaves and manumission as they were now conquerors of the
Mediterranean. The references to a “second law” in two newer forms of wills, the mancipatory
and praetorian wills, demonstrate that the Romans continued to experiment with new forms of
367

Watson appears to think that Ulpian is referring to the Twelve Tables’ rulings on statuliber, VII. 12 (Watson
1975: 86). Crawford omits that section from his reconstruction of the Twelve Tables, likely because he reads this
sentence not as testimony but as interpretation (1996: 555-723). No other sources make similar types of claims about
manumission in the Twelve Tables.
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wills after writing the Twelve Tables, suggesting the contexts for manumission in wills
continued to change.368
Although the legal evidence for very early manumission through wills is unclear,
Cicero’s discussion of manumission demonstrates that, by the first century, Romans understood
manumissio testamento as an essential part of manumission. In his philosophical work, the
Topica, Cicero uses the three types of manumission as an example of how definitions can include
the enumeration of parts. That is, for Cicero, manumission is a good example of how a definition
can include possible requirements, for which the fulfillment of merely one is sufficient:
tum partium enumeratio, quae tractatur hoc modo: Si neque censu nec vindicta nec testamento
liber factus est, non est liber; neque ulla est earum rerum; non est igitur liber;—tum notatio,
cum ex verbi vi argumentum aliquod elicitur hoc modo…
Sometimes there is an enumeration of parts, and this is handled in the following manner: so
and so is not a free man unless he has been set free by entry in the census roll, or by touching
with the rod, or by will. None of these conditions has been fulfilled, therefore he is not free.
Cicero, Topica, 10, trans. H.M. Hubbel.

In this passage, Cicero demonstrates how equivalent legal procedures can precisely describe the
status of a person in question. For Cicero’s philosophical purposes, that these different processes
produce the same legal result is sufficient to make them legally equivalent. But examples from
the Imperial Period demonstrate that Romans knew that these different legal processes served
different motivations and contexts. The result was, in a way, the opposite of what Cicero
describes: rather than these types of manumission being equivalent, the Roman state saw them as
separate and distinct.369
Unlike the other two forms of manumission, the Imperial Roman state sought to limit the
number of slaves that slave-owners manumitted through manumissio testamento. In 2 BCE,
Augustus passed the lex Fufia Maninia, a law that regulated the percentage of slaves that a man
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or woman could manumit in their will. The percentage varied depending on the number of slaves
he or she owned, with the following categories:
1-2 slaves: law does not apply
3-10 slaves: may manumit half, that is, up to five slaves
11-30 slaves: may manumit a third, that is, up to ten slaves
31-100 slaves: may manumit a quarter, that is, up to twenty-five slaves
101-500 slaves: may manumit a fifth, that is, up to hundred slaves
500+ slaves: may manumit only a hundred.370

Since Augustus made no move to limit the ability of slave-owners to manumit their slaves
through the other means, it is unclear how much impact this law had on how and why slaveowners freed their slaves. Testimony from a contemporaneous author, Nicolaus of Damascus,
suggests that intersection of slaves, wills, and extravagant wealth was a target for invective; the
lex Fufia Maninia may have attempted to address such concerns. Nicolaus asserts that rich
Romans included in their wills the demand that their favorite slaves fight to the death, although
the historian admits that such requests were not legally valid.371 Dionysius of Halicarnassus
voices a similar concern about Roman funerals, exclaiming that Romans manumit slaves for the
sole purpose of having freedmen and freedwomen at their funerals.372 Indeed, Gardner and
Mouritsen take the position that Augustus’ reforms likely had little impact. Instead, Augustus’
reforms were more the assertion that slave-owners ought to manumit only those slaves with
whom they can personally vouch as being worthy of manumission.373 In a similar vein, this law
may be connected to fears about the ability of owners to translate the patronage of large number
of freedmen and freedwomen into political power, similar to Appian’s description of Sulla’s
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Cornelii.374 Augustus reformed manumissio testamento in an attempt to change how slaveowners saw manumission: rather than seeing only from the perspective of a property owner who
had absolute freedom over his or her property, Augustus’ state attempted to force slave-owners
to approach manumission as vigilant representatives of the state, ones who observed and
assessed the viability of certain slaves as potential citizens.
As a reform about disciplining slave-owners, the Lex Fufia Maninia is similar to
Augustus’ laws that attempted to restructure and reinforce the importance of the Roman family,
and therefore is a law belonging distinctly to the Imperial Period and not the Republic.375 The
law clearly demonstrates Roman anxiety about excessive use of manumission, a sentiment quite
similar to Dionysius’ diatribe about manumission.376 Nonetheless, the law is important evidence
for the changing relationship between the Roman state and manumission as well as the lengths to
which Romans went in their attempts to regulate manumission. Such regulations sought to
discipline slave-owners so that they would only free certain types of slaves.

8. Conclusion
How the state looked at manumission complicates the notion that the Roman state was a
tool that slave-owners used to ensure that they could do as they wished with their slaves. In other
words, while it is easy to assume that the state represented the interest of slave-owners generally,
such an assumption does not explain how power functioned within manumission. On the one
hand, the Romans told stories in which the state, rather than the slave-owner, was the primary
cause of manumission. On the other hand, during the ritualized practice of manumission, most
especially manumissio vindicta and manumissio censu, it was the state’s representatives who had
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prioritized roles, rather than the slave-owner. While it may be easy to assume that the state was a
tool for Roman slave-owners and that therefore they simply turned to the state to ratify their
decisions to manumit a particular slave, the evidence of how the state looked at manumission
demonstrates that the state interests were separate from those of individual slave-owners. As a
result, when slave-owners such as Cicero turned to the state to manumit their slaves, they did so
cautiously and at times with a willingness to deceive the state’s gaze.
The tension between slave-owners and the state was in part the result of conflicting
interests. The state taxed manumission: slave-owners and slaves paid the vicesima tax. Slaveowners evaluated whether slaves were worthy of manumission based on their loyalty to
themselves and their families. The state was concerned with whether slaves were loyal to Rome,
as exemplified in the stories that Romans told about Vindicius.
The difference in how the state and slave-owners looked at manumission was not simply
a matter of conflicting interests, but also a qualitative difference in their gazes. The state
considered manumission abstractly, concerned not with the specific history of a particular slave,
but whether or not a particular slave met general requirements as outlined in the law. Dionysius’
description of how Servius enfranchised manumitted slaves despite the protests of slave-owners
articulates how slave-owners felt that grouping their own particular slaves in with all Roman
slaves reduced their control over their own slaves. The state’s gaze had to look at not only the
particular slave being manumitted, but also manumission as an iterative and generalized practice.
I argue that this kind of abstraction of manumission follows Scott’s description of how
summation is necessary for the creation of knowledge palatable for centralized states. In short,
rather than documenting the precise relationship that a slave had with a slave-owner, the state’s
witnesses instead looked to see if slaves remained slaves or became freedpeople, a general
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category compatible throughout the Republic. By focusing on these details of the ritualized
practice of manumission, the state gaze’s sees a summary of the relationship between a slave and
slave-owner, just as Scott describes.
The state’s gaze also disciplined both slaves and slave-owners, evaluating the worth of
slaves who were freed and shaping the values and priorities of slave-owners. Foucault’s
examination of the panopticon points to how witnesses functioned in the practice of manumissio
vindicta, since they were not only gazing upon the slave, but also upon the slave-owner.
Foucault’s thoughts on the disperse nature of power elaborates how the power of this gaze was
not inherent in these witnesses; instead, their gaze took up that role as part of the construction of
the ritualized practice itself and was connected to the state’s policing of the border between
Romans and non-Romans.
Even though the state’s role in manumission ought not to be underestimated, slaveowners played a significant role in manumission. But it was not merely the relationship between
the slave and the slave-owner that was important for manumission. The relationship among
slave-owners was also fundamental because policing and documentation were necessary for the
freedom that manumission granted to survive. In contrast to the state’s role in manumission, that
of slave-owners’ was personal, that is, part of the life of the slave-owner and intimately
connected to his or her goals and projects for a particular slave. The slave-owners’ stake in
manumission was also public because by manumitting a slave, slave-owners were participating
in a public sphere that was separate from the sphere of the state. During the fraught activity of
manumission, slave-owners had to negotiate the surveillance, taxation, and documentation of the
state, but they also had to negotiate the expectations and policing of other slave-owners.
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Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection
1. Introduction
Knowing how to use manumission properly was part of being a Roman slave-owner, and
so to become a Roman slave-owner meant adapting to how other slave-owners reflected on this
practice. In Butler’s terminology, manumission was part of the subjection of Roman slaveowners, since slave-owners became subjects with the power and agency to act according to their
own interests in regards to the manumission of their slaves. In using the phrase “subjection,” I
again return to Butler, not only as a way to draw together the insights of Foucault and Hegel, but
also to bring to the forefront that when individual slave-owners manumitted their slaves, they did
so while negotiating the expectations and gazes of other slave-owners. While there is some
overlap between the state’s gaze and the surveillance of other slave-owners, I argue that there
were various social pressures and expectations that lay outside the legal sphere that individual
slave-owners had to confront and negotiate when they planned and practiced manumission.
Roman slave-owners were concerned about how other slave-owners manumitted slaves,
including what motivated other slave-owners to free their slaves. Dionysius of Halicarnassus and
Plautus make clear that there were concerns that Roman slave-owners frivolously, if nonetheless
legally, manumitted slaves. Such concerns fostered a discourse that justified some motives for
manumission and excluded others. To perform manumission successfully and to be proper
subjects in the culture of Roman slave-ownership slave-owners had to know how to justify
manumission amongst themselves and in what contexts manumission was acceptable.
In Section 2 of this chapter, I argue that Butler’s terminology of subjects and subjection
articulates how the external pressures of the culture of slave-ownership have internal
consequences for individual Roman slave-owners. I use Butler’s thought to articulate the motives
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of why slave-owners policed the practice of manumission among themselves, separate from the
state’s policing. Indeed, in Plautus and in Cicero, the state’s role in manumission is either
insignificant or invisible, thereby necessitating that the slave-owners themselves police what is
and is not acceptable. In deploying Butler’s vocabulary on subjection, I build upon my argument
of slavery as an unlivable life.377 I also find Butler’s thoughts on the psychic aspects of
subjection and self-reflection to combine productively with the philosopher Rémi Brague’s
description of Rome’s “secondarity” to Greece. From this combination of Butler and Brague, I
argue that Roman slave-owners’ self-reflection on Roman manumission was refracted through
Greek concerns and ideas about Roman manumission. Because I closely examine the works of
Plautus and Terence, this methodological section justifies the ways in which I read Roman
comedies, especially the concerns of slaves and slave-owners in the texts.
The two most extensive Greek discussions of Roman manumission were those of Philip
V and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In Section 3, I argue that because Romans used Greek culture
and expectations as a reference point for evaluating their own culture, therefore, the Greek
perspective on Roman manumission provides a key for how the Romans reflected on their own
practice. The Greek perspective is also important because while the Romans were not unique in
the Mediterranean in being slave-owners, they were unique in their treatment of freedmen and
freedwomen. The Greeks looked at Roman manumission as a practice that had the power to
shape Roman political and military power. This Greek gaze is important because Greeks like
Dionysius were participants in the Roman world and therefore participated in the discourse
around the justifications for Roman manumission. Furthermore, the Greek gaze is important
because the Romans referred to and integrated Greek evaluations of Rome and Roman practices
into their reflective gaze.
377
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I have two goals for Section 4: The first goal is to highlight similarities between Romans’
own evaluation of Roman manumission with those of the Greek writers in the previous section.
Specifically, I read two parallels between the description of Roman manumission and political
power in the works of the Greeks Philip and Dionysius and that of Plautus’ pimp Dordalus and
the rustic slave Grumio. The second goal is to argue that the negative evaluations of
manumission in these instances are not the values of the state, but are instead the values of slaveowners, not the state. For, in the examples that I take from Plautus’ plays and Cicero’s letters,
none of the manumissions violate any laws and yet they are provocative and worthy of censure. I
explain the disapproval these manumissions merit as the result of the disciplining gaze of slaveowners, which is to say, part of the disciplining of non-state actors.
In Section 5, I note how Romans frame the joys of manumission as familial, which is to
say entirely separate from the gaze of the state, but contingent upon the approval of other family
members. Cicero’s letters reveal that Tiro’s manumission was an event of great joy, and
therefore worthy of representation, since both Cicero and Tiro himself wrote to Quintus about
the event, each independently, thereby recreating the event in the virtual space of epistles. By
recreating Tiro’s manumission, they sought to inform Quintus of the event, but they also framed
the manumission as a topic for Quintus’ approval, a nod to the importance of his recognition.378
Quintus’ prickly reply to their letters includes an allusion to Quintus’ manumission of Statius, a
subtly caustic remark that I argue is evidence that Quintus aims to use this joyful moment in
order to compete with his brother. In other words, while Roman slave-owners celebrated
successful manumissions together, for them, manumission was a field over which questions of
authority were at play.
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The importance of familial approval rather than adherence to the law in the representation
of joyful and successful manumissions does not simply appear in Cicero’s letters, but also in
Roman comedies. I point out how the comedians, almost completely, severe manumission’s
connection to the state when they have their characters perform manumission on stage. For the
comedians represent manumission as a speech-act of the slave-owner, a simple and private affair
at a remove from the world of courts and magistrates. On the one hand, this representation
without the state is important for the demands of their particular genre. On the other hand, the
result of this framing is that it downplays the importance of the state to manumission and,
instead, frames the process as one entirely contingent on the approval of the slave-owner and the
slave-owners’ family, thereby emphasizing the need for slave-owners to police themselves over
the matter of manumission.

2. Subjection, self-reflection, and secondarity
Because manumission was a practice that could only come to completion with the
recognition of the Roman public, it is appropriate to approach it as a machination of social
power. Nonetheless, a slave-owner’s decision to manumit a slave could be, and often was, a
personal one, in that the slave-owner justified this reward by referring to how the slave built and
maintained a personal relationship. I turn to Butler’s term subjection to chart how the Romans
maintained manumission as a process that passed through the individual psyches and the
recognition of the wider Roman public. Butler’s description of subjects and subjection draws on
her readings of both Foucault and Hegel. From Foucault, Butler takes the description of power as
part of the very conduit that allows for subjects to exist. But then Butler uses Hegel’s conflict
between the lord and the bondsman as an articulation of two developments: first, the interplay of
internal and external aspects of power; second, how the lord’s consciousness turns back on itself.
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I use Butler’s account to analyze Roman slave-owners’ descriptions of manumission in the
context of the lord’s failed self-reflection. I also argue that this Hegelian connection of selfreflection to a backwards turn opens up a fruitful link to Brague’s description of the
“secondarity” of Roman culture to Greek culture. In essence, I use Brague to describe that when
the Romans reflected on their own culture and practices such as manumission, they did so using
ideasand values that they understood as Greek.

a. Subjects, subjection, and non-state discipline
Because in common English subjection implies subordination, it is, perhaps initially,
awkward to describe Roman slave-owners’ experience of manumission as connected to their
subjection. In Butler’s terminology, a subject is not the same as an individual or a person, but is
rather a term that speaks to how people possess agency, albeit an agency that comes at the cost of
subordination to social rules and expectations.379 Indeed, for Butler, to be a subject requires
subjection, as for her subjection is “the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as
the process of becoming a subject.”380 Furthermore, following Foucault, subjection is a process
for all, not only for those at the bottom of a social hierarchy.381 Subjection is connected to
individuals’ search for recognition and their necessary adaptation to distribution of power that
preceded their arrival:
Bound to seek recognition of its own existence in categories terms, and names that are not of
its own making the subject seeks the sign of its own existence outside itself, in a discourse that
is at once dominant and indifferent. Social categories signify subordination and existence at
once. In other words, within subjection the price of existence is subordination.382

379

1997: 10.
1997: 2.
381
“Power is both external to the subject and the very venue of the subject.” (1997: 15), for Foucault cf. (1997: 16).
382
1997: 20.
380

145

Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection
Therefore, to use Butler’s words, for Roman slave-owners to exist as Roman slave-owners, they
had to go through the process of subjection, since only this process allows for the broader
recognition of them as slave-owning subjects.
Rather than simply being an abstract description of power, Butler’s description of
subjection raises questions about how a slave-owner’s decision to manumit a slave was
connected to social norms and expectations. For Butler, subjection culminates in a subject who
has an emphatically ambivalent relationship to power. For on the one hand, since subjection is
the price to operate within a particular field, after the price is paid, the subject has the freedom to
use the resulting power. The danger with this description is the possibility of describing power
only ever in external opposition to the subject. Following Foucault, Butler highlights how a
subject’s very formation depends on the reiteration of power.383 On the other hand, paying the
price to enter the field alters the subject’s sense of value; that is, what the subject considers worth
doing once the subject is in the field. Within the field, the subject can see which paths are
precluded and which paths are inviting. By refusing to resolve this ambivalence in her
description of subject formation, Butler describes subjects as unconstrained by “teleological
necessity.”384 In the context of Roman manumission, Butler’s words refuse to describe particular
examples of manumission as intrinsically motivated to replicate an ideal, but are instead sensitive
to the contingencies of the current distribution of power, a distribution itself conditional upon the
slave-owners’ own need for recognition.
I use Butler’s thought to articulate how slave-owners themselves underwent subjection in
the process of achieving recognition as slave-owners. For Butler is also empathic about the
importance of the iterative nature of this process, that is, how subjection is a process of
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reproduction: “The subject is precisely the site of such reiteration [one of power], a repetition
that is never merely mechanical.”385 I argue that it is important to understand manumission as
part of the subjection of slave-owners because this language articulates how other slave-owners,
in addition to the Roman state, monitored and judged a particular slave-owner’s practice of
manumission. Indeed, Butler writes that states rely on such extrajudicial policing, noting that
“[t]he state draws upon non-statist operations of power and cannot function without a reserve of
power that it has not itself organized.”386 By non-statist, Butler refers to both institutions and
arrangements of power that exist outside the state, such as the family. I argue that there is
evidence of Roman non-statist operations of power in the disciplining of manumission: first,
Plautus’ characters condemn certain forms of manumission. Second, Dionysius complains about
slave-owners manumitting unworthy slaves. Third, Cicero complains about his brother’s
manumission of the slave Statius. In other words, even though a slave-owner’s decision to
manumit a slave was, in an important sense, personal—because slave-owners were legally
entitled to manumit slaves for emotional reasons, and also because of promises they made to
slaves as part of their relationship—in an equally important sense, manumission was part of the
dominant discourse with which slave-owners had to reconcile as part of becoming and being
Roman subjects. Part of the price of acting as a slave-owner and joining the discourse of slaveowners was making oneself vulnerable to comparisons against other slave-owners’ ideals of
manumission. This cultivated vulnerability included sensitivity both to the condemnation of and
competition with other slave-owners. For Roman slave-owners not only policed each to prohibit
incorrect forms of manumission, but they also used manumission as events within the longer
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chronologies that constituted their relationships with each other. Manumission was part of
Roman slave-owners’ rivalries with each other.387

b. Self-reflection and the reflective gaze of slave-owners
In Hegel’s struggle of the bondsman, the truth of the development of independence
resides with the bondsman rather than with the lord. The lord’s consciousness is the not site of
truth for a number of reasons, one of which is the lord’s inability for self-reflection.388 I argue
that Butler’s analysis of the stymied nature of the lord contextualizes what was at stake for
Roman slave-owners when they missed the truth of their situation, as part of their self-reflection
upon manumission: that their pretense to independence was a sham; they were dependent on
slave-labor for much of their day to day activities, including writing and reading.389 Furthermore,
I utilize Butler’s emphasis of reflection as a backward turn as an opportunity to set up Brague’s
description of Roman secondarity to Greek culture. In other words, Roman self-reflection is a
backwards turn that goes through Greek culture.
Butler’s reading of the struggle of the bondsman brings the bodies of these two figures to
the forefront, a hermeneutical move that allows for an easy correspondence of the lord to Roman
slave-owners and the bondsman to Roman slaves. However, this correspondence does not remain
easy because Butler also highlights the importance of the psychic aspect of this relationship.
Butler explains that the lord’s attempt at self-reflection is doomed because his domination over
the bondsman depends on his misrecognition of what constitutes his body:
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In a sense, the lord postures a disembodied desire for self-reflection one who not only requires
the subordination of the bondsman in the status of an instrumental body, but who requires in
effect that the bondsman be the lord’s body, but be it in such a way that the lord forgets or
disavows his own activity in producing the bondsman, a production which we will call
projection.390

The lord’s consciousness is radically prescribed and limited, even though it participates in a
dynamic interplay with the bondsman. For Hegel asserts that the lord desires self-reflection, but
as Butler points out, the lord’s commitment to domination precludes his understanding of his
dependence on the bondsman. Significantly, this self-reflection is distinct from recognition, as
for Hegel, recognition is bound up with a confrontation with another. In this post-abolitionist
age, the implications for the analysis slavery are practically intuitive: the slave-owner’s
commitment to maintaining slavery creates a blindness to how slavery actually works, most
especially its cruelty and violence, but also how slaves yearn to quit enslavement.391 While I
think that Butler’s reading of Hegel does point in this direction, I argue that her description of the
stymied lord’s self-reflection also articulates the productive aspect of Roman slave-owners’ selfreflection: this failed self-reflection was part of the subjection of slave-owners. To become a
slave-owner was to inherit and repeat this failed self-reflection: to disavow this failed selfreflection was to invite the discipline of other slave-owners.
Drawing upon Butler’s description of subjection and self-reflection, I use the term
reflective gaze to categorize how Romans, slave-owners and otherwise, looked at and evaluated
their own practice of manumission as well as how other Romans practiced it. As the physical act,
the slave-owner’s gaze is connected to the state’s gaze, since the state had a stake in evaluating
whether a particular instance of manumission was performed correctly. But slave-owners had
interests in manumission separate from those of the state; for example, slave-owners could face
390
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the disapproval and disciplining of their fellow Romans, even if they performed manumission
according to the letter of the law. One of the ways that the slave-owners’ gaze differed from the
state’s gaze was how this gaze participated in the reproduction of the slave-owner as a Roman
subject. Both children and foreigners, including slaves themselves, had to learn how to look at
manumission as slave-owners, to internalize the expectations and values that surrounded this
practice, as well as the physical movements that were appropriate in the practice of
manumission. In this way, the slave-owners’ gaze was both coercive and productive; coercive in
that it sought to prevent slave-owners from practicing certain kinds of manumission, and
productive in that it was part of the process of producing proper slave-owners.

c. Secondarity and Roman self-reflection
The Greek gaze on Roman manumission informs the Roman gaze on manumission
because of how the Romans themselves positioned their own culture as second to the Greeks’. In
his argument about European history, Brague uses the term secondarity to describe how the
Romans imagined themselves as a people who adopted, rather than originated, the religious
practices and philosophical ideas of Greece and Jerusalem. However, the term secondarity need
not be bound to philosophical and theological descriptions of Rome. For example, Brague’s
description of Rome’s secondarity in relation to Greece parallels Weibke Denecke’s phrase
“reference culture,” which she uses to describe the relationship between Rome and Greece and
also the one between Japan and China.392 It is therefore not surprising the Classicist Emma
Dench uses secondarity to explain how the Romans positioned themselves as knowledgeable, not
only of Greek values and practices, but also of those of Etruscans and other Italianite cultures. 393
My argument is that when the Romans evaluated the worth of their own practice of
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manumission, this self-reflective gaze included ideas based on how the Greeks saw Roman
manumission.
Asserting that secondarity is essential to Rome need not run the risk of reducing the
Roman state and people to mere transmitters, as part of Brague’s argument is to describe the
challenges and rewards of the active acceptance of other cultures. Brague’s project of describing
the functioning and importance of Rome’s secondarity in his book Eccentric Culture is, in part, a
response to the work of political philosopher Leo Strauss. Taking advantage of an older tradition
of the conflict between Greek and Judaic thought, Strauss had analyzed recurring tensions in the
cannon of political thought as a conflict between the analytic thought from Athens and the
prophetic revelation from Jerusalem.394 Brague finds this bipolar relationship unsatisfactory
because such a tension between Athens and Jerusalem can only take place in a third location,
which Strauss never defines. Brauge posits this third location as Rome. But for Brague, Rome is
more than a place, it is also an attitude.395 Specifically, Brague writes that
To be “Roman” is to perceive oneself as Greek in relation to what is barbarous, but also as
barbarous in relation to what is Greek. It is to know that what one transmits does not come
from oneself, and that one possesses it with difficulty, and only in a fragile and provisional
manner.396

Brague then elaborates that this Romanity is the “situation of secondarity in relation to a
previous culture.”397 This transformation of Rome into an attitude is essential for Brague’s
Catholic defense of the idea of Europe as the inheritor of Rome.398 For Brague’s larger project is
to explain that Europe itself is the inheritor of Rome’s space as the site of the struggle between
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Athens and Jerusalem.399 It is possible to reject this theological argument while keeping the
emotional stakes bound up in the term secondarity, as Dench’s use of the term secondarity
demonstrates.400 Brague’s emphasis on self-perception draws me to his term secondarity rather
than the more neutral phrase “reference culture” because this description parallels my own
argument about self-reflection. Furthermore, Brague’s framing of Romanity as a negotiation
between Greekness and barbarity highlights how, since the beginning of Latin literature, Romans
were negotiating and playing with how Rome and Roman life appeared to the Greeks. Plautus
famously describes plays not as the result of his own writing (scripsit), but the result of making
Greek comedies barbaric (vortit barbare).401
I use the term secondarity to describe how when the Romans looked at themselves and
their practices, this reflective gaze included a Greek perspective. I also describe the adoption of
this Greek gaze into their self-reflection as part of the subjection of Roman slave-owners. That
the Romans, unique among the peoples of the Mediterranean, translated Greek literature in order
to use it as the basis of their own literature points to the value that they placed upon Greek
culture, especially in Roman comedy. The Roman comedians were quite conscious that they
were adapting Greek comedies. As a result, using Roman comedies as evidence of Roman
practices offers up a number of pitfalls, which the next section addresses.
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Nonetheless, his terms are seperable from his larger argument see Dench (2005: 12, 27, 49). O’Brien, in my mind
rightfully, argues that Brague’s overall project does not displace Europe from the center of history and is therefore
best understood as an apologia for Eurocentrism (2005).
400
Dench (2005: 12, 27, 49). Dench neither credits Brague, nor anyone else, with the term secondarity. In contrast to
Dench’s position, Barchiesi argues that Roman uses of Greekness were so diverse that it is overall unprofitable to
theorize about these uses as having any particular coherence (2009). That may indeed be the case. However, in this
study, I only use secondarity to describe how the Romans adopted Greek perceptions of Roman practices, like
manumission. For more on the variabilities of what was at stake in the Roman adaptation of Greekness and Greek
literature, see Feeney (2016).
401
Cf. “Demophilus scripsit, Maccus vortit barbare”, Asinaria, 11.
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d. Slaves, slave-owners, and Roman comedy
I use descriptions and depictions of manumission in Roman comedy as evidence for how
Roman slave-owners looked at manumission.402 This position requires defending: I articulate and
defend three main assumptions that undergird my reading. The first assumption is that it is
reasonable to approach Plautus and Terence as authors, even though they write of their own
works as translations.403 The second assumption is that it is reasonable to use these plays for
evidence about Roman thoughts and attitudes about Roman practices even though the plays star
Greek characters and unfold in Greek settings. The third, more complex assumption, is that it is
possible to use the surviving texts of Plautus and Terence in order to reconstruct, even only if
partially, the contexts of the original performances of these comedies. Significantly, these
contexts included slaves in the audience and on stage, two positions that suggest that slaves’
voices survive in the comedies. The plays, especially Plautus’, contain voices that speak to the
lives of Roman slaves, but that in certain moments, these slave voices also speak the values of
slave-owners. Likewise, the characters, such as parasiti, also at times speak the values of slaveowners, even though they are neither slaves nor slave-owners. As a result, I use a combination of
characters’ voices as evidence for how slave-owners evaluated each others’ manumissions, as
well as how they conceived of manumission as a familial event.
Although now unremarkable, the assumption that both Plautus and Terence are authors
was at one point quite radical. Eduard Fraenkel argued in his influential book Plautinisches im
Plautus that Plautus was more than a mere translator because his process of “translating” Greek
comedies included adding or subtracting characters, changing plots, as well as writing Latinate
402

For more on Plautus, see Chapter 2 Section 5d above. Potter raises the important questions about using comedies
as texts for history, but he gives little attention to Plautus (cf. 1999: 45). Leigh is more attuned both to the problems
and possibilities of Plautus for history (2004).
403
Plautus’ prologues make clear that he translated three of Menander’s plays and one of Diphilus’. Terence
translated four of Menander’s plays and two of Apollodorus’. See Fontaine for an overview of the Greek plays
behind Plautus’ other works (2014: 517).
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puns and jokes specifically targeted at a Roman audience.404 Terence enjoyed the same freedom
when he wrote, and he was quite willing to attack other Roman comedians for hewing too
closely to the original Greek.405 Also like Plautus, Terence had to entertain Romans with Roman
jokes. One solution to this pressure was to turn to Roman sources rather than Greek ones, hence
the accusation that he stole a scene from one of Plautus’ plays.406
Even though all Roman comedies are set in Greek locales with Greek characters, I argue
that Plautus’ and Terence’s plays contain Roman thoughts about Roman manumission. While the
characters may have Greek names, rather than being “proper” Greeks, they inhabit a thoroughly
elastic setting that is stretched between Greece and Rome.407 Plautus, in particular, takes
advantage of this elastic setting in two different ways. First, he sometimes projects onto this
supposed Greek slavery expectations and practices that are actually part of Roman slavery. The
most obvious example of this is Dordalus’ description of his manumission of a slave as an
addition to the citizenry.408 Plautus’ second method is to describe Greek slavery as a practice that
functions along the inverse of the values and expectations of Roman slavery. For in Plautus’
plays, slaves have holidays, throw parties for each other, and act as patrons to the women whom
they surreptitiously manumit.409 While Plautus’ second method does contain insights into the
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Fraenkel (1922). In their preface, translators Devikosky and Muecke point out that Fraenkel’s work still directs
the exploration of Plautus (2007: xi). See also Petrides (2014).
405
Eunuchus, 7-8. Cf. Brown (2013: 20).
406
Specifically, that he has stolen a scene from Plautus’ rendition of Diphilus’ Synapothneskontes. Adelphoe, 6-14.
407
Gratwick therefore entitles the setting of all Plautus’ plays “Plautopolis” (1993: 15). Leigh’s work on comedy
and history demonstrates that Terence’s plays also interact with contemporary Roman affairs and concerns (2004).
408
See Section 4a below.
409
Slave holidays: Stichus, 421-22 and Persa, 28-9. Party: Stichus, 661 ff. Slave as patron to a freedwoman:
Pseudolus: 1310a-b. Donatus reads the Greek location of the plays as giving the playwrights certain freedoms,
asserting that the Romans had outlawed the depiction of Roman slaves being cleverer than Roman owners (Ad
Eunuchum, 57). The question of the influence of the Greek setting on Plautus’ representation of slaves is, in a sense,
a variation of the question of Greek influence on Roman comedy. As such, the question of the Greekness of Plautus’
slaves is a question that goes back to Fraenkel (2007: 159-172). In his approach to the overall question of how
Plautus blends Greekness and Romannes, Segal uses slavery as an example (1967: 31-4). McCarthy, Spranger, and
Stewart all cite the importance of Greekness for understanding slaves in Plautus. McCarthy frames it as the conflict
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values of Roman slave-ownership, in this chapter, I focus on the examples and comments on
manumission that are part of his first method. In comparison with Plautus, Terence writes about
slaves and slavery infrequently. He similarly uses these two methods, albeit he rarely projects the
inverse practices of Roman slavery onto Greek slavery.410 As with Plautus, in this chapter, I
focus Terence’s description of a definitively Roman manumissions, such as in his Adelphoe.
While Romans in the first century approached some comedies as readers, Plautus’ and
Terence’s wrote in order that actors—actors who included slaves—would speak these words as
characters in a performance.411 A logical way to conceptualize the relationship between these
texts and the performance of these texts is that the actors, having been assigned to a specific role
or combination of roles, memorized the lines assigned to that character. However, recently C.W.
Marshall has argued that this assumption hides how theater was a collective endeavor that
included complex and fruitful exchanges between the playwright and actors. This interaction
could have been as simple as the actor consulting with the playwright about changing the script.
A more radical suggestion is that the actors improvised lines during the performance of the plays,
prompting the playwright to alter the manuscript after the play.412 Testimony from Cicero points
to how Roman audiences expected actors to improvise.413 Such theories about improvisation,
combined with the ancient accounts of Plautus’ base and Terence’s servile backgrounds, suggest
that the Roman theater contained voices of those who used to be slaves and those who were

between Greek naturalism and Roman frace (2000: 5-6). Building upon Fraenkel, Spranger complicates the idea that
Plautus reflects the Hellenic world (1984: 54-63). Stewart also builds on Franekl (2012: 14-16).
410
Terence describes the slaves taking a holiday in the Eunuchus, 277-9. Furthermore, Terence, like Plautus, writes
of slaves as being married (Adelphoe, 972-3).
411
For slaves as actors: Asinaria, 2 and Cistellaria, 782-5.
412
Marshall (2006). Marshall places more emphasis on the troop as a collaboration, although he builds on VogtSpira’s interpretation that places Plautus’ individual scenes in the context of Atellan farce and mime (Vogt-Spira
1995 and 1997). Slater argues for a different kind of improvisation, in which Plautus’ literariness, in a Hegelian turn,
absorbs and overcomes Italic performance traditions (1985). For the relationship of these different theories, see
Petrides (2014).
413
“nam illud ipse actor adiungebat amico animo” Cicero, Pro Sestio, 121. Cf. Marshall (2006: 275).
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currently enslaved.414 An important consequence of this reconstruction of Roman theater is that
the discussion and depiction of manumission within the comedies included the perspectives of
Roman slaves.
While the comedies include the voices of slaves, many of Plautus’ and Terence’s
characters speak as slave-owners or as people who are not slave-owners but nonetheless share
values of slave-owners, including slave-owners’ evaluation of manumission. That a variety of
characters do adopt the perspective of slave-owners does not imply that this perspective
completely dominated Roman comedy. Instead, such adoption indicates that because there were
advantages to thinking like a slave-owner, as well as acting for the benefit of slave-owners,
Romans did not have to be slave-owners in order to bear the slave-owners’ gaze. In some
instances, slaves have clearly internalized the values of slave-owners. For example, in the
Mostellaria, the slave Grumio attacks his fellow slave Tranio for not being sufficiently loyal to
their owners.415 Through disciplining Tranio, Grumio demonstrates his commitment to the
subjection of slave-ownership. More complex are examples in which a figure such as Curculio
attacks pimps for being improper slave-owners. As a parasitus, Curculio does not own slaves,
but is rather in a subordinate relationship to powerful men, a subordinate relationship that makes
him similar to, but distinct from, a slave.416 Such a similarity could imply that his attack on
pimps comes from the perspective of those who lack power, rather than policing pimps for not
following the standards of the powerful.417 I am sympathetic to such a reading, but because a
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Such is the conclusion of Richlin’s article (2014). Because Richlin focuses on Plautus and takes advantage of his
fondness of servi callidi, adapting her argument to include Terence is not easy. However, Spranger uses both Plautus
and Terence in his analysis of Roman slavery (1984). Suetonius describes Terence as a Carthaginian slave (Vita
Terenti, 1). Aulus Gellius writes that Plautus “worked the mills” (Noctes Atticae, 3.3.14). In Plautus’ plays, this
demeaning work is a punishment reserved for slaves (e.g., Pseudolus, 709). For an opposing view of Richlin’s
inclusive model for the audiences of and voices in Roman comedy, see Fontaine (2010) and Stewart (2012).
415
I examine this episode in detail in Section 4a.
416
I examine this episode in detail in Section 4a.
417
Richlin draws out parallels between slaves in Plautus and other stock characters, such as parasiti (2014: 185-6).

156

Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection
moneylender later echoes Curculio’s attack on pimps as slave-owners, I am inclined to read
Curculio’s rant as him disciplining pimps using the values of slave-owners.418 In other words,
while Roman comedies include the traces of slaves’ voices and experiences, the comedians were
also playing to the values of the other audience members, such as the slave-owners and freeborn
non-slave-owners. As a result, the comedies provide a number of examples of the judgment of
slave-owners on manumission, including the dangers of bad manumission.
That Roman comedies included the voices, complaints, and fantasies of slaves raises the
question of how slave-owners related to slave characters who were working towards their
freedom. Related to this question is why slave-owners would permit the plays to contain the
viewpoint of slaves. McCarthy argues that the hierarchical nature of Roman society made it easy
for slave-owners to sympathize with the slave characters. For both the slave characters on the
stage and the slave-owners in the audience had to deal with powerful men who were absent,
absent minded, or needlessly cruel. That is, the slave-owners in the audience read their own
struggles with officials, and other authorities, as analogous to the slave characters’ struggles
against their owners.419 As a result, for slave-owners, the manumissions on the Roman stage
were analogous to generic social advancement. In other words, as part of their subjection, slaveowners had the tools in order to obfuscate their discovery of the truth of manumission, even
when watching it performed in Roman theater. Rather than simply presenting the slave-owners’
view of the world, the comedies contain the conflicts that ran through Rome.420
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For the simple reason that I read Plautus making this moneylender unsympathetic because of the abusive way that
he wields his power. For more, see Section 4a.
419
McCarthy (2000).
420
I return to this idea of the comedies as continuations of conflicts within Roman society in Chapter 4. In contrast,
Stewart argues that it is important to approach Plautus with the assumption that Roman slave-owners have
effectively silenced slave voices (2012: 12).
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By adopting Greek comedy and combining it with a variety of Italic performance
traditions, Plautus and Terence wrote texts that contain clues for how Romans thought about
their own practices, including manumission. Their work also shows that they responded to Greek
thoughts on Roman manumission. First, I examine how the Greeks thought about Roman
manumission and what conclusions they drew.

3. The Greek gaze and Roman manumission
Although the Greek writers who elaborated the most extensive analyses of Roman
manumission were separated by two hundred years, both Philip V and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus understood Roman manumission as playing an essential role in the expansion of
the Roman state. This is not to say that the two Greeks were of the same mind of the worth of the
Roman approach. While Philip cites the liberality of Roman manumission as an example for the
Larisaeans of Thessaly to follow, Dionysius complains that contemporary Romans do not take
proper care in selecting which slaves to manumit, that they follow a slipshod approach that
results in many ignoble freedmen with Roman citizenship. Dionysius concludes his diatribe on
Roman manumission with a call for the Romans to reform manumission. Dionysius himself was
not a Roman, despite his mastery of archaic Roman history, and so his call upon the Romans
speaks how his Greek text is both outside and within the Roman worlds.
Although Dionysius’ relationship to Rome is complex, trying to determine Philip’s
relationship to Rome is harder because the scarcity of evidence of the context of his writing
about Rome in the third century. Indeed, there are two competing narratives about the
intersection of the Greeks and Romans in the third century. The first narrative tells a story in
which the Romans had minimal contact with the Greeks until the third century. In this narrative,
the third century unfolds with an unprecedented Roman interest in the Greeks, as evidenced by
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Roman cultivation of Greek talent such as Livius Andronicus.421 The second narrative asserts
that the connection between the Greeks and Romans is older than the third century, that the
Greeks and Romans were always in contact with each other. Material evidence shows that
Romans and other Italians traded for and valued Greek pottery; Greeks as old as Hesiod wrote of
legends containing figures with Italian connections.422 But according to both narratives, during
the third century, the Romans examined themselves, their practices and their institutions with the
Greeks in mind. The Greek gaze was part of how the Romans reflected on themselves. As a
result, the Greek gaze played in a role in how the Romans recognized themselves, including their
slaves and their practices, including manumission.

a. Philip V: In his own words and in Livy’s
H.G. Lolling discovered the inscription that included Philip V’s comments on the
Romans in 1882, prompting great interest in what exactly Philip V’s comments can reveal about
the Roman world and the Greeks’ relationship to it.423 But this interest has not translated into
respect for the king’s worth as a witness. More bluntly, Theodore Mommsen, A.J. Toynbee, and
Edward Togo Salmon refuse to accept Philip’s description of Rome as a place so inclusive of
freedmen.424 The rhetorical context of Philip’s description means that the king was intent upon
persuading the Larisaeans; he was not intent upon accurately representing Roman practices.
Philip wanted to convince the Larisaeans that social inclusivity, particularly the inclusion of
421

Gruen’s account is perhaps the best articulation of this version (1992). Cf. Dench (2005: 28).
Cf. Hesiod on Latinos, Theogeny, 1013. Momigliano is perhaps the most ardent advocate of this position: “There
is no time and no place in which the Romans were free of Greek influences.” (1984: 438, trans. Wiseman 1995: 43).
Wiseman agrees with Momigliano (1995: 43). See also Momigliano (1969a: 450ff.), (1969b: 31ff.), and (1989). Cf.
van Berchem (1966: 739ff) and Bayer (1972: 305ff), whom Raaflaub cites in his more agnostic assessment of the
question (2005: 15 n.75). Likewise, Forsythe reviews the evidence of Greek influence in Roman archaeology
without pressing the point as to the degree of Greek influence (2005: 31-35 and 41-45). However, both Feeney and
Cornell are resolute that early Roman culture only makes sense when viewed in conversation with Greek culture,
Feeney in terms of literature (2015: 9) and Cornell in terms of history (1995: 86-92).
423
Lolling (1882: 61-76). Throughout the rest of Section 3, I refer to Philip V as Philip.
424
Mommsen (1908: 49-56), Toynbee (1965: 278-9), and Salmon (1969: 69). See also Syll. 2 (1960: 514 n. 24, 25
and 26).
422
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freedmen, leads to a stronger state. Philip’s emphasis on social inclusion is all the more radical
when contrasted with the practices of his Thessalian audience. For the Thessalians owned
penestai, helot-like slaves who had little hope of social advancement. While the king identifies
this inclusion as a way in which the Romans differ from the Greeks, he also believes that the
Greeks can change to become more like the Romans. Philip’s letter demonstrates that, already in
the third century, the Greeks were seeking to understand what made the Romans different from
other peoples in the Mediterranean. Philip, like Dionysius, argued that one of the key differences
was manumission. But Philip’s Greek gaze did not remain that of an outsider appraising and
analyzing Rome. As a Roman historian, Livy utilizes Philip’s Greek gaze to assert that the
Romans are not barbarians, but instead a people worthy of Greek respect. While Livy’s Philip
does not mention manumission, the historian’s depiction of the king is a demonstration of how
the Romans appropriated the Greek gaze in their self-reflection. Livy’s Philip is an example of
Roman secondarity to the Greeks and demonstrates how Roman evaluation of Roman practices,
such as manumission, occurred against a backdrop of Roman appropriation of Greek evaluation
of Roman practices.
In the first letter that Philip wrote to the Larisaeans in 217 BCE, he ordered them to admit
into their citizenry a number of soldiers.425 This command apparently rankled the Larisaeans
because the inscription bearing the names of these new citizens was later defaced, an act likely
indicative that the Larisaeans had rescinded their decree. Philip then wrote his second letter to
the Larisaeans, commanding them to both rewrite the inscription and re-invite these men to be
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IG IX 2 517.10 ff. It is likewise important not to forget Philip’s amanuensis; for the ἐπιστολογράφος in the courts
of Hellenistic kings, see Welles (1934: xxxviii). For how this letter intersects with the history of Greek
epistlography, see Ceccarelli (2013: 308-9). Habicht’s reading of the stone dates the first inscription to 217 (1970);
Walbank’s biography of Philip uses the previously accepted date of 221 (1940: 35 and 295-99).
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citizens.426 In order to convince the Larisaeans that his command is reasonable, Philip uses Rome
as an example of how inclusivity leads to strength, claiming that the Romans permitted their
freedmen to become magistrates and colonists:
…ὧν καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοί εἰσιν, οἳ καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ὅταν ἐλευτερώσωσιν προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ
πολίτυεμα καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων μεταδιδόντες καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου οὐ μόνον τὴν ἰδίαν
πατρίδα ἐπηυξήκασιν, ἀλλά καὶ ἀποικίας σχεδὸν εἰς ἑβδομήκοντα τόπους ἐκπεπόμφασιν.
…the Romans are among such people, and when they free their slaves, they receive them into
the franchise and give them magistracies, and on account of this practice they have not only
increased their own fatherland but they have sent out colonists to nearly seventy locations.
IG IX 2 517.30-34 = Syll. 2 543, translation my own.

With this context in mind, it is therefore questionable whether as an author Philip was concerned
about how accurately he described Roman practices: he instead wants to ensure that the
Larisaeans enfranchise these men and no longer resist his orders. This letter is evidence that he
expected the Larisaeans to believe his description of Rome as an inclusive society, but only to
the extent that the Larisaeans would then follow his commands to change their stance towards
the inclusion of foreigner soldiers within their own polis. Philip’s gaze upon Roman
manumission is evaluative and acquisitive; he looks at the Romans in order to find ways to
improve Greek practices, specifically the practices of the Larisaeans of Thessaly.
In this context, Philip’s implicitly contrasts the social mobility of Roman freedmen with
the Thessalian practice of owning penestai. This contrast has passed without comment in
previous investigations of the inscription.427 While the exact details of who the penestai were and
what role they placed in Thessalian society is ambiguous, ancient Greek writers were consistent
in comparing them Spartan helots.428 The implication of this comparison is that the Thessalians

426

IG IX 2 517.26-9.
Cf. Mommsen (1908: 49-56)), Toynbee (1965: 278-9), and Salmon (1969: 69). See also Syll. 2 (1960: 514 n. 24,
25 and 26).
428
Cf. Plato, Laws ,776 c-d and Aristotle, Politics, 1264a35. For the representation of penestai in these passages,
and all other references to penestai, see Ducat (1994). In general, Northern Greece deserves more attention for how
they practiced slavery, as their practices differed from those of the Athenians, cf. Alexianu (2008).
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exercised collective ownership over the penestai.429 Such an arrangement suggests that Larisa,
along with the rest of Thessaly, was highly stratified, with minimal social mobility or acceptance
of outsiders.430 Philip’s brief description of Roman manumission highlights practices that are in
direct conflict with the values of the Thessalian control of penestai. In the context of this letter,
Philip defines the Romans by their manumission practices, and in doing so, he contrasts these
practices to those of the Greeks, specifically the Larisaeans. In other words, since both Philip and
the Larisaeans were slave-owners, it makes sense that they would be interested in how a strange
people liked the Romans treated their slaves.431 Nonetheless, when the king conceives of the
Romans in this letter, he does not see a people whose values are inimical to that of the Greeks.
Instead, for him the Romans are a people who use better social practices in order to accumulate
more power.432
Centuries after Philip’s letter to the Larisaeans, Livy depicted Philip looking enviously at
the Romans and their practices. The close similarities between this story and a story about
Pyrrhus of Epirus complicates any attempt to create a direct link between Philip’s representation
of himself and how Livy depicts him. I instead argue that these stories represent how Romans’
self-reflection used the Greek gaze in order to explain the purpose and rationales of Roman
practices such as manumission. These stories and themes emphasize that while the Romans may
be second to the Greeks in terms of culture and literature, the Romans surpass the Greeks in
political and military organization, a superiority that becomes particularly apparent when Greek
429

Ducat (1994).
Such is Ducat’s assessment. I see a similar picture of Thessaly in the works of Helly (1995 and 2004). Mili urges
caution about relying too much on this picture for explaining Thessalian society, but nonetheless concedes the
importance of Thessalian oligarchy (2015: 59).
431
The treatment of slaves was an area of Greek ethnography, cf. Herodotus on the Persians’ treatment of slaves
1.137.1.
432
Livy describes Philip as overseeing forced migration of Thracians and sponsoring programs to increase the
populations (39.24.3-4). Possibly these programs reflect the interest in population growth and assimilation that he
displays in this letter. For migration, see and Walbank (1940: 243-4) and Oetjen (2010: 245-6). For the family
programs, see Walbank (1940: 224 n.5) and Briscoe (2008: 304).
430
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kings look upon the Romans for the first time. This trope of Greeks recognizing the superiority
of Roman organization is therefore parallel to Philip’s letter, as there the king recognized the
superiority of Roman manumission.
As a Greek writer in the Imperial Period, Plutarch reproduces these Roman concerns in his
biography of Pyrrhus. In part, the biographer conceptualized Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy as an
originary event that demonstrates how it is the Romans who have political power, but it is the
Greeks who have the authority to judge what is and is not barbarian. Plutarch describes Roman
organization [τάξις] as beguiling the Greek king:
δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐγγὺς εἶναι καὶ πέραν τοῦ Σίριος ποταμοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσεν,
προσίππευσε τῷ ποταμῷ θέας ἕνεκα: καὶ κατιδὼν τάξιν τε καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ κόσμον αὐτῶν καὶ
τὸ σχῆμα τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐθαύμασε, καὶ τῶν φίλων προσαγορεύσας τὸν ἐγγυτάτω, ‘τάξις
μέν,’ εἶπεν, ‘ὦ Μεγάκλεις, αὕτη τῶν βαρβάρων οὐ βάρβαρος, τὸ δὲ ἔργον εἰσόμεθα.’
Learning that the Romans were nearby and encamped on the other side of the river Siris, he
rode to the river so that he might see. And looking down upon their order, garrisons and
discipline and the planning of their encampment, he was amazed and spoke to the companion
who was nearest “O Megacles, now that we see their works, this order of these barbarians is
not barbaric.”
Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, 16.4-5, trans. B. Perrin.433

Plutarch finds this comment so essential to understanding the relationship between the Romans
and Pyrrhus, and thereby the Greeks in general, that he repeats this anecdote in his Life of
Flamininus.434
But Roman organization inspiring wonder in Greeks is not simply a trope of later writers
like Plutarch. Instead, Plutarch’s depiction Pyrrhus belongs to a Greek tradition of Greeks being
amazed at Rome and Roman practices.435 Strabo reports that Erastosthenes described the
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For a reader-reaction analysis of this scene, with particular attention to Greek and Roman relations in the Second
Sophistic, see Mossman (2005). Mossman also notes how Pyrrhus’ appreciation of the Romans is a virtue for
Plutarch (1992: 97-8). For the politics surrounding the memory of Pyrrhus, see Erskine (2001: 157-161).
434
Flamininus, 5.4.
435
Pyrrhus is also an important figure in the Roman tradition as well, with Pyrrhus being a key figure in Ennius’
Annales. Cicero reports how Ennius valorized Pyrrhus to be a worthy foe for the Romans. See, especially, Cicero,
De Divinatione 2.56, 116 = Warmington Fragment, 174. Cf. Welsh (2011).
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Romans as “administrating their state amazingly.”436 Likewise, the entire enterprise of Polybius’
history is a diachronic and synchronic explanation of how Rome amassed the amazing ability to
conquer the world in less than a century, a feat so awesome that Polybius assumes that it is
obvious that anyone would be fascinated by this story.437 Of course, not all Greek evaluations of
Roman practices were positive. Nicolaus’ description of Romans requiring slaves to fight to the
death contains amazement that this people permitted such a practice.438 As a result, when a
Roman such as Livy writes about Greeks gazing and assessing Roman practices, he is adapting
to Roman self-reflection the ideas and values that Greeks made of Romans.
The Roman reflective gaze adopted how the Greeks gazed at Roman practices. Livy
writes of Philip’s first sight of the Roman army and includes the following anecdote:
ac subiecta cernens Romana castra, admiratus esse dicitur et universam speciem castrorum et
discripta suis quaeque partibus cum tendentium ordine tum itinerum intervallis et negasse
barbarorum ea castra ulli videri posse.
It is said that as he looked down on it and gazed with admiration on the appearance of the
camp as a whole and its various sections marked off by the rows of tents and the roads crossing
each other, he exclaimed, “No one can possibly take that for a camp of barbarians.”
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 31.34.4-9, trans. Roberts.

Livy writes that the Roman military, and by extension other institutions and practices like
manumission, is so great that it strikes awe into the Greek king. Livy appropriates Philip’s own
gaze in part to justify the triumph over the Greeks and, also, to explain the importance of Roman
practices.439
Livy’s use of Philip’s gaze on Rome demonstrates how the Roman reflective gaze used
Greek practices, as a reference point for understanding the importance of Roman practice such as
manumission. But, while Philip originally wrote for a specifically Greek readership, later Greek
436

“οὕτω θαυμαστῶς πολιτευομένους.” Strabo, 1.4.9.
Polybius 1.1.5-6. Champion (2000 and 2004) explores how Polybius negotiated the Romans’ difference from the
Greeks in his history. Allen explores Polybius’ relationship to the Romans through the lens of hostageship (2006:
201-223).
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FrGH 90.78 = Athenaeus 153f-154a. For more on this passage, see Chapter 2 Section 7.
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Cf. Polybius on Roman camp arrangements (6.27.1-41.2). See Champion (2004: 70-5 and 93).
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authors, such as Dionysius and Plutarch, wrote expecting Roman readers of their works. Livy’s
and Plutarch’s retelling of similar stories demonstrates how the Greek and Roman writers used
similar stories to pose different questions.440 Plutarch’s description of Pyrrhus’ wonder at Roman
order connects to Plutarch’s own status as a Greek looking at and investigating Rome.441 In
contrast, Livy’s description of Philip is a Roman writer using the Greek gaze to emphasize, and
internally evaluate, the glory of Rome. During, and after, the Roman conquest of Greece, the
Greek gaze did not become identical to the Roman one, but it did become part of the Roman
world. As such, the Greek gaze on Rome was available for writers, such as Livy, to use for their
own descriptions and evaluations of Roman practices and strengths. I argue that Dionysius’
comments on manumission are connected to his negotiation with Greekness and Romanness. For
Dionysius knows that, as a Greek, his gaze on manumission has value to the Romans, and
therefore chooses his words carefully.

b. Dionysius of Halicarnassus: His own words and Servius’
As part of his historical narrative, Dionysius writes that king Servius Tullius began
Roman manumission through fiat.442 Dionysius also includes a speech by the king, followed by a
diatribe, in which the historian writes in his own voice. The king’s speech and the historian’s
diatribe are examples of how the Greek writer looked at Roman manumission. Indeed, questions
of Greekness and Romanness are important ones for Dionysius’ investigation into and evaluation
of manumission, since one of his stated aims of his history is to prove that Romans are Greeks.
Since no Greeks practiced manumission like the Romans did, the historian therefore needed to
explain how the principles behind Roman manumission are properly Hellenic. In doing so,
440

Nissen argues that Livy’s passage is Polybian (1863: 128). Briscoe agrees and argues that the Pyrrhus story
developed from the story about Philip (1973: 1 and 140-1). Toynbee (1965: 437 n.3) and Mossman (2005: 513 n.
58) are open to the possibility of a communis locus for the two stories.
441
Pelling argues that Plutarch’s scholarship on Rome is in part motivated by the desire to understand how the
Romans became the kind of people who were able to conquer the Mediterranean (1986).
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For more on this story, see Chapter 2 Section 7.
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Dionysius not only asserts that Greeks should accept and enjoy Roman dominion, but he also
builds up the authority and worth of the Greek gaze on Rome. Since Dionysius himself was an
active participant in the Roman literary world, it is logical to assume that he anticipated that
Roman readers would use his Greek gaze in the Roman Antiquities in order to reflect on their
practices and principles. As a consequence, his diatribe on Roman manumission ought to be read
as participating in a debate on Roman manumission that lead to the reforms of manumission in
Augustus’ Lex Aelia Sentia. Unlike Philip V’s Greek gaze, Dionysius’ Greek gaze was of the
Roman world and was, furthermore, part of how Roman slave-owners understood the importance
of their manumission practices.
Because Dionysius is the only ancient writer to assert that Servius reformed
manumission, I examine how Dionysius positioned his history in the Roman world of the first
century, as well as the related question of how he approached his sources, in order to consider
why the historian chose this variant aetiology of Roman manumission. In order to prove that the
Romans were Greeks in Book 1, Dionysius cites over fifty authors as part of his theses that the
Romans originally came from the East and that Latin is merely a dialect of Greek.443 But in the
later books, including Book 4, Dionysius does not typically name his sources. In his preface, he
indicates that his research included visiting Roman libraries and listening to the oral histories of
Roman families.444 Perhaps this story of Servius’ reformation of manumission originally
belonged to one of those families. Perhaps it existed as an aetiloogical account in some
scholar’s manuscript. In either case, the Servius story likely had a complex relationship to the
Vindicius’ story. Whether or not the Romans themselves originated the Servius story, Dionysius
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Cf. Schultze (1986: 129) and Musti (1970). For Dionysius’ argument that Latin is a form of Greek, see Stevens
(2006) and Marin (1969).
444
1.7.2-3. Cf. Gabba (1991: 85-90). See Wiseman (2009: 81-98) for an argument that Dionysius took his account of
Romulus’ asylum from Varron. See also Chapter 2 Section 4a.

166

Chapter 3: Slave-owners and subjection
retells the story from Greek perspective on Roman manumission, albeit a perspective that the
author intends to be palatable for Roman readers.
Dionysius’ perspective on the Romans and Roman practices was Greek, but it was a
Greek perspective from within the Roman world, and therefore one sensitive to the expectations
of a Roman audience, as C.E. Schultze shows. Dionysius’ works reveal that he was very much
part of the literary milieu in Rome: his treatise on Thucydides is dedicated to Q. Aelius Turbo, a
Roman acquaintance to both Varro and Cicero.445 That Dionysius had the Romans in mind when
writing his history is not immediately apparent, since he presents himself as the first Greek to
document thoroughly the origins and practices of Rome.446 But while an educated Roman reader
may not find any new information in Dionysius’ work, he or she would be intrigued by the new
theories and interpretations that Dionysius applies to Roman history.447 This is not to say that
Romans would have only been interested in Dionysius for his Greek perspective, since his
accounts of conflict and unification in early Rome offered parallels ripe for moralizing and moral
thinking about the recent civil wars and Augustus’ rise.448 Dionysius’ text anticipates that Roman
readers will utilize it for Roman ends, and so Dionysius’ Greek gaze on Rome is in a way
domesticated. While Dionysius does not challenge Rome’s authority, his diatribe on
manumission challenges the Romans to follow through on the very Roman principles that he
himself articulates. In other words, even though he is not a Roman, Dionysius participates in
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Cicero: Pro Ligario, 1, 10 and 21. Cf. Schultze (1986: 122). For libraries and Roman politics, see Casson (2001),
Dix (2000), and Yarrow (2006: 38). For comparison, see Erskine on the library of Alexandria (1995).
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In order to present himself as authoritative and original, Dionysius either denigrates or highlights the limited
scope of the works of the Greek historians Antigonus, Hieronymus of Cardia, Polybius, Silenus, and Timaeus, as
well as works of the Roman historians Quintus Fabius and Lucius Cincius (1.6.1). Cf. “οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀκριβὴς
ἐξελήλυθε περὶ αὐτῶν Ἑλληνὶς ἱστορία μέχρι τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς χρόνων, ὅτι μὴ κεφαλαιώδεις ἐπιτομαὶ πάνυ βραχεῖαι”
(1.5.4). The best analysis of Dionysius’ audience is Schultze (1986). See also Momigliano (1975: 22-50) and (1978),
as well as Marincola (1997: 17). Yarrow discusses the audiences of historians at the end of the Republic (2006: 825).
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Schultze (1986: 139).
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discussions on Roman practices. Since Dionysius’ gaze on Roman manumission is
simultaneously that of an insider and an outsider, he is writing from a porous place between
Greekness and Romanness.
Dionysius’ text plays with the porosity between Greekness and Romanness in the figure
of Servius. In addition to foreshadowing Dionysius’ own thoughts on and complaints about
manumission, Servius’ speech allows Dionysius to depict the king as Greek even though the
historian is highlighting how this king instituted a practice contrary to how the Greeks practiced
manumission. The king argues that numerous kingdoms have passed from slavery to freedom
and freedom to slavery, a restatement of the succession of worldwide hegemonies that is a theme
of Greek historiography, including Dionysius’ own history.449 In other words, Servius has the
advantage of Dionysius’ own Greek ideas, even though Servius is a Roman king.
Additionally, Servius appears as a Greek because of the philosophical arguments that he
makes:
Πρῶτον μὲν θαυμάζειν, ἔφη, τῶν ἀγανακτούντων, εἰ τῇ φύσει τὸ ἐλεύθερον οἴονται τοῦ
δούλου διαφέρειν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῇ τύχῃ: ἔπειτ᾽ εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἤθεσι καὶ τοῖς τρόποις ἐξετάζουσι τοὺς
ἀξίους τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς συντυχίαις, ὁρῶντες ὡς ἀστάθμητόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα εὐτυχία καὶ
ἀγχίστροφον, καὶ οὐδενὶ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ τῶν πάνυ μακαρίων μέχρι τίνος αὐτῷ.
…he said he wondered at those who were displeased at his course, first, for thinking that free
men differed from slaves by their very nature rather than by their condition, and, second, for
not determining by men’s habits and character, rather than by the accidents of their fortune,
those who were worthy of honors, particularly when they saw how unstable a thing good
fortune is and how subject to sudden change, and how difficult it is for anyone, even of the
most fortunate, to say how long it will remain with him….
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquites, 4.23.1, trans. E. Cary, modified.

Servius argues that enslavement does not reflect slave’s internal character, since enslavement is
the result of external chance. Notably, this dichotomy of internal character and external chance is
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Servius on vicissitude of enslavement: 4.23.1-2. Dionysius on the succession of empires: 1.2, cf. Gabba (1991:
192-4). Herodotus’ statement on growth and decline seems particularly resonant because of Croesus’ enslavement
(1.3-4). For the succession of empires in Greek historiography generally, Momigliano (1975). Caygill investigates
how the succession of empires was important to Momigliano’s thought on the uniqueness of Greek historiography
and his own political theology (2011).
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a veritable trope of Stoic ethics.450 On the one hand, this stance does make Servius appear
somewhat sympathetic to slaves.451 On the other hand, by having Servius recite a formula of
Greek philosophy, Dionysius depicts the Roman king as a participant in Greek culture.
Furthermore, the story of this speech is itself an exemplum of the importance of the Greek art of
rhetoric, since through this speech the king successfully convinces the patricians to adopt his
practice of combining manumission with enfranchisement.452
In addition to making Servius appear Greek, Dionysius also has the king deploy two
arguments that speak to the patricians as Roman slave-owners. The king points out that
enfranchising slaves will benefit slave-owners individually, since both the former slaves and
their children become their clients. Dionysius’ Servius also argues that enfranchising former
slaves will also benefit the Roman state because only enfranchised men can join the Roman
military.
τελευτῶν δὲ τὸν περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰσηγήσατο λόγον τοὺς μὲν ἐπισταμένους
ὑπομιμνήσκων, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀγνοοῦντας διδάσκων, ὅτι πόλει δυναστείας ἐφιεμένῃ καὶ μεγάλων
πραγμάτων ἑαυτὴν ἀξιούσῃ οὐδενὸς οὕτω δεῖ πράγματος ὡς πολυανθρωπίας, ἵνα διαρκέσῃ
πρὸς πάντας τοὺς πολέμους οἰκείοις ὅπλοις χρωμένη, καὶ μὴ ξενικοῖς στρατεύμασι
καταμισθοφοροῦσα συνεξαναλωθῇ τοῖς χρήμασι: καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔφη τοὺς προτέρους βασιλεῖς
ἅπασι μεταδεδωκέναι τῆς πολιτείας τοῖς ξένοις.
He concluded by speaking of the advantage that would result from this policy, reminding those
who understood such matters, and informing the ignorant, that to a state which aimed at
supremacy and thought itself worthy of great things nothing was so essential as a large
population, in order that it might be equal to carrying on all its wars with its own armed forces
and might not exhaust itself as well as its wealth in hiring mercenary troops; and for this
reason, he said, the former kings had granted citizenship to all foreigners.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquties, 4.23.4, trans. E. Cary.
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Seneca gives the most elaborate articulation of this position; however, it is clear that the argument is older.
Seneca: Epistulae, 47.10-13; cf. also Cicero Paradoxa Stoicorum, 5.33-4 and De Officiis, 1.41. For earlier Stoic
arguments, see Garnsey (1996: 131-3). Mouritsen places this speech in the context of various apologia for slaves by
slave-owners (2011a: 53).
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For Servius’ various connections to the religious life of Roman slaves, see Chapter 2 Section 5a.
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Schultze argues that there are three types of speeches in Dionysius: populist arguments for reform, conservative
arguments against reform, and moderate arguments on “reasonableness of change” (1986: 131). Servius’ speech
appears to begin in the first category but then shifts to the third by the end.
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In addition to these military reasons, Servius also claims that combining manumission with
enfranchisement will benefit Rome financially.453
Servius’ argument that there are political and military merits to liberal manumission are
clearly similar to those of Philip, but what this similarity indicates for Dionysius is not. For just
as Philip argues that the liberality of Roman manumission, as indicated by the status of freedmen
as magistrates and colonists, makes the state strong, so too does Dionysius’ Servius argue that
liberal manumission will increase the size of Rome’s army, thereby increasing Rome’s potential
for conquest. This similarity speaks to how Dionysius, like Philip, sees manumission as a
practice in which Greeks and Romans differ. Such a different practice, therefore, has the
potential to explain why the Romans were so successful in their military affairs that they
conquered the Greeks. Significantly, the two Greeks came to this same conclusion despite having
different experiences of Roman conquest at the respective time of their compositions. For
Philip’s comments are from outside Rome, at time when the Romans were fighting Greeks, while
Dionysius’ comments are from within the Roman world after it is the undisputed master of the
Mediterranean.454 The similarities of the two men’s comment invite the idea that this explanation
of Roman manumission circulated throughout the Greek world. But Dionysius complicates the
“Greekness” of this idea because he voices this analysis of the political benefits of Roman
manumission through the mouth of a Roman king. In doing so, Dionysius positions this analysis
of Roman manumission as the result of Roman self-reflection, not that of external Greek inquiry.
Put another way, Servius’ speech is a Greek interpretation of Roman self-reflection on
manumission.

453
454

4.23.5.
For Dionysius’ search for the cause of Rome’s dominance, see Gabba (1991: 193 and 201-208).
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Dionysius constructs Servius’ speech in order to make his own comments on Roman
manumission appear more authoritative. Dionysius’ diatribe on manumission immediately
follows the king’s speech and has similarities of form and content. Both Servius and Dionysius
address a Roman audience and both conclude with calls for the Romans to change: Servius asks
that the Romans accept his reforms, while Dionysius asks that the Romans return to following
Servius’ instructions on how to practice manumission properly.455 For Dionysius is ardent that
the current way that Romans are manumitting slaves is not working.
Dionysius has a number of complaints about contemporary Roman manumission,
including how slaves who earn their money through ignoble means—whether with or without
their owners’ knowledge are able to purchase their freedom.456 He is also incensed that there are
slave-owners who manumit slaves solely so that these new citizens might collect governmentsponsored grain.457 And according to the historian, other slave-owners manumit slaves for
entirely frivolous reasons, such as increasing the stature of those who attend their funerals.458
Dionysius concludes his complaints by noting that these problems are so bad that many people
condemn it in the following way:
εἰς τούτους μέντοι τοὺς δυσεκκαθάρτους σπίλους ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποβλέποντες οἱ πολλοὶ
δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ προβέβληνται τὸ ἔθος, ὡς οὐ πρέπον ἡγεμονικῇ πόλει καὶ παντὸς ἄρχειν
ἀξιούσῃ τόπου τοιούτους ποιεῖσθαι πολίτας.
Most people, nevertheless, as they look upon these stains that can scarce be washed away from
the city, are grieved and condemn the custom, looking upon it as unseemly that a dominant city
which aspires to rule the whole world should make such men citizens.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.24.6-7, trans. E. Cary

Such people are indistinguishably Greek or Roman, since they look at Roman manumission not
from the perspective of citizens or conquered, but as a practice of a world hegemony. From this
455

Servius’ call to the Romans as a successful act of persuasion: 4.23.7. Dionysius’ own call for specific reforms:
4.24.7-8. Dionysius’ own diatribe fits into Schultze’s category of a call for reasonable reform. For Servius’ speech
as a call for reasonable reform, see above.
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4.24.5. For more on grain and manumission, see Conclusion Section 2.
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4.24.6. Cf. Satyricon, 42.6 and 65.10. See also Section 4a below.
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porous space, Dionysius constructs a way to look at Rome that justifies his judgment on Roman
manumission even though he himself is not a Roman. In other words, Dionysius constructs his
Greek gaze on Rome as being equally valuable in assessing Roman manumission as that of a
Roman.
From that space of within and without, Dionysius’ diatribe participates in the Roman
debate on manumission and articulates the Greek aspect of the Romans’ self-reflective gaze.
Debates from the first century CE make clear that Roman slave-owners themselves had similar
concerns as Dionysius.459 Likewise, Dionysius’ preface indicates that he feels as though there are
Greek critics of Rome whom his history confronts and contradicts.460 Possibly these anonymous
Greek critics targeted Roman manumission, a particularly vulnerable practice because it differed
so greatly from Greek practices. For just as Philip’s letter to the Larisaeans occurred in a context
in which the Larisaeans owned penestai and would have compared Roman manumission to their
treatment of the penestai, the assumed Greek audience of Greek historiographies of Rome would
have compared Roman manumission to the Greek manumission with which they were familiar.
Whether or not Dionysius himself was content occupying this porous space is unclear.
Schultze argues that Dionysius coveted Roman citizenship and that his diatribe against slaves is,
in part, the result of his annoyance that mere slaves have become citizens, but that he himself has
not.461 If the historian was so motivated, it is further evidence the extent to which learning to
appreciate manumission was part of the subjection of Roman citizens. For despite his
complaints, Dionysius is careful not to argue that manumission ought to be abolished. Instead, he
459

Tacitus records a debate in which senator attempted to legalize the re-enslavement of freedmen and freedwomen
(Annales, 13.26-7). Cf. Mouritsen (2011a: 55). See also Chapter 2 Section 7 on Augustus’ reforms of manumissio
testamento.
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More specifically, Dionysius might have had in mind historians of the Mithridatic court, such as Metrodorus, cf.
Alonso-Núñez (1982), Gabba (1991: 190-2,) and Yarrow (2006: 138-145).
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a Roman citizen. Schultze therefore argues that this descendant had Roman citizenship because Dionysius was
ultimately successful in his bid to become a Roman (1986: 141).
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takes up the viewpoint of a Roman slave-owner and contemplates how the practice could be
improved in order to better Rome. While Dionysius may be jealous that former slaves are
Romans and he is not, he is nonetheless eager to demonstrate that he understands how important
manumission is to being a Roman slave-owner.462 Whereas Philip looked at Roman
manumission and found a valuable practice for making Greeks strong enough to resist the
Romans, Dionysius looked at Roman manumission and saw a foreign practice that he needed to
understand in order to participate in Roman discourse, and perhaps even become a Roman
himself. Dionysius’ comments on Roman manumission were in conversation with Romans
reflecting on manumission, including what made certain manumissions bad.

4. Slave-owners and disciplining bad manumission
Plautus’ plays provide a number of references to and commentary on manumission done
legally, but still inappropriately. While as a comic Plautus is more concerned with provoking
laughter than providing explicit models to emulate or avoid, I read his comments on
manumission as Plautus finding laughs in the values and discomfort of Roman slave-owners. By
joking about the lived experience of manumission, Plautus deploys his jokes within the field of
the slave-owners’ reflective gaze, not the gaze of the state. His jokes are in part reminders to
slave-owners of the stakes of manumission, that even if they themselves were practicing
manumission correctly, they nonetheless face consequences from their neighbors if they either
freed the wrong type of slaves or freed them for the wrong reasons. In other words, Plautus’
jokes about manumission were also part of the subjection of slave-owners, since they provided
warnings of the costs of performing manumission badly and reiterated how the Roman public,
not just the Roman state, scrutinized manumission. Furthermore, I argue that the words of
462

Compare how Plutarch depicts the enslavement and manumission of Tyrannion (Life of Lucullus, 19). For that
manumission, see Christes (1979: 107-15), Treggiari (1969: 119-21), and Yarrow (2006: 39-40). See also Chapter 2
Section 5e above.
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Plautus’ characters show the playwright playing with the language and concepts of Roman
manumission similar to the language and conceptions articulated by the Greeks Philip and
Dionysius, specifically that Roman manumission is a practice that strengthens Roman political
power. I conclude that the Greek gaze shaped the secondarity of Plautus’ reflective gaze on
manumission. Thus, this secondarity was bound up in the aspects of the subjection of Roman
slave-owners that survive in Plautus’ works.
From Plautus’ stylized comments on manumission, I turn to Cicero, whose fraternal tiff
with Quintus over the manumission of Statius I use as a case study in how slave-owners engaged
each other in non-state policing. In two separate letters to his friend Atticus, Cicero makes clear
that he finds Quintus’ manumission of Statius unwise and upsetting, while simultaneously
asserting his authority as a family member in the matter. What upsets Cicero is that Statius’
manumission makes Quintus vulnerable to attacks from an anonymous Roman public, a concern
that he expresses directly to Quintus in a letter. Cicero’s epistolary confrontation is a
demonstration of how improper manumission prompted other slave-owners to take disciplinary
action over perfectly legal manumissions.

a. Plautus
Plautus’ characters describe how manumission can go badly because of the improper
behavior and motives of the slave-owner. Their complaints also allude to the stakes of Roman
manumission proceeding correctly. In doing so, Plautus’ characters use language and ideas that
parallel Philip and Dionysius’ comments and concerns about Roman manumission. First,
Dordalus describes manumission as a potential source of political strength in a way similar to
Philip. Second, both Grumio and Dionysius are concerned that slave-owners allow selfish and
frivolous motives guide their decision-making process, rather than considering whether a slave
has demonstrated his or her loyalty and has therefore earned Roman citizenship. In addition to
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demonstrating the Greek nature of Roman reflection on manumission, that is, its secondarity,
these examples also characterize how the surveillance of manumission was connected to nonstate discipline. Plautus’ characters point to how the incorrect performance of manumission left
slave-owners vulnerable to a variety of charges, including acting like a decadent Greek or being
an irresponsible slave-owner. Furthermore, Plautus’ plays suggest that for some Roman citizens,
specifically pimps, the possibility of enacting a proper manumission was out of their reach,
precluded by their marginal status.
When the pimp Dordalus frames his manumission of a slave woman as an increase of the
Athenian citizenry, Plautus engages in a projection of specifically Roman concerns about
manumission into the Greek world. Dordalus’ comment is also evidence that Plautus is playing
with the Greek perception of Roman manumission, since his line of thought parallels the ideas
and language of Philip and Dionysius. In the Persa, the pimp Dordalus frames a personally
financially profitable manumission as a virtuous increase in the citizenry:
DO. sumne probus, sum lepidus civis, qui Atticam hodie civitatem
maximam maiorem feci atque auxi civi femina?
DORDALUS: Am I not an upright citizen? Am I not a fine citizen, who today
Has made the great Attic citizenry greater and added a woman citizen?
Plautus, Persa, 474-5, translation my own.463

Even though Dordalus claims to be helping the Athenian citizenry, his comments provoke
laughter because he is describing a pointedly Roman aspect of Roman manumission: how former
slaves become citizens. There is also comedic fricition in Dordalus’ description of Lemniselenis
as both a woman and a citizen. Furthermore, that this line could have provoked Roman laughter
is suggestive of a peculiarly Roman anxiety about manumission, specifically that slave-owners
can manipulate the make-up of the citizenry through manumission.464 Dordalus is an
463
464

For more on Dordalus specifically, see Fayer (2013: 274-281).
Such anxiety could spur legislative action, see Chapter 2 Section 3a.
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uncomfortable reminder that by distributing this power to all Roman citizens, the Romans had
empowered even pimps such as Dordalus to modify the citizenry through manumission. When
Dordalus says that his manumission has “made the great citizenry greater,” he equates the
quantitative increase in the size of the citizenry through manumission with a qualitative increase
in the citizenry’s strength, the same line of thought in Philip’s and Dionysius’ comments on
Roman manumission.
I find the parallels between Dordalus’ comment and that of Philip as indicative that the
secondarity of Romans’ reflective gaze meant that this gaze included the adaptation of the values
of Greeks in their assessment and analysis of Roman practices. In his comment, Dordalus
describes his manumission as the addition of a woman citizen, “auxi civi femina.” In his letter to
the Larisaeans, Philip frames the Romans’ political strength as, in part, due to how they
enfranchise former slaves as citizens, describing Roman manumission as the Romans “increasing
their fatherland (τὴν ἰδίαν πατρίδα ἐπηυξήκασιν).”465 I do not mean to suggest that Plautus is
responding directly to Philip’s description of Rome. Rather, my argument about Plautus’
adoption of the Greek gaze explains why there are more general parallels between Dordalus’
equation of manumission as a strengthening of the citizenry with that of King Servius in
Dionysius’ history. Dionysius expresses similar concerns about the connection of manumission
to political strengthen when he writes that King Servius says that manumission will help the
Romans cultivate a large citizen body.466 Furthermore, Dionysius’ concern that the Romans now
misuse manumission because of the freedom afforded to them, specifically that they might to
manumit as they please, also has parallels in Plautus’ comedy.
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See Section 3a above for more.
See Section 3b above for more.
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The slave Grumio complains that his owner Philolaches does not consider manumission
seriously, prompting the slave to accuse Philolaches of acting like a Greek. I read this derogatory
use of pergraecor as a way for Plautus to project Roman concerns about manumission into a
Greek setting. In the Mostellaria, when the rustic slave Grumio accuses both his fellow slave
Tranio and their master Philolaches of acting like Greeks, it is in part because they manumit
women in a thoroughly sympotic setting.
[GRUMIO:] Corrumpe erilem adulescentem optumum;
Dies noctesque bibite, pergraecaminei,
Amicas emite, liberate: pascite
Parasitos: opsonate pollucibiliter.
[GRUMIO:] You corrupt our master, the best young man. Both of you drink day and night,
and acting like Greeks, you buy girlfriends and then free them, you suffer flatterers and you
feast too sumptuously.
Plautus, Mostellaria, 21-24, translation my own.

This joke is in part metatheatrical, since the audience can laugh at how this supposed Greek uses
a word that means to act like a Greek as an insult. This insult is also clearly a Plautine addition,
for while Grumio’s moralizing concerns about revelry and feasting have numerous parallels in
Greek New Comedy, no Greek comedian could have used a word similar to pergraecor.467
Grumio’s concern that Philolaches manumits slaves while partying parallels Dionysius’
complaint that the Romans now manumit their slaves for frivolous reasons is another indication
of the secondarity of Roman concerns about Roman manumission. Recall that Dionysius had
specifically complained that there are Romans who manumit slaves, simply to ensure that there
would a better class of people at their funerals:
οἱ δὲ διὰ διὰκουφότητα τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ κενὴν δοξοκοπίαν. ἔγωγ᾽ οὖν ἐπίσταμαί τινας ἅπασι
τοῖς δούλοις συγκεχωρηκότας εἶναι ἐλευθέροις μετὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν τελευτάς, ἵνα χρηστοὶ
καλῶνται νεκροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ ταῖς κλίναις αὐτῶν ἐκκομιζομέναις παρακολουθῶσι τοὺς πίλους
ἔχοντες ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς….
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And others owe their freedom to the levity of their masters and to their vain thirst for
popularity. I, at any rate, know of some who have allowed all their slaves to be freed after their
death, in order that they might be called good men when they were dead and that many people
might follow their biers wearing their liberty-caps.
Dionysius of Halicarnauss, Roman Antiquities, 4.24.5-6, trans. E. Cary.468

Dionysius’ explicit concern, which is only implicit in the complaint of the Latin speaking Greek
slave Grumio, is that the slave-owners have not considered all the implications of the
manumission and that he manumits his slave without the proper motive.469
Grumio’s grumbles about the sympotic setting of manumission also anticipate Petronius’
Trimalchio, who during his dinner manumits a slave, merely so that it cannot be said that he was
injured by a slave. In this instance, Petronius uses Trimalchio to satirize the degree to which
some Romans turn their management of slaves into a performance.470 In one of his didactic
letters, Seneca lodges a similar complaint about decadent Romans and provides Lucilius with
numerous strategies for how to be a humble and inconspicuous slave-owner.471 The comparison
to these Imperial writers is useful because these other works highlight how Grumio’s complaint
is also an example of how the slave-owners’ gaze had disciplining authority over manumissions
performed entirely legally, that is, ones that the state’s gaze judged acceptable.
Plautus’ plays provide comments on manumission that are examples of how the slaveowners’ gaze reflected on manumission, in part, to police its propriety. For while the state’s gaze
was concerned with whether the manumission was done legally, slave-owners evaluated
manumission by subtler standards; they evaluated both actual and hypothetical examples of

468

For more on this passage, see Section 3b above.
In contrast, Segal interprets Plautus as using pergraecari to label all pleasurable activities that are in opposition
to Roman severity (1968: 33-42).
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manumission. Indeed, Gruimo’s complaint is indicative of these standards, since he implies that
while his owner Philolaches may have manumitted these hypothetical women entirely according
to the law; nonetheless, he fails to act as a proper Roman slave-owner, since he initiated process
while carousing. Instead, such a manumission means that Philolaches is acting like a Greek,
which in this instance connotes a people who lack moral fortitude, even if they have an enviable
culture. Indeed, the standards for manumission within the slave-owners’ gaze can be so high that
it effectively judges certain types of legal manumission as always lacking in propriety, such as
the manumissions that pimps conduct.
I argued above that Dordalus’ humorous framing of his manumission as an increase of
the Athenian citizenry depended on the discomfort of slave-owners, as his comment forced them
to reflect upon how the Roman practice of manumission entailed empower even men such as
pimps with the ability to create new citizens. That Plautus wants his audience to condemn
Dordalus is especially clear when the pimp states that his motive for manumitting the anonymous
woman in question is only an incentive for her to be a more enthusiastic prostitute. The audience
is primed to hate Dordalus in this scene because he bought the anonymous girl while aware that
she is a freeborn citizen: 472
DO. Ne sis plora; libera eris actutum, si crebro cades.
DORDALUS: Don’t wail. You will quickly be a freedwoman, if you lie down often.
Plautus, Persa, 656, translation my own.

This line establishes that Dordalus is not interested in evaluating whether this slave has proved
her loyalty to him, and thereby earned her freedom properly.473 While being a willing prostitute
can be construed as a form of loyalty to Dordalus, Plautus so relentlessly characterizes Dordalus
472

653-4.
Following Richlin’s line of argument, is possible this negative depiction of Dordalus is meant to include slaves’
evaluation of him as a disloyal slave-owner (2014). For the relationship between prostitutions on and off the stage,
see Duncan (2006).
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as greedily obsessed with profit, that it seems unlikely that this line deviates from Plautus’
project of depicting the pimp as entirely focused on money.474 In short, Dordalus’ own
description of this hypothetical manumission presents his action to the audience as failing the
expectations for a proper manumission.
Similarly, in the comedy Curculio, two different characters use pimps’ handling of
manumission as evidence of their untrustworthiness. These accusations are part of a larger
pattern in Plautus’ work of pimps as objects of contempt and worthy of violence.475 This
comment is evidence that in the gaze of Roman slave-owners, pimps’ manumissions remained
suspect, even if conducted legally. The first accusation about pimps’ handling of manumission
comes from the titular Curculio, a parasitus, who engages in diatribes throughout the play. In
this instance, Curculio has become incensed about pimps and argues that one of the reasons that
they are untrustworthy is how they handle manumissions.
CU. Egon ab lenone quicquam
mancupio accipiam, quibus sui nihil est nisi una lingua,
qui abiurant si quid creditum est? alienos mancupatis,
alienos manu emittitis alienisque imperatis,
nec vobis auctor ullus est nec vosmet estis ulli.
CURCULIO: Should I take this title from a pimp?
One of those who has nothing but a tongue,
Who deny what they owe? Some people you sell,
Others you manumit and yet others still you command,
But you have no guarantor nor do you truly own anything.
Plautus, Curculio, 494-8, translation my own.

Curulio’s complaint about pimps is that they appear very similar to respectable slave-owners, but
lack the actual social cache to justify their appearance of authority. For of course Romans would
consider nothing wrong with commanding, selling, or manumitting people, and indeed, any
remotely successful Roman man would engage in all three activities. But Curculio, like the
474
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character Lyco, notes that pimps do all three things without also engaging in the same pursuit of
respectability like successful Romans do, since pimps are persistent liars and as a result have
isolated themselves to the point that no one will vouch for them.476 That Curculio’s main reason
for distrusting pimps’ manumission is their status on the margins of society is evident by his
exclamation that pimps do not have any guarantors or even the proper authority to own their own
property.
The other character who disparages pimps’ manumission is the moneylender Lyco. He
echoes Curculio’s concern that pimps engage in manumission too frequently, but also adds the
charge that they abandon these new freedmen and freedwomen:
LY. Faci’ sapientius
quam pars lenonum, libertos qui habent et eos deserunt.
LYCO: You act more wisely than most pimps, who have freedmen but abandon them.
Plautus, Curculio, 547-8, translation my own.

Lyco does not charge pimps with breaking or even skirting the law. Instead, he suggests that they
do not follow through on the duties that they owe their freedmen and freedwomen as patrons.477
Lyco’s comments, combined with those of Curculio, suggest that in Plautus’ world, pimps, as
pimps, were incapable of performing manumission correctly.
Under the gaze of slave-owners, pimps’ manumissions might be legal, but they
nonetheless do not follow all the standards that slave-owners demanded of each other for a
proper manumission. Cicero’s quarrel with his brother Quintus over the manumission Statius
suggest that Plautus’ examples reflect a lived Roman experience, that is, that Romans understood
legal manumissions as events worthy of debate, criticism, and reproach if done incorrectly. The
parallels between the comments of Plautus’ characters and that of the Greeks Philip and
476
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Dionysius points to how Roman secondarity to Greece included how the Romans evaluated
Roman manumission. In other words, Plautus did more than translate Greek plays into Latin, he
also made accessible to Romans Greek evaluations of Roman manumission.

b. Statius, Cicero, and Quintus
Cicero’s laments about Quintus’ manumission of Statius is an example of how Roman
slave-owners monitored each other and evaluated the propriety of each other’s manumissions,
not just their legality.478 Unlike Cicero’s manumission of his slave Chrysippus, there is no
indication that Cicero thought that either Quintus or Statius did anything to skirt the law, but
nonetheless, the Roman lawyer found Quintus’ decision to manumit Statius highly
objectionable.479 While Cicero does not detail his objections about Statius’ manumission, in a
letter to Quintus, Cicero lays out a series of complaints about how the freedman is unworthy of
the power that he has because of Quintus’ status as governor of Asia.480 In this letter, Cicero’s
concerns about Statius do bleed into the political sphere, but in the two letters that Cicero sends
to Atticus detailing his initial grief and anxiety about Statius’ manumission, Cicero frames this
misfortune as a family affair, outside the concern of the state. Cicero’s complaints are a
demonstration to Atticus of Cicero’s own internalization of the subjection of the values of slaveowners regarding manumission. While Plautus’ characters had performed their understanding of
bad manumission on the stage, Cicero performs this recognition of bad manumission in the
virtual space that his letters create.
Cicero had written about Statius’ manumission in June of 59, but it is in a letter to Atticus
from the following month that Cicero demonstrates the extent to which Quintus’ decision
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480
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wounds him as a family member.481 Cicero frames Quintus’ decision as a familial concern in two
ways. First, he juxtaposes his other political problems to the molestius of Statius’ manumission.
Second, Cicero deploys a quote from Terence:
Multa me sollicitant et ex rei publicae tanto motu et ex his periculis quae mihi ipsi intenduntur.
Et sescenta sunt, sed mihi nihil est molestius quam Statium manu missum:
‘ne meum imperium - ac mitto imperium - non simultatem meam
Reveri saltem!’
I have many things on my mind, arising from the grave political crisis and these dangers that
menace me. They are legion, but nothing distresses me more than Statius’ manumission:
“That my commands- no, leaving aside my command - that my displeasure should count with
him for nothing.”
Cicero, Ad Atticum, 2.19.1 = Shackleton Bailey 39.1, trans. Shackleton Bailey, modified.482

This quote is from the beginning of Act II of the Adelphoe, when the senex Demipho believes
that his son Antipho has married without his blessing.483 Cicero’s deployment of this quote lays
out the possibility of an analogy between the family in the play and Cicero’s own family.
Specifically, by mouthing Demipho’s words, Cicero sets himself up as the offended father figure
and Quintus as the reckless son. Cicero’s use of a Terentian quote about marriage frames Statius’
manumission as a family affair in the private and virtual space generated by Cicero’s
correspondence. By virtual space, I mean that Cicero uses this letter to create a non-physical
place in which he can perform for Atticus, his intended reader.484
Three months after writing to Atticus about how Statius’ manumission is a problem,
Cicero writes to Quintus himself in part to complain about Statius’ character generally and about
Quintus’ recent decision to manumit him specifically. But while in his letters to Atticus, Cicero
had framed his judgment of Statius’ manumission as a familial concern, when writing to Quintus,
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Cicero notes the public nature of the manumission. In effect, Cicero writes that through
manumitting Statius, Quintus has disappointed an anonymous Roman public and that as a result
he risks a loss of stature and influence. Cicero cites how numerous people have come to him
asking for recommendations to Statius, altercations that Cicero frames as slights to Quintus,
since presumably these people ought to have asked for recommendations to Quintus himself,
rather than to his freedman.485 Cicero then elaborates that Statius’ manumission is a legitimate
complaint that other Romans can use to attack Quintus’ character:486
Atque hoc habeto (nihil enim nec temere dicere nec astute reticere debeo), materiam omnem
sermonum eorum qui de te detrahere velint Statium dedisse; antea tantum intellegi potuisse
iratos tuae veritati esse non nullos, hoc manumission iratis quod loquerentur non defuisse.
Please realize that all the grist to the mills of your would-be detractors has been furnished by
Statius. Previously it could only be thought that some people might have been annoyed by
your strictness, but after his manumission that those who were had got something to talk about.
Cicero, Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.2.3 = Shackleton Bailey 2.3, trans. Shackleton Bailey.

On the one hand, Cicero’s emphatic plea to his brother to change his ways is an example of how
slave-owners’ surveillance of each other prompted them to discipline each other.487 On the other
hand, judging the effectiveness of this specific disciplining action is a much harder task, since
Quintus’ response to Cicero does not survive. What the surviving letters do reveal is that Quintus
continued to trust, and use, Statius. Indeed, Quintus appears to have aided Statius’ entry into the
collegium Lupercus.488 But perhaps Quintus did react to and absorb Cicero’s criticisms in his
treatment of Statius. Or perhaps Quintus simply ignored what his brother said. Slave-owners’
surveillance of each other was diffuse and constant, but in contrast to the powers of the state,
their ability to discipline each other was limited, often limited to persuasion. As such, slaveowners such as Quintus could reject the disciplining power that resulted from this surveillance.
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Despite Cicero’s numerous negative assessments of Statius, he maintained a relationship
with the freedman over the years. Cicero writes of doing large financial transactions with Statius,
and he even corresponds with him in order to learn about the affairs of his nephew.489 Cicero
appears to have known that Quintus’ relationship with Statius was strong, since when Quintus
learns of Tiro’s manumission, Quintus writes that he hopes that Cicero gets the same kind of joy
from his relationship with Tiro that Quintus has received from his relationship with Statius.490 At
this later date, Quintus has transformed his manumission of Statius into an exemplum of a proper
manumission. In other words, because the gaze of slave-owners evaluated manumissions, in part,
through recourse to specific examples, examples of proper manumission were important enough
that slave-owners contested and debated what was a good manumission.

5. Manumissions, families, and fraternal rivalries
Because the comedians include manumissions as part of the on stage action of their plays,
it is logical to assume that the comedians would be a useful source to combine with the jurists’
descriptions of the words and movements associated with manumission. But the comedians’
representation of manumission is practically incompatible with that of the jurists: the jurists
emphasize the need for state representatives and ritualized movements, in addition to the use of
specific words, while the comedians present manumission as a speech-act of the slave-owner.491
By discarding the state’s role in manumission and elevating the role of the slave-owner, the
comedians make manumission compatible with the familial concerns and domestic settings of
their comedies. I therefore argue that in the plays of Plautus and Terence, the characters reflect
on manumission not through the gaze of the state, but instead through the gaze of slave-owners.
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The comedians present manumission as the purview of slave-owners and their families alone,
thereby implying that only other slave-owners have the ability to surveil and police
manumission.492 Another consequence is that the comedians are able to focus on manumission as
an event of great joy. But while great, this joy is not pure, but rather an event that is the product
of familial politicking. More specifically, both Plautus and Terence include on-stage
manumissions that are the result of fraternal rivalries, a common theme all the more intriguing
because fraternal rivalry undergirds Quintus’ congratulations of Cicero’s manumission of
Tiro.493
Tiro’s recent manumission gives Quintus the chance to allude to his own manumission of
Statius. By drawing lines of equivalency between Tiro and Statius, Quintus both indirectly
refutes Cicero’s charges that manumitting Statius was unwise and reaffirms his own standing as
a slave-owner who had successfully found and cultivated a slave to be so loyal and temperate
that the slave has earned manumission. In other words, Quintus frames his own manumission of
Statius as an exemplum towards which Cicero’s manumission of Tiro can reach, effectively
defining himself as a slave-owner superior to his brother. The representation of Tiro’s
manumission in Quintus’ letter, therefore, suggests that Roman slave-owners not only surveilled
each other for the purpose of disciplining cases of bad manumission, but also for the purpose of
competing with each other over cases of proper manumission.

a. Plautus and Terence
The comedians present manumission as a speech-act entirely separate from the legal
sphere, hence why they take no concern for issues such as magistrates, witnesses, or ritual
492
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instruments. By speech-act, I mean an utterance that has constative power, that is, the power to
make something happen.494 In the comedies, although manumission is a speech-act that gains
authority through the use of legalistic phrases, the judicial tinge to these formulae is the only
remnant of the court and the state in the process of manumission. By separating manumission
from the law courts, the comedians are able to make manumission a family affair, which is to say
a size appropriate to the familial scope of Roman comedy.495 Because the plays are grounded in
the world of the family, the characters gaze at manumission not as the Roman state but as slaveowners. From this perspective, the slave-owner has complete control over the process of
manumission and is concerned with how the granting of manumission is part of the personal
relationship between the slave-owner and slave. By making manumission a speech-act, the
comedians present manumission to their audience as an inherent power of slave-ownership,
rather than a power dependent on a negotiation with the state. This framing of a manumission as
a familial event also allows the comedians to present manumission as the object, and result, of
rivalries between brothers, further evidence for how the subjection of slave-owners included the
competition with other slave-owners over manumission.
The only manumissions that occur on stage in the plays of Plautus and Terence are those
of the of servi callidi, clever slaves.496 That only servi callidi are manumitted on stage indicates
the degree to which the comedians are concerned with manumission only to the extent that it
connects to the narrative and character types of their plays. Furthermore, the importance of the
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narrative to the manumission of the servus callidus is evident by how only a minority of servi
callidi are manumitted at the end of comedies. Plautus ends only two of his comedies with the
performance of the manumission of a servus callidus, and Terence only one, the Adelphoe.497
Messenio’s manumission in Plautus’ Menaechmi in particular reinforces the idea that
manumission is a personal attribute of the slave-owner because the play establishes how
Messenio’s first manumission was invalid, a development that places even more importance on
how it is only Messenio’s true owner who can manumit him. Messenio’s first manumission did
not count because his true owner, the Syracusan Menaechmus, did not perform it; instead, his
owner’s twin brother did, the Epidamnian Menaechmus (for, to further confuse matters, both
brothers have the same name). Messenio had misrecognized Epidamnian Menaechmus for his
true owner and had therefore risked his life to save him. After this rescue, Messenio then asks
this Menaechmus to free him. The confused man insists that Messenio is not his slave, but
eventually agrees to free him regardless:
MEN: mea quidem hercle caussa liber esto atque ito quo voles.
MES: nemp’iubes? MEN: iubeo hercle, si quid imperi est in te mihi.
MES: Salve, mi patrone. ‘quom tu liber es, Messenio,
gaudeo.’
EPIDAMNIAN MENAECHMUS: By god, for my sake be free and go where you will.
MESSENIO: You really command that?
EPIDAMNIAN MENAECHMUS: By god, I command it, if that authority over you is in me.
Plautus, Menaechmi, 1029-1030, translation my own.498

While this Menaechmus voices his doubts about his authority to do as Messenio wishes, he
nonetheless uses the proper legal language in manumitting him, “be free” (liber esto).499 Notably,
in this scene, only Messenio and Menaechmus are on stage; there are no witnesses to Messenio’s
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fraudulent manumission.500 Plautus emphasizes how this lack of witnesses makes Messenio’s
freedom vulnerable, for when Messenio attempts to persuade his true owner, the Syracusan
Menaechmus, that he is free, the slave’s cause appears hopeless when his owner simply denies it.
Instead of recognizing Messenio’s freedom, Syracusan Menaechmus becomes agitated, even
saying that he would rather be sold into slavery himself than free Messenio.501
However, Syracuasan Menaechmus soon eats his words, as his new-found brother
persuades him to free Messenio. By staging Messenio’s manumission in this way, Plautus frames
manumission as an object of fraternal negotiation, since Messenio gains his freedom as the result
of Epidamnian Menaechmus’ intervention:
MEN: optumum atque aequissumum orat, frater: fac caussa mea.
MEN: liber esto.
EPIDAMNIAM MENAECHMUS: He asks for the best and most proper thing, brother. Do it
for my sake.
SYRACUSAN MENAECHMUS: Be free.
Plautus, Menaechmi, 1147-1148, translation my own.502

The Syracusan Menaechmus says the same words as the Epidamnian Menaechmus, but because
the words come from the mouth of the true owner, Messenio becomes truly free. Because he is
the only rightful owner of Messenio, it is Syracusan Menaechmus’ speech-act that makes
Mesenio a freedman, affirming the importance of the personal relationship between the slave and
the slave-owner in the slave-owner’s gaze. The power of his speech-act depends on the authentic
and personal relationship between the slave and slave-owner. Furthermore, Syracusan
Menaechmus accepts his brother’s framing of his manumission as a personal favor, a framing
that positions manumission as a familial concern.
Similarly, in his Adelphoe, Terence makes manumission both a speech-act and an event
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within the complex rivalry between the brothers Demea and Micea. At the beginning of the play,
Micea had charged that Demea was miserly. During a monologue in the final act, Demea
declares that he has become frustrated by the limitations of being a scrooge and now resolves to
be generous, a transformation he describes largely as spurred by a rivalry with his brother, whom
Demea understands to be popular because of his life of leisure and his clementia.503 As soon as
Demea concludes his monologue, the slave Syrus enters, prompting the senex to promise, “You
yourself are scarcely a crude [inliberalem] slave, I’d like to do you a good turn.”504 To prove his
dedication to his new generosity, Demea then pressures his brother to free Syrus and the woman
whom Syrus calls his wife.505 Regardless of whether or not Demea’s resolution is sincere, the
senex here frames his decision to help Syrus as part of his plan to become a generous person,
which is to say, Syrus’ manumission is directly connected to the rivalry between these two
brothers.506
By making manumission a simple speech-act, Terence is able to keep the comedy moving
quickly and also make Syrus’ manumission a plot point in Demea’s self-transformation.
DE. Postremo hodie in psaltria ista emunda hic adiutor fuit,
Hic curravit: prodesse aequomst: alii meliores erunt.
Denique hic volt fieri MI. vin tu hoc fieri?
AE. cupio. MI. Si quidem,
Tu vis, Syre, eho accede huc ad me: liber esto.
SY:Bene facis.
Omnibus gratiam habeo, et seorsum tibi praeterea, Demea.
DEMEA: Finally today he was a help in procuring this woman. He ran here; equally, he was
useful. There were other, greater things too. And finally, he himself wants to be free.
MICEA: And also you want this?
AESCHAENIUS: Yes.
MICEA: If that’s what you want. Syrus, come to me here: be free!
SYRUS: Well done. I give thanks to all of you, and a separate one to you, Demea.
Terence, Adelphoe, 970-1, translation my own.507
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“facilitate nil esse homini melius neque clementia," 861.
“Servom haud inliberalem praebes te et tibi // lubens bene faxim.” Adelphoe, 886-887
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Demea even offers to pay for the manumission of this Phrygia, 974-6.
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Demea’s self-stated transformation may or may not be sincere. See Traill for an overview of the various
interpretations (2013: 326-9).
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Ashmore (1908: 312) notes that the “tu” in the first clause addresses Aeschinus.
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According to Terence’s text, Micea performs the manumission through the declaration “be free!”
Commentators Ashmore and Gratwick read Micea’s command “come to me” (accede huc ad me)
as indicating some physical motion similar to the ones that the jurists describe in their accounts
of manumission.508 Importantly though, Terence’s text does not describe Micea either hitting
Syrus or using a festuca. Instead, the legal phrase “liber esto” represents the entire practice of
manumission; the legal phrase is a speech-act, and no ritualized movements are necessary.
Terence utilizes his ritualistic sense in order to construct a representation of manumission, a
representation that is in dialogue with the Roman expectations of the movements, instruments,
and words that constituted manumission.509 Micea’s words are all that it takes to make Syrus
free: the slave-owner is the only authority over Syrus because Terence has swept the state aside.
However, Micea is not the sole cause of Syrus’ manumission. As the slave himself notes, Demea
is the reason that he is free, and it is Demea who had provided Micea with the proof that Syrus
was a slave worthy of manumission by listing his accomplishments from the play. Syrus reminds
the audience and readers that it was not Micea who was the cause of his manumission, but rather
Demea, whom the audience knows was motivated in part through his fraternal rivalry.
In their plays, Plautus and Terence depict manumission as a fraternal concern, a topic
which brothers see as important enough that they consider it worthwhile to exert influence over
each other. I further note that this framing of manumission as a familial topic removes
manumission from the state’s sphere. True, both Plautus and Terence incorporate legal language
into their manumissions, but by making manumission a speech-act, they eliminate the need for
magistrates and ritual instruments.510 A consequence of this privatization of manumission is that
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Ashmore (1908: 312), Gratwick (1987: lemma to line 970).
For Bourdieu and Bell on the sense of ritual, see Chapter 1 Section 6 above.
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“Liber esto” is the phrase used in XII Tables 4.2, cf. Crawford (1996: 631-2).
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the comedians make manumission into topic worthy of competition, a process that the conflict
between Cicero and Quintus suggests was indicative of actual Roman practice.

b. Tiro, Cicero, and Quintus
The evidence of Tiro’s manumission survives in a short, undated letter from Quintus to
Cicero. In this letter, Quintus reveals that he had learned of Tiro’s manumission from two
sources: a letter from Tiro and another letter from Cicero himself. Because Quintus is responding
to Cicero’s own letter, Quintus provides little detail about Tiro’s description of his manumission,
there being no point in describing this event to a man who participated in it. Instead, Quintus’
words testify to his prioritization of Cicero’s description and understanding of the manumission
at the expense of Tiro’s own description. Cicero and Tiro both wrote to Quintus, in part, because
while the ritualized practice of manumissio vindicta had made Tiro legally a Roman, for him to
become a freedman required the recognition of men like Quintus, who had not participated in the
manumission itself. Quintus, being both a slave-owner and the patron of the freed slave Statius,
participates only in Cicero’s joy of Tiro’s manumission, not the joy of the freed slave. While
some of Quintus’ participation comes from his fraternal sympathy with his brother, Quintus’
words do have an adversarial tone. For just as manumission was a practice at which Roman
slave-owners could fail, thereby risking discipline, so too was manumission a practice in which
slave-owners could excel and therefore compete with each other.
Quintus’ letter to Cicero references Cicero’s and Tiro’s own representation of Tiro’s
manumission, raising the question of why both men had written to him about this event and what
was at stake in their separate descriptions of the manumission. That Tiro wrote to Quintus
independently of Cicero perhaps gives the false impression of the degree to which Tiro’s life was
separate from that of Cicero’s. For after his manumission, Tiro nonetheless continued to serve as
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Cicero’s courier and eyes on the ground for various assignments.511 Instead, Tiro’s letter to
Quintus is further evidence of how deeply embedded Tiro was in Cicero’s own relationships with
his family and friends. After manumission, Tiro remained the lawyer’s subordinate adjunct.512
Quintus therefore writes about Tiro with his own relationship to the slave in mind.
mihi crede, tuis et illius litteris perlectis exsilui gaudio et tibi et ago gratias et gratulor.
Trust me, when I finished reading both his letter and yours, I jumped with joy! I thank you and
congratulate you!
Cicero, Ad Familiares, 16.16.1 = Shackleton Bailey 44.1, translation my own.

Whether Tiro’s own letter to Quintus was entirely concerned with his manumission is a matter of
guesswork. Likely, Tiro had included this news along with some logistical question or financial
request request.513 Nonetheless, such a description was Tiro’s own and therefore was an example
of a freedman’s self-representation of his manumission. Although Quintus mentions Tiro’s
representation of his own manumission only for the sake of juxtaposition to Cicero’s news,
Quintus implies that Tiro had written about this event with great joy, just as Cicero had. In
Quintus’ evaluation of the event, Cicero’s testimony is sufficient, rendering Tiro’s account
superfluous rather than as a bearer of the true joy of manumission. Just as Hegel’s lord fails in
his self-reflection on his relationship with the bondsman, so too does Quintus fail to represent
Tiro’s joy of manumission because Quintus considers Cicero’s joy to be all that matters. But this
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Courier: Ad Atticum, 15.18.1. Eyes on the ground: Ad Atticum, 15.15.4. For more on Tiro after his manumission,
see Treggiari, although Tregiarri’s attempt to correlate Tiro’s manumission to his age is fraught (1967: 261-2).
McDermott reviews the evidence of Tiro’s age to try and argue that Tiro was Cicero’s bastard son, but this argument
is mainly a scandalized reaction against ancient evidence that asserts their relationship was sexual (1972).
Unfortunately, McDermott’s speculation gets Shackleton Bailey’s full endorsement (1977: 344-5). For a more
nuanced approach to sexuality, Tiro and Cicero, see Williams (2010: 273-4).
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Book 16 of Ad Familiares contains three letters from Quintus, one to Cicero and the other two to Tiro, and two
letters from Cicero’s son to Tiro. Similarly, a letter from Curius to Cicero concludes with best wishes for Tiro (Ad
Familiares, 7.29). See also Mouritsen (2011a: 45-8).
513
Because these few words are the only reference to Tiro’s letter, firmly establishing the immediate context of
Tiro’s description of his own manumission to Quintus is impossible. A wider context makes clear that Quintus and
Tiro did have something of one-on-one relationship: Quintus at times explicitly requested news from Tiro (cf. Ad
Fratrem Quintum, 3.1.10 = Shackleton Bailey 21.10). Furthermore, even Quintus’ letter of congratulation about
Tiro’s manumission includes logistical items (Ad Familiares, 16.16.2 = Shackleton Bailey 44.2).
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failure is not simply the result of Quintus’ inherent status a slave-owner; rather, Quintus is
responding to and manipulating the expectations connected to the subjection of slave-owners.
In his description of Tiro’s manumission, Quintus references Statius, thereby alluding to
Statius’ manumission, because such a deployment allows Quintus to appear more accomplished
and experienced than Cicero. In other words, Quintus congratulates Cicero while at the same
time competing with him. In his response to Cicero’s description of Tiro’s manumission, Quintus
highlights his relationship with own freedman Statius in order to set a standard to which Cicero’s
manumission of Tiro can attempt to reach. Because of Cicero’s emphatic disagreement with
Quintus about the propriety of Statius’ manumission, the commentator Shackleton Bailey asserts
that Quintus cannot possibly have forgotten how his brother disciplined him over Statius.
However, Shackleton Bailey provides no explanation for why Quintus alludes to that rancorous
affair.514 While to modern readers it may appear strange that brothers would compete over an
issue such as manumission, Cicero’s letters reveal that friendships among Roman men included
competitions amid deeply personal and intimate affairs, such as mourning.515 Furthermore,
Cicero’s letters reveal that he frequently instructed Quintus on how to conduct his affairs,
ranging from his governorship to his familial responsibilties.516 Since Cicero and Servius
Sulpicius Rufus compete with each other over grief, it is not surprising that Quintus is competing
with Cicero over manumission, sarcastically highlighting the very virtues in Statius that Cicero
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Shackleton Bailey poses his reading as a rhetorical question, “Did Cicero remember, and was he not meant to
remember, his own violent disapproval of Statius’ manumission six years previously?” (Shacketlon Bailey 1971:
131 = Shackleton Bailey 1977: 346). In her otherwise very insightful reading of this letter, Beard provides no
comment on the allusion to Statius’ manumission (2002: 132-4).
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Wilcox (2012: 55).
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Cicero on Quintus’ governorship: Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.1. and 1.2. Cicero on Quintus’ duties to his wife: Ad
Atticum, 11.8.2 = Shackleton Bailey 219.2. Cicero on Quintus’ duties to his son: Ad Fratrem Quintum, 2.4.2.
Intiguingly, Plutarch records that it was one of Quintus’ freedmen, with the rather eyeraising name of “Philologus,”
who betrayed Cicero to Athony (Life of Cicero, 48.1). Cf. Philogonus, a freedman of Quintus, whom Cicero
mentions in Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.3.4.
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had attacked years before.517 Quintus’ elaboration of Cicero’s joy about Tiro includes a
comparison of the two slaves. Quintus explains that while both slaves have similar fidelitas and
frugalitas, only Tiro has more skills at letters and the valuable virtue of humanitas:
si enim mihi Statii fidelitas et frugalitas est tantae voluptati, quanti esse in isto haec eadem
bona debent additis litteris et sermonibus et humanitate, quae sunt iis ipsis commodis potiora!
For if Statius’ loyalty and temperance have given me such pleasure, for you there must be
something similar, since in that man there are those same goods, as well as greater qualities:
his learnedness, style and humanity!
Quintus, in Cicero, Ad Familiares, 16.16.2 = Shackleton Bailey 44.2, translation my own.

By describing Statius has having the virtues of fidelitas and frugalitas, Quintus alludes to, and
partially refutes, Cicero’s attacks on Statius years earlier. For Cicero had then charged that
Statius reached beyond his station as a freedman, a charge which implied that Statius had neither
sufficient modesty about his own limited authority, nor sufficient loyalty to Quintus.518 By
asserting that Statius and Tiro are similarly loyal and temperate, Quintus implies that because
Cicero’s decision to manumit Tiro is worthy of much praise, so too was Quintus’ decision to
manumit Statius. For Quintus’ remark is also a reminder that Quintus has preceded Cicero,
thereby establishing himself as having the authority of a successful patron of a loyal freedman, a
patron worthy to judge Cicero’s manumission of Tiro. Quintus’ congratulation is also an attempt
to one up his elder brother.
This cynical reading of Quintus’ words of congratulations makes sense in the context of
the brothers’ relationship. For the Ciceros’ fraternity was hardly one of easy intimacy and
affection. In December of 48, Quintus began denouncing Cicero to Julius Caesar. The direct
cause of this betrayal appears to have been Cicero’s decision to lend money to Pompey rather
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Wilcox notes how Cicero engages in an eristic consolation with Servius (2012: 51-56).
For Cicero’s invective against Statius, see Section 4b above.
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than his brother.519 Doubting that this breakdown had only one cause, Shackleton Bailey
highlights a prolonged tiff between Quintus and Atticus in 61 as precedent to the nadir of
Quintus and Cicero’s relationship in 47, as well as Cicero’s attacks against Statius.520 While
Cicero often praised his brother, their relationship was not a source of consolation and strength
like his friendship with Atticus.521 Cicero’s various successes in the public sphere would have
made his freshman status as the patron—not just of any slave, but of slave who is learned and
trusted—a tempting tool for Quintus to use and leverage his own seniority as a patron of valued
freedman.522
Since Quintus was a human being, and therefore a complex and contradictory creature, in
this letter, he is also expressing genuine feelings of happiness about Tiro’s new freedom. Quintus
was persistently concerned about Tiro’s health and success, admired Tiro’s talents, and valued
his company.523 But Quintus feels all of these emotions from the standpoint of a slave-owner,
and as a slave-owner, Quintus’ happiness about Tiro’s freedom is channeled through his
relationship with Tiro’s owner. Hence why Quintus only briefly mentions Tiro’s own description
of the manumission and instead engages Cicero. Quintus had paid the costs of the subjection of
slave-owners, and he now works to maintain the resulting status through his competition with
Cicero. This subjection explains not only Quintus’ concerns in this letter to Cicero, but also the
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Ad Atticum, 11.5.4, 11.8.2 and 11.10.1 = Shackleton Bailey 216, 219 and 221. Cf. Shackleton Bailey (1971: 179181).
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1971: 183-4. Shackleton Bailey’s account makes the brothers appear quite independent of each other. Bannon’s
portrait of their relationship is a good counterpoint, highlighting how involved they were in each others’ finances,
politics, and childrearing. For whatever reason, Bannon excludes two of Quintus’ letters to Tiro as part of her
account (1997: 101-16).
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Shackleton Bailey harshly notes while Cicero wrote to Atticus and Brutus after the death of Tullia, he did not
write to Quintus (1971: 184). Bannon emphasizes the role of the civil war in the deterioration of their relationship
(1997: 116).
522
Cicero lectured Quintus both on his marriage (Ad Atticum, 1.5.2 = Shackleton Bailey 1.2) and on his
gubernatorial duties, the latter in the form of a public letter (Ad Fratrem Quintum, 1.1 = 1.1).
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Quintus’ two letters to Tiro are full of praise for the freedman’s abilities and desire for his help (Ad Familiaries,
16.26 = Shackleton Bailey 351 and 16.27 = 352). Cicero reveals that Quintus specifically asks for Tiro to write to
him (Ad Fratem Quintum, 3.1.10).
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language and ideas in his letters to Tiro. In these letters, he uses the language and images of
slavery to command and belittle Tiro while simultaneously praising him.524 Furthermore, despite
Quintus’ praises and genuine affection, likely Quintus did not see Tiro as unique. Cicero’s
description of Atticus’ scribe Alexis—who was likely similarly enslaved and then manumitted—
includes Alexis performing similar duties as Tiro’s, as well as an explicit comparison between
the two men.525 If, as a slave-owner, Cicero saw Tiro as a slave and compatible with other slaves,
why would Quintus look at Tiro in a more intimate or humanizing fashion?

6. Conclusion
In Chapter 2, I argued that the Romans understood the state as having interests in
manumission distinct from those of slave-owners. In this chapter, I laid out groundwork for how
manumission was connected to the subjection of slave-owners. Mastery of the nuances of
manumission were necessary for slave-owners, both to avoid censure and to be able to compete
against other slave-owners. Because of this importance, the Romans reflected on how
manumission connected to Rome’s power. Rome’s secondarity to Greece complicated this selfreflection, as the Romans adapted Greek interest in and explanations of Roman manumission.
Returning to Butler’s thoughts on subjection, Hegel’s insistence that the lord sees the
bondsman as an extension of his body explains why when Roman slave-owners reflected on
manumission, they focused on slave-owners and what manumission meant to them. Cicero was
concerned about what Statius’ manumission meant for Quintus. Upon learning of Tiro’s
manumission, Quintus imagined and empathized with, Cicero’s joy. If the comedies are any
guide, then these fraternal concerns were hardly unique: Plautus and Terence both depict
manumission as the result and object of familial feeling and machination. And, indeed,
524

Beard explores how the language of slavery shapes Tiro’s relationship with the brothers Cicero (2002: 133-40).
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manumission meant quite a bit to slave-owners, since the proper performance of manumission
was necessary, not just because there were legal and non-state penalties for failure to obey
certain norms, but also because manumission was a topic over which slave-owners rivaled each
other as part their endless competitions for dominance.
Roman slave-owners’ self-reflection failed to find the truth of manumission because
instead of finding slaves, they instead only found themselves. Such misrecognition is at the heart
of Patterson’s identification of slavery as social death. But as I hope this chapter shows, rather
than being isolated or shunned, slaves were intimately bound in the social fabric of Rome.
Instead, I read the slave-owners’ failure of self-reflection as part of how they render slave life
unlivable. This failure explains why even after Tiro’s manumission, the man whom he praised
for numerous virtues, Quintus write to Tiro as a slave, using the virtual space of his epistles to
evoke violent fantasies of corporeal punishment.526 Tiro was a freedman, but in Cicero’s familial
network, manumission could not erase the memory of Tiro as a slave. Manumission allowed Tiro
to advance, but he did not advance enough. Quintus still reveled in his superiority over the
former slave.
In the next chapter, I explore how the Romans’ attachment to such psychic superiority
limited the possibilities of freedmen and freedwomen to integrate into Rome. Specifically, I
connect Butler’s description of subjection to W.E.B. Du Bois’ description of psychological
wages, in order to articulate the psychic benefits that freeborn Romans received from racializing
slaves. Significantly, while such racialization was connected to the practice of slave-ownership, I
argue that both slave-owning and non-slave-owning Romans alike benefited and participated in
the racialization of slaves. As a result, the negotiation of manumission, race, and Romanness is
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separate from the subjection of slave-owners because it is an area in which freeborn Romans
who did not own slaves had much at stake.
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Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and
the psychological wages of freeborn Romans
1. Introduction
In order to be free, freedmen and freedwomen required that all Romans, even those who
did not own slaves, recognize their manumissions. As a result, non-slave-owning Romans
mattered for the practice of Roman manumission. This recognition from freeborn Romans did
not come easily. Classicist Henrik Mouritsen argues that while the Romans were quite capable of
conceiving of slavery as a temporary condition, nonetheless Roman society attached a stigma to
enslavement that persisted after manumission. Mouritsen calls this stigma macula servitutis, the
stain of slavery, a term that he takes from the Roman jurist Modestinus. Mouritsen applies the
term to freedmen throughout Roman history as part of his synchronic account of Roman
freedmen.527 However, this macula servitutis was not simply an issue of law, but as Mouritsen
shows, reflected the barriers and antagonism that former slaves faced in society generally. In this
chapter, I ask how manumission mattered to Romans who did not own slaves. More specifically,
I seek to answer how macula servitutis functioned in the relationship between Romans who did
own slaves and those who did not and how the relationship between these two groups of Romans
shaped the practice and experience of manumission.
In Section 2, I argue that the stigma of the macula servitutis strengthened the bond among
freeborn Romans, a bond particularly important to slave-owners as it prevented possible
solidarity between slaves and poor Romans. The macula servitutis was a combination of methods
and tools that the Romans used to recognize and mark slaves. That is, it was a circular system:
the Romans whipped slaves because slaves were the kind of people deserving of being whipped,
527

Digest, 40.11.5 and Codex Iustini, 7.16.9, 10.32.2. Mouritsen (2011a: 12-13).
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and once the slaves had the scars, they were marked as bodies worthy of whipping. This system
of punishment and differentiation has important connections to Butler’s description of
subjection. Through the macula servitutis, freeborn Romans were able to differentiate
themselves from the ambiguous servile body. Punishment, most prominently whipping and
crucifixion, was a tool for the construction of the macula servitutis. This differentiation was
important to freeborn Romans because they collected a psychological wage from their
superiority over freedpeople and therefore needed to distinguish themselves from freedpeople. I
take the term psychological wage from sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois, who used the term to
describe the benefits reaped by white workers at the expense of Black workers.528 The historian
David Roediger has elaborated upon the implications of Du Bois’ term for the study of
whiteness. Indeed, Roediger’s influence over Du Bois’ term has been so successful that Paul C.
Taylor attributes to Du Bois the term “psychic wage,” rather than “psychological wage.”529 For
Roediger, Du Bois’ psychological wage has important connections to the psychoanalytical work
of Frantz Fanon and Joel Kovel.530 Given this history, there are racial undertones to using the
term “psychological wage,” undertones that are useful for my larger argument. For I argue that
racialization was another tool that the Romans used to construct macula servitutis and that this
racialization was connected to the psychological wage that freeborn Romans collected.
Furthermore, Du Bois’ term has important parallels and intersections with Butler’s work on the
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psychic life of power, as both thinkers are interested in the tracing the trajectory of power
through material, social, and psychological worlds.531
In Section 3, I demonstrate that the comedians conceived of two types of enslaved
characters. The first type are enslaved freeborn people. The comedians describe these characters
as being inherently worthy of freedom. The second type of enslaved characters are slaves, whom
the comedians describe as having to act a certain way in order to be worthy of freedom. The
distinction between these groups is not incidental, but rather fundamental to the progression of
the comedic plot. The recognition of the true status of enslaved citizens saves them from sex
work and reunites them with lost families, while slaves had to prove their loyalty to their owners
in order to be worthy of manumission. That the comedians also conceived of enslaved citizens
differently from slaves is also evident in their vocabulary: while both enslaved citizens and
slaves yearn for libertas, only slaves look for and work for manumissio. I argue that the
playwrights’ production of this fundamental difference between enslaved citizens and slaves—a
difference in which freeborn citizens have inherent value while slaves do not—is one form of the
psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans, regardless of whether or not they owned slaves.
For the Roman plays reiterated that freeborn citizens, unlike slaves, are inherently worthy of
freedom.
The performances of comedies contain clues to how the Romans struggled with
constructing a discreet servile body that they could use in opposition to the body of the freeborn.
Manumission not only complicates this distinction between slave and free, but also threatens to
undermine the psychological wages paid to the freeborn. I argue that the comedians’ creation of
a strict difference between two types of enslaved characters occurred in conjunction with visual
markers of servility. While the particular time and place greatly influences the performance of a
531
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particular play, the ubiquity of New Comedy means that writers and artists from other periods
and places provide evidence that ought to be read alongside the works of Plautus and Terence in
order to reconstruct the visual aspect of these performances for Republican audiences. That the
Romans were aware of a lack of a persistent visual distinction between slave and free in
everyday life is most evident in Seneca’s famous anecdote about the Senate’s debate on marking
slaves. Seneca reports that one senator proposed requiring all slaves wear a white ribbon to
indicate that they were slaves. He withdrew this proposal after another senator pointed out that
such a plan would allow slaves to know their true numbers.532 Similarly, in her review of the
slave characters in the figurines, masks, wall paintings, and other visual arts depicting New
Comedy, Kelly Wrenhaven notes that while slaves are closely associated with the grotesque, so
too were other groups, such as barbarians and the poor.533 The servile body in the Roman
imagination was ambiguous, part of a continuum of peoples who were distinct from the bodies of
proper Romans. Nonetheless, as Pollux’s testimony shows, ancient audiences expected that they
would be able to read the bodies of slave characters on the stage as servile. Since the bodies of
slaves characters were distinctly servile, onstage performances of manumission did not challenge
the superiority of the freeborn over slaves and former slaves. Section 4 includes a case study on
red hair and how the comedians used visual aspect of masks to mark certain characters as slaves.
In Section 5, I analyze Livy’s description of the volones as a reflection and production of
the psychological wages paid to Romans who did not own slaves. The volones were a group of
slaves whom the state recruited to fight against Hannibal. As a reward for their fighting, Livy
writes that they earned their freedom. Livy’s description of the volones and the painting
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depicting their victory at Beneventum in 214 point to how Roman memory and memorialization
intersected with the macula servitutis. Livy’s account of the volones’ memorialization also
intersects with the Romans’ memory of the Gracchi, since the commander who lead and freed
the volones was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the great-uncle of the Tiberius who died while
plebeian tribune in 133. Notably, although Livy records that the volones earned their freedom, he
also insists that the slaves were cowardly and inept fighters. I place this cowardice in the context
of Rome’s citizen army, and argue that this assertion the slave soldiers could not be brave was
another psychological wage to the Roman freeborn, a way for the Romans to claim the triumph
of the volones’ victory without giving them any credit. I clarify that Livy understands the volones
to be fighting and living with a different relationship to freedom through a juxtaposition to his
description of the cowardice and enslavement of Roman soldiers. While Livy describes the
fighting ability of the volones as inherently suspect, he frames the cowardice and ineptitude of
freeborn Roman soldiers as exceptional. This exceptionality of cowardice is important to Livy,
as it justifies the Roman state’s reluctance to ransom prisoners of war, since cowardly soldiers
have questionable status as Roman citizens. Nonetheless, when Livy does describe the freeing of
Roman soldiers, he does not describe them as going through manumission, even though they use
clothing closely associated with manumission. Notably, even though these men appear visually
similar to new freedmen, Livy leads his readers to interpret these ambiguously servile bodies as
indicative of the restoration of freedom to those worthy of it, rather than the achievement of
freedom through manumission.

2. The servile body and psychological wages in Rome
I use Mouritsen’s thoughts on punishment as groundwork for my own analysis of how
race intersected with the Roman practice of slavery and manumission. Mouritsen’s definition of
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macula servitutis details how this stigma related to the Romans’ idea that slaves’ bodies were
ambiguous and hard to distinguish visually from the bodies of Romans. Mouritsen argues that
punishment shaped the Romans’ expectations of the servile body, both in the material world and
in their collective imagination. That is, scars of punishment were clues that Romans read on a
body in order to designate a person as a slave. However, these scars were only clues, not
definitive markers, because the body of the slave existed in the Roman imagination on the
continuum of the ambiguous servile body. This continuum recalls Butler and Foucault’s
comments on how power is always grounded in and constitutive of the body. Because these scars
were permanent, Mouritsen posits punishment as a way in which the stigma of slavery continued
into the lives of freedmen. Turning to the sociologists Omi and Winant, I use the term
racialization to describe how the Romans read the servile body on the comedic stage through the
lens of race. Like the scars of punishment, race was not a definitive marker of slavery. However,
it was a visual clue that a particular person could be a slave. In the Roman imagination, both
punishment and race were visual clues that the body of a particular person was on the continuum
of the servile body. Both signs of punishment and race were visual markers that the Romans
could use to separate the freeborn from slaves.
I argue that the Romans used these visual markers of slave’s bodies as part of the
psychological wages to freeborn Romans. In order to foster a superiority of freeborn Romans
over slaves and former slaves, the Romans had to distinguish between the former slaves and
freeborn Romans. Du Bois coined the term psychological wages to describe how racism
undermined possible alliances among American workers. I argue that the phrase psychological
wage illuminates a similar relationship between Roman slave-owners and freeborn Romans who
did not own slaves. In short, this psychological wage united Roman slave-owners with non-
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slave-owners in their superiority over slaves, even though Romans who did not own slaves did
not reap the material benefits of slavery that slave-owners did. I use the phrase psychological
wage to describe the benefits that freeborn Romans reaped from the representation of freeborn
Romans and the degradation of slaves in both Roman comedy and historiography.

a. Macula servitutis and the ambiguous servile body
Although the servile body in antiquity was ambiguous, nonetheless the ancients created
the servile body in opposition to the citizen body. In the Roman imagination, the corporeal
division between the slave and free was fundamental, and they relied on evidence of slaves’
bodies and minds in order to identify slaves as servile. These marks were neither temporary nor
coterminous with enslavement and therefore continued to mark freedwomen and freedmen as
former slaves after manumission, what Mouritsen names macula servitutis. Importantly,
freedmen and freedwomen suffered from this stigma despite often being visually very similar to
Roman citizens. I review Mouritsen’s description of how the punishment of slave’s bodies was
vital to the differentiation between the free and the slave as a prelude to my own argument that
racialization was another tool for the construction of macula servitutis.
The ambiguity of the visual boundary between slaves and citizens caused problems for
the Romans, as it meant that the boundary was porous. In the Introduction above, I noted the
anecdote from Seneca about the Senate’s fear of inadvertently unifying slaves by requiring them
to wear white ribbons. Suetonius provides a similar story that points to the ambiguous
appearance of the slave’s body. In his de Rhetoribus, Suetonius writes that in the port of
Brundusium two men dressed up a slave boy as a Roman citizen in order to avoid paying import
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tariffs. Somehow their evasion was uncovered.534 Strangely, Suetonius reports that the courts
ruled that by dressing the boy as a citizen, the men had effectively manumitted him. Suetonius
frames this story as a historical example that was a topic for students of rhetoric, pointing to how
the Romans grappled with how important appearance and fashion were to marking the
ambiguous slave body as servile.535 That Suetonius believes that the courts ruled that the boy was
manumitted suggests that he thinks that the need to preserve the visual boundaries between
slaves and freeborn Romans was more important than identifying the true social status of the boy
in question.
Mouritsen argues that one way in which the Romans attempted to resolve the ambiguity
of the servile body was through punishment. First, slaves were vulnerable to the threats of certain
punishments that the Romans prohibited from using against citizens. These punishments
included whipping, torture, and crucifixion.536 Second, punishment physically and visually
marked slaves as servile. The scars of punishment were therefore visual clues that the Romans
used to identify men and women as either slaves or former slaves.537 In other words, the Romans
read scars of punishment as possible evidence that a person had been a slave, even if now they
are free. Importantly, Mouritsen does not argue that scars were synonymous with the servile
body. The story of Coriolanus’ scars indicates that the Romans were quite capable of reading
scars as evidence of military heroism.538 Nonetheless, scars and other vestiges of punishment are
important to Mouritsen’s description of Roman slavery, since he posits that the continuous

“Venalici cum Brundusi gregem venalium e navi educerent, formoso et pretioso puero, quod portitores
verebantur, bullam et praetextam togam imposuerunt; facile fallaciam celarunt. Romarn venitur, res cognita est,
petitur puer, quod domini voluntate fuerit liber, in libertatem.” De rhetoribus, 1.
535
“Veteres controversiae aut ex historiis trahebantur, sicut sane nonnullae usque adhuc, aut ex veritate ac re, si
qua forte recens accidisset; itaque locorum etiam appellationibus additis proponi solebant.” De rhetoribus, 1.
536
2011: 25-27. See also Hengel (1977: 51-62) and Fitzgerald (2000: 32-41).
537
2011: 27-28.
538
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 2.23.4. Plutarch, Life of Coriolanus, 15.1. Cf. also Marcus Sergius (Livy, 7.104-5, 28).
534
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practice of enslavement must include the cultivation of radical differences between the enslaved
and the free.539 Mouritsen points out that the Romans, while often explicitly accepting the
contingent nature of enslavement, simultaneously conceptualized and acted upon the
conceptualizations of slaves having distinctly different minds and bodies from Roman citizens.
The scars of punishment provided visual clues that the division between slave and free was
warranted. In Section 4, I argue that the visual motifs of the servile body provided the Roman
audience with visual proof that the on-stage manumissions were no real threat to the superiority
of freeborn Romans over slaves. Here, I argue that the Roman theater racialized the hair of
servile bodies in order to mark slaves as distinct from citizens.

b. Macula servitutis and racialization
I propose an addition to Mouritsen’s thesis on macula servitutis and the servile body:
when reading a body, the Romans similarly paid attention to race for evidence that a person was
servile. In his conclusion to his history of freedmen in the Roman Empire, Duff writes that
The profuse intermixture of race, continuing without interruption from 200 BC far into the
history of the Empire, produced a type utterly different from that which characterized the
heroes of the early Republic. Instead of the hardy and patriotic Roman with his proud
indifference to pecuniary gain, we find too often under the Empire an idle pleasure-loving
cosmopolitan whose patriotism goes no further than applying for the dole and swelling the
crowds in the amphitheater.540

Duff utilized theories that posit race is a stable and biological human attribute that has the power
to cause historical processes, even ones as complex as the fall of the Roman Empire. Such
theories are not just racist in the extreme, but unscientific at their core. I posit race as something
that needs to be explained within the context of ancient Rome. That is, I reject race as a
biological category and, instead, begin with the idea that race is constructed, which is to say, it is
contingent on material and social factors. In doing so, I follow sociologists Omi and Winant,
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2011: 17.
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from whose work I take the terms race and racialization. While in Duff’s work, Roman
manumission resulted in the assimilation of races ontologically distinct from the Roman people, I
instead argue that racialization of slaves was one strategy, among others, that freeborn Romans
used in order to maintain their hierarchy over slaves and former slaves.541 In other words,
racialization was only one of the tools, along with punishment, that the Romans used to make an
alliance between slave-owners and non-slave-owners against slaves.
Classicist Denise McCoskey argues that to ignore race entirely in antiquity is to promote
a range of mistaken impressions, including that the Greeks and Romans themselves ignored race
entirely.542 While emphasizing that the ancients did not think about race in the same way that
moderns do, McCoskey, nonetheless, argues that race is a meaningful lens through which to
view the ancient world, including how the Greeks and Romans thought about people from
outside their own societies. McCoskey herself highlights the ideas and vocabulary of Omi and
Winant as a possible starting point for a meaningful and productive exploration of race in
antiquity.543 For while Omi and Winant are emphatic that their ideas are intended only for the
modern world, nonetheless their vocabulary has the potential for framing the Greeks and
Romans’ discussion of race in their own historical context, including the context of ancient
slavery and manumission.544 However, the idea that Roman manumission intersected with the
Roman practice of race is not new: Patterson had persuasively argued in 1982 that what he
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Cf. Duff on the consequences of Roman manumission: “How different would Roman society have appeared if
masters had only given freedom in gratitude for good service and only sold it those who had increased their
peculium by honest means! The influx of Oriental blood would not have been so overwhelming, and further, the
slaves freed in such circumstances would on the whole been men of good character, who had loyally served their
masters and who might be expected to prove good citizens…The vast throngs of idle and worthless freedmen that
left their curse upon Rome would never have issued from the bonds of servitude. The indigenous stock would not
have been ousted from its predominance….” (1928: 209).
542
McCoskey (2012: 9). Cf. Gruen (2013a and 2013b).
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termed racial antipathy shaped how and why certain Roman slaves achieved manumission.545 As
a result, to ignore the question of the intersection of race and slavery in ancient Rome is to ignore
Patterson.
Omi and Winant’s definition of race combines a concern about the social and the
experiential, without ignoring the corporeal. For Omi and Winant, because an important aspect
of race is the body, race is therefore visual:546
Race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to
different types of human bodies. Although the concept of race invokes seemingly biologically
based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human
features for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical
process….547

This definition of race is broader compared to that of Hannaford. In contrast to Omi and
Winant’s emphasis on the body, Hannaford instead insists that race is an idea about lineage,
specifically how lineage explains physical differences among various peoples. Through this
narrower definition, Hannaford proclaims that neither the Greeks nor the Romans ever developed
the idea of race.548 However, Dench’s work on the Romans and Isaac’s work on ancient racism
demonstrate both that the Romans took their own lineage seriously and they were quite capable
of identifying and degrading others based solely on their physical appearance.549
Omi and Winant build upon their definition of race with the term racialization.
Racialization is the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified
relationship, social practice or group. Racialization occurs in large-scale and small-scale
ways, macro- and micro-socially.550
545

Patterson (1982: 177-8). More specifically, Patterson argues that because beauty and sexuality played an
important role in how slaves were able to win approval and therefore manumission, the Romans’ racist thoughts on
beauty influenced which slaves were able to achieve manumission.
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Omi and Winant on the visual aspect of race: “…there is a crucial and non-reducible visual dimension to the
definition and understanding of racial categories. Bodies are visually read and narrated in ways that draw upon an
ensemble of symbolic meanings and associations.” (2015: 111).
547
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For the importance of lineage to Greek and Roman identity, see Dench (2005: 222-297). Isaac carefully
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I argue that the Romans racialized slavery only to the following extent: they understood various
racial markers, including such things as hair color and skin color, as indicative that this person’s
body was part of the ambiguous servile body, that is, a body in opposition to the ideal citizen
body. A person’s race was not proof that they were a slave, but it did indicate that they could be
a slave. Roman comedians took advantage of this racialization in their performances. As I
demonstrate in Section 4, in the context of the masks of New Comedy, red hair was closely
associated with slaves. As a result, slaves in Roman New Comedy remained visibly slaves even
after they achieve manumission. I read the intersection of manumission and race as indicative of
how manumission and race intersected in Roman society writ large. That is, the racialization of
slaves mattered to the relationship between slaves and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves.
For because slavery was racialized, slaves whom the Romans considered racially distinct from
themselves remained visually marked even after their manumission. For such slaves,
racialization was another form of macula servitutis. For freeborn Romans, such racialization
provided a psychological wage through the establishment of their superiority over Romans who
gained citizenship and freedom through manumission, rather than through birth.

c. Psychological wages and Du Bois
I approach the relationship between slaves and freeborn Romans who did not own slaves
by asking why there were so few alliances between freeborn Romans and slaves against slaveowners. In other words, I ask why and how did freeborn Romans helped maintain the superiority
of slave-owners over slaves. To answer this question, I turn to Du Bois, who asked a similar
question about the relationship between white workers and Black workers during American
Reconstruction.
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Du Bois posits that a certain psychological wage was fundamental to the relationship
among American capitalists, white workers and Black workers. Specifically, Du Bois argues that
this psychological wage provided white workers with just enough compensation that they allied
with capitalists rather than with Black workers. This psychological wage depended as much upon
the degradation of Black workers as the preferential treatment of white workers. In other words,
this psychological wage was the psychic twin to the material differences between the lives of
Black workers and the lives of white workers.
It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low
wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given
public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They were admitted freely
with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools. The
police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent on their votes, treated them with
such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this
had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment
and the deference shown them. White schoolhouses were best in the community, and
conspicuously placed, and they cost anywhere from twice to ten times as much per capita as
the colored schools. The newspapers specialized on news that flattered the poor whites and
almost ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule.
On the other hand, in the same way, the Negro was subject to public insult; was afraid
of mobs; was liable to the jibes of children and the unreasoning fears of white women; and was
compelled almost continuously to submit to various badges of inferiority. The result of this
was that the wages of both classes could be kept low, the white fearing to be supplanted by
Negro labor, the Negroes always being threatened by the substitution of white labor. 551

I cite Du Bois’ passage in full to make clear that Du Bois did not understand this wage as the
result of any particular justification that white workers gave to themselves for why they were
superior. Instead, Du Bois’ list of the various social, judicial, and economic practices that
cultivated this psychological wage make clear that he sees it as the result of material
circumstances and diverse social practices. Du Bois also concludes this passage by pointing out
how this arrangement benefited different whites in different ways: while workers reaped the
benefit of a sense of superiority through the degradation of Blacks, white capitalists reaped
profits from low wages of all workers. Furthermore, just as white capitalists were invested in the
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defense of this system in order to protect their material wages, so too were white workers
invested in the defense of this system in order to protect their psychological wages.
I argue that the macula servitutis was a psychological wage to freeborn Romans, thereby
preserving Roman hierarchy by incentivizing freeborn Romans to ally with slave-owners rather
than slaves. For while many Romans owned slaves, there were many free Romans who did not,
therefore raising the possibility that slaves could ally with freeborn Romans against the wealthy.
Roman writers such as Livy and Sallust reveal their fear of this possibility in their descriptions of
rebel leaders recruiting slaves to their cause.552 Importantly, this psychological wage was not
simply the result of the slave-owners imposing a false consciousness on other Romans: because
both the servile body and servility itself existed on a continuum, non-slave-owning freeborn
Romans were following their own interests in distinguishing themselves from slaves and former
slaves.553 Furthermore, to follow Du Bois closely, I emphasize that this psychological wage was
only a psychic twin to the material differences in the lives of slaves and freeborn Romans.
Consequently, just as how white workers were invested in protecting the material advantages that
they had over Black workers, so too were freeborn Romans invested in protecting the material
advantages that they had over slaves. In the rest of this chapter, I argue that both Roman
comedies and histories preserve strategies that freeborn Romans used to distinguish themselves
form slaves and former slaves. Such differentiation was necessary in order to create the
conditions that they might collect their psychological wage.

3. Manumission, language, and the Roman stage
In Roman comedy, the enslavement of children threatens the stability and continuity of
freeborn families, but the comedians conclude the plays by reuniting these families, thereby
552
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assuring the freeborn families in their audiences of their importance. Pirates, runaway slaves, and
anonymous figures at markets capture and enslave children—usually girls—who remain lost
during their adolescence and appear as enslaved characters in the play. The plays conclude with
the liberation of this enslaved character through the recognition of the true status of their birth. I
use the word “liberate” purposefully because the playwrights never describe these acts as
examples of manumission. Possibly, the playwrights expected their audiences to imagine these
actions as vindications of free status.554 Instead, the playwrights only use variations of the
adjective liber, the noun libertas, and verb libero to describe what happens to these men and
women. For the sake of convenience, I call this cluster of words the language of liberation. The
playwrights also use the language of liberation to describe the manumission of servi callidi,
meretrices, and even figures such as the lorarii. But Plautus and Terence only use variations of
the noun manumissio and verbal phrase manu emitto to describe the freeing of slave characters
such as servi callidi and meretrices. Also for the sake of convenience, I call this cluster of words
the language of manumission. In other words, the playwrights describe both groups as longing
for liberty, and so both groups use the language of liberation to describe that goal. But characters
who are freeborn simply require the proper recognition of their status, and so the comedians only
describe their freedom with the language of liberation. In contrast, those who are “true” slaves
can only achieve liberation through manumission, and so the comedians describe their freedom
through both the language of manumission and the language of liberation.
I argue that this distinction is more than a linguistic curiosity, that it reflects how the
Romans thought about the freeborn and slaves on the stage as having radically different
relationships to freedom because of their birth. Significantly, this distinction implies that
freeborn men and women did not go through manumission. Furthermore, this linguistic
554
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distinction between liberation for freeborn people and manumission for slaves compliments
important plot distinctions between these two groups of characters. For a common plot point in
Roman comedy is that the recognition of her status as freeborn saves a woman just prior to her
needing to partake in sex work. In other words, the comedians present these women as being
enslaved, but lacking the proper recognition of their freedom. In contrast, slaves have to earn
their freedom, of which manumission is a part. The implication is that these slaves can only
become free if they act a certain way.
By presenting freeborn families as units capable of withstanding the vicissitudes of
fortune, including the threat of enslavement, the plays of Plautus and Terence pay a
psychological wage to the freeborn, non-slave-owning Romans in their audiences: the
playwrights assure them that their status as freeborn is important enough that they simply have to
exist in order to deserve freedom. In contrast, slaves can only gain their freedom by successfully
navigating the demands of their owners and other Romans.

a. The language of liberation and freeing the freeborn on the Roman stage
Rather than using the language of manumission to describe freedom for enslaved,
freeborn people, Plautus and Terence use the language of liberation to describe how proper
recognition attests to the true status of freeborn men and women. At the same time these
comedians use this language of liberation, they also take great care to ensure that by the end of
play all the freeborn who were enslaved are freed. Notably, these enslaved, freeborn people do
not need act a certain way to be worthy of freedom. Because in the world of the comedies
everyone who is born in a freeborn family is worthy of freedom, these enslaved, freeborn people
simply require the proper recognition.555 The comedians were aware of the importance of this
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recognition and used it as a plot point that further emphasizes the distance not only between
enslaved, freeborn people and slaves but also the distance between men and women. For the
comedians frequently use the plot line that the act of recognizing that a woman is freeborn saves
her from performing sex work.
In the comedic world of Plautus and Terence’s plays, pirates, runaway slaves, and
strangers often abduct boys and girls, but the boys encounter significantly less danger than the
girls. Indeed, none of Terence’s characters who were abducted during childhood are boys. Out of
his hundreds of characters, Plautus only writes of three freeborn men as having been abducted
when they were children.556 Two of these men who were taken as children are Agorastocles of
the Poenulus and the Syracusan Menaechmus of the Menaechmi. Freeborn families adopted both
these characters as sons, in turn allowing them to grow up to become respected and prosperous.
In other words, at the beginning of the plays, neither Menaechmus nor Agorastocles required
saving from enslavement as they are already free citizens.
In contrast, Tyndarus of the Captivi most certainly requires saving, since he begins the
play both as a slave and as a prisoner of war. As the title suggests, that play is particularly
focused on the issue of captivity. Because of this emphasis, Tyndarus is not a good example of
either a slave or a captured, freeborn man, as Plautus creates an exceptional history for this
character in order to blur the distinction between the freeborn and the slave. Tyndarus was born
to a freeborn family, but their untrustworthy slave Stalagmus stole him and sold him into slavery.
The senex Hegio bought him as a companion for his son Philocrates, and as a result, Tyndarus
received an education worthy of a citizen. Tyndarus’ appearance and actions on the play also
defy the expectations that surround comedic slaves: because he is of a similar age to Philocrates,
the adulescens who is his owner, Tyndarus is therefore younger than other slaves, whose bearded
556

Because I emphasize capture during their youths, I exclude the capture of Philocrates in the Captivi.

216

Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans

masks on stage marked them as older men.557 Also, while slave-owners in Roman comedy
frequently threaten slaves with beatings and torture, Tyndarus actually experiences torture.
Unfortunately for Tyndarus, the other characters only fully recognize that he is a citizen after he
suffers torture.558 But despite Tyndarus’ exceptional history and acts, during the Captivi,
Tyndarus’ ultimate freedom nonetheless falls into a larger pattern about the difference between
freeborn people and slaves: Plautus only describes Tyndarus’ freedom using the language of
liberation, rather than manumission.559 Tyndarus, by virtue of being freeborn, does not need
manumission.
Likewise, Plautus and Terence use the language of liberation to discuss the freedom of
eleven women characters who had been abducted in childhood. Appendix A contains all the
instances in which characters refer to these women’s freedom. In all these examples, the
characters use the language of liberation rather than the language of manumission to describe the
freeing of these women. I argue that the playwrights’ use only the language of liberation to
describe the freeing of these women is indicative that the Romans saw these women as
inherently worthy of freedom.
That the Romans saw these women as automatically deserving freedom is further
reiterated through the way that Plautus Terence use this secret background as a plot point. In all
eleven examples, the recognition of these women’s true status removes them from circumstances
in which they are practicing, or might be forced to practice in the near future, some sort of sex
work. In other words, these women’s birth status provides them with a type of protection that
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saves from a life of sex work.560 The Persa provides the best examples of the kind of protection
that being a freeborn woman provides. For in this play, Plautus offers up a variation of the
recognition plot: a servus callidus pretends that an anonymous freeborn woman is a slave and
sells her to a pimp.561 After the sale is completed, the clever slave arranges the revelation of the
woman’s true background, resulting in her freedom, because her ontological status as freeborn
overrides the pimp’s claim to her as a slave.562 Unsurprisingly, there are variations on this plot
throughout Plautus and Terence’s plays. In Plautus’ Epidicus, Epidicus hires a freewoman to
pretend to be a slave in order to trick a solider into buying her.563 In the Poenulus, Collybiscus
pretends to want to buy a slave from the pimp, a ruse intended to gather proof that the pimp has
been purposefully hiding this woman from the adulescens Agorastocles.564 Likewise, in
Terence’s Heautontimorumenos, Syrus deceives Menedemus into thinking that Antiphila is an
enslaved, but rich, captive.565 Antiphila is, in fact, a freeborn woman.
That the comedians took such care to save freeborn women from sex work reiterates the
importance of the freeborn family as a unit. True, the comedians present women from a range of
legal and social statuses as prostitutes, including freeborn women.566 However, the comedians do
not describe freeborn prostitutes as active family members, but rather as having very weak or
non-existent family connections. This individualism marks such women as outside the purview
of a respectable family. In contrast, long lost daughters remained within the purview of families,
most especially the purview of their fathers. Such fathers were concerned about their daughters’
virginity, something that enslavement directly threatened since slaves have no right not to be
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raped by their owners. By avoiding the language of manumission, the comedians avoid implying
that these women’s enslavement was at times marked by rape.567 The language of liberation
freed these women from associations of rape.

b. The language of manumission and freeing slaves on the Roman stage
In contrast to the enslaved freeborn, slaves can only ever become free on stage
conditionally. That is, it is not enough for a slave to be, he or she must act a certain way in order
to be worthy of manumission. I include both men and women in this category, for while the
comedians are primarily concerned about the manumission of slave men, they also provide
detailed examples of how loyalty was connected to the manumission of slave women, most
especially meretrices. Fitzgerald, McCarthy, and Stewart have argued that slaves’ loyalty and the
performance of loyalty was essential to Roman manumission, most especially for Roman slaveowners.568 But the attendance of non-slave-owning Romans in the theatrical audience poses a
different question of loyalty and manumission: what does slave loyalty mean to a Roman who
does not, and likely never will, own a slave? I argue that by making loyalty a condition to
manumission, the Roman comedians implicitly reaffirm the distinction of slaves from freeborn
Romans. In other words, the mere act of going through manumission makes the slave bear the
macula servitutis. As a result, the comedians’ language of manumission ends up being both a
promise for the potential advancement of slaves, but also marks them as excluded from the
citizen families who stand at the center of the plays.
In Appendix B, I collect all the instances of language of manumission in Plautus and
Terrence’s complete plays, and I argue that, in each instance, the comedians use this language to
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I certainly do not imply that the comedians rejected depicting the rape of freeborn women. However, in the plays
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analysis of the use of rape for the most part applies to Roman New Comedy, Lape (2004) and (2010).
568
Fitzgerald (2000), McCarthy (2000), Stewart (2012).

219

Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans

describe freedom for a slave character, rather than an enslaved citizen. I read this distinction as
indicative that the Roman audiences associated manumission with the process of slaves
becoming worthy of freedom. In other words, the process of manumission made a slave free, but
was also a reminder of their servile past. This reminder was a benefit to freeborn Romans, who
used slaves’ experience of manumission as a way to exclude them from their own group.
In the Mostellaria, Plautus makes the manumission of a slave explicitly contingent upon
her loyalty to her owner. Furthermore, because this relationship is between lovers, Plautus
frames manumission as part of an erotic relationship. Prior to the beginning of the play, the
adulescens Philolaches has fallen in love with the meretrix Philomatium, who is a slave.
Philolaches then buys Philomatium and frees her, the cost of which causes the financial crisis
that motivates the play’s plot.569 In Act I, Philolaches spies on Philomatium in order to see how
she handles herself as freedwoman, in particular whether she proves herself loyal to him in a
long conversation with the old nurse Scapha. Although the nurse encourages Philomatium to
understand her relationship with Philolaches purely in utilitarian terms, Philomatium expresses
nothing but love for Philolaches.570 These declarations so please the young man that he exclaims
to himself and the audience:
PHILOL. Divi me faciant quod volunt, ni ob istam orationem te liberasso denuo et ni Scapham
enicasso.
PHILOLACHES: May the gods do what they will if I don’t free you again because of that
speech and if I don’t destroy Scapha.
Plautus, Mostellaria, 222-3, translation my own.

569
570

20-24.
Scapha: 209-212. Philomatium professes her devotion: 239-40.
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By secretly observing how Philomatium uses her newfound freedom, Philolaches asserts that a
former slave, such as her, has to act in a certain manner in order to be worthy of being free.
Specifically, she must act loyally to her former owner, after he has declared his love for her.571
The comedians also demonstrate that loyalty was necessary for manumission, even if
loyalty itself was insufficient grounds for manumission. In all three of the manumissions that
occurred on stage, the slave in question had some lucky break that distinguishes him from other
slaves. In Terence’s Adelphoe, Syrus is loyal to the family, but a major cause for his
manumission is Demea’s resolve to become a generous person.572 In the two examples from
Plautus, the slaves in question had the luck to participate in reuniting a family. Messenio from
the Menaechmi helps reunite the two long-lost twins.573 Likewise, the eponymous Epidicus helps
reunite Periphanes with his lost daughter Telestis. The manner in which Epidicus asks for his
freedom from his owner is practically impudent, but Periphanes judges his actions as evidence of
Epidicus’ worth.574 Epidicus ends his play with his freedom.
The importance of a slave’s loyalty to an owner is evident from Gripus of Plautus’
Rudens. Gripus also has the luck to participate in the reunification of a family, but because he
lacks loyalty, he fails to convince his owner to grant him manumission. The slave of Daemones,
Gripus, is a man with outsized ambitions. In a soliloquy, Gripus explains that he not only wants
to be free, but also to become a king.575 That is, this slave is not content with equality, he nurses
a dream of dominating everyone, including his former owner. Gripus’ outsized dreams mean that
he is incapable of acting as a slave worthy of the freedom of a freedman. Upon finding a box on
571
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Gendered Humor in Plautus’ Mostellaria, at the Classical Association of the Mid West and South, Boulder CO,
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the beach, Gripus is eager to present his find to his owner, so that he might ask for his freedom.
When he does present the box to Daemones, Gripus’ greed overwhelms what little sense his has,
for he attempts to contradict the proof that the freeborn woman Palaestra provides to demonstrate
that the box belongs to her.576 Gripus’ bluster in this situation results in Daemones never taking
the slave’s request for manumission seriously, although, as Roberta Stewart points out, as a
crafty owner, Daemones does not thoroughly rule out the possibility of manumission either.
Gripus ends the play still enslaved, and given what the audience has learned of his relationship to
his owner, there is simply little chance that, in the world of the story, Daemones will ever
manumit Gripus.577
Because the comedians’ distinction between enslaved citizens and slaves works itself out
at both the level of language and of plot, I suggest that this distinction was important not only to
the comedians, but also to their audiences. More radically, I argue that this distinction was part
of the payment of psychological wages to freeborn Romans. Attending the theater, they saw
stories in which the playwrights took it as a given that freedom was essential to freeborn family
members.578 They listened to language in which the freedom of freeborn citizens was
distinguished from the manumission of slaves. In doing so, the comedies cultivated the
superiority of freeborn Romans over both slaves and former slaves, a superiority that depended
on the audience understanding that there was a root distinction between freeborn Romans and
slaves. In the next section, using red-haired masks as a case study, I show that the Romans
performed this distinction visually.

576

Rudens, 1410-11. Herodotus describes Cyrus as becoming king despite being raised a slave (cf. Herodotus
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4. Manumission, masks, and the Roman stage
I argue that the Romans’ ideas of the servile body undermined the egalitarian potential of
manumission on the Roman stage as part of the psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans.
Prior to analyzing how Roman manumission intersected with the Romans’ ideas on the servile
body the stage, I first gather evidence to integrate the evidence about masks from Greek New
Comedy into the reconstruction of how the Romans used masks in the production of Plautus’ and
Terence’s plays. These Greek sources, which span from the time of Menander to the late Roman
Empire, point to how Plautus and Terence’s own plays make reference to the physicality of the
characters’ masks in a way that suggests a correspondence between this later evidence for masks
and the Romans’ texts. For example, in Pseudolus, Harpax describes the titular servus callidus in
part by referencing his red hair, a description that corresponds to Pollux’s description of slave
masks.
Pollux’s catalogue of slave masks is evidence of how ancient audiences read comedic
slave masks in conversation with the masks of freeborn citizens. Eschewing an overly rigid and
inflexible structuralist account of these masks, I instead follow the work of Classicist C.W.
Marshall, who argues that the sophisticated performers in Rome used these masks as tools to
evoke particular associations amongst the audience. In short, the masks do not reveal everything
about a particular character, despite Pollux’s seeming enthusiasm to associate each mask with a
particular stock type. Pollux’s catalogue is, instead, important evidence that audience members
assumed that they could recognize a slave character by sight on the stage.
Although this visual recognition of slaves was not based on a single physical factor, a
survey of the predominance of red hair in the representation of slaves on the Roman stage is
suggestive of the overall trend in Roman expectations. Viewers such as Pollux recognized certain
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masks as slaves only through the juxtaposition to other masks, most importantly the masks of the
citizen family members. One way of distinguishing a slave mask from family members was
through red hair. But the comedians, being comedians, played with this distinction: some
freeborn family members also had red hair. While this detail complicates the representation of
slaves on the Roman stage, it does not undermine Plautus and Terence’s association of red hair
with slave’s bodies. However, the small number of examples of slave masks with red hair in the
remains of material culture suggest that hair color was only one visual strategy for identify
certain characters as slaves.
I argue that a slave’s visual distinction was necessary for the freeborn members of the
audience because this distinction was necessary for the maintenance of their superiority over
slaves and former slaves. In other words, that ancient audiences could recognize slaves and
former slaves by sight undermines the egalitarian potential of manumission in these comedies.
On the stage, freedmen and freedwomen remained visually distinct from freeborn peoples,
facilitating the freeborn Romans’ cultivation of superiority at the expense of former slaves.

a. Pollux and slave masks
Julius Pollux was a sophist whose reputation eventually earned him the chair of rhetoric
at Athens under the Emperor Commodus.579 He was the author of a work known as the
Onomasticon. Unfortunately, this book is itself lost; what survives of it today is the work of an
anonymous epitomizer.580 The epitomizer’s role in the creation of the surviving text complicates
ascribing all the details in the text to Pollux himself, since certain incongruities suggest that the
epitomizer intervened and rearranged parts of the list. The epitomizer seems to have preserved a
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Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, 20. Also, Lucian may be specifically targeting Pollux’s lexigraphical
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great deal of Pollux’s own language. For the sake of convenience, I refer to the author of this list
as Pollux.
The question of how Pollux assembled his list is connected to what kind of relationship
the masks have with New Comedy. Did Pollux copy the list from another author? Or did he write
his list after inspecting the masks of a nearby theater troop? Is the list meant to be a complete
representation of all the masks in New Comedy? Wiles suggest that he adopted a list from
another author but that the list was not exhaustive.581 If one believes that Pollux took his list from
an authoritative writer such as Aristophanes of Byzantium, it is easier to believe that this list was
intended to be exhaustive.582 Webster maintains that Pollux intended his list to be representative
of the entire range of masks in New Comedy, but is agnostic about the source. Webster also
maintains that the masks are intimately connected to the performance of the particular stock
characters that make up New Comedy.583 On the other hand, the surviving visual evidence of
comedic masks does not demonstrate that Pollux’s list was representative of the range of possible
comedic masks, in part because very few visual representations survive of slave masks with red
hair.584 Based on my own survey of the visual evidence, I am inclined to agree with Marshall,
Poe, and Wrenhaven that Pollux’s list is not an exhaustive catalogue of all the masks in New
Comedy.585 For Pollux’s list suggests a preponderance of red hair on comedic slave masks, even
though there are very few examples of masks with red hair in the evidence from material culture.
I read Pollux’s list, not as a guide to the attributes expected of the mask of a particular comedic
character, but rather as evidence for how ancient audience members put the physical attributes of
581
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these masks into conversation with each other and how these audiences understood racialization
in the context of on-stage manumissions.586
Although a Greek writing about Greek New Comedy, Pollux is a valuable source for the
reconstruction of Roman masks and how they operated in the performance of Roman comedy.
There is so little evidence that Plautus and Terence expected their actors to wear masks that for
many years Classicists argued that masks were foreign to Roman comedy. However, the
argument of continuity is perhaps the strongest reason to believe that the actors on the Roman
stage did indeed wear masks. The argument of continuity consists of two points: First, two of the
three types of performances that significantly influenced Roman comedy, Italian palliatia and
Greek New Comedy, used masks. Second, later Roman comedies used masks, and the Greeks
and Romans of the Imperial Period make numerous references in literature and visual art to
comedic masks. In short, because the comedic performances before and after Plautus and
Terence included the use of masks, it is reasonable to assume that these playwrights expected
their performers to wear masks similar to the ones of Greek New Comedy, that is, the types of
masks that Pollux describes.587 Therefore, because Pollux’s list is evidence for how a Greek
audience member reacted to the masks on stage, his list is also valuable for theorizing how
Roman audience members reacted to comedic masks.588
That Pollux understood slave masks were visually distinct from other comedic masks is
evident by how he organizes his list, as he groups slave masks as outside the two binaries of
gender and age. By assigning slaves a category distinct from the other four categories of masks,
586
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Pollux affirms how these slave characters that use these masks are the characters that are
excluded from the freeborn family, which consists of old men, young men, old women, and
young women. Pollux arranges his forty-four different masks in the following order:
Old men:
Young men:
Slaves:
Old women:
Young women:

Webster numbers 1 – 9
Webster numbers 10 – 20
Webster numbers 21 – 27
Webster numbers 28 – 30
Webster numbers 31– 44589

Significantly, the only masks in Pollux’s slave category are the masks of slave men.
At the beginning of each category Pollux announces the names of the different masks that
he reviews in that section. At the beginning of the section of the slave masks, he describes this
section as including the following:
Τὰ δὲ δούλων πρόσωπα κωμικὰ πάππος, ἡγεμὼν θεράπων, κάτω τριχία ἢ κάτω τετριχωμένος,
θεράπων Μαίσων, θεράων Τέττιξ, ἡγεμὼν ἐπίστειστος.
The slave-masks in comedy are the Pappos (21), the leading servant (22), the downwardshaired (23), the curly-haired servant (24), servant Maison (25), servant Tettix (26), and the
leading wavy-haired (27).
Pollux, Onomasticon, 4.148-9, trans. Webster et al.

Importantly, even though Pollux titles this section as concerning the masks of slaves (τὰ δὲ
δούλων πρόσωπα), this list nonetheless contains masks that he explicitly, and implicitly,
describes, not as slaves, but as servants or lowly people. While not all masks of slaves, all the
masks in this list are of men whose bodies are servile, especially when in juxtaposition to the
masks of the young and old men. For Pollux explains that the Pappos mask is not the mask of
slave, but of a freedman, “The Pappos is the only slaves’ [θεραπόντων] mask with white hair,
and it indicates he is a freedman.”590 Furthermore, Pollux includes on this list two masks that
other writers indicate where closely associated with cooks, Maison and Tettix.591 As J.C.B. Lowe
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shows in his analysis of cooks in New Comedy, while the Romans assumed that the theatrical
cocus was a slave, the Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries did not. Instead, these
Athenians could and at times had to assume that theatrical cooks (μαγείροι) were citizens, in part
because their work had ritual importance.592 However, this association was not permanent:
Athenaeus illustrates how the Tettix is a foreign character with a quote from a play by Philemon
in which a slave-owner complains that his cook does not speak Greek.593 Pollux’s list of slave
masks is therefore not a list of masks that actors wore to indicate that a character was a slave.
Instead, this is a list of masks with traits of the ambiguous servile body that audience members
nonetheless recognized as slaves through the juxtaposition with other masks.
I read Pollux’s list as evidence for the broad distinctions among masks that interested an
ancient audience member. As a sophist, Pollux prided himself on his knowledge of Greek
culture. In addition to reading comedy, attending performances of New Comedy was necessary
for such knowledge as well as the authority that came with such knowledge. Because Pollux
creates a category for the mask of slaves—even though not all the masks in this category were
used by slave characters—I argue that Pollux’s list demonstrates that ancient theater goers were
invested in the visual distinction between freeborn characters and slave characters. In other
words, whether or not the creators of the masks thought that there was a visual distinction
between slave and freeborn, Pollux, as a theater-goer, thought it was necessary to discover one.

b. Red hair and slave masks
In Pollux’s list of comedic masks, red hair is an attribute closely, but not exclusively,
associated with slaves. I use the English word red-haired to refer to the following Greek and

eius Maesone comoedo, ut ait Aristophanes Grammaticus.” (134M). Tettix: Athenaeus explains that Tettix was a
cook in 659a.
592
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Latin words: πύρρος, rufus, and rutilus. I also use red-haired to refer to Greek and Latin words
derived from those words, such as πυρρόθριξ and rufulus. None of these words have an exact
correspondence with each other, as the ancients were aware.594 Furthermore, none of these words
correspond to the English conception of red-haired, as many of them apparently could refer to
light or blond hair.595 For Greek and Roman writers, red hair was a bodily attribute that
demanded explanation. Some of these explanations were racialized, as the authors associate red
hair with northern peoples such as the Scythians and Germans. In the plays of Plautus and
Terence, three different characters comment on the red hair of three different slaves. I argue that
Roman audiences visually read the red hair on masks as indications of a character’s possible
servility, that is, the macula servitutis. Red hair was in part a possible marker of the macula
servitutis because the Greeks and Romans associated red hair with barbarians.
Pollux uses red hair to construct an ambiguous servile body. Out of his seven slave
masks, Pollux describes five as having red hair.596 That is, Pollux uses some variation of the
Greek word reddish (πύρρος) to describe each of these masks. Pollux describes the Tettix mask
as having black hair. Significantly, Pollux appears to believe that his readers expect the Pappos
mask to have red hair, as he offers an explanation of why the mask instead has white hair: he
asserts that this white indicates that this slave is a freedman. That red hair was important to the
slave masks is clear through Pollux’s description of the Pappos mask, since he clarifies that the
purpose of this mask’s white hair is “in order to indicate that he is a freedman.”597 Pollux implies
that this mask indicates a character who was a slave, but whose age has granted him the time to
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pursue and obtain manumission. But while Pollux associates red hair with slaves and servants, he
does not suggest that only slaves have red hair. Pollux describes the second Pappos as having red
hair.598 This second Pappos is the second mask in Pollux’s list of Old Men. In other words, it is a
mask associated with a freeborn family member. While Pollux closely associates red hair with
slaves, not all slaves have red hair and not all those who have red hair are slaves.
Pollux’s association of red hair with the ambiguous servile body was part of a larger
Greco-Roman discourse on red hair. Some ancient authors posit a strong connection between red
hair and various northern races; that is, they racialize red hair. Other authors present more
complex causes for red hair, as they see this hair color as the result of both environmental causes
and lineage. I use both associations as evidence that for the Greeks and Romans, red hair was
one possible physical marker of the macula servitutis. In addition to asserting that murex divers
are red haired because of their exposure to the sun, the pseudo-Aristotlean author of the
Problemata writes that “[a]nd indeed, all those in the north are red-haired and thin-haired.”599
Likewise, Tacitus describes the Germans as having red hair, an attribute he explicitly attributes
to their lineage: “they are all the same: tall, with blue eyes and red hair.”600 Other authors make
clear that red hair was not a positive marker. In Aristophanes’ Frogs, the chorus includes red
haired people as one of the groups misleading Athenians, along with others such as scoundrels
and foreigners.601 Such a context suggests that there were negative associations with the red hair
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in New Comedy. For just as red hair was associated with slaves in Greek New Comedy, so too
was it in Roman New Comedy.602
By making hair color the object of metatheatrical jokes, Plautus affirms the connection of
hair color to character types, including the connection of red hair to slaves. In the Mercator, the
senex Demipho vainly denies that his white hair has any bearing on his love for the young
woman Pasicompsa. “Whether that hair on my head is white, red or black, I love.”603 But
Demipho is very much wrong, for his white hair is a visual indication that he is a senex, and in
New Comedy, lovesick senes never get the young women they desire. Instead, they embarrass
themselves to such an extent that they make themselves worthy of punishment, which is what
Demipho proceeds to do in this play.604 In contrast, if Demipho had black hair, then he would be
an adulescens, which would make all the difference in his pursuit of Pasicompsa. For in New
Comedy, the adulescens who pursues love, regardless of the cost, is laudatory and almost always
achieves his goal. Because in the context of Demipho’s line white hair stands for senes and black
hair for adulescentes, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the third type of hair, red, stands
for slaves. That is, if Demipho did not have white hair or black hair then he would have red hair,
making him a slave.
But while red hair was closely associated with slaves in Roman comedy, not all slaves
had red hair. Indeed, both Plautus and Terence used red-haired masks to distinguish a particular
slave from other slave characters. As a result, I argue that within the world of the plays, red hair
functioned as a macula servitutis; not that all slaves were red haired, but that having red hair was
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visual clue that a character could be a slave. Terence’s Phormio demonstrates that there was a
connection between the red hair on slave masks and the construction of the slave’s body within
the world of the story. After the prologue, the first character on the stage in the Phormio is the
slave Davos, who initially appears alone. Davos talks to the audience on a number of his
relationships, including his relationship to the slave Geta. At the end of this little speech, Geta
then appears on stage and wonders: “If a redheaded fellow [rufus] were to look for me….”605
Davos then speaks to Geta. Getas’ comment points to how the red hair of Davos’ slave mask is a
detail that existed both visually as a stage prop and as a detail within the story world of the
Phormio. The Roman audience must have made the connection between the slave mask that the
actor playing Davos wore and the character Davos within the world of the play. If the Roman
audience did not make this connection, the slaves’ subsequent conversation has no starting point.
Furthermore, I suggest that it is reasonable to read Getas’ comment about Davos’ own red hair as
evidence that Getas’ mask did not have red hair, thereby creating a visual distinction between the
slaves Getas and Davos.
By using red hair as a detail that existed both visually on the mask and was part of the
slave’s body in the world of the play, Plautus similarly used red hair to distinguish one slave
character from another. In both the Asinaria and the Pseudolus, servile characters describe the
callidus servus of that particular play as having red hair. Indeed, the cases are so similar that
Marshall claims these passages as evidence that the same actor played the servus callidus in both
plays.606 In both plays, the servus callidus assumes a disguise to deceive a visitor: in the
Pseudolus, Pseudolus deceives the servant Harpax, and in the Asinaria, Leonida deceives the
slave Libanus. Harpax describes Pseudolus as having “red hair, a big belly, stout calves and he is
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blackish”607 Likewise, Libanus describes Leonida has having “a jutting jaw, red hair, a belly.”608
In both cases the interlocutor provides even more details about the servus callidus, and none of
them are complimentary. Since red hair is included on this list unattractive, and unusual,
attributes, I argue that it reasonable to conclude that neither speakers had red hair. Pseudolus’
and Leonida’s red hair marked them not only as distinct from the families that owned them, but
also from the slaves and servants that they deceived.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, that the Romans associated red hair with the servile body
is evidenced through Plautus’ description of the freeborn Philocrates as having somewhat reddish
hair. For Philocrates is the adulescens of the Captivi, a play in which Plautus plays with the
distinction of free and slave. The play begins with both Philocrates and his slave Tyndarus as
enslaved captives. The play’s prologue explains to the audience that, as part of a scheme for
liberation, these two characters have exchanged clothes in order to convince their captors that
Philocrates is actually Tyndarus and Tyndarus is actually Philocrates. In other words, just as in
the Mnaechmi and the Amphityro, Plautus is playing with a confusion of identities.609 Unusually
for Roman comedy, the slave Tyndarus is not middle-aged, but rather the same age as
Philocrates the adulescens. This similarity anticipates Tyndarus’ liberation as a freeborn citizen,
but it is also indicative of how Plautus wishes to exacerbate the confusion between Tyndarus and
Philocrates. For Plautus also makes Philocrates an unusual adulescens, since Aristophantes,
another adulescens, describes Philocrates as having “somewhat reddish hair.”610 As Marshall
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notes, Plautus blurs the visual boundary between Philocrates and Tyndarus by describing
Philocrates as having the type of hair commonly associated with slaves.611
Roman comedians took advantage of the racialized connotations of red hair to mark
certain masks as the masks of slaves. This visual distinction complimented the comedians’
frequent use of ethnic slave names: the name Syrus for a Syrian slave, Davos for a Phrygian
slave.612 Furthermore, the ancients did not limit themselves to red hair in their depiction of slave
bodies on stage. In some instances, they associated black skin with servile characters. The most
famous example is the Mytilenean mosaic of a scene from Menander’s Samia. Created sometime
in the fourth century CE, this mosaic labels as the cook the man wearing a mask colored to
represent black skin and topped with material to represent hair styled as dreadlocks. The mask’s
representation of black skin is all the more striking through its juxtaposition to the actor’s white
hands.613 This depiction also evokes the Ethiopian maid from Terence’s Eunchus.614 Although
the maid’s part was mute, nonetheless the Romans could have represented this character through
a mask similar to the one in the Mytilenean mosaic. Because comedy was public art, these pieces
of evidence point to how racialization was a project dependent on the participation of freeborn
Romans. In other words, it was a project similar to that of manumission.
In order to become free, freedmen and freedwomen required the recognition of freeborn
Romans who did not own slaves. The superiority of freeborn Romans over slaves and former
slaves was an incentive for these Romans to recognize this freedom only while reaping some sort
of benefit for themselves. The distinction between freeborn and former slaves allowed the
freeborn Romans to risk little in recognizing these former slaves as free, as the freedom of
611
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former slaves was of a lesser quality. As such, the distinction between freeborn and slave was
important, important enough that the Romans engaged in a variety of strategies to mark slaves’
bodies as distinct from their own, despite their lived experience of the heterogeneity of slaves’
actual bodies. The red hair on comedic slave masks was one such strategy to mark the bodies of
slaves, even though not all comedy slave masks had red hair.

5. Livy, manumission, and the volones
Just as the comedians distinguish between the manumission of slaves and the liberation
of captured citizens, so too does the Roman historian Livy. I defend this position by examining
in detail two separate, but related, accounts in Livy’s history: Tiberius Gracchus’ manumission
of the volones and Titus Flamininus’ rescue of captured Roman soldiers. Livy emphasizes the
volones’ servility both in their triumph over the Carthaginian forces and in his retelling of their
celebration. Livy takes care to mark the volones with the macula servitutis through a number of
details, including details that have correspondences to the depiction of slaves in ancient popular
culture. I use these connections as evidence to argue that Livy’s account of the volones’ victory
has the overtones of popular Roman values, even though this story is part of Livy’s larger
narrative of the Romans’ resistance to Hannibal’s invasion, a narrative that Livy makes clear is
drawn from aristocratic writers such as Polybius. These similarities take on more importance
when combined with Livy’s description of the painting of the volones in the Temple of Liberty.
As a painting in public space, the Roman public was free to interpret this painting by putting its
images into conversations with stories about the volones. In other words, the Roman people read
this painting through the lens of public memory. I argue that Livy’s account of this painting is
not so much a description of the images, as it is a summary of an interpretation of the painting,
an interpretation that I further argue was the negotiated result of the Romans’ need to distinguish
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freeborn Romans from manumitted slaves. As a result, Livy’s depiction of the volones intersects
with the priorities of Romans who did not own slaves, as this story emphasizes that former slaves
are not as competent or deserving as freeborn Romans.
Livy again makes use of this dichotomy between freeborn Romans and slaves in his
description of the soldiers that Flamininus returns to Rome. Flamininus won important victories
in mainland Greece, including against Philip V. Flamininus also secured the release of thousands
of Romans whom the Greeks held as slaves. Livy includes these men as part of the spectacle in
Flamininus’ triumph and asserts that these men appeared in the tonsorial style of manumitted
slaves, since they marched while sporting shaved heads. However, Livy is careful to ensure that
his readers do not think of these soldiers as freedmen, but rather as Romans who use the symbols
of freedmen to assert that they had regained their freedom.

a. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus manumits the volones
Livy emphasizes the servility of the volones by attributing to them servile attributes and
by using tools that were part of ancient popular culture. By popular culture, I mean the culture
that people such as peasants, craftsmen, and slaves created.615 As a result, I argue that Livy’s
description of the volones contains valuable evidence for what methods were available for
freeborn Romans to distinguish themselves from former slaves. For in Livy’s account, even
though the volones risk their lives to save Rome and thereby earn their freedom, they nonetheless
remain servile, an attribute that complicated the celebration of Tiberius Gracchus’ leadership of
the volones.
Livy makes clear that his account of the volones from 216 to 214 follows the same
cohort, a narrative that takes up five different sections of his history. First, Livy details how the
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For thoughts on searching ancient Greek popular culture in literary texts, see Kurke (2012: 2-15) and Forsdyke
(2012: 6-16). Clarke (2003), Knapp (2011), and Toner (2015) ask similar questions about Roman culture.
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Romans bought 8,000 slaves from slave-owners in order to train them as soldiers.616 Second,
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus rallies the volones the day before the battle, an exhortation that
includes a detailed plan for the volones’ manumission.617 Third, Livy describes the battle itself to
explain how Gracchus’ virtues as a commander allow him to overcome the volones’ servile
vices.618 The fourth section is the volones’ celebration of their victory and their new freedom.
Livy explains that his source for the story of the volones’ celebration is a mural depicting the
occasion in the Temple of Liberty on the Aventine. After this detailed description of the battle
and the celebration, Livy does describe what happens to the volones in 212, that is, after
Tiberius’ death.619 I consider this description Livy’s fifth section on the volones, as he is
referring to the same soldiers who served under Tiberius at Beneventum. Livy continues to
describe volones as participants in the Roman army after this dispersal, but he provides
significantly fewer details on their fighting.620 In this section, I focus on Livy’s depiction of the
cohort of volones under the command of Tiberius.
In the second section, which begins Livy’s description of the battle of Beneventum, the
historian depicts Tiberius as both a judicious military commander as well as a judicious slaveowner. According to Livy, Tiberius is aware that he has more power over these particular
soldiers than a typical Roman commander. But Tiberius is careful with this power and ensures
that he has the proper backing from the senate and the consul before he makes any extraordinary
promises to the volones.621 For the night prior to the battle of Beneventum, Tiberius reveals that
the volones will be able to secure their own freedom the next day.
616
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qui caput hostis rettulisset, eum se extemplo liberum iussurum esse; qui loco cessisset, in eum
seruili supplicio animaduersurum.
Any of them bringing back the head of an enemy he would immediately declare a free man,
but anyone who gave ground he would punish as a slave.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.14.7, trans. Yardley.

Tiberius assumes that this command provides an incentive for the volones to fight well and to
fight well on behalf of the entire army.
In the third section, Tiberius uses his cunning as a military leader and as a slave-owner to
counteract the volones’ ineptitude in a way that corresponds to comic stories about slaves from
ancient popular culture. According to Livy, the volones were not good soldiers in part because
they were overly literal:
…nec alia magis Romanum impediebat res quam capita hostium pretia libertatis facta. nam ut
quisque hostem impigre occiderat, primum capite aegre inter turbam tumultumque abscidendo
terebat tempus; deinde occupata dextra tenendo caput fortissimus quisque pugnator esse
desierat, segnibus ac timidis tradita pugna erat.
Nothing more impeded the Romans than the fact that the heads of the enemy had been made
the price of liberty. The men all showed great spirit in dispatching an enemy, but the first thing
they did after that was to waste time in the difficult task of severing the head in the confused
melee. Then, their right hands fully employed holding the head, all the most intrepid gave up
the fight, leaving the battle to the laggards and the faint-hearted.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.15.3-5, trans. Yardley.

Specifically, the volones assumed that Tiberius’ command meant that as soon as they had killed
an enemy soldier, they were to immediately bring the head of that soldier to him. If they did not
do so, they would forfeit their chance for manumission. Livy implies that the volones interpreted
the command in this way because they were not true soldiers for two reasons: first, they are
foolish, they interpret Tiberius’ command too narrowly. Second, they are more focused on their
own freedom than the collective well-being that comes with Rome’s military success. This
individualism threatens to undermine the volones completely, except that Tiberius diagnoses the
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problems and therefore issues a new command: if they win, he will free them all.622 For Livy, the
volones’ misinterpretation of Tiberius’ command reflects badly on all of them.
Livy’s description of the volones’ literal interpretation of Tiberius’ command resonates
with the depiction of slaves in Greek and Roman literature that are closely associated with, but
distinct from, ancient popular culture. One such overly literal slave is the Aesop of the Life of
Aesop, a Greek prose text, likely written sometime in the Imperial Period.623 The Life of Aesop is
a fictional biography, likely the product of a man with sophistic training.624 Despite this
authorship, the text does not simply present the views or concerns of an elite man during this
time period because his work includes the retelling of popular, and authorless, stories. In one
story, Aesop brings his owner Xanthus an empty oil flask because Xanthus had merely asked for
an oil flask and not one full of oil. Similarly, Aesop prepares a dinner consisting of one lentil
because the Greek word for lentil, φακός, is a collective noun.625 The degree to which the
anonymous author modified these traditional stories for his own purposes is a question that needs
to be asked of each story individually. Leslie Kurke and Sara Forsdyke point out that to assume
these stories only represent the values of the elite is to miss how the author wrote the Life of
Aesop against a cultural background in which Aesop was a narrative figure who belonged to
everybody, including freeborn citizens who did not own slaves.626 In other words, that the stories
and tropes within the Life of Aesop were part of a common, popular culture in the ancient world
622
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Holzberg (1992).
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There is debate on the genre of the Life of Aesop. Jouanno (2005) argues that it is a comic biography. Wills
(1997) argues for its connection to the gospel genre. Ruiz-Montero aligns it alongside texts such as the Life of
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explains the similarities of these stories to Livy’s description of the volones interpreting
Tiberius’ commands literally.
Such stories about Aesop and the volones had appeal to both Greek and Roman, rich and
poor, slave and free because these stories exaggerated a strategy that slaves used for
simultaneously serving and resisting their owners, as evidenced in an anecdote by Plutarch.
Plutarch recounts how Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi, eager to have his slaves speak as little as
possible, realizes too late that some of his slaves have followed this instruction too well.
Specifically, one slave truthfully answered that an honored guest had received Piso’ invitation,
but omitting telling Piso that the guest had declined to come.627 Importantly, Plutarch’s anecdote
is just as much a detail taken from a literary source as the stories about Aesop and the volones.
However, unlike those other stories, Plutarch frames his anecdote as depicting a facet of the
relationship between a slave and a slave-owner that was only slightly unusual and therefore an
amusing bit of historical data.628 In contrast, the story of the volones as enthusiastic headhunters
and the story of Aesop as the cook of a singular lentil take the premise of overly literal
interpretation and exaggerate it for comedic effect.
Because of the comedic value in a slave’s overly literal interpretation, it is unsurprising
that volones’ misinterpretation of Tiberius’ commands also has parallels in Roman comedy.
These examples from Plautus’ comedy demonstrate that the public of the Roman Republic—that
is, even those Romans who did not own slaves— was also familiar with a servile hermeneutic
similar to the one in Livy’s description of the volones. In the Persa, Toxilius requests that his
slave Paegnium hurry home as quickly as possible; Paegnium does indeed hurry home, but he
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On Talkativeness 18 = Moralia 511d-e. Cf. Hopkins (1993: 19 n.31).
See Potter on the analysis of anecdotes (1999: 59-60).
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gets there quickly by abandoning his errands.629 Likewise, in the Pseudolus, the eponymous
slave misinterprets his owner Calidorus’ commands through a creative literalism: Pseudolus
argues that Calidorus’ lover Phoenicium is herself present in the wax tablet that bears her letter
to Calidorus.630 Pseudolus also expresses surprise that Calidorus has carried (attuli) an
accomplice to the scene of their scheme, prompting Calidorus to clarify “I meant to say ‘I lead
him’” (‘adduxi’ volui dicere).631 However, Livy and Plautus’ examples differ in one important
respect: while Plautus uses literal interpretation as a tool for the slave to have a joke at the
owner’s expense, Livy uses the slaves’ overly literal interpretation in order to denigrate them.
For Livy, the volones’ inability to understand the nuances of Tiberius’ command is further
evidence that they are not good soldiers and, therefore, distinct from freeborn Roman soldiers.
This distinction becomes even more apparent in Livy’s account of volones’ celebration of their
victory.
According to Livy, despite the volones’ foolishness and cowardice, they nonetheless
triumphed at Beneventum, giving grounds for Tiberius to manumit all of the volones.632
However, Tiberius again searches for and creates a distinction between the cowardly volones and
the brave volones. While many of the volones were inspired to fight all the more fiercely when
they heard that their freedom was dependent on their collective victory over the enemy, others
failed to live up to that standard. Instead, they shirked from fighting on the front lines and
collectively fled Tiberius’ camp.633 To address the disparity in how the volones fought, Tiberius
investigates each of his soldiers individually.634 After these investigations, Tiberius bifurcates the
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newly manumitted volones: on the one hand, those who were brave he permits to eat as Roman
citizens at the banquet that celebrates their victory. That is, they eat while reclining. On the other
hand, those who were cowardly must serve food to those reclining volones; they also must eat
while standing up for that day and all remaining days during that campaign.635 Livy asserts that
this banquet with the two groups of volones celebrating in very different styles is depicted on a
painting in the Temple of Liberty on the Aventine Hill. As Livy explains, this location is
particularly suited to such a display because Tiberius’ father had built the temple.636 Michael
Koortbojian and Anna Clark argue that this location of this third century temple was also well
suited to such a display because of the Aventine’s close association with the Roman plebeians.637
Significantly, even though Livy is explicit in attributing his story about Tiberius’
manumission of the volones to this painting, the historian does not specify whether he himself
has seen this painting. While this question is to a large extent unanswerable, I argue that it is
worthwhile asking because it highlights the question of how this painting relates to the story of
the volones at the battle of Beneventum.638 Indeed, Gaetano De Sanctis and Karl-Wilhelm
Welwei, wishing to have the battle and celebration come from a single source, argue that Livy’s
description of the battle is based on a scene in the painting itself.639 To ask whether Livy saw the
painting is also useful because it points to how Livy is constantly negotiating his control over his
narrative, while also being constrained by his traditions and sources, even though he himself
often skillfully hides these very negotiations. In this passage, Livy has hidden the negotiation to
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such an extent it is unclear was what included in this painting. These details are open to debate
because Livy has subsumed his description of this painting into his narrative analysis of it,
resulting in a blurring of visual and non-visual details.640 Visual details include his account of
men reclining outside while being served by men who also joined in the eating.
pilleati aut lana alba uelatis capitibus uolones epulati sunt, alii accubantes, alii stantes qui
simul ministrabant uescebanturque. digna res uisa ut simulacrum celebrati eius diei Gracchus,
postquam Romam rediit, pingi iuberet in aede Libertatis quam pater eius in Auentino ex
multaticia pecunia faciendam curauit dedicauitque.
The slave volunteers dined wearing caps, or had fillets of white wool on their heads. Some
were reclining and others standing, the latter serving food and eating at the same time. The
event seemed worthy of a picture, and so on his return to Rome Gracchus had a painting of that
festive made in the temple of Liberty which his father had had constructed and had dedicated
on the Aventine.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 24.16.18-19, trans. Yardley.

Because both the men reclining and the men standing wear pillei, visually these men have a
close, but not absolute, association with freedmen.641 Livy does detail events in which freeborn
citizens, rather than freedmen, wear the pilleus, prompting Karl-Wilhelm Welwei to suggest that
Livy’s identification of these men as volones is completely independent of the painting.642
Indeed, Livy includes a number details that are clearly not drawn from the picture, such as his
assertion that Tiberius sponsored the creation of this painting.643 Possibly Livy drew that
particular detail from an inscription or caption included with the painting.644 Or possibly this
detail originates from a source completely separate from the painting itself, a source that also did
the interpretative work of explaining why some men ate while standing and others ate while
reclining. For while Livy’s account implies that it was obvious that this painting was of the
640

For this particular painting, see Feldherr (1998: 33-4).
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volones celebrating after the battle of Beneventum, Pliny’s account of Lucius Hostilius Mancius’
painting makes clear that the Romans were comfortable on relying on non-visual cues in order to
interpret the narrative of a painting.
I argue that Pliny’s account of Lucius Hostilius Mancinus’ explanation of his own battle
painting suggests that Livy’s account of the painting of the volones participated in a similar
aesthetic, in which Romans interpreted paintings by relying on oral explanations. Lucius
Hostilius Mancinus was a commander during the third Punic war. Discontent with his reputation
after the war, Pliny the Elder writes that he used art as a way to increase his chances of winning
the consulship, and so commissioned a painting of his winning battle. But rather than let the
public interpret this painting on their own, Mancinus told the Roman public his own
interpretation of his painting, thereby allowing him to recount the narrative of his victorious
battle to an audience of Roman citizens:645
Non dissimilem offensionem et Aemiliani subiit L. Hostilius Mancinus, qui primus
Carthaginem inruperat, situm eius oppugnationesque depictas proponendo in foro et ipse
adsistens populo spectanti singula anarrando, qua comitate proximis comitiis consulatum
adeptus est.
Also Lucius Hostilius Mancinus who had been the first to force an entrance into Carthage
incurred a very similar offence with Aemilianus by displaying in the forum a picture of the
plan of the city and of the attacks upon it and by himself standing by it and describing to the
public looking at the details of the siege, a piece of popularity hunting which won him the
consulship at the next election.
Pliny, Natural History, 35.23, trans. Rackham.

Pliny’s comments on Mancinus’ exegesis suggests that it was remarkable, but this remarkability
appears to have been its connection to Mancinus’ resulting success in securing the consulship. 646
In Pliny’s mind at least, Mancinus’ audience were Roman citizens who were so impressed by his
war stories that they subsequently voted him into office. Similarly, in the Satyricon, Encolpius’
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description of the wall painting and other decorations at the entrance to Trimalchio’s house
includes details drawn from the visual aspects of the paintings, inscriptions, and the verbal
account of a nearby porter.647 I therefore argue that it is very likely that Livy’s assertion that both
the men lounging and the men serving were volones was not based on the visual elements of the
painting alone, but was an interpretation based on the painting, an interpretation that used
information from outside of the painting. This position is very similar to T.P. Wiseman’s
conclusion how the Roman annalists’ representation of monuments is intimately bound up with
the politics and stories of the men within the monuments.648 The implication of Wiseman’s work
for analyzing this painting is that it is impossible to separate Livy’s description of the volones’
celebration from the stories and memories of the Gracchi family. As a result, Livy’s description
of the death of Tiberius is bound up with stories that stress the distinction between freeborn
Romans and former slaves.
Livy details how Tiberius’ military success benefited him and how his death was ruinous
for the volones in the fifth section of his story on the volones. According to Livy, after his victory
at Beneventum in 214, Tiberius became consul again in 213.649 Livy also records that Tiberius
died in 212, although the historian does not stand by any particular version of the consul’s
death.650 However, Livy does elaborate how Tiberius’ death affected the volones. Livy writes
that after Tiberius died the volones disbanded.
ceterum super eam cladem quae in Lucanis accepta erat volonum quoque exercitus, qui vivo
Graccho summa fide stipendia fecerat, velut exauctoratus morte ducis ab signis discessit.
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To add to the defeat suffered in Lucania, however, the army of volunteer slaves deserted its
standards. It had served with unswerving loyalty when Gracchus was alive, but felt that the
leader’s death released it from its obligations.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 25.20.5, trans. Yardley.

Despite the volones’ bravery at Beneventum, they nonetheless were not true Roman citizens, as
their bravery was the result of their loyalty to Tiberius and his promise of freedom, not to the city
of Rome and its citizens. In other words, the conclusion of Livy’s narrative about the volones
completely undermines the distinction between the worthy and unworthy volones that Tiberius
worked strenuously to maintain.
Because this conclusion to the story is so at odds with the celebration of the volones in
the painting, I suggest that Livy is weaving together two separate traditions. On the one hand, he
includes the stories around a painting that he says Tiberius sponsored, implying that Tiberius was
so proud of this mass manumission that he himself emphasized his patronage over the volones in
order to advance his reputation. On the other hand, Livy also implies that the volones are
incorrigible cowards, not the type of men with whom Tiberius Gracchus would want to associate.
While it is possible that this story originated as a way to discredit Tiberius Gracchus and his
family, I argue that in the second century, the Gracchi themselves had reason to tell the story of
the desertion of the volones in order to win political support from freeborn Romans, in particular
poor freeborn Romans who did not own slaves.
The Tiberius Gracchus who died as plebeian tribune in 133 rallied freeborn Romans to
his land reform efforts in part by disparaging slaves, a rhetorical move that demanded a
renegotiation with his family’s close association with the volones. Appian paraphrases Tiberius’
first speech to an assembly of Romans (a contio) in the following way:
…δημαρχῶν ἐσεμνολόγησε περὶ τοῦ Ἰταλικοῦ γένους ὡς εὐπολεμωτάτου τε καὶ συγγενοῦς,
φθειρομένου δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον εἰς ἀπορίαν καὶ ὀλιγανδρίαν καὶ οὐδὲ ἐλπίδα ἔχοντος ἐς
διόρθωσιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ δουλικῷ δυσχεράνας ὡς ἀστρατεύτῳ καὶ οὔποτε ἐς δεσπότας πιστῷ, τὸ
ἔναγχος ἐπήνεγκεν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δεσποτῶν πάθος ὑπὸ θεραπόντων γενόμενον….
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[Tiberius Gracchus] delivered an eloquent discourse, while serving as tribune, concerning the
Italian race, lamenting that a people so valiant in war, and related in blood to the Romans, were
declining little by little into pauperism and paucity of numbers without any hope of remedy.
He inveighed against the multitude of slaves as useless in war and never faithful to their
masters, and adduced the recent calamity brought upon the masters by their slaves in Sicily….
Appian, Civil War, 1.9, trans. H. White.

Although the historian Appian does not preserve the exact words of the speeches of this Tiberius,
the resonances between his words and other sources suggest that Appian is drawing on sources
closely associated with and sympathetic to the Gracchi.651 Appian reports that for this Tiberius,
bravery in battle was vital to the distinction between slaves and freeborn Italians. Unfortunately
for this Tiberius, his great-uncle Tiberius’ victory at Beneventum completely contradicts this
stance, as there the volones fought bravely enough to warrant their freedom and to win a battle
on behalf of Rome. Rather than attempt to contradict this story, or worse yet disown his
connection to a successful commander, there was another solution: Tiberius could assert that his
great-uncle was unique in his ability to overcome the volones’ natural servility and turn them
into soldiers, a uniqueness that Livy’s own story emphasizes by demonstrating that once the
commander dies, the volones reverted to their cowardly ways. The story of Tiberius Gracchus
and the volones therefore nicely compliments the politics of Tiberius Gracchus the plebeian
tribune, pointing to how manumission was a concern for freeborn Romans who did not own
slaves.
The memory of the Gracchi was not just a concern for Roman aristocrats, historians, and
politicians, but also many different segments of Roman society, for the Gracchi were the
recipients of cult worship.652 I argue that the broad-stroke narrative similarities between the
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus who lead the volones and the Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus who
pushed for agricultural reform reflect how the Romans used similar stories to think through these
651

Cf. Appian, Civil War, 1.11, Plutarch, Life of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, 8.3, 8.7. For Appian’s depiction of
the alliance between poor Romans and poor Italians, see Roselaar (2012: 235-246) and Stone (2015).
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Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 18.2, cf. Flower (2013: 100 n.68) and Flower (2006: 79-81).
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men from the same family. In other words, it is not mere coincidence that the following narrative
arc undergirds the stories of both Tiberii: a man gains an unusual amount of power because of
his patronage to men normally marginalized or excluded from Roman politics, but his use of this
power is short-lived because of his untimely death. That the Tiberius Gracchus who freed the
volones had a great deal of power is not immediately obvious. But as Carlo Castello makes clear,
this Tiberius is unique in third century Rome for individually freeing such a large number of
slaves who belonged to the state, thereby making himself a strange but powerful sort of
patron.653 Remember that Livy details Tiberius’ contingent of volones as initially numbering
8,000 men.654 Examples from first century BCE Rome, such as Sulla and his Cornelii, point to
the power of such mass manumissions.655 Furthermore, Livy’s story about how the volones
disbanded rather than follow another leader indirectly casts Tiberius as the patron of these former
slaves. To review: on the one hand, after a victorious battle, this Tiberius had the personal
loyalty of several thousand soldiers. He won the consulship for a second time. Tiberius then died,
dispersing his followers. On the other hand, the tribune Tiberius Gracchus gained the loyalty of
the plebs through promises of land reform. He became a powerful plebeian tribune, but his death
dispersed his followers, averting the possibility of further changes at Rome.656 The senators
opposed to the Gracchan reforms prevented further changes in part by driving a wedge between
freeborn Romans and former slaves. In other words, Roman aristocrats emphasized the benefits
that freeborn Romans received in comparison to former slaves, enticing freeborn Romans to
oppose any alliance with slaves and former slaves.
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Castello (1989: 111).
See above. Livy writes that 2,000 volones died at the battle of Beneventum (24.16.5). Valerius Maximus provides
a different number of men, compare Castello (1989: 94-8).
655
Appian, Bellum Civile, 1.100. Cf. Conclusion Section 2.
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Tiberius’ foes had also consistently labelled him rex prior to the assassination, cf. Bernstein (1978: 224).
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Five different ancient writers provide an anecdote about the aftermath of Tiberius’ land
reforms that points to how Roman aristocrats reinforced the hierarchy of freeborn Romans over
former slaves. According to Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, Polyaenus, and the
anonymous author of de viris illustribus, after the death of Tiberius Gracchus in 133, Scipio
Aemilianus addressed an assembly (contio) and asserted that senators had been right to murder
this tribune.657 This assertion incited the assembly, and so he then derided them by indirectly
calling them slaves, as he described them as stepchildren to Italy. While all five writers agree on
this detail, they differ in their explanation of this insult. Significantly for the study of
manumission, Valerius Maximus and the author of the de viris illistribus has Aemilianus
elaborate, saying that such men are stepchildren to Italy because at one point they were his
prisoners of war.658 In contrast, Velleius Paterculus writes that Aemilianus justified himself by
referring to how frequently he heard the shouts of enemies.659 Although neither Plutarch nor
Polyaenus record Aemilianus presenting any justification for his insult, and even though he
himself points out that this jibe at freedmen is an extension of the stepmother invective, A.E.
Astin, Aemilianus’ biographer, regards it as unwise to believe that Aemilianus did not use the
“step-children” insult.660 Cicero’s comments in the Brutus point to the availability of many
speeches from the second century and would explain the numerous attestations of Aemilianus’
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Astin collects these sources as items 50f through 51e in his appendix (1967: 265-6). Astin (1960) argues with
Fraccaro (1912) on the authenticity and chronology of a number of these dicta, a debate that Beness helpfully
summarizes and augments (2005 and 2009). Beness notes that since Astin’s publication, there is more acceptance of
Plutarch’s authorship of the Apophthegmta Scipionis Minoris (2009: 69 n.36).
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De viris illustribus: ‘taceant’ inquit ‘quibus Italia noverca, non mater est’; et addidit, ‘quos ego sub corona
vendidi. (58.8) = Astin 51c. For Valerius Maximus, see below. For the multiplicity of ways that the Romans related
to prisoners of war, see Allen (2006).
659
“hostium…armatorum totiens clamore non territus…” (2.4.4) = Astin 51b.
660
Plutarch: Apophthegmata Scipionis Minoris, 22 = Moralia, 201e = Astin 51d. Polyaenus: 8.16.5 = Astin 51e.
Astin (1960: 137), cf. Astin (1967: 234). Beard is more skeptical (2007: 140-1). For more on Valerius Maximus’
methodology, see Section 5b below.
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bons mots.661 Therefore, Valerius Maximus’ evidence of Aemilianus’ thoughts on manumission
needs to be taken seriously as evidence of the connection of manumission and the counterattack
against Gracchan reforms.
Valerius Maximus quotes Aemilianus as using the stain of manumission to discredit those
who disagreed with him.
‘taceant’ inquit ‘quibus Italia noverca est’. orto deinde murmure ‘non efficietis’ ait ‘ut solutos
verear quos alligatos adduxi.’
He said: “Let them be quiet, for whom Italy is a step-mother!” Then when a rumble rose, “You
will not make me fear men - set free from fetters - whom I myself lead in bound.”
Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia, 6.2.3 = Astin 51a, translation my own.

Valerius’ depiction of Aemilianus’ accusation is particularly significant because Appian writes
that Tiberius had united his followers through their own hatred of slaves.662 Aemilianus takes
these Romans’ hatred of slaves, and turns it against themselves: he accuses them of having in
their midst former slaves, men who are unworthy of participating in Roman politics, but who are
nonetheless drowning out their own, legitimate, voices. Aemilianus asserts that the former slaves
in the audience do not have a proper relationship to Italy, as rather than being Italy’s children,
they are instead her stepchildren through enslavement and conquest.663 This accusation builds on
the stigmas against stepmothers and the vulnerability of the enslaved.664 Mouritsen notes that the
Romans used shackles and the scars caused by wearing shackles were visual cues to a slave’s
servile nature.665 In other words, these men’s shackled past precludes them from having a proper
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Astin lists all the men whose speeches Cicero mentions in the Brutus (1967: 7 n.2). Astin collects all surviving
words attributable to Aemilianus (1967: 248-269).
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Civil War, 1.9. Cf. Flower (2013: 98).
663
That all five writers record that Aemilianus spoke of a mother Italy rather than a mother Rome indicates the
degree to which this statesman considered Italia a unifying concept, notably at time significantly prior to the Social
War. Dench analyzes this passage as part of the question of Roman lineage (2005: 253-4), but see also her thoughts
on Italy, especially prior to the Social War (2005: 152-221). Cf. Bispham (2008: 54-6).
664
Watson cites this dictum of Aemilianus as evidence for how the Romans constructed the stepmother as alien, in
contrast to the natural mother (1995: 16 n. 53). I add, however, that this invective uses the stepmother relationship to
discredit the metaphorical children, not the metaphorical mother, who is honorable Italy.
665
Mouritsen in particular points to Horace, Epodes 4, Juvenal, 7.14-6 and Martial, 2.29 (2011a: 27-8).
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relationship to Italy, and as a result, these men cannot question Aemilianus’ authority.
Aemilianus is not disqualifying all criticism directed at him. Rather, he implies a division among
those who oppose him. On the one hand, there are former slaves, whose criticism is worthless
because of the macula servitutis. On the other hand, there are freeborn Roman citizens, whose
criticism Aemilianus implicitly invites. But by asserting that all those who do criticize him are
former slaves, Aemilianus pays a conditional compliment to freeborn Romans: they gain the
satisfaction of knowing that this successful aristocrat takes their complaints seriously, as long as
they do not align themselves with slaves and former slaves.
I argue that Livy’s account of how the volones dissolved upon Tiberius’ death similarly
compliments freeborn Romans, as this story asserts that freeborn Romans can rejoice with the
volones as victors over the Carthaginians, as long as they do not count the volones as proper
soldiers and proper citizens. The similarities between this story and the stories about the plebeian
tribune Tiberius Gracchus suggest that Livy is in conversation with stories about the Gracchi
family writ large, including stories that were not confined to history books. For Livy’s account of
the volones’ overly literal interpretation of Tiberius’ commands is a trope that was part of
popular Roman culture. Freeborn Romans, most especially freeborn Roman men who were either
soldiers or veterans, had reason to retell stories that disparaged the volones as inadequate
soldiers. For in antiquity, it was a commonplace that slavery and soldiery were incompatible, as
men in part justified their citizenship through participation in the military.666 The volones’ mere
service as soldiers was in a sense a threat to the citizenship of all freeborn Romans, most
especially if the volones won manumission through their military service. Indeed, Livy alludes to
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Hunt (1997) demonstrates the extent to which this feeling guided historiography in Classical Athens. Polybius’
description of the mercenary revolt in Carthage after the First Punic War suggests that this sentiment continued past
classical Athens. Polybius, 1.69.
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this conflict between freeborn, but captive, soldiers and the volones in his initial description of
the volones’ recruitment:
octo milia iuuenum ualidorum ex seruitiis, prius sciscitantes singulos uellentne militare, empta
publice armauerunt. hic miles magis placuit, cum pretio minore redimendi captiuos copia
fieret.
They bought and armed at state expense 8,000 sturdy young men from the slave population,
asking them first on an individual basis if they were willing to serve. Such soldiers were
preferred even though the Romans had the chance of ransoming their captives at a lower price.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.58.11-12, trans. Yardley.

The soldiers in question are those that Hannibal captured at the battle of Cannae. When their
delegation from Hannibal’s camp arrives at Rome, Livy reports that they struggled to argue that
they were worth more to the Romans than these slave soldiers. The volones were a threat to the
freeborn soldiers, especially as their ability achieve manumission meant that they could replace
the captured soldiers as citizens. Livy’s denigration of the volones was part of the psychological
wage paid not just to freeborn soldiers, but to freeborn Romans generally; this denigration was
an assurance that freeborn were superior to slaves, even slaves who won their freedom on the
battlefield.

b. The appearance of manumission and Flamininus’ triumph
Livy’s denigration of former slaves such as the volones was important to freeborn Roman
soldiers because they too had to prove their courage on the battlefield. However, freeborn Roman
soldiers faced different expectations: while Livy recounts the story of the volones with the
assumption they are both cowardly and incompetent, freeborn Roman soldiers had to live up to
the expectation that they would rather die in battle than be captured. In this section, I examine
how the Romans thought about and valued captured and enslaved Romans. This Roman value of
military bravery was connected to another Roman practice, namely, the refusal to use state funds
to ransom captured soldiers. This indifference to the fate of freeborn Roman soldiers is important
to understanding the manumission of the volones: freeborn Romans knew that they could not rely
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on the state to consider them worthy enough to rescue from enslavement, so why should they
celebrate the state’s decision to manumit slaves? Livy dramatizes this anxiety of freeborn
soldiers in his depiction of the debate on the soldiers captured at Cannae. Livy also dramatizes
this anxiety in his depiction of Flamininus’ triumph of 194. This pairing of the two events is
logical as the historian recounts how Flamininus went against Roman expectations and brought
back soldiers whom the Greeks had enslaved, including those whom the Greeks had purchased
from Hannibal during the second Carthaginian war. That is, Livy leaves open the possibility that
men who were enslaved at the battle of Cannae marched with Flamininus in his triumph. In
addition to Livy, Plutarch and Valerius Maximus write about these soldiers marching in this
triumph. All three writers describe these men as visually indistinguishable from freedmen.
However, none of the writers describe the soldiers as freedmen, instead describing them as
Romans who regained recognition of their freedom. Possibly, the three writers assumed that their
readers would realize that, rather than being slaves, these soldiers were undergoing the process of
postliminum or some form of liberation similar to postliminum.667 In other words, just as the
comedians do not use manumission to describe the freeing of captured citizens, neither do these
writers describe enslaved Roman soldiers as being manumitted, even though they dress as
freedmen.
Immediately after the historian explains the origins of the volones, Livy describes how a
delegation of Roman soldiers came from Hannibal’s camp in order to make their cases before the
Senate and the Roman people. An anonymous delegate pleads with the Roman people to raise
the funds to ransom these soldiers. He points out that if the Senate was willing to raise money to
buy slaves to be soldiers, which they were, then they should be willing to spend money to
ransom freeborn soldiers.
667

For more on postliminum, see Chapter 1 4b.

253

Chapter 4: Manumission between the ambiguous servile body and the psychological wages of freeborn Romans

octo milia servorum audio armari. non minor numerus noster est, nec maiore pretio redimi
possumus quam ii emuntur; nam si conferam nos cum illis, iniuriam nomini Romano faciam.
I am told that 8,000 slaves are being put under arms. Our number is no smaller than that, nor is
the cost of our ransom greater than their buying-price. Costs I compare—for comparing
ourselves with those people would mean insulting the Roman name!
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.59.12, trans. Yardley.

In other words, the soldier understands that the Romans’ decision to recruit the volones is
directly connected to a degradation of the value of freeborn Roman soldiers. Livy himself makes
this point.668 While the emotions motivating this episode are unique to these captured freeborn
Roman soldiers and this very unusual collection of slave soldiers, I suggest that hostility between
these two groups was quite common. Livy merely heightens the stakes by clarifying the Senate’s
preference for the volones over the captured soldiers.
While Livy suggests that the Senate unanimously refused to ransom the soldiers, he is
explicit that this decision resulted from a range of motivations. Livy writes that some Romans
considered it paramount to continue the tradition of refusing to ransom captives. In a speech, the
senator Titus Manlius Torquatus makes the claim that these soldiers are not worthy of freedom
precisely because they were captured. According to Torquatus, that the soldiers are captives
proves that they do not truly love Rome. Furthermore, because they do not love Rome, they are
nothing more than Hannibal’s slaves.
liberi atque incolumes desiderate patriam; immo desiderate, dum patria est, dum cives eius
estis: sero nunc desideratis, deminuti capite, abalienati iure civium, servi Carthaginiensium
facti.
You must long for your country while you are still free, with your rights intact, or rather while
it is still your country, and while you are still its citizens. Your longing for it now comes too
late; you have lost your status, forfeited your rights as citizens, become slaves of the
Carthaginians.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.60.14-15, trans. Yardley.

Torquatus’ logic is that because Roman soldiers who allow themselves to be captured are worthy
of death, they must also be worthy of enslavement. Signficantly, Torquatus’ logic parallels that
668

22.58.11-12. See Section 5a above.
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of Patterson’s description of slavery as social death.669 Because Torquatus does win the vote,
Livy indicates the power among the Romans of the idea that capture had transformed these
soldiers into slaves.
But while this idea was powerful, Livy suggests that it was a minority position. Livy does
not depict either the senatorial audience or the citizen audience, who had appeared when the
delegates make their way from Rome’s gates, as persuaded by this particular argument of
Torquatus’ speech. Rather, Livy explains that many senators were concerned that they would set
a bad military and financial precedent by ransoming these soldiers. Livy details the sympathy in
Rome by describing how many of the senators, and the Romans who had heard the delegates’
speech, were primarily concerned about their enslaved relatives. Livy suggests that many
Romans thought that these enslaved soldiers deserved freedom because they were Romans.
…quamquam patrum quoque plerosque captivi cognatione attingebant, praeter exemplum
civitatis minime in captivos iam inde antiquitus indulgentis, pecuniae quoque summa homines
movit, quia nec aerarium exhauriri, magna iam summa erogata in servos ad militiam emendos
armandosque, nec Hannibalem maxime huiusce rei…
Most of the senators also had relatives amongst the prisoners, but after Manlius’ address they
were concerned not only about the precedent—from early days, the state had shown little
regard for prisoners of war—but also about the amount of money involved. They did not wish
to see the treasury depleted (for they had already spent a large sum on buying and equipping
slaves for service) and they also did not want any improvement in the finances of Hannibal….
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.61.1-2, trans. Yardley.

While the Senate does agree to Torquatus’ motion to sacrifice these captured soldiers, they do so
because they thought this sacrifice was necessary to preserve Rome. In other words, many
senators and Romans continue to think of these captured soldiers as Roman and as worthy of
freedom, despite being captured. The Romans’ value that soldiers ought to prefer death to
capture was not an inviolable maxim, but rather an ideal worked through debate and experience.

669

See Chapter 1 Section 4a.
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Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, and Livy present similar portrayals of the captured soldiers
in Flamininus’ triumph as well as going to similar lengths to note that while these men are
dressed in the garb of freedmen, they are not the same as freedmen. The three different authors
disagree as to how these soldiers appeared: Valerius asserts that they wore the pilleus, Plutarch
that they wore the pilleus and had shaved heads, while Livy writes that they had shaved heads
only. Even though this hat and hairstyle was closely associated with freedmen, the three writers
write these details not as proof that these men completed manumission, but rather they are
citizens using the symbols of manumission to express the restoration of their freedom. Unlike
slaves, these captured soldiers did not have to prove themselves worthy of freedom, they instead
had to regain it.
In 194, Flamininus marched in triumph in Rome because of his victories in mainland
Greece against Philip V.670 Included in his triumph was a group of soldiers, now free, whom the
Greeks had enslaved, presumably during the course of Flamininus’ own military actions.
Valerius reports that this crowd of soldiers also included men whom Hannibal had sold to the
Greeks during the second Punic war.671 In order for these men to re-integrate into Roman
society, Valerius presents these men as wearing the pilleus, the hat closely associated with
manumission.
At Flaminini de Philippo rege triumphantis currum non unus, sed duo milia ciuium
Romanorum pilleata comitata sunt, quae is Punicis bellis intercepta et in Graecia servientia
cura sua collecta in pristinum gradum restituerat. geminum ea decus imperatoris, a quo simul
et devicti hostes et conservati cives spectaculum patriae praebuerunt. illorum quoque salus
dupliciter omnibus accepta fuit, et quia tam multi et quia tam grati exoptatum libertatis statum
recuperaverant.
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For this triumph, see Allen (2006: 1-4). For triumphs more generally, see Beard (2006), Künzl (1988), Versnel
(1970), and Warren (1970). For triumphs and public memory, see Popkin (2016: 1-43).
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It is quite possible that Valerius’ source for this event was Livy. While Valerius was interested in historical
anecdotes, he was not interested in the particularities of the past, and his proem makes clear that he does not see
himself competing with Livy (1.1.1). Instead, he mined the past for stories that he makes universally applicable. Cf.
Welch (2013), Bloomer (1992: 11).
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But the car of Flamininus when he triumphed over king Philip was accompanied not by one
individual, but by two thousand Roman citizens wearing caps of liberty. Captured in the Punic
Wars and enslaved in Greece, Flamininus had been at pains to assemble them and had restored
them to their former status. The general’s glory was doubled thereby: enemies by him defeated
and citizens by him conserved offered a spectacle to the fatherland. Their salvation too was
doubly agreeable to all, both from their number and because they were so grateful for the
longed-for recovery of their freedom.
Valerius Maximus, Dicta et fabula memorabilia, 5.2.6, trans. Shackleton Bailey.672

As with Livy’s description Tiberius Gracchus’ manumission of the volones, the pilleus plays a
key role in identifying these men as distinct from other soldiers in the writer’s visual spectacle.673
But while Livy had asserted the pilleus identified the volones as former slaves of Roman citizens
in the context of Tiberius’ painting in the Temple to Libertas, in this passage, Valerius asserts
that the pilleus identifies Roman soldiers who had been slaves to Greeks. For notably, Valerius
does not describe these men as slaves, but rather as citizens who wore the pilleus.674 In other
words, Valerius draws attention to the tension between these men’s servile appearance and their
status as Roman citizens. While their bodies bear the trappings of Roman freedmen, Valerius
explains to his readers that this stylistic choice indicates not freedom newly won, but freedom
restored.
In his Life of Flamininus, Plutarch draws attention to the same tension between these
soldiers’ appearance and their ontological status. In his description of these enslaved soldiers, the
biographer empathizes with them, asserting that their enslavement is an example of a reversal of
fortune. For Plutarch, these men’s enslavement is unexpected and deserving of rectitude.
…ἀεὶ μὲν οἰκτροὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς, τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς εἰκός, ἐντυγχάνοντες οἱ μὲν υἱοῖς, οἱ
δὲ ἀδελφοῖς, οἱ δὲ συνήθεσιν, ἐλευθέροις δοῦλοι καὶ νικῶσιν αἰχμάλωτοι….
The change in their lot made them pitiful objects always, but then even more than ever,
naturally, when they fell in with sons, or brothers, or familiar friends, as the case might be,
slaves with freemen and captives with victors.
Plutarch, Life of Flamininus, 13.4, trans. B. Perrin.
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For the emendation to geminum ea, see Briscoe (1998: 313).
For Livy and the painting of the volones in the Temple to Libertas, see Section 5a above.
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Plutarch writes that these men suffered a pain because they were treated as slaves even though
they are Roman soldiers, implying that the philosopher did not think of them as slaves who had
to prove their worth in order to deserve manumission. Nonetheless, Plutarch makes these men
indistinguishable from former slaves in his description of Flamininus’ triumph:
…ὃ δὴ δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸν θρίαμβον αὐτῷ πάντων ὑπάρξαι λαμπρότατον. οἱ γὰρ ἄνδρες οὗτοι,
καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς οἰκέταις ὅταν ἐλευθερωθῶσιν, ξύρεσθαί τε τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ πιλία
φορεῖν, ταῦτα δράσαντες αὐτοὶ θριαμβεύοντι τῷ Τίτῳ παρείποντο.
This appears to have furnished his triumph with its most glorious feature. For these men
shaved their heads and wore felt caps, as it is customary for slaves to do when they are set free,
and in this habit followed the triumphal car of Titus.
Plutarch, Life of Flamiminus, 13.6, trans. B. Perrin.675

Unlike Valerius, however, Plutarch visually clarifies the spectacle for his readers by asserting
that these men did not march in front of Flamininus’ chariot like captives, but behind him like
triumphant soldiers.676 Also unlike Valerius, Plutarch needs to explain to his Greek readers that
these men’s odd hairstyle and choice of chapeau meant that they were visually similar to Roman
freedmen.
Plutarch was not alone in having to explain these details, as the historians Polybius and
Livy also unpacked the visual messaging of men other than freedmen wearing the pilleus. In his
account of Prusias II’s obsequious entreaty to the Roman Senate in 167, Polybius interpreted this
king’s outfit through the eyes of a Roman, noting that the shaved head and wool hat were
indicative of a Roman freedman.677 Notably, in Livy’s account of this scene, the Roman historian
includes Polybius’ stylistic details and the explicit interpretation of Prusias II’s appearance as
similar to a freedmen, thereby making it especially clear to his Roman readers why this king’s
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appearance was so sycophantic.678 Likewise, Livy explains that when Quintus Terentius Culleo
wore the pilleus at Scipio’s triumph, it was not because he was a freedmen, but in order to
express his gratitude to Scipio Africanus.679 Livy does so again when he describes how the
colonists of Cremona and Placentia marched behind the chariot of Gaius Cornelius in order to
express their gratitude to him.680 Plutarch, Polybius, and Livy had to explain the meanings of
these choice of hairstyle and hat because even though the men in question were dressed as
freedmen, they themselves were not freedmen. Livy’s account of the men in Flamininus’ retinue
appearing as freedmen therefore participates in his collection of men who only appeared as
freedmen while wearing the pilleus.
For Livy, a spectacle results from the tension between the captured soldiers’ status as
Roman citizens and their tonsorial appearance as newly manumitted freedmen. This tension is in
part the result of the soldiers’ placement within the procession of Flamininus’ triumph. First
come the prisoners of war, which include two sons of Greek monarchs. Then comes the
Flamininus the conqueror. After him comes his soldiers, including the captured soldiers, grouped
together through their lack of hair.681
et hostiae ductae et ante currum multi nobiles captivi obsidesque, inter quos Demetrius, regis
Philippi filius, fuit et Armenes, Nabidis tyranni filius, Lacedaemonius. ipse deinde Quinctius in
urbem est invectus. secuti currum milites frequentes ut exercitu omni ex provincia deportato.
his duceni quinquageni aeris in pedites divisi, duplex centurioni, triplex equiti. praebuerunt
speciem triumpho capitibus rasis secuti, qui servitute exempti fuerant.
And before the triumphal chariot there were many prisoners and hostages of noble birth,
including Demetrius, son of Philip, and Armenes the Spartan, son of the tyrant Nabis. Behind
these Quinctius himself entered the city, his chariot attended by a large crowd of soldiers, the
entire army having been brought back from the province. The distribution to these men was:
250 asses for the infantry, double that for each centurion, and triple for each cavalryman. What
provided a spectacular sight in the triumph was the men who had been bought out of slavery
marching along with shaved heads.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 34.52.9-12, trans. Yardley.
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Livy imagines the ancient audience knowing to interpret the shaved heads of these captured
soldiers not as signs that they are freedmen, but as signs that they are returning soldiers. 682 Like
Plutarch, Livy provides a number of visual cues to indicate that even though these men appear
servile, they are in fact Romans participating in the triumph with Flamininus, as they march
behind the chariot. This passage comes at the end of an extensive catalogue of Flamininus’
triumph, which details all the treasures that he brought from Greece. Noticeably, these men with
shaved heads do not march with the captives whom Livy describes, but with the soldiers who
fought with Flamininus. Their placement in the triumph reverses their identification as captives
of Rome and, instead, marks them as Roman soldiers participating in Rome’s triumph over the
Greeks. On the one hand, this manipulation of the placement and movements that constitute a
triumph, while in dialogue with expectations on how triumph ought to look, is emblematic of the
the ritual sense that Bell describes.683 On the other hand, Livy’s careful placement of these
soldiers points to the connection that Butler draws between the sense of triumph and social
death:
And can the sense of triumph be won precisely through the practice of social differentiation
which one achieves and maintains “social existence” only by the production and maintenance
of those socially dead?684

For Livy, the maintenance of the freeborn Roman’s social existence required the use of the
symbols of manumission without having to undergo manumission: they did not need to earn their
freedom, they simply had to regain it.
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Even though Livy records some instances in which Roman citizens used the visual
markers of manumission, he nonetheless treats the liberation of Roman citizens quite differently
from manumission. Livy’s description of the volones depicts the former slaves as permanently
servile, even though they earned their manumission on the battlefield. I suggest that this
animosity is connected to the Romans’ need to maintain military prowess as a virtue of and for
citizens, a virtue that the volones’ success at Beneventum challenged. Maintaining Roman
military virtue was also challenging because of the high standards that the Roman set for their
soldiers, most especially the belief in the shame of being captured. While the Romans expected
soldiers to fight to the death rather than be captured, Livy nonetheless details Roman objections
to this position and also suggests that captured citizens used the symbols of manumission in
order to negotiate their return to life as Romans. However, Livy does not suggest that these
citizens went through manumission. Instead, the historian is drawn to the friction between their
appearance as former slaves and their true status as citizens. Former slaves and freeborn Romans
are both free, but they are not the same.

6. Conclusion
In the summary, written under the orders of Constantine Porphyrogennetos, of the first
slave war on Sicily, there is a description of the emotional relationship between Sicilian slaveowners and those free people too poor to own slaves in the immediate aftermath of the slaves’
uprising:
Ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐπισυμβάντων τοῖς Σικελιώταις, τούτοις ἅπασιν ὁ δημοτικὸς
ὄχλος οὐχ οἷον συνέπασχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἐπέχαιρε προσεπιφθονῶν ἀνίσου τύχης καὶ
ἀνωμάλου ζωῆς.
When these great and countless evils were inflicted on the people of Sicily, the democratic
mob had no sympathy when they witnessed the misfortunes of the masters. Quite the opposite:
they were overjoyed. The common people were filled with envy because of the lives they were
compelled to lead, so very different from those of the rich.
Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 34/35.2.48 = Constantine Excerpt 4, p. 385, trans. Shaw.
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While the exact connection between the epitomizer’s words and Diodorus’ words is complex,
even more complex is the possible connection between Diodorus’ words and Posidonius’ words,
whom the historian Diodorus likely used as his source for this war.685 And even though the
connection between Posidonius’ words and the reality of the slave war is practically unknowable,
this passage still suggests that slave-owners understood that a supportive relationship between
themselves and free people was essential to the stability of slavery. I suggest that this passage is
indicative of how the status quo of slavery depended, in part, on the free poor refusing to ally
with slaves. Those freeborn poor who did not own slaves needed incentives to support slavery, as
without such incentives, slaves were simply another indication of their inferiority to wealthy
slave-owners. In this chapter, I have argued that the way in which Romans conceived and
practiced manumission was part of the psychological wage paid to freeborn Romans because
while manumission granted citizenship to slaves, this freedom was not equivalent to acceptance
among freeborn Romans. Manumission both granted freedom to slaves, but also marked them as
former slaves, allowing for freeborn Romans to maintain superiority over them.
The material and social benefits that freeborn Romans reaped from the exclusion of
former slaves is reflected in Roman comedy, that these values are part of the comedies’ language
and plot, as well as integrated into the visual spectacle of theater. While the comedians use the
language of liberation to discuss the freeing of both slaves and captured freeborn people, by only
using the language of manumission to discuss the freeing of slaves, the comedians reinforce the
importance between these two different activities. This difference also registers as the level of
the plots of the comedies, as slaves have to work to earn manumission, while enslaved, freeborn
people require the recognition of their true status. Given this importance of distinguishing
685
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between freeborn people and slaves, it is unsurprising that the ancients sought visual distinctions
in the masks depicting freeborn people and the masks depicting slaves. Some of the
distinguishing visual markers of slave masks included the racialized body parts, such as hair
color. These markers undermined the inclusive potential of slaves’ manumissions, as racialized
markers of servility meant that these former slaves were forever marked as slaves.
Like the comedians, Livy also touches upon the importance of excluding former slaves in
his description of the volones. Even though the volones won a battle for their Roman owners,
nonetheless Livy depicts them as cowards and inept fighters. Livy’s particular method for
disparaging these slaves draws upon a theme from ancient popular culture, namely that slaves
interpret commands in an overly literal way. While other writers depict this hermeneutic as a
way for a slave to resist an owner’s will, Livy suggests that the volones do so because they are
terrible soldiers. Livy again describes volones as terrible soldiers when he depicts them as fleeing
after the death of their leader Tiberius Gracchus. The volones’ manumission has not made them
into worthy citizens, just as in the comedies former slaves do not quite fit into lives of the
freeborn families. Also like the comedians, Livy depicts the freeing of enslaved, freeborn
soldiers differently than the manumission of slaves. Indeed, Livy maintains a distinction between
these two processes even when freeborn soldiers use the same hair style and hats as freedmen.
By distinguishing between the liberation of captured, freeborn soldiers and the manumission of
slaves, Livy maintains the boundary between former slaves and freeborn peple.
My argument, that the Romans’ practice and conception of manumission was integrated
into the disruption of potential alliances between poor freeborn Romans and slaves, rests on the
separate argument that the distinct boundaries distinguishing slaves, freedpeople, and freeborn
Romans were constantly policed. However, simply because the Romans policed these boundaries
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does not mean that at times the boundaries were blurry or porous. Indeed, any boundary among
humans is susceptible to humans crossing them. Nor does my argument about the importance of
maintaining the hierarchical position of freeborn Romans over slaves mean that the Romans
completely prohibited the advancement of slaves. The comments of Greek writers such as Philip
V and Dionysius of Halicarnassus make clear that in comparison to the Greeks, Roman slaves
enjoyed some form of inclusion and access to social advancement.686 Rather, I argue that the
integration of former slaves into the Roman citizenry was a radical enough process that it was
bound-up with the maintenance of Roman hierarchy generally.
Du Bois describes the psychological wages paid to white workers as the psychic twin to
material, judicial, and social advantages that white workers had at the expense of Black workers.
Likewise, I suggest that the denigrations of manumission and former slaves in the stories and
performances that were part of the texts of Plautus, Terence, and Livy were psychic twins to the
material, judicial, and social advantages that freeborn Romans had over former slaves. In the
Conclusion, I examine how the changing fortunes of first century Rome created radically new
contexts for manumission, as powerful Romans such as Julius Caesar renegotiated the material
and social advantages that freeborn expected from their government.
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See Chapter 3 Section 3.
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Conclusion
1. Introduction
With the collapse of the Republic, manumission was no longer an entry point to Roman
sovereignty, but manumission remained an integral aspect of upward social mobility. As a result,
there was a renegotiation of how slaves, slave-owners, the state, and freeborn Romans related to
manumission. Whereas the previous chapters examined manumission in the context of the
Republic, this conclusion analyzes manumission in the first century through the lens of the
Republic’s violent and uneven transformation into the Empire. Manumission was a historical
process and therefore contingent on the political arrangements of the state, slave-owners, and
freeborn Romans. As the institutions and processes that held up the Republic failed, the state’s
relationship to manumission transformed because the state’s interest in manumission now had to
coincide closely with the interests of a single, powerful slave-owner. In the new Empire, that
single slave-owner was Augustus, whose familia Caesaris was fundamental to Imperial
administration. But because the Empire’s birth in the ashes of the Republic was slow, the first
century BCE includes many men, such as Sulla, who experimented with the power of
manumission.

2. Manumission between Republic and Empire
Augustus’ combination of his and the state’s interest in manumission was the elaboration
of two techniques that Sulla had used during his dictatorship: control over mass manumission
and the elevation of freedmen to high administrative positions. Mass manumissions were
terrifying events because the man who manumitted large number of slaves appeared less as a
citizen, and more like a king. Recall that according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, King Servius
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manumitted thousands of slaves by fiat.687 Sulla was such a first century figure: he manumitted
thousands of slaves who became known as the Cornelii. Furthermore, Sulla gave former slaves,
such as his freedman Chrysogonus, a great deal of authority. Harriet Flower argues Sulla’s
dictatorship marks a turning point in the Republic: when Sulla had power, he initiated political
and cultural practices that become integral to the Rome Empire.688 Sulla’s freedmen, both the
Cornelii and Chrysogonus, were models of how manumission could be a tool for centralizing
power under one man. Orlando Patterson recognized and analyzed the important role that
freedmen and slaves played in the Roman Empire in supporting one man rule. During the first
century, a number of powerful Roman politicians, ranging from Sulla to Julius Caesar,
manipulated manumission and the context of manumission in a way that anticipates Augustus.
The juxtaposition of Sulla to Licinius Nerva makes all the more apparent the importance
of Sulla to Roman manumission during the collapse of the Republic. Just before the beginning of
the first century, Licinius Nerva, the governor of Sicily, freed 800 slaves. Diodorus Siculus
describes this mass liberation as one of the precipitating events of the second slave war of 104.
Nerva freed these slaves because Nicomedes, the king of Bithynia, had successfully petitioned
the Senate to decree that Romans had no right to enslave citizens of allied states:
Τῆς δὲ συγκλήτου ψηφισαμένης ὅπως μηδεὶς σύμμαχος ἐλεύθερος ἐν ἐπαρχίᾳ δουλεύῃ καὶ τῆς
τούτων ἐλευθερώσεως οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρόνοιαν ποιῶνται, τότε κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὢν στρατηγὸς
Λικίνιος Νέρουας ἀκολούθως τῷ δόγματι συχνοὺς τῶν δούλων ἠλευθέρωσε, κρίσεις προθείς,
ὡς ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πλείους τῶν ὀκτακοσίων τυχεῖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. καὶ ἦσαν πάντες οἱ κατὰ
τὴν νῆσον δουλεύοντες μετέωροι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.
The Senate then decreed that no person who was a free citizen of an allied state was to remain
enslaved in a Roman province and that the governors of the provinces ought to take measures
to see that such persons were set free. In compliance with this decree, Licinius Nerva, who was
governor of Sicily at the time, established judicial hearings and immediately set about freeing
slaves. Within a few days, more than eight hundred people obtained their freedom. The main
consequence of these events was that all people who were in slavery on the island how had
their eyes set on freedom.
Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 36.3.2 = Photios, Library, 387-90, Trans. B.D. Shaw.
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According to Photios at least, Diodorus is emphatic that this mass liberation enflamed the
rebellious desire for freedom among the other slaves on Sicily. This comment also sets up a
dramatic reversal: the re-enslavement of the former slaves. Diodorus goes on to explain that after
this mass liberation, the local elites successfully pressured Nerva to re-enslave the slaves that he
had just freed.689 Nerva agrees, causing the Bithynians, among others, to flee to the countryside
rather than resubmit to their owners.690 For Photios, Nerva’s improper handling of the
relationship between slaves and slave-owners is a key cause of a slave revolt. But Nerva is
incapable of learning his lesson of the importance of treating slavery carefully. Photios recounts
how during the siege of the Morgantina, Nerva again inserts the state inbetween slave-owners
and their slaves:
ὁ δὲ Σάλουιος, πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κατορθώματος συρρεόντων, διπλασιάσας τὴν
ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἐκράτει τῶν ὑπαίθρων, καὶ πολιορκεῖν πάλιν ἐπεχείρει τὴν Μοργαντῖναν,
κηρύγματι δοὺς τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ δούλοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. τῶν δὲ κυρίων ἀντιπροτεινόντων αὐτοῖς
ταύτην, εἰ σφίσι συναγωνίσαιντο, εἵλοντο μᾶλλον τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κυρίων, καὶ προθύμως
ἀγωνισάμενοι ἀπετρίψαντο τὴν πολιορκίαν. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
ἀνατρέψας αὐτομολῆσαι τοὺς πλείστους παρεσκεύασε τοῖς ἀποστάταις.
For this reason, Salvius [leader of the rebel slaves] made another attempt to take Morgantina
by siege. He issued a proclamation in which he promised freedom to all the slaves in the city.
But when their masters countered with the same offer of freedom to any slave who joined them
in the fight to defend the city, the slaves chose the masters’ offer. Indeed, by their zealous
efforts in the battle, these slaves helped repel the siege. When the Roman governor [Nerva]
later rescinded these grants of freedom, most of the slaves ran away and joined the rebels.
Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 36.4.8 = Photios, Library, 387-90. Trans. B.D. Shaw.

Nerva remains a man who does not understand how to use his authority over manumission and
liberation to maintain the hierarchy essential to Roman life. By wavering in his commitment to
the slaves’ new freedom, Nerva incites the slaves to rebellion.691 Photios concludes his section
on the second slave war by lamenting that “[a] great chaos and an Iliad of evils disrupted all of
689
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Sicily, since not only slaves but also poor persons of free birth became implicated in every kind
of brigandage and lawlessness.”692 Roman manumission stood at the intersection of slaves, slaveowners, the state, and freeborn Romans. Diodorus illustrates how Nerva failed to balance the
interests of all these groups, despite having extraordinary powers over slaves: first because of
Rome’s treaty with Bithynia and second because of the siege of Morgantina.
In contrast, Appian describes Sulla as successfully using mass manumission to create a
balance of power that supports his status as a dictator. But while Sulla used a variety of novel
practices so that he might retire from political life, politicians in the generation that followed him
used his techniques of manumission to centralize power for themselves. One of Sulla’s
manumission techniques, to the extent that it is visible in the accounts of Appian, is that he used
manumission as a way to bind slaves to himself personally rather than to the state:
τῷ δὲ δήμῳ τοὺς δούλους τῶν ἀνῃρημένων τοὺς νεωτάτους τε καὶ εὐρώστους,
μυρίων πλείους, ἐλευθερώσας ἐγκατέλεξε καὶ πολίτας ἀπέφηνε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Κορνηλίους ἀφ’
ἑαυτοῦ προσεῖπεν, ὅπως ἑτοίμοις ἐκ τῶν δημοτῶν πρὸς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα μυρίοις χρῷτο.
To the plebeians he added more than 10,000 slaves of proscribed persons, choosing the
youngest and strongest, to whom he gave freedom and Roman citizenship, and he called them
Cornelii after himself. In this way he made sure of having 10,000 men among the plebeians
always ready to obey his commands.
Appian, Civil War, 1.100, trans. H. White.

On the one hand, it is Appian who is explaining why Sulla acts in this manner. On the other
hand, Patterson finds the same rationale in his study of how Roman emperors used slaves and
freedmen in the Imperial bureaucracy. Patterson writes that, “As natally alienated persons with
no other anchor in Roman society or as freedmen owing their status solely to the emperor, their
[slaves’] interests were completely identified with his own and he could use them and abuse
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them as he wished.”693 In other words, slaves’ lack of connection to Roman families made them
dependent on the Emperor, the same analysis that Appian makes of Sulla’s Cornelii.
Appian suggests that these Cornelii are more bound to Sulla than they are to the Roman
state, an analysis that provides a grounding for understanding the invectives that Cicero hurls at
Sulla’s freedman Chrysogonus. According to Cicero, Chrysogonus was a close confidant of Sulla
and was fundamental to the execution of the proscriptiones in 82.694 For Cicero, Chrysogonus is
a villain of epic proportions, the orchestrator of murder and state-sanctioned theft. Cicero attacks
Chrysogonus in his speech in defense of Sextus Roscius, who was charged for the murder of his
father in 80. In that year, Sulla was no longer dictator, but he was an elected consul, that is, a
man with considerable power.695 In Cicero’s speech Pro Roscio Amerino, Chrysogonus is a
threatening figure precisely because he is a freedman with a powerful patron.696 Chrysogonus’
authority and power is not like that of proper Romans, who have to manage their own reputations
through their familial and social histories. Chrysogonus’ power comes without the negotiations
that aristocratic Romans make because of Sulla’s extraordinary imperium.
Sulla began a renegotiation of the intersection of manumission with slaves, slave-owners,
and the state that outlasted his time as dictator, as men, like Pompey and Julius Caesar, continued
it. This renegotiation did not follow a direct path: Roman men who sought to use manumission
as a tool for greater power faced resistance from Roman senators. In both 66 and in 59, Roman
senators halted potential changes to Roman manumission that would have strengthened the
power of freedmen and made it easier to manumit slaves. According to Asconius, when Gaius
Manilius was plebeian tribune in 66, he proposed changing freedmen’s voting districts, thereby
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prompting a riot. In his commentary on Cicero’s Pro Milone, Asconius reveals that Manilius
aimed to redistribute freedmen throughout all thirty-five Roman tribes. In doing so, Manilius
would overturn the practice, which the Romans deemed traditional, of assigning all freedmen to
the four urban tribes. Indeed, Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes that this practice dates to the
reign of King Servius.697 In her analysis of the voting districts of Rome, Lily Taylor agrees with
Asconius that more than tradition was at stake.698 Asconius frames the conflict as one between
Manilius, the reckless reformer who represents slaves, freedmen, and plebeians, and Domitius,
the wise conservative who represents the senators:
Nam eo tempore cum C. Manilius tribunus plebis subnixus libertinorum et servorum manu
perditissimam legem ferret ut libertinis in ominbus tribubus suffragium esset, idque per
tumultum ageret et clivum Capitolinum obsideret, discusserat perruperatque coetum Domitius
ita ut multi Manilianorum occiderentur. Quo facto et plebem infimam offenderat et senatus
magnam gratiam inierat.
For at the time when C. Manilius was tribune of the plebs, supported by a gang of freedmen
and slaves, he was passing an utterly immoral law to allow freedmen the vote in all of the
tribes, and was pursuing this aim with rioting and was blockading the climb to the Capitol,
Domitius scattered and broke through the gathering so violently that many of Manilius’ men
were killed. By this act he both gave offence to the lower ranks of the plebs and acquired great
goodwill in the senate.
Asconius, Pro Milone, 45C, trans. R.G. Lewis.

While Asconius describes Manilius as passing that law, in another note, Asconius explains that
the senate reconvened and overturned Manilius’ law the next day.699 After 66, all freedmen
remained concentrated within the urban tribes; their voting power remained weak.
Despite Domitius’ victory over Manilius, senators like Cicero still feared that
manumission would change. First, Cicero was afraid that a politician like Clodius Pulcher would
pass some version of Manilius’ law.700 Second, Cicero worried about the vicensima. While the
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vicensima, the five percent tax on the manumission of slaves, ultimately did survive into the
Roman Empire, Cicero testifies that this continuity was the result of the victory of senators over
men who would have been happy to scrap this tax.701 In a letter to Atticus that he wrote in the
early summer of 59, Cicero both highlights the financial importance of manumission to the
Roman state as well as how this importance was nonetheless no guarantee that during the first
century Roman manumission was going to remain the same:
praeterea si ulla res est quae bonorum animos quos iam video esse commotos vehementius
possit incendere, haec certe est et eo magis quod portoriis Italiae sublatis, agro Campano
diviso, quod vectigal superest domesticum praeter vicensimam? quae mihi videtur una
contiuncula clamore pedisequorum nostrorum esse peritura.
Moreover if anything could further inflame better-class sentiment, roused already as it
evidently is, assuredly this will do it; especially since after the abolition of customs duties in
Italy and the distribution of the Campanian Domain the only internal revenue left is the five
percent—and that will probably be swept away by the shouts of our footmen at a single scratch
assembly.
Cicero, Ad Atticum, 2.16.1 = Shackleton Bailey 36.1, trans. Shackleton Bailey.

By internal tax, Cicero means a tax that Roman citizens themselves paid to the state, in contrast
to taxes that the Romans raised from people who were not Roman citizens. Cicero worries that
the Romans will pass a new law abolishing this tax in a fit of democratic madness, a Roman
concern unique to the Republican period. In other words, Cicero testifies to a conflict between
the Roman state and citizenry that took a shape distinct from the conflict between the state and
the citizenry in the Roman Empire. Specifically, Cicero imagines the Roman citizenry uniting
against the state to reserve all the financial benefits of manumission for themselves.
While the vicensima remained, nonetheless the purposes and rationales of manumission
changed because Roman politicians changed what it meant to be a Roman citizen. According to
Cassius Dio, in 58, Clodius Pulcher began distributing grain for free to Roman citizens,
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abolishing the nominal fee that had originally been part of the law.702 The abolition of this fee
changed the state’s relationship to the citizenry: the Roman state now had a limited social safetynet, one that could accommodate citizens who could not rely on their families for aid. Dio
elaborates on the implication of this reform for manumission in his description of the year 57. In
that year, the senate granted Pompey imperium over the grain supply, the first time that the
Romans decided that the grain supply required such direct and authoritative oversight.703 Dio
reports that because of the public’s trust in Pompey’s abilities, slave-owners began to manumit
slaves with the expectation that these new freedmen would join the grain dole (cura annonae):
οὗτοί τε οὖν ἐμάχοντο, καὶ ὁ Πομπήιος ἔσχε μὲν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ σίτου διαδόσει τριβήν τινα·
πολλῶν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐλπίδας ἐλευθερωθέντων, ἀπογραφήν σφων, ὅπως ἔν τε
κόσμῳ καὶ ἐν τάξει τινὶ σιτοδοτηθῶσιν, ἠθέλησε ποιήσασθαι…
While these men kept up their conflict, Pompey, too, encountered some delay in the
distribution of the grain. For since many slaves had been freed in anticipation of the event, he
wished to take a census of them in order that the grain might be supplied to them with some
order and system.
Cassius Dio, Roman History, 39.24.1, trans. E. Cary.704

With the grain dole, the state had a new interest in the distinction between slaves and freedmen.
While slaves were the concern of their respective owners, freedmen, as citizens, had the right to
food. Dio’s report that Pompey initiated a census of freedmen is a demonstration of the state’s
need to investigate and maintain through law the distinction between slaves and freedmen.
However, Dio is also clear that Pompey’s had a personal, rather than state-like, interest in
overseeing manumission: his successful management of the grain dole justified his novel and
extraordinary imperium.
Pompey had shored up the state’s commitment to freedmen’s rights as citizens through
his efficient management of the grain dole, similar to how Julius Caesar, during his dictatorship,
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38.13.1.
39.24.1. Cf. Leach (1978: 134-139) and Rawson (1978: 123 n. 131). Gaius Gracchus had merely had the Roman
state sell grain (Plutarch, Life of Gaius Gracchus, 6.2 and 5.2).
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Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes a similar comment: 4.24.5. Cf. Livy, Periochae, 104.10.
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used his colonization program to give land and offices to freedmen. Importantly, these freedmen
were not simply an afterthought to colonization: Caesar was willing to upend Roman tradition to
make colonies more welcoming to freedmen. The details of Julius Caesar’s founding of the
colony of Urso survives in the Lex Coloniae Genetivae, an inscription preserved on two bronze
tablets.705 The law explicitly prohibits the exclusion of freedmen from the office of the
decurions:
CV
Si quis quem Decurion(em) indignum loci aut ordinis decurionatus esse dicet, praeterquam quot libertinus
erit, et ab IIvir(o) postulabitur, uti de ea re iudicium reddatur, IIvir quo de ea re in ius aditum erit,
ius dicito iudiciaque reddito.
CV If anyone shall say that any of the decurions is unworthy of his place or of the order
of the decurionate, except on the ground that he shall be a freedman, and it shall be
demanded of a IIvir, that a trial be granted concerning that matter, the IIvir to whom
approach shall have been made for a pre-trial concerning that matter, is to administer
justice and grant trials.
Tablet c, Col. V, L. 19-24, trans. J. Crawford.

Presumably just as freedmen were grateful that Pompey supplied them with grain, so too were
freedmen of Urso grateful that Julius Caesar granted them access to magistracies.706 The two
politicians changed the context of manumission in order to increase their popularity and their
power.
Urso was not unique in permitting freedmen to become magistrates because freedmen
also participated in the governance of Caesar’s colony of Corinth. The Greek poet Crinagoras,
who lived in the first century BCE, wrote an invective epigram against Corinth, the site of
another Caesarian colony. Crinagoras complains that slaves are corrupting Corinth’s proud
legacy:
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That Julius Caesar was the supreme authority for founding of this colony, see Crawford (1996: 396-7). The
surviving inscription is from the Flavian period. However, Crawford argues that the text itself reflects laws from the
first century BCE (1996: 395).
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Cf. Yavetz (1983: 143-50, esp. 145).
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Οἵους ἀνθ᾽ οἵων οἰκήτορας, ὦ ἐλεεινή,
εὕραο. φεῦ μεγάλης Ἑλλάδος ἀμμορίης.
αὐτίκα καὶ γαίης χθαμαλωτέρη εἴθε, Κόρινθε,
κεῖσθαι, καὶ Λιβυκῆς ψάμμου ἐρημοτέρη,
ἢ τοίοις διὰ πᾶσα παλιμπρήτοισι δοθεῖσα
θλίβειν ἀρχαίων ὀστέα Βακχιαδῶν.
What inhabitants, O luckless city, hast thou received, and in place of whom? Alas for the great
calamity to Greece! Would Corinth, thou didst lie lower than the ground and more desert than
the Libyan sands, rather than that wholly abandoned to such a crowd of often-sold slaves, thou
shouldest vex the bones of the ancient Bacchiadae!
Crinagoras, Greek Anthology, 9.284, trans. W.R. Paton, modified.

Albert Harrill notes that in the context of the Urso inscription, Crinagoras’ complaint is that
former slaves have too much power in this Corinthian colony.707 These former slaves have too
much power because Julius Caesar discarded the traditional prohibition of freedmen holding
magistracies. Indeed, Plutarch writes that Mark Antony’s freedman Theophilus lived in Corinth
after Augustus was triumphant; possibly Theophilus himself became a magistrate. Plutarch
describes this Theophilus as having been close to Antony, which is to say, Theophilus had an
unusual amount of authority because of Antony’s own high status.708 The logic that made
Theophilus powerful is the same logic that had made Chrysogonus powerful; Mark Antony
elevated Theophilus similar to how Sulla elevated Chrysogonus. Sulla experimented with using
manumission as a way to build power, and Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Mark Antony followed
his example.
Because manumission was at the intersection of the state and the citizenry, manumission
changed with the transition to the Empire. Under the Republic, the citizenry was sovereign.
While Augustus paid lip service to this sovereignty, under his rule, his authority on issues such
as manumission was absolute. To secure this position, Augustus centralized under his control,
economic, political, and judicial power, including the legal oversight of manumission. Susan
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Harrill (1998: 71-2).
Life of Antony, 67.7. Cf. Crawford (1996: 446).
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Treggiari notes that in doing so, Augustus continued, and legitimized, a pattern begun in the
Republic:
It was shocking to republican sentiment if dependent freedmen who were employed by patrons
who held public office displayed their influence or wealth. Pompey caused offence; Cicero was
discreet. Everyone needed the services of confidential administrators. Augustus perforce
continued the system….709

In other words, Treggiari describes Augustus creating out the practices of Pompey and Cicero
the Imperial system of freedmen and manumission, the system that Patterson theorizes. The
surviving evidence testifies that Augustus passed three laws that reformed manumission: the Lex
Iunia, likely 17 BCE, Lex Fufia Canina, 2 BCE, and the Lex Aelia Sentia, 4 CE. The Lex Iunia
clarified the legal status of slaves whom their owners had freed despite not using a magistrate.
The Lex Fufia Canina limited the number of slaves that an owner could manumit in a will. The
Lex Aelia Sentia codified the permissible intentions an owner might have for freeing slave; it
also established age requirements for both the manumittor and the manumitted slave.710 All three
reforms expanded and strengthened the state’s role as an overseer and arbiter of manumission.
At the same time that Augustus strengthened the state’s oversight of manumission, he
also presented himself as an authoritative arbiter of slaves’ freedom. There was power in the
ability to declare slaves free, and in the chaos of the first century, Augustus sought to emphasize
that he alone had definitive control over this power. In his Res Gestae, Augustus explains that
one of his great accomplishments was the capture,and rightful return of 30,000 slaves:
Eo bello servorum qui fugerant a dominis suis et arma contra rem publicam ceperant triginta
fere millia capta dominis ad supplicium sumendum tradidi.
In that war I captured about 30,000 slaves who had escaped from their masters and taken up
arms against the republic, and I handed them over to their masters for punishment.
Augustus, Res Gestae, 25.1, trans. Brunt and Moore.
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Augustus presents himself as a friend to slave-owners, perhaps the same goal of the inept
Republican Licinus Nerva. Such was the goal of Publius Popillius, who had been consul in 132
BCE: an inscription of his boasts about his successful return of 917 slaves to their rightful
owners during his time as praetor of Sicily.711 While Augustus’ boast about returning 30,000
slaves to their owners is clearly in the same vein, Augustus’ words do the added work of
delegitimizing his opposition.712 Even though Augustus does not state why these slaves fled their
owners, they may have done so because some optimistic politician promised them their freedom,
similar to how Sulla freed the Cornelii. But with Augustus’ victory, the recognition that was the
basis of their freedom was destroyed.
How closely manumission was connected to the political trajectories of powerful men in
the first century is evident in the case of Sextus Pompeius, the son of Pompey and enemy of
Augustus. Cassius Dio asserts that to fight Augustus, Sextus recruited and attracted many slaves
to his holdfast on Sicily:
κἀκ τούτου τό τε ἐκείνου ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν δούλων τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀφικνουμένων
πλῆθος προσλαβὼν πάμπολυ ηὐξήθη· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ δὴ ηὐτομόλουν ὥστε καὶ τὰς
ἀειπαρθένους καθ’ ἱερῶν εὔξασθαι ἐπισχεθῆναί σφων τὰς αὐτομολίας.
Thus reinforced by the fleet of Staius and also by the multitude of slaves who kept arriving
from Italy, he gained tremendous strength; in fact, so many persons deserted that the Vestal
Virgins prayed over the sacrifices that their desertions might be checked.
Cassius Dio, Roman History, 48.19.4, trans. E. Cary.

As Alan Gowing points out, ancient writers from Horace to Lucan to Paterculus closely associate
Sextus’ fighting force with slaves.713 This association suggests that when Augustus describes his
victory over slaves in Sicily and Sardinia, he is describing his victory over Sextus without even
naming him: “I had previously recovered Sicily and Sardinia which had been seized in the slave
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war.”714 Augustus’ military victory over Sextus converted Sextus’ freedmen soldiers into upstart
slaves. As part of his centralization of power, Augustus refused to recognize Sextus’ ability to
manumit slaves en masse. Augustus transformed Sextus from a manumittor into a traitor and
transformed the freedmen into slaves.
Manumission was a practice at the center of three poles: slave-owners, freeborn Romans,
and the Roman state. During the first century BCE, the state’s pole moved to accommodate a
new purpose: the protection of the Romans’, now singular, head of state. This protection entailed
the Emperor’s control over mass manumission, including the delegitimization of the mass
manumission of opponents, as well as using manumission as part of the cultivation of a large and
sophisticated bureaucracy. But while Augustus could control the contexts in which a slave
experienced manumission, he did not control the slave’s experience itself. In other words, what
about a fourth pole of manumission: that of slaves themselves?

3. Towards slaves and manumission in Republican Rome
In Plautus’ Amphitruo, the slave Sosia has an unsettling encounter with the god Mercury.
Mercury has appeared, in Thebes, to trick Alcumena into sleeping with Jupiter. First, however,
Mercury decides to have some fun with Amphitruo’s slave Sosia: the god appears in Sosia’s own
form. Mercury also beats and berates Sosia, activities that Plautus presents as very funny.715 As
Mercury taunts and wounds Sosia, Sosia surrenders his identity to the god, a process that
strengthens Mercury’s disguise as Sosia. Intriguingly, when Mercury finally lets him be, Sosia
does not mourn the loss of his identity. Rather, he sees his loss of self as an opportunity to
become free:
[SO.] nisi etiam is quoque ignorabit: quod ille faxit Iuppiter,
ut ego hodie raso capite capiam pilleum.
714
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[SOSIA] Unless that is he doesn’t recognize me. For if Jupiter himself did that,
then today I’ll put the hat of freedom on my shaved head.
Plautus, Amphitruo, 461-2, translation my own.

Sosia asserts that if his owner does not recognize him, then he will be free. Furthermore, by
using two images closely associated with freedmen, the pilleus and the shaved head, Sosia
imagines this freedom to be the freedom of manumission.716 But Sosia’s imagined manumission
is manumission without an owner, since he says that he would only put on the pilleus if his
owner does not recognize him. Sosia the slave combines the freedom of manumission with the
freedom of maroonage. Sosia’s dream opens up the possibility that Roman slaves looked at
freedom from a radically different perspective than either the state, slave-owners, or freeborn
Romans, a perspective in which freedom was the goal, regardless of recognition from the state,
slave-owners, or freeborn Romans.
The groups at the center of my analysis—the state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans—
differed greatly in their contact with and relationship to slaves and manumission. All three also
had their unique stakes in manumission. The state benefited from the revenue and from the
increase in the citizenry. Slave-owners benefited from the increased status of their subordinates;
such status was particularly important for the competition among Roman elites. Similarly,
freeborn Romans benefited from manumission because freedmen and freedwomen functioned as
a social group lower themselves, but who were nonetheless above the rank of slave. The stakes
of these groups manifested in the practice manumission. The state’s role of overseer and arbiter
of manumission appears in the stories that Romans told about manumission and in the physical
actions that made up the practice of manumissio vindicta. Slave-owners’ concerns about
manumission as an aspect of their relationship to other slave-owners appear both in Cicero’s
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rivalry with Quintus and in Demea’s rivalry with Micea. Because of the surviving evidence,
evaluating what was at stake in manumission for Romans who did not own slaves is necessarily
oblique. But because freeborn Romans had a stake in Roman popular culture and because
remnants of Roman popular culture survive in texts such as Plautus’ comedies, it is possible to
see what was at stake in freeborn Romans’ denigratation of former slaves. This denigration
allowed freeborn Romans to position themselves as superior to former slaves, while nonetheless
reaping the benefits of former slaves’ inclusion into Roman society. Freeborn Romans, slaveowners, and the Roman state all had stakes in manumission. So, too, did slaves. Plautus’ Sosia
points to how manumission was not something that slaves simply let happen to them. Rather,
they fantasized and dreamed about freedom while living in the fear that is slavery.
Sosia’s dream of freedom comes directly after Mercury’s torture and obliteration of his
identity, which is to say, a dramatized moment of fear and dread. That Plautus, like Hegel, so
closely links the obliteration of the self with a movement towards freedom suggests that Hegel’s
struggle of the bondsman will be useful in analyzing how Roman slaves themselves approached
and experienced manumission and freedom. Hegel describes the bondsman as experiencing “fear
of death” prior to moving to become “pure being-for-self”:
For this [the bondsman’s] consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or
just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the
fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in
every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But
this pure universal moment, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple,
essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which
consequently is implicit in this consciousness.717
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The italics are those of translator A.V. Miller. “Dies Bewußtsein hat nämlich nicht um dieses oder jenes, noch für
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Fixe hat in ihm gebegt. Diese reine allgemeine Bewegugn, das absolute Flüssigwerden alles Bestehens ist aber das
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Bewußtsein ist.” §194. For more on this passage, see Chapter 1 Section 4a.
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For Hegel, the purpose is to theorize the movements and transformations of consciousness that
are present in universal moments. Manumission was the transformation of a slave’s status, a
transformation that required the buy in from the state, slave-owners, and freeborn Romans. To
ask how the slave experienced this transformation is to build upon the analysis of these social
forces while simultaneously asking how to listen to a people actively and systematically silenced
in their pursuit of freedom.
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Appendix A: The language of liberation and the enslaved citizens in
Plautus and Terence
Author

Play

Freeborn man Description of character
or woman
abducted in
their youth

Plautus

Captivi

Tyndarus

Plautus

Casina

Plautus

Cistillaria

Casina (does
not appear on
the stage)
Selenium

Plautus

Epidicus

Telestis

Plautus

Menaechmi

Epidamnean
Menaechmus

Plautus

Persa

Plautus

Poenulus

Anonymous
woman
Agorastocles,
Adelphasium,
and
Anterastiles

718

Keyword
that
describes
their
freedom
Slave to Philocrates;
402-408:
resolution of the play
emittat
includes the recognition that manu;718
is he is the son of Hegio, a
1010-14:
citizen
liber
-

Planesium is a slave for the
pimp Cappodox. Discovery
of a ring allows her to
marry Phaedramus.
Telestis is a hired(?) singing
girl. She is revealed to be
the daughter of Philippa and
Philomenes.
Menaechmus was separated
from his twin brother in his
youth and raised by a
merchant in Epidamnos.
-

208:
liberem

Agorastocles was born in
Carthage but adopted and
raised in a Greek family.
Adelphsium and
Anterastiles were born in
Carthage but were enslaved
and are now owned by the
pimp Lycus. The play
concludes with the
revelation that the two
women are the daughers of

359-363:
liberare

654: in
libertatem

-

656: libera

For why Tyndarus straddles the roles of the enslaved citizen and the servus callidus, see Chapter 4 Section 3a.
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Plautus

Terence

Terence

Hanno, who is
Agorastocles’ uncle.
Rudens
Palaestra
Palaestra is owned by the
pimp Labrax. Her
recognition of the tokens in
a chest proves to Daemones
that she is his daughter.
Heautontimorumenos Antiphila
Antiphilia was raised by an
old weaving woman, who
dies at the beginning of the
play. The revelation that she
is the daughter of Chremes
means that Clinia can marry
her.
Eunuchus
Pamphila (does not appear on
the stage)

735-9:
liberas;
1098-1104:
liberas
-

-
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Appendix B: The language of manumission and slave characters in
Plautus and Terence
Author
Plautus

Play
Aulularia

Passage
L.S. quin ego illi me invenisse dico hanc
praedem atque eloquor?
Igitur orabo ut manu me emittat. ibo atque
eloquar. 816-9.

Plautus

Aulularia

Plautus

Captivi

Plautus

Captivi

L.S. in arca apud me. nunc volo me emitti
manu.
LY. egone te emittam manu,
scelerum cumulatissume? 823-7.
[TY.] haec pater quando sciet,
Tyndare, ut fueris animatus erga suom gnatum
atque se,
Numquam erit tam avarus quin te gratiis
emittat manu…. 405-8.
TY. at ego aio recte, qui aps te sorsum sentio.
Nam cogitato, si quis hoc gnato tuo
Tuo’ servos faxit, qualem haberes gratiam?
Emitteresne necne eum servom manu? 710-3.

Plautus

Casina

Plautus

Casina

Plautus

Curculio

Plautus

CH. intellego
Quin, si ita arbitrare, emittis me manu? LY.
quin id volo.
sed nihil est me cupere faciam, nisi tu factis
adivuas. 283-5.
LY. potest,
Siquidem cras censes te posse emitti manu.
473-4.

CU. egon ab lenone quicquam
Mancupio accipiam, quibu’ sui nihil est nisi un
lingua
Qui abiurant si quid creditum est? alienos
mancupatis,
Alienos manu emittitis alienisque imperatis,
Nec vobis auctor ullus est vosmet estis ulli.
494-498.
Menaechmi MES. ergo edepol, si recte facias, ere, med

Summary
Lyconidis Servus
asks his owner,
Lyconidis
Adulescens, to
manumit him.
Lycondidis Servus
continues to ask
about his
manumission.
Tyndarus
speculates that his
works will earn
him his freedom.
While escaping,
Tyndarus mentions
a hypothetical
example of a freed
slave.
The servus
Chalinus asks
about his possible
manumission.
The senex
Lysimachus
promises the slave
Olympio that he
will manumit him.
The parasite
Curculio speculates
about the
manumission of a
hypothetical slave.

Messenio asks for
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emittas manu.
1023.

Plautus

Persa

Plautus

Poenulus

Plautus

Rudens

Plautus

Rudens

Terence

Adelphoe

his freedom from
Epidamnean
Menaechmus,
thinking that he is
actual owner.
TO. eho, an iam manu emissiti mulierem? 483. Toxilus asks
whether or not his
beloved
Lemniselenis will
be freed.
AG. emittam manu –
The adulescens
MI. I modo. AG. non hercle meream –
Agorastocles
429-30.
explains that he
will not free
Milipho today,
suggesting that he
is open to the
possibility later.
[GR.] id ego continuo huic dabo adeo me ut hic His plan to buy his
emittat manu.
freedom with a
salvaged chest
thwarted, the slave
Gripus schemes for
another way to
freedom.
DA. pro illo dimidio ego Gripum emittam
The senex
manu,
Daemones
Quem propter tu vidulum et ego gnatam inveni. announces his
1410-11.
plans for freeing
Gripus.
DE. hercle vero serio,
The senex Demea
Siquidem prima dedit, haud dubiumst quin
convinces his
emitti aequom siet. 975-6.
brother Micio that
the wife of the
servus Syrus ought
to be freed.
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